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9. ABSTRACT
 
The economic development of South Korea is examined from the end of World War II 
through the eariy 1970s. Among the author's conclusions: The remarkable growth
of the South Korean economy, particularly since 1963, can be attributed to several
 
special factors that are not likely to be replicated in other countries. First,
 
the country received abundant foreign assistance, particularly during reconstruction
 
after the Korean War. Second, Korea was able to maintain high and growing levels of
 
government savings. This is probably achievable only in countries where political
 
leaders are powerful and secure. Third, Korean industrialists did not intensely

resist gliding-peg currency evaluations until 1972, when Korea abandoned this 
practice. Fourth, government policies toward labor in Korea prevented real wages

from rising except in response to labor shortages in the late 1960s. This lack of
 
pressure from organized labor Is partly historical accident--a carryover from Japanese

suppression of labor organizai.;rs when Korea was an annex of Japan (1910-1945).
Fifth, Korea underwent a t.',horoughgoing land reform, first under the United States 
military government and later under an indigenous Korean government. Sixth, Korean 
culture places a very high value on education; parents spend their own funds to 
support a vigorous system of high-quality private schools, thus freeing public funds 
for channeling irto other productive investments. Those factors alone, however, are 
not sufficient to explain the success of the South Korean economy. Economic policies
also made important contributions: tax and government expenditure reforms, the 
interest rate reforms, the exchange rate reforms, and the general emphasis on export
promotion and reliance on international prices. Unfortunptely, the economic gains
have been accompanied by much political repression, including repression of labor 
unions. 'However, the South Korean experience does Illustrate the fffectiveness of
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-_ e .a 
This volume isone of a series resulting from the research project on Exchange 
Control, Liberalization, and Economic Development sponsored by the Na­
tional Bureau of Economic Research, the name of the project having been sub­
scquently broadened to Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development. 
Underlying the project was the belief by all participants that the phenomena 
of exchange control and liberalization in less developed countries require care­
ful and detailed analysis within a sound theoretical framework, and that the 
effects of individual policies and restrictions cannot be analyzed without con­
sideration of both the nature of their administration and the economic environ­
ment within which they are adopted as determined by the domestic economic 
policy and structu.t: of the particular country. 
The research has thus had three aspects: (1) development of an ana­
lytical framework for handling exchange control and liberalization; (2) within 
that framework, research on individual countries, undertaken independently 
by senior scholars; and (3) analysis of the results of these independent efforts 
with a view to identifying those empirical generalizations that appear to 
emerge from the experience of the countries studied. 
The analytical framework developed in the first stage was extensively 
commented upon by those responsible for the research on individual countries, 
and was then revised to the satisfaction of all participants. That framework, 
serving as the common basis upon which the country studies were undertaken, 
is further reflected in the syntheses reporting on the third aspect of the research. 
The analytical framework pinpointed these three principal areas of re­
search which all participants undertook to analyze for their own countries. 
xvii CO-DIRECTORS' FOREWORD 
Subject to a common focus on these three areas, each participant enjoyed 
maximum latitude to develop the analysis of his country's experience in the 
way he deemed appropriate. Comparison of the country volumes will indicate 
that this freedom was indeed utilized, and we bel-eve that it has paid hand­
some dividends. The three areas singled out for in-depth analysis in the 
country studies are: 
1. The anatomy of exchange control: The economic efficiency and dis­
tributional implications of alternative methods of exchange control in each 
country were to be examined and analyzed. Every method of exchange con­
trol differs analytically in its effects from every other. In each country study 
care has been taken to bring out the implications of the particular methods of 
control used. We consider it to be one of the major results of the project that 
these effects have been brought out systematically and clearly in analysis of 
the individual countries' experience. 
2. The liberalization episode: Another major area for research was to be 
a detailed analysis of attempts to liberalize the payments regime. In the ana­
lytical framework, devaluation and liberalization were carefully distinguished, 
and concepts for quantifying the extent of devaluation and of liberalization 
were developed. It was hoped that careful analysis of individual devaluation 
and liberalization attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, would permit
identification of the political and economic ingredients of an effective effort in 
that direction. 
3. Growth relationships: Finally, the relationship of the exchange con­
trol regime to growth via stati:-efficiency and other factors. was to be inves-' 
tigated. In this regard, the possible effects on savings, investment allocation, 
research and development, and entrepreneurship were to be highlighted. 
In addition to identifying the three principal areas to be investigated, the 
analytical framework provided a common set of concepts to be used in the 
studies and distinguished various phases regarded as useful in tracing the ex­
perience of the individual countries and in assuring comparability of the anal­
yses. The concepts are defined and the phases delineated in Appendix A. 
The country studies undertaken within this project and their authors are 
as follows: 
Brazil Albert Fishlow, University of California, Berkeley 
Chile 
Colombia 
Egypt 
Ghana 
Jere R. Behrman, University of Pennsylvania 
Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Yale University 
Bent Hansen, University of California, Berkeley, 
Karim Nashashibi, International Monetary Fund 
J. Clark Leith, University of Western Ontario 
and 
xviii CO-DIRECTORIS' FOREWORD 
India 	 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Massachusetts Institute of Tech­
nology, and T. N. Srinivasan, Indian Statistical Institute 
Israel 	 Michael Michaely, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem' 
Philippines 	 Robert E. Baldwin, University of Wisconsin 
South Korea 	 Charles R. Frank, Jr., Princeton University and The 
Brookings Institution; Kwang Suk Kim, Korea Develop­
ment Institute, Republic of Korea; and Larry E. West­
phal, Northwestern University 
Turkey 	 Anne 0. Krueger, University of Minnesota 
The principal results of the different country studies are brought to­
gether in our overall syntheses. Each of the country studies, however, has 
been made self-contained, so that readers interested in only certain of these 
studies will not be handicapped. 
In undertaking this project and bringing it to successful completion, the 
authors of the individual country studies have contributed substantially to the 
progress of the whole endeavor, over and above their individual research. 
Each has commented upon the research findings of other participants, and 
has made numerous suggestions which have improved the overall design and 
execution of the project. The country authors who have collaborated with us 
constitute an exceptionally able group of development economists, and we 
wish to thank all of them for their cooperation and participation in the project. 
We must also thank the National Bureau of Economic Research for its 
sponsorship of the project and its assistance with many of the arrangements 
necessary in an undertaking of this magnitude. Hal B. Lary, Vice President-
Research, has most energetically and efficiently provided both intellectual and 
administrative input into the project over a three-year period. We would also 
like to express our gratitude to the Agency for International Development for 
having financed the National Bureau in undertaking this project. Michael 
Roemer and Constantine Michalopoulos particularly deserve our sincere 
thanks. 
JAGDISH N. BHAoWATi 
Massachusetts 	 Institute of Technology 
ANNE 0. KRUEGER 
University of Minnesota 
Adm 
When Charles Frank was engaged by the Co-Directors of this series to 
write the book on Korea, he learned that Larry E. Westphal and Kwang Suk 
Kim were already at work on a parallel study sponsored by the World Bank. To 
avoid duplication, the three of them agreed to collaborate, and the present
volume represents their joint efforts. 
Kim did most of the research for chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, and also wrote 
the first drafts. Wes.phal and Kim produced chapters 6 and 10, and Frank 
contributed the remaining chapters. All three authors participated in tle plan­
ning of each other's work and in the revision of first drafts. 
Much of the material in chapters 6 and 10 was drawn from the Wcstphal
and Kim contribution to the World Bank study. Their essay, "Industrial Policy 
and Development in Korea," emphasizes the methodology of measuring effec­
tive incentives and cqntains considerably more detailed analysis than it was 
thought necessary to include in the Nntional Bureau's series. 
We are grateful to the World Bank and to Bela Balassa, editor of Devel
opment Strategies in Semi-Industrialized Countries, for permission to make use 
of the Westphal and Kim essay in this book. We are also grateful to Balassa for 
his helpful guidance at every stage of our research and for his comments on 
several draft chapters. 
The authors thank Thomas Olmsted and his colleagues at the USAID 
mission to Korea for their full support and cooperation. They also acknowledge
the Ford Foundation grant of 1971 that enabled Kim to spend a year at Prince­
ton working closely with his coauthors. Upon his return home, Kim was named 
a senior fellow of the Korea Development Institute. The Institute and its 
XX ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
president, Mahn-je Kim, were very helpful to the authors. The Korean officials 
who offered their services are too numerous to be listed here. 
The compilation of the 1955 input-output table ih Chapter 10 was sup­
ported by grants from the University Committee on Research in the Humanities 
and Social Sciences and the Council on International and Regional Studies, 
Princeton University. Sac Min Oh of the Bank of Korea's staff oversaw the 
task. Much of the computation of the growth contributions was financed by 
the Research Program in Economic Development, the Woodrow Wilson 
School, Princeton University. The Research Program in Economic Develop­
ment provided general assistance including office space, secretarial help, and 
research assistants. Northwestern University granted Westphal a quarter's paid 
leave to permit time for further computations and writing. 
Hal Lary read each draft of this volume very carefully and made numerous 
suggestions which greatly improved the end result. Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne 
Krueger provided expert guidance and intellectual stimulation. They gave us 
many helpful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. T. N. Srinivasan, 
who read the next to last draft, passed on a variety of useful ideas. All of our 
colleagues associated with the National Bureau project are to be thanked for 
the insight of their suggestions, which were offered at the group sessions on 
research strategy. 
A special acknowledgment is due Alice Ann Navin, without whose valu­
able assistance, the input-output analysis and effective incentive calculations 
could not have been done so expeditiously. Rekka Nadkarni furnished expert 
and extremely valuable help to Charles Frank in the computer programming and 
analysis in chapters 8 and 9. Kyi-Ja Kang tabulated statistical materials 
and performed computations for Kwang Suk Kim. 
Many draft chapters were typed by Dorothy Rieger of Princeton's Re­
search Program in Economic Development. Claudette Simpson also helped 
with the typing of several revised chapters. The final draft was typed by R~ose­
mary Taromino. 
The authors alone are responsible for all errors and omissions. 
Principal Dates and Historical Events 
in South Korea 
1904 
1910 
1945 
1947 
May 1948 
July 1948 
Aug. 1948 
1949 
June 1950 
Sept. 1950 
Nov. 1950 
March 1951 
July 1951 
July 1953 
March 1960 
April 1960 
Effective takeover of government by the Japanese in Korea. 
Korea formally annexed to Japan. 
Liberation of Korea by American and Russian troops; country 
split along 38th parallel; U.S. military government installed in 
South Korea. 
First stage of land reform; properties expropriated after de­
parture of Japanese landlords are redistributed. 
National Assembly elections, rightist parties in the majority. 
Syngman Rhee elected President of South Korea by the Na­
tional Assembly. 
Enu of rule by U.S. military government. 
Second stage of land reform; expopriation and redistribution of 
land from farms greater than three chongbos (about three 
hectares). 
Beginning of war between North and South Korea. 
General MacArthur lands with UN troops at Inchon. 
UN troops reach the Yalu River but are thrown back by Chinese 
troops who enter the war.
 
Seoul retaken by UN troops.
 
Peace talks begin at Kaesong; battlefront stabilized.
 
Korean War armistice signed.
 
Opposition parties walk out of National Assembly over charges
 
of fraud.
 
Student demonstrations lead to resignation of President Rhee.
 
xxii PRINCIPAL DATES AND HISTORICAL EVENTS 
July 1960 New National Assembly elections; Chang Myon chosen as 
prime minister by the Assembly. 
Jan. 1961 Devaluation of the won from 65 to 100 won to the U.S. dollar. 
Feb. 961 Devaluation of the won from 100 to 130 won to the U.S. dollar. 
May 1961 Military coup from which General Park Chung Hee emerges as 
head of ruling junta. 
June 1961 Unification of the multiple exchange rate system. 
Jan. 1963 Return to multiple exchange rates. 
Oct. 1963 National Assembly elections followed by Assembly elections of 
Park Chung Hee as president. 
May 1964 Devaluation from 130 to 257 won to the U.S. dollar; exchange 
rate fluctuates. 
March 1965 Reunification of the multiple exchange rate system. 
Aug. 1965 Exchange rate pegged at 271 won to the U.S. dollar. 
Sept. 1965 Interest rate reform; loan rate on regular commerc;al bank 
loans raised from 16 to 26 percent. 
Jan. 1967 Controlled flotation of the domestic currency upwaru from 271 
won to the doliar. 
May 1967 Reelection of Park Chung Hee as president. 
July 1967 Reform of the import control syslem by switch from the posi­
tive-list to a negative-list system. 
1967 Tariff reform. 
April 1971 Third election of Park Chung Hee as president. 
June 1971 Devaluation from 326 to 370 won to the U.S. dollar; exchange 
rate pegged. 
1971 Further tariff reforms. 
Jan. 1972 Exchange rate floated upward in controlled fashion from 370 
won to the U.S. dollar. 
June 1972 Exchange rate pegged at about 400 won to the U.S. dollar. 
Aug. 1972 Financial reforms and initiation of price stabilization program. 
Sept. 1973 Frther tariff reforms. 
w ma Trade Rlms 
and ,omniD.....Ment: 
SOUTH KOREA 

Chapter I 
The economy of South Korea has grown very rapidly since 1963. The average
annual rate of growth of GNP between 1963 and 1972 was about 9.6 percent.Exports have grown even faster, from $87 million in 1963 to $1.6 billion in 
1972, and to about $3.2 billion in 1973. The annual rate of growth of exports
averaged 38.9 percent between 1963 and 1972 and reached a peak of almost
100 percent in 1973, a very remarkable rate of increase. 
This volume examines the relationship between trade and exchange rate
policies and the rapid growth of South Korean output and trade. Of particular
interest are the attempts to liberalize trade policy and the exchange rate sys­
tem and the effects of these efforts on resource allocation and growth.
There are a few easy explanations that might be given for the growth ofKorean trade. For example, South Korea's economy was devastated by both 
World War II and the Korean War. Between 1953 (when the Korean War
ended) and 1960, exports averaged only 1.1 to 2.4 percent of GNP, although
a country of South Korea's population and income might have been expectedto reach a much higher level of exports, perhaps one of at least 10 or 15 per­
cent of GNP. Thus one explanation of South Korea's export performance is 
to say that what appears to be growth is really a case of "catching-up" to 
some "normal" level. By 1971, however, South Korean exports had surpassed
the level that is usual in countries of similar population and income.' Exports
reached about 26 percent of GNP in 1973 and showed little tendency towardless rapid expansion. While early growth of exports might be attributed in part
simply to "catching-up," continued growth remains to be explained. Further­
more, South Korea lacks the readily exportable primary products commonly 
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found in other countries of similar size and income. Almost all her exports 
are manufactured and as a fraction of GNP they are exceedingly high com­
pared with the proportion of manufactures exported by other less developed 
countries. 
Other easy explanations could be imagined: for example, South Korea's 
exports may have been boosted by war in Viet Nam. In fact, only a tiny frac­
tion of South Korea's exports have been destined for Viet Nam or were in any 
way related to the hostilities there. Alternatively, one might attribute South 
Korea's ,port growth to government targets. While such targets have played 
a role, it is unlikely that they are the sole or even the major reason exports 
grew so rapidly. Unless incentives to export accompany targets, firms will be 
driven out of business if continuously forced to oxport, at a loss, an increasing 
proportion of their output. 
Growth in :acome has also been explained in various ways. The most 
commonly accepted easy explanation is that South Korean growth is due to 
very high levels of foreign aid. Foreign aid has been important, especially
from 1953 to 1963. Domestic savings averaged only about 3 percent of GNP 
during those years, while foreign savings (imports of goods and services less 
exports of goods and services financed mostly by foreign aid grants) aver­
aged 9 percent of GNP. Approximately three-quarters of total investment 
was financed by foreign aid. Those were the years, however, when economic 
growth was relatively slow in South Korea. The rate of growth of GNP aver­
aged about 5 percent. After 1964 domestic savings grew very rapidly, rising
from about 4 percent of GNP to almost 17 percent in 1970. The fraction of 
total investment financed domestically rose from less than one-third in 1963 
to about 63 percent in 1970. Furthermore, beginning in 1965, foreign capital
imports took less the form of foreign aid and more the form of commercial 
loam. By 1969, well over half of all foreign loan agreements in that year were 
commercial. The period of decreasing reliance on foreign aid, 1964 to 1970, 
was also a period of accelerated growth, the annual rate over the period aver­
aging close to 11 percent. 
No doubt foreign assistance has been important to South Korea's eco­
nomic growth. But to attribute rapid growth solely to massive foreign aid 
would be a mistake, for South Korea's economic policies have played a role 
too. They have ensured the effective use of foreign resources while increasing
the'domestic contribution to the process of growth.
In this volume we shafl concentrate on the function of trade and ex­
change rate policies. South Korea has followed a set of policies which are 
unusual compared with those of most less developed countries. Instead of 
emphasizing import substitution, most policy initiatives have promoted ex­porte. A wide variety of export incentive schemes has been devised, and the 
exchange rate has been adjusted frequently and dramatically. During most of 
the period since 1967, exchange rate policy has been based on the gliding peg. 
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Chapter 2 ot .1is volume is a brief economic history of South Korea 
since World War II. it is largely descriptive and intended as general back­
ground for the rest of the book. 
Chapter 3 deals with phases I and 11 of the Bhagwati-Krueger scheme. 2 
Phase I begins with the end of World War Il and ends with the Korean War 
armistice signed in 1953. The government was directly involved in trade and 
controlled what little private trade existed. There was a multiplicity of ex­
change rates and a flourishing black market in foreign exchange and military 
payment certificates. Phase II lasted from the end of the Korean War until 
1960. It was a period of increasingly sophisticated contia! mechanisms and 
complicated procedures which were invented to assist barter trade and to 
facilitate trade payments. 
Chapter 4 covers two Phase III attempts at liberalization, the first from 
1961 to 1962, the second from 1964 to 1965. A steep devaluation declared 
in 1961 was followed by an abortive effort to unify exchange rates and to lib­
eralize trade policy. But a bad crop in 1962 combined with the expansionary
fiscal policies of the military government, which had ousted the reformist 
civilian administration in May 1961, led to a return in 1963 to a Phase I! 
regime with multiple rates and stringent controls on trade. 
A much more successful attempt to realize a Phase III liberalization 
began in May 1964 with a devaluation of the won close to 50 percent and 
continued through September 1965, when domestic interest rates were sub­
stantially raised. The multiple exchange rate system was unified, trade restric­
tions were eased, and tax administration reformed. 
Chapter 4 also covers 1966, the first year of a Phase IV regime in which 
efforts were made to consolidate reforn . Chapter 5 analyzes the continuation 
of the Phase IV regime from 1967 to early 1973. During this period, tariffs 
were revised and the trade control program was changed in 1967 from a 
positive-list to a more liberal negative-list system. The won was allowed to 
"glide" from early 1968 to mid-1971, i.e., it floated downward at a deter­
mined rate which was meant to be consistent with rates of inflation in Korea 
and in her major trading partners. The won was again devalued in June 1971 
and was floated again during the first half of 1972. In August 1972, a new set 
of reforms involved price stabilization, pegging the exchange rate at about 400 
won to the dollar. There was also a tendency during this period to resort to 
the old price-distorting practices whenever the balance of payments was under 
pressure. Trade controls were alternately strengthened and relaxed. The ntun­
ber and level of export subsidy measures increased until early 1973. 
Chapter 6 is an analysis of Korea's export growth and treats this subject
in some detail. Besides discussing the import-intensity of export production, 
we also analyze the role of exchange rates, export subsidies, and other incen­
tives in stimulating exports. The degree to which exports are responsible for 
the growth of the South Korean economy, sector by sector, is described by 
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means of various decomposition techniques. South Korea's growth patterns are
compared with those of other countries to demonstrate the relatively pre­
dominant role of exports in the South Korean economy.
Foreign capital inflows have been very important in South Korea'sgrowth. Immediately after the Korean War, most of the capital inflow con­
sisted of foreign aid grants. By the mid-1960s, private commercial loansbecame important. Chapter 7 an,lyzes the part played by foreign capital inSouth Korea's growth and the efficiency of the foreign capital inflow.In Chapter 8, we develop an econometric model of the South Korean 
economy. The estimation of the model involves the testing of a number ofhypotheses concerning the role of exchange rates and commercial policy vari­
ablcs on aggregate behavioral relationships in the economy. Chapter 9 uses 
the econometric model to determine whether alternative sets of commercial 
policies would have resulted in more or less growth over the decade of the1960s. The simulations in Chapter 9 examine the optima;'ty of South Korea's
exchange rate policy, tariff levels, and levels of expor, subsidy in a macro­
economic framework. 
In Chapter 10, we discuss the efficiency of the South Korean trade and
exchange rate regime. The analysis of efficiency involves first the measurement
of nominal protection rates by means of a survey of price comparisons of
world market and domestic prices. The nominal protection rates are used to
estimate the effective protection of some 150 sectors of the economy. We gobeyond measures of effective protection to estimates of rates of effective sub­
sidy which include a wide range of taxes and subsidies to industry in addition 
to tariff rates. In Chapter 10 we also investigate the labor and capital intensity
of South Korea's exports and the effect of valuation at domestic prices, or at 
international prices, on the growth and structure of the economy.
Chapter 11 provides an overview. The first two sections examine the
effects of rapid growth on employment and income distribution. Since these
topics are not closely related to trade policy, they do not readily lend them­
selves to treatment in the main text. We felt, however, that a book on Korean 
development would be sorely inadequate if it omitted discussion of employ­
ment and income distribution. 
The next six sections of Chapter 11 consider the factors responsible forgrowth in Korea with particular reference to trade and exchange rate policies.We draw on the results of research presented in the preceding chapters as
much as possible. To a certain extent, however, we must take a broader viewof the growth process in order to provide a proper context for the analysis
of the role of exchange rates and trade policy. Thus we talk about education
and literacy, political regimes, the influence of Japanese culture, and otherimportant factors that help to determine economic policies. Furthermore, we 
cannot hope to be definitive within this volume even with respect to trade and 
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exchange rate policies because of limitations on data, time, and rearch ca­pacity. Therefore, some of the observations in Chapter 11, even those involv­
ing trade and exchange rate policy, are speculative.
The final section of Chapter 1 offers some caveats about generalizing
from the South Korean experience and drawing lessons for other countries. 
The special factors operating in Korea are extremely important to keep iv 
mind. 
NOTES 
I. See Bhagwati and Cheh (1972). See also the analysis of exports in Chapter 6.2. For a description of the Bhagwati-Krueger five-phase scheme, see Bhagwati and 
Krueger (1970) and also the description of the phases in Appendix A. 
Chapter 2 
bmunI* Gi Nwih i SsuUt 
KvIM imM Wo WVW II 
ECONOMIC DISORGANIZATION FOLLOWING 
LIBERATION 
The Japanese occupation of Korea ended on August 15, 1945 and was sup­
planted in part by a U.S. military government. The immediate postwar period 
was characterized by extreme economic disorganization and stagnation caused 
by the sudden separation of the Korean economy from the Japanese economic 
bloc, and by the partition of the country along the 38th parallel. 
Under colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, the Korean economy became 
highly dependent upon Japan for capital, technology, and management. Of the 
total authorized capital of business establishments in Korea, the Japanese 
owned approximately 94 percent, as of 1940.1 Japanese engineers and tech­
nicians employed in manufacturing, construction, and public utilities in 1944 
constituted about 80 percent of the total technical manpower in Korea. The 
proportion of Korean engineers and technicians was particularly small in the 
metal and chemical industries (11 to 12 percent). 2 The relative number of 
Korean businec, establishments was very small in high-technology industries­
about 10 percent in the metal and chemical industries and 25 percent in the 
machinery industry. Most Korean establishments were small and used simpler 
technology than the Japanese. Furthermore, establishments in Korea were 
mainly subsidiaries of Japanese companies. Therefore, the sudden retreat of 
the Japanese and the separation of the economy from the Japanese economic­
bloc brought about a suspension of many production activities in Korea. 
Partition also had deleterious effects on the South Korean economy. In 
1940, Korea's total population was 23.5 million people, 15.6 million in the 
South and 7.9 million in the North. Approximately 92 percent of average an­
nual power generation, however, had come from plants in the North and most 
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of the country's mineral resources were located there too. In 1940, the North 
produced about 90 percent of Korea's output of metal products and 83 percent 
of its chemical products (Table 2-1). By contrast, the South accounted for 
72 percent of machinery production, 85 percent of textile production, 64 per­
cent of processed food output, and 89 percent of printing and publishing out­
put in the same year. Thus, metals, electric power, and chemical industries 
were located mainly in North Korea at the time of liberation, while light in­
dustries and machinery production tended to be located in the South. 
The number of industrial establishments and employment in South Korea 
declined sharply after 1945 when the Japanese left and when firms closed for 
lack of electricity. The industrial survey of November 1946 showed that the 
number of manufacturing establishments had dropped by 43.7 percent since 
TABLE 2-1
 
Manufacturng Output and Employment, 1940 md 1948
 
(output in millions of 1948 constant won) 
Manufac-
South Korea's wuring 
Manufacturing Output in 1940a South Manufac- Workers, 
Korea's turing 1948 
All Korea South Korea Share Output, 1948 (000) 
Metal 49.2(9.3) 4.9(2.0) (10.0) 2.2(4.2) 4.9(3.7) 
Machinery 19.3(3.6) 13.9(5.6) (72.0) 3.4(6.4) 14.4(11.0) 
Chemicals 181.5(34.2) 30.7(12.4) (16.9) 15.2(28.8) 32.6(24.9)
Textiles 72.8(13.7) 61.5(24.8) (84.5) 21.6(41.0) 60.4(46.1)
Foods 118.8(22.4) 76.0(30.6) (64.0) 6.6(12.5) 9.0(6.9)
Ceramics 15.7(3.0) 4.3(1.7) (27.4) 1.4(2.7) 5.6(4.3)
Printing 7.0(1.3) 6.2(2.5) (88.6) 1.6(3.1) 2.4(1.8) 
Handicrafts 7.6(1.4) 4.9(2.0) (64.5) 0.7(1.3) 1.8(1.4)
Other 59.0(11.1) 45.7(18.4) (77.5) 0.0 0.0 
Total 530.9(100.0) 248.1(100.0) (46.8) 52.6(100.0) 131.1(100.0) 
Central government operated 11.6(22.1 )b 37.8(28.8)b 
Local government operated 6.8(12.9) b 25.6(19.5) t' 
Private 34.2(65.0) 67.8(51.7) 
Total 52.6(100.0) 131.1(100.0) 
NoTE: Figures in parentheses are percentages. 
Souwca: Bank of Korea, Economic Statisics Yearbook, 1949, pp. 1-47-1-48. 
a. Data for 1940 were recompiled by Bank of Korea to obtain manufacturing out­
put for South Korea. 
b. These shares wtere large because the govcmment took over Japanese firms after 
August 1945. Most of those firms were later sold to private interests. 
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1944. Manufacturing employment was 59.4 percent lower. In 1948 total man­
ufacturing output in South Korea was only about one-fifth of the 1940 level 
(Tabk 2-1) and had declined sharply in every major sector. (Manufacturing 
output is likely to have been much lower in 1946, but data are not available.) 
In addition to the drastic decline in domestic manufacturing, severe food 
shortages developed after the war. Population increased rapidly because of 
the immigration of refugees from the North and the repatriation of Koreans 
from Japan and other countries. Since domestic grain output was not enough 
to feed the incrcased population, the U.S. military government imported 
about 670 thousand metric tons of food (including wheat, barley, rice, and 
powdered milk) from May 1946 to January 1948. 
Uncontrolled expansion of the money supply before and after liberation 
set off a hyper-inflation. Currency in circulation expanded by about 6.7 times 
between the end of 1941 and August 15, 1945.3 After the liberation, it ex­
panded 77 percent between August 15 and November 1, 1945 and by about 
15 times in the four years and four months from August 15, 1945 to the end 
of 1949. Prices rose very rapidly. The Seoul retail price index increased about 
123 times from June 1945 to June 1949. 
The U.S. military government attempted to control inflation by announc­
ing maximum prices on essential goods and by rationing. These measures 
were not successful and were accompanied by increased black market activ­
ities. When this became apparent, the government relaxed the controls. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRADE, 
1946 TO 1953 
Neither national income data nor an overall industrial production index is 
available for the period 1946 to 1953. Production indexes Are available, how­
ever, for major commodities as shown in Table 2-2. 
Although the average production index for the major commodities is an 
unweighted, simple average, it gives a rough indication of the growth rate -of 
production. Starting from a very low base in 1946, the postwar recovery of 
production was fairly rapid. The average production index shown in Table 2-2 
increased about two and a half times from 1946 to 1949. Electric power gen­
eration and tungsten production for export increased sharply. Heavy industry, 
howev.-r, recovered much more slowly, especially iron and steel and chemicals. 
The Korean War again brought a sharp drop in industrial production in 
1950 and 1951. By 1952 induatrial ptciuction began to pick up again as the 
fighting gradually stalemated along the present demil'tnkized zone. Although 
hostilities did not cease until 1953, by that time the average production index 
(excluding tungsten) had slightly surpassed the 1949 level. The recovery, how­
ever, was uneven. Tungsten production increased spectacularly, but production 
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TABLE 2-2
 
Prodinedbn mindeof Mejur C..mmiullu, 194 to 1953
 
(1946 = 100)
 
Commodity 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
Rice 115 123 122 121 94 77 117
 
Wheat and barley 90 95 123 127 74 106 125 
Anthracite coal 169 281 347 222 44 175 269 
Tungsten ore 353 394 41: 112 32/ 1,106 2,347 
Salt 87 113 225 208 99 241 238 
Processed marine products 72 61 118 52 61 61 78 
Cigarettes and tobacco 237 296 367 280 316 480 '33 
Raw silk 100 91 92 46 66 70 112 
Cotton yarn 109 115 247 191 111 188 257 
Cotton cloth 119 79 230 198 116 154 216 
Paper and paper products 83 84 213 150 62 266 261 
Laundry soap 7 141 197 164 268 316 310 
Cement 172 212 225 108 68 339 390 
Chinaware 107 150 419 303 274 356 330 
Nails 598 595 865 716 225 569 1,114 
Transformers 93 74 41 14 53 51 57 
Light bulbs 163 162 127 49 35 30 68 
Electric power 109 217 291 182 140 282 327 
Average index (unweighted) 155 184 259 180 135 270 392 
Average index (unweighted) 
excluding tungsten 143 171 250 184 124 221 277 
SouRcE: Various indexes, Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1955; various 
annual output figures, ibid. 
of a number of commodities, such as coal and cotton cloth, did not reattain 
the 1949 level. 
From 1946 to 1953, the average production index increased about 3.9 
times (2.8 times if tungstcn is excluded). Despite its rapid growth, however, 
industrial production in South Korea by 1953 was still far below the level 
achieved in 1940. We can infer from the data presented above that by 1953 
total industrial production was probably not much more than one-third of the 
1940 level. 
Table 2-3 gives merchandise exports and imports (excluding aid im­
ports) from 1946 to 1953. Since all export and import data for that period 
were tabulated in won, we can show the trend in Korea's trade in real terms 
only by deflating the export and import current price figures, using for this 
purpose the Seoul wholesale price index. 
South Korea's exports and imports in 1946 were negligible since the 
country was only beginning to recover from World War II. By 1949 exports 
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TABLE 2-3
 
Matbe E"pesb md Impo6, 1945 f15N3
 
(millions of won) 
Seoul Wholesale 1947 
Current Pricess Price Index Constant Prices 
Exports Impors (1947 = 100) Exports Imports 
1946 0.05 0.16 55.0 0.09 0.29 
1947 1.11 2.09 100.0 1.11 2.09 
1948 7.20 8.86 162.9 4.42 5.44 
1949 11.27 14.74 222.8 5.06 6.62 
1950b 32.57 5.21 348.0" 9.36 1.50 
1951 45.91 121.83 2 ,194.1d 2.09 5.55 
1952 194.96 704.42 4,570.8 4.27 15.41 
1953 398.72 2,237.01 5,951.0 6.70 37.59 
NOTE: Table includes recorded private and government trade only. Aid-financed 
imports, transactions with North Korea, and smuggling are excluded. 
SouRcE: B.nk of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1955. 
a. Exports and imports were valued in won according to f.o.b. export or c.i.f. im­
port prices until March 1951; thereafter, according to domestic market prices (tariffs, 
domestic taxes, and trade margins were subtracted from domestic prices to estimate the 
price of imports).
b. Imports and exports through Inchon and Seoul customs offices were not included 
becaus records were lost during the war. 
c. Average index for June 1950. 
d. Average index for April-December in Pusan. 
and imports were still quite small, about $17 million and $22 million, respec­
tively.4 Ahhough the Korean War severely disrupted trade patterns, exports 
by 1953 exceeded the 1949 level by more than 32 percent and imports were 
almost six times greater than in 1949.5 
Nearly all of South Korea's exports during this period were primary 
products. Agricultural and fishery products generally declined from about 80 
percent of total annual exports in 1946 to only some 10 to 15 percent during 
1951-1953 because fishing was limited during the Korean War. On the other 
hand, exports of mineral products, mainly tungsten but also graphite, copper, 
kaolin, and talc, expanded sharply from about 10 percent of the total in 1946 
to about 80 percent from 1951 to 1953. 
Major imports in this period were food grains and manufactured goods. 
In 1946, 1952, and 1953, food grain imports accounted for 34 to 44 percent 
of total nonaid imports. In other years, when grain imports were not as high, 
manufactured goods imports accounted for 39 to 59 percent of total imports. 
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POST-KOREAN WAR RECONSTRUCTION 
The Korean Armistice took effect on July 27, 1953. According to government 
estimates, war damages to industrial offices, plant and equipment, public fa­
cilities, private dwellings, and transport equipment (exclusive of military in­
stallations) in South Korea were approximately $3.0 billion. This amount was 
almost equal to estimated GNP for 1952 and 1953 combined.0 In addition, 
about one million civilians were killed during the war. 
After the Korean War, real GNP grew rapidly from 1953 to 1957, aver­
aging about 5 percent per annum. The only relatively bad year was 1956 
when agricultural production declined almost 6 percent (Table 2-4). Mining 
TABLE 2-4 
Annual Percentage Growth of GNP and Major Sectors, 
1954 to 1972 
(1970 constant prices) 
Agriculture, Social 
Forestry, Mining Overhead & 
Year GNP &Fishery &Mfg. Services 
1954 5.5 7.6 11.2 2.5 
1955 5.4 2.6 21.6 5.7 
1956 0.4 -5.9 16.2 4.0 
1957 7.7 9.1 9.7 5.8 
1958 5.2 6.2 8.2 3.5 
1959 3.9 -1.2 9.7 7.5 
1960 1.9 -1.3 10.4 2.8 
1961 4.8 11.9 3.6 -1.1 
1962 3.1 -5.8 14.1 8.9 
1963 8.8 8.1 15.7 7.4 
1964 8.6 15.5 6.9 3.0 
1965 6.1 -1.9 18.7 9.9 
1966 12.4 10.8 15.6 12.6 
1967 7.8 -5.0 21.6 13.8 
1968 12.6 2.4 24.8 15.4 
1969 15.0 12.5 19.9 14.6 
1970 7.9 -0.9 18.2 8.9 
1971 9.2 3.3 16.9 8.9 
1972 7.0 1.7 15.0 5.8 
SouRcE: Bank of Korea, Economic Staliirs Yearbook, 1973, pp. 298­
299. 
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and manufacturing output grew by about 15 percent per annum. By contraslthe period 1958 to 1960 was one of decliing GNP growth, averaging Isthan 4 percent. Since population increased about 2.9 percent per annum, pC
capita income barely changed. The growth of mining and manufacturing averaged only about 9 percent per annum from 1958 to 1960, less than two-third
of the rate in the preceding four-year period. One of the causes of the slowdown from 1958 to 1960 was a financial stabilization program that had beeiforcefully applied in 1957 and 1958. 
Most of South Korea's imports from 1953 to 1960 were financed blforeign aid grants from two sources: the United Nations Korea Reconstructior 
Agency (UNKRA), which had been providing relief through the United Na.tions Civil Assistance Command in Korea (UNCACK) during the war, anthe United States bilateral assistance program. UNKRA assistance from 1953to 1960 totaled approximately $120 million, and official U.S. aid during the same period amounted to $1,745 million, including $158 million of PL 480goods. Foreign aid from both UNKRA and the United States was used foiimporting food and essential industrial raw materials as well as capital goods.Between 1954 and 1960, foreign assistance, excluding donations by foreign
voluntary organizations, financed more than 70 perent of total imports.From 1956 to 1958 imports financed by U.S. aid exceeded 80 percent of totalimports. About 74 percent of South Korean investment was financed by for­
eign aid from 1953 to 1960. 
Rapid economic growth from 1953 to 1957, largely induced by substan­tial injections of foreign assistance, was accompanied by rapid inflation (Table2-5). The wholesale price index increased more than three and one-half timesbetween 1953 and 1957, an -verage annual rate of inflation of almost 40 per­
cent. Concern with inflation led to an agreement between the South Korean government and the Office of the Economic Coordinator (the U.S. ICA Mis­sion to Korea) on a financial stabilization program which was implementedfrom 1957. The annual rate of domestic inflation started to decline from that year. Price stability was achieved in 1958-1959 (wholesale prices even de­
clined slightly in 1958). After the student revolution in April 1960, the newgovernment abandoned the stabilization program in its first months in office.Wholesale prices rose by about 11 percent in 1960. 
Commodity exports declined substantially during the period of rapid eco­nomic growth in the 1950s. By 1957 they were less than one-half the 1953level in dollar terms (Table 2-6). During the stabilization period, exportsbegan a recovery, but did not reach the 1953 level until 1961. In any case,during the whole period 1953 to 1960, exports of goods and services were neg­ligible, ranging from 1.1 to 2.4 percent of GNP (Table 2-7 and Figure 2-1).Exports continued to be primarily mining, agricultural, and fishing products.Imports of goods and services were substantial, ranging from 8.8 to 14.3 per­
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TABLE 2-5 
Major 1Pke Idues of MIWjyw, 1953 f 1972 
GNP 
Year Deflator 
1953 5.7 
1954 7.5 
1955 12.4 
1956 16.2 
1957 19.5 
1958 19.4 
1959 19.9 
1960 21.8 
1961 25.1 
1962 28.6 
1963 36.8 
1964 48.6 
1965 52.6 
1966 60.1 
1967 68.5 
1968 76.6 
1969 86.7 
1970 100.0 
1971 111.5 
1972 127.7 
(1970 
Wholesale 
Price 
Index 
8.2 
10.5 
19.1 
25.1 
29.2 
27.3 
28.0 
31.0 
35.1 
38.4 
46.3 
62.3 
68.5 
74.6 
79.4 
85.8 
91.6 
100.0 
108.6 
123.8 
= 100) 
Wholesale 

Price of 

Foods 
8.1 
6.5 
15.4 
24.7 
28.4 
23.3 
20.4 
24.4 
28.9 
32.6 
44.8 
61.4 
60.4 
65.3 
70.9 
79.7 
89.3 
100.0 
115.0 
137.5 
Wholesale Seoul 
Price Index Consumer 
Excluding Price 
Foods Index 
8.3 7.5 
13.9 10.2 
21.5 17.3 
26.2 21.2 
30.6 26.1 
30.3 25.3 
32.5 26.4 
35.2 28.6 
39.0 30.9 
41.9 32.9 
46.3 39.7 
61.5 51.4 
73.0 58.4 
79.8 65.4 
84.1 72.5 
89.3 80.6 
93.0 88.7 
100.0 100.0 
105.7 112.3 
117.5 125.6 
SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, pp. 4 and 262-265 in 
1973; pp. 328-329 in 1970. 
a. F.-om 1953 to 1959 these figures are the wholesale price indexes of grains and 
the wholesale price indexes excluding grains converted from a 1965 to a 1970 base. 
cent of GNP or, on the average, almost seven times export earnings. Food 
grains and manufactured goods were the most important imports. 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1961 TO 1963 
A military coup in May 1961 overthrew the Chang Myon government that 
had come to power following the student revolution of April 1960. The mili­
tary government controlled the economy from May 1961 to the end of 1963. 
Stagnation developed in the South Korean economy from the spring of 1960 
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TABLE 2-6
 
adimef fay 163 t 1972
 
(millions of U.S. dollars)
 
Gold & 
Com- Com- Net Official Net Foreign 
moditys modity S,.rvices Goods & Grant Capital Exchange 
Year Exports Imports Net Services Aid Inflows Holdingsb 
1953 40 347 28 -279 193 112 109 
1954 24 241 37 -10 139 28 108 
1955 18 327 43 -266 240 -3 96 
1956 25 380 24 -331 298 14 99
 
1957 19 390 -17 -388 355 18 116 
1958 17 344 16 -311 319 -7 146 
1959 20 273 25 -228 229 - 1 147 
1960 33 305 10 -262 256 -1 157 
1961 41 283 44 -198 207 19 207 
1962 55 390 43 -292 200 19 169 
1963 87 497 7 -403 208 108 131 
1964 119 365 25 -221 141 27 136
 
1965 175 420 46 -199 135 -17 146
 
1966 250 680 107 -323 122 196 245
 
1967 335 909 157 -417 135 293 356
 
1968 486 1,322 170 -666 121 476 391
 
1969 658 1,650 198 -794 98 717 553
 
1970 882 1,804 119 -- 803 82 626 610 
1971 1,132 2,178 28 -1,018 64 834 568 
1972 1,676 2,250 33 -541 52 330 740 
SouRcE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, pp. 266-267 and p. 271 in 
1971; pp. 222-223 and p. 219 in 1973. 
a. Customs clearance data fo.b. includes exports to Viet Nam through U.S. 
procurement. 
b. End of year figures. 
to the early part of 1962, mainly because of the political and social instability 
that followed two upheavals in a little over a year's time. The military govern­
ment, anxious to revitalize the economy, adopted a very expansionary set of 
fiscal and monetary policies. These policies brought back inflation in 1962 
which accelerated in 1963 (Table 2-5). From 1960 to 1963 the average rate. 
of inflation was about 15 percent per annum. These same policies, however, 
stimulated ,Vowth. Although 1962 was a bad year for agriculture, mining and 
manufactunng output increased by 14.1 percent. In the next year, which was 
good for both agriculture and industry, GNP increased by 8.8 percent. 
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TABLE 2-7
 
GNP, Expe, md lmpeei 193 to 1972
 
(billions of 1970 constant won)
 
Exports- Imports* Exports 
as Percent as Percent Less 
Year GNP Exportso of GNP Importss of GNP Imports 
1953 844 17.0 2.0 109.4 12.9 -92.4 
1954 890 10.3 1.1 78.1 8.8 -67.8 
1955 938 12.9 1.4 104.8 11.2 -91.9 
1956 942 11.5 1.2 122.4 13.0 -110.9 
1957 1,014 15.6 1.5 144.8 14.3 -129.2 
1958 1,067 19.7 1.9 125.3 11.7 -105.6 
1959 1,108 22.9 2.1 102.6 9.3 -79.7 
1960 1,130 27.4 2.4 117.5 10.4 -90.1 
1961 1,184 38.2 3.2 106.6 9.0 -68.4 
1962 1,221 43.0 3.5 141.2 11.6 -98.2 
1963 1,328 46.2 3.5 179.2 13.5 -133.0 
1964 1,442 57.1 4.0 133.7 9.2 -76.2 
1965 1,530 80.3 5.2 149.6 9.8 -69.3 
1966 1,719 122.3 7.1 237.9 13.8 -115.6 
1967 1,853 166.0 8.9 320.7 17.3 -154.7 
1968 2,e87 235.0 11.3 468.0 22.4 -233.0 
1969 2,400 310.1 12.9 583.8 24.3 -273.7 
1970 2,589 381.2 14.7 642.4 24.8 -261.2 
1971 2,827 459.4 16.3 773.6 27.4 -314.2 
1972 3,024 643.3 21.3 801.2 26.5 -157.9 
SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 260-261. 
a. Export and import figures are taken from Korea's national income accounts 
data in 1970 constant prices. Both exports and imports include services and goods. 
During 1961 and 1962, the military government enacted many economic 
reforms including budget and tax reforms, a reform of the foreign exchange 
control system, and in June 1962 a currency reform.? A new budget and ac­
counting l-w was enacted, and various tax laws were revised to increase do­
mestic tax revenues and, at the same time, to promote business internal saving. 
The military government became increasingly concerned about earning 
foreign exchange and raising domestic savings since U.S. grant aid was re­
duced after 1960. South Korea's foreign exchange holdings, which had been 
increasing through 1960, gradually declined from 1961 to 1963 owing to the 
reduction in U.S. aid and the expansionary policies of the military govern­
ment (Table 2-6). The government increased controls on imjorts and imple­
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mented export incentive schemes such as tax exemptions. Measures were also 
taken to encourage the inflow of foreign loans and foreign direct investment. 
Since domestic savings averaged only 4.3 percent of GNP from 1961 to 1963 
(Table 2-8 and Figure 2-1), foreign capital imports and Vant aid financed 
the bulk of investment which was 12 percent of GNP during the period.' 
Commodity imports declined in 1961, but increased sharply between 
1961 and 1963 as the result of the expansionary policies. Export growth was 
substantial over the period 1961 to 1963; the average annual rate of growth 
from 1960 to 1963 was about 38 percent. The trade deficit, however, was still 
very large and grew raridly from 1961 to 1963. Imports increased from $283 
TABLE 2-8
 
GNP, Domestic Saving%and Groin Invesment, 19J to 1973
 
Gross Investment"Domestic Savings&GNP 
(1970 constant (1970 constant (percent (1970 constant (percent 
Year billion won) billion won) of GNP) billion won) of GNP) 
1953 843.5 -32.3 -3.8 49.1 5.8 
1954 890.2 24.2 2.7 83.2 9.3 
1955 938.2 9.1 1.0 91.9 9.8 
1956 942.2 -3.9 -0.4 98.4 10.4 
1957 1,014.4 -16.5 -1.6 103.9 10.2 
1958 1,067.2 4.4 0.4 101.1 9.5 
1959 1,108.3 26.3 2.4 97.0 8.8 
1960 1,129.7 19.4 1.7 100.9 8.9 
1961 1,184.5 46.9 4.0 108.5 9.2 
1962 1,221.0 58.5 4.8 149.2 12.2 
1963 1,328.3 55.9 4.2 181.0 13.6 
1964 1,442.0 82.6 5.7 151.2 10.5 
1965 1,529.7 139.2 9.1 199.5 13.0 
1966 1,719.2 201.8 11.7 302.1 17.6 
1967 1,853.0 257.5 13.9 387.1 20.9 
1968 2,087.1 326.2 15.6 533.2 25.5 
1969 2,400.5 408.9 17.0 655.6 27.3 
1970 2,589.3 427.9 16.5 677.2 26.2 
1971 2,826.8 405.4 14.3 721.6 25.5 
1972 3,023.6 467.4 15.5 637.4 21.1 
1973 3,522.7 813.5 23.1 893.6 25.4 
SouacE: Bank of Korea. 
a. Domestic savings exclude transfers from abroad, and changes in grain inven­
tories which are more a function of the level of the fall harvest than of desired savings 
in the form of inventories, but include statistical discrepancy. 
b. Excludes grain inventory changes. 
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million to $497 million and the trade deficit from $242 million to $410 million 
or 15.6 percent of GNP. 
Although commodity exports had been growing rapidly since 1959, they 
started from i very low base and did not become sigificnt until 1963, total­
ling more thai $87 million or about 3.3 percent of GNP. The same year also 
saw a phenomenal rise in the importance of manufactumd exports to more 
than 50 percent of the total; the major items being plywood, woven cotton 
fabrics, clothing, and iron and steel. 
The First Five-Year Plan announced in 1961 reflected the basic eco­
nomic policies of the military government. The annual growth target was 7.1 
percent for 1962 to 1966. It listed priorities in the following order: 
(1) 	 an increase in energy supply, including electric power and coal; 
(2) 	 an increase in agricultural production and in farmers' incomes; 
(3) 	 expansion of key industries and social overhead capital; 
(4) 	 national land conservation and dcvelopment through utilization of idle 
resources, particularly manpower; 
(5) 	 an improvement in the balance of payments through the expansion of 
exports; 
(6) 	 promotion of technology. 
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC 
REFORM, 1964 TO 1966 
A nominally civilian government emerged from the general election in early 
1964 after three years of military government. South Korean GNP continued 
to grow rapidly from 1964 to 1966, averaging about 9 percent. The rate of 
inflation in wholesale prices increased to almost 35 perccnt in 1964, the 
steepest rise since 1956, but declined to 10 percent in 1965 and to 9 per­
cent in 1966. Rapid economic growth and a reduced rate of inflation in this 
period were brought about by reforms in 1964 and 1965 and by a stabilization 
program introduced in late 1963. The main feature of the program was a strict 
limit on expansion of the money supply, which imposed ceilings on the annual 
and quarterly increases inthe four major sources of "high-powered money," 
namely, central bank finance of government deficits, bank reserves, fertilizer 
loans, and for'eign sector deposits. Since government deficit financing through 
central bank channels had been the major factor underlying the monetary ex­
pansion in 1961-1963, the government eliminated all deficits from its general 
budget beginning in 1964 and engaged only in periodic short-term borrowing. 
As Chapter 4 explains,, the government reformed the exchange rate in 
1964 in order to increase incentives for export and to restrain demfand for iM­
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ports. In September 1965, t1 government announced an interest rate reform 
that substantially raised interest rates on both bank time deposits and loans. 
As a result, bank time and savings deposits increased very rapidly, thus en­
larging the supply of loanable funds. The interest rate reform, however, created 
a large interest differential between domestic bank and foreign loans, making 
the latter particularly attractive. 
The government made a serious effort beginning in 1965 to increase tax 
collections through administrative improvements and minor changes in rates. 
It also worked out a comprehensive tax reform program in 1966 for imple­
mentation in 1967. Government tax revenues gradually expanded from 7.3 
percent of GNP in 1964 to 10.8 percent in 1966. Domestic revenues, which 
had been less than half of total central government revenues until 1958 and 
about 65 percent in 1964, financed about 75 percent of total central govern­
ment expenditures in 1966 while counterpart funds originating in U.S. assis­
tance financed the balance. 
The ratio of domestic savings to GNP also increased rapidly from 4.2 
percent in 1964 to 11.7 percent in 1966. Both private and government savings 
expanded, the one because of the interest rate reform of 1965 and the other 
because of the tax drive in 1965 and 1966. The proportion of gross domestic 
investment financed by domestic saving expanded from 31 percent in 1963 
to 66 percent in 1966. The trade balance was also greatly improved, since 
exports increased continuously by more than 40 percent a year while the rate 
of increase in imports substantially declined after the devaluation in 1964. 
The improvement in the trade balance together with the enlarged inflow 
of foreign capital brought about a gradual increase in foreign exchange hold­
ings over the period. For this reason, the government gradually loosened 
import controls. 
CONTINUATION OF RAPID GROWTH, 
1967 TO 1971 
Rapid growth of the economy continued from 1967 to 1971 with considerably 
more price stability than there had been throughout most of the period since 
World War 11. Basic economic policy was generally guided by the Second 
Five-Year Plan and the Overall Resources Budget for annual implementation 
of the plan. For this reason, it is important to present the basic targets and 
directions of the second plan, aniounced in mid-1966. 
The plan set an annual growth target of 7 percent from 1967 to 1971. 
The basic objective was "to promote the modernization of the industrial struc­
ture and to build the foundations for a self-supporting economy." The plan 
described the major targets as follows: 
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(I) The emphasis will be placed on attainment of food elf-sufficiency,
reforestation, and development of marine resources; 
(2) The basis for accekrated and diversified industrialization will bebroadened by giving emphasis to investment in such industries as 
chemicals, machinery, and iron and steel;(3) Further improvement in the balance of payments situation will be made 
by achieving a $700 million level of exports (5ncluding $550 million 
commodity exports) in 1971 on the one hand and by promoting
import substitution on the other hand;(4) Populaticn increases will be restricted as much as possible by pro­
moting family planning, while at the same time maximum efforts will 
be made to increase employment;(5) A further sharp focus will be placed on increasing farm productivity
and income through diversification of farming; and(6) The level of technology and productivity will be raised by the promo­
tion of scientific and management skills and by improvement of man­
power resources. 
The actual performance of the economy from 1967 to 1971 far exceeded
the original targets in almost all major sectors. The government revised them 
almost every year through the annual Overall Resources Budget according to
actual performance in earlier years and new forecasts. 
South Korean real GNP attained an average annual growth rate of more
than 10 percent from 1967 to 1971, exceeding the planned figure by a wide
margin. Exports of goods and services overshot the original goal by 1968,
since both commodity and service exports expanded rapidly owing to anintensified government export drive and an increase in service earnings from
construction workers and troops in Viet Nam. The commodity export target
which had been set at $550 million for 1971 was actually exceeded by 1969.Commodity exports in 1971 reached $1,132 million and exports of commodi­
ties and services exceeded 16 percent of GNP. By 1971, exports of manu­factures reached 86.0 percent of total commodity exports. Plywood, woven 
cotton fabrics, iron and steel, and clothing continued to be major exports.
Electrical machinery, footwear, and wigs also became important.
Despite the rapid increase in commodity exports, the trade balance was 
not significantly improved during this period because of a concomitant increasein imports. The growth of imports reflected gradual over-valuation of the won 
as domestic prices rose, enlarged inflows of foreign loans, trade liberalization,
and increased imports of raw materials for exports. However, South Korea'sforeign exchange holdings continued to accumulate rapidly after 1966, mainly
because of inflows of both short-term and long-term foreign loans including
cash loans beginning in 1965. The rapid accumulation of foreign exchange 
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holdings generated a large expansion in the money supply. Consequendy, a 
major problem in the annual stabilization programs during this period was the 
neutralization of the additions in bank reserves brought about by the inflow 
of foreign exchange. The major instruments used to sterilize reserves were 
increases in bank reserve requirements, compulsory deposits into the Bank of 
Korea Stabilization Account, and sales of Bank of Korea stabilization bonds. 
SLOWDOWN, 1971 TO 1972, NEW REFORMS, 
AND RECOVERY, 197. 
From late 1971 through the first half of 1972, industrial production and con­
struction slowed considerably. Growth of GNP in 1972 fell to 7.0 percent 
from 9.2 percent in 1971, despite a recovery toward the end of the year. Gross 
domestic investment, which declined from 25.5 percent cf GNP in 1971 to 
21.1 percent in 1972, dropped absolutely hy about 12 percent. This slowdown 
was caused to some extent by a slackening in the growth of Korea's major 
export markets, the United States and Japan. Korean export firms were also 
hurt by a 10 percent surcharge imposed by the United S'ates on most manu­
fectured imports. 
A financial squeeze on a number of South Korean firms was another 
cause of the slowdown. Many firms that produced primarily for domestic 
markets had borrowed heavily abroad to finance the import of capital goods 
for expansion of capacity. As the official rate for the won went from 317 to 
the dollar in December 1970 to about 4 9 v.'on by June 1972 and as the 
Japanese yen and other key currencies apnrecia. d in reition to the dollar 
in late 1971 and early 1972, the won value of foreign debts held by domestic 
firms in ceased by much more between the end of 1970 and mid-1972 than 
any inflation in profits. Also, many domestic firms had borrowed heavily and 
on a very short-term basis in the unorganized money markets where rates of 
interest approached 50 to 60 percent per annum. 
The government responded to the problems caused by retarded economic 
expansion with an Emergency Presideatial Decree for Economic Stabilization 
and Growth dated August 3, 1972. The decree promulgated a set of economic 
reforms, predicated, for the most part, on the assumption that resumption of 
rapid economic growth required financial relief for ailing industrial firms. The 
changes included the following: 
(1) Most outstanding unorganized money-market loans to the business 
sector were converted into medium-term and long-term loans at relatively low 
interest rates. To enforce this measure, the government required both unofficial 
moneylenders and debtor firms to report all outstanding loans and debts. All 
unorganized money-market loans, except small on-s of less than 300,000 won, 
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were frown for terms ranging from six months to three years, with extended 
repayment periods after that. During the freeze, debtor firmi, were to pay only
1.35 percent moathly interest, regardless of the interest rate originally con­
tracted, which gemerally ranged from 3 to 5 percent per month. 
(2) Both bank deposit and loan rates were reduced as of August 3,
1972, the rate on one-year time deposits from 16.8 to 12 percent per annum 
and the ordinary bank i.,n rate from 19 to 15.5 percent. In addition, the 
government granted approximately 200 billion won to the banking system for 
the replacement of high-interest, short-term loans to the business sector with 
low-interest, long-term bank loans, and for special long-term loans for speci­
fied major indusies. 
(3) The government authorized special accelerated depreciation rules, 
allowing 40 to 80 percent more depreciation for specified major industries. In 
addition, a 10 percent investment credit was granted for new investment in 
,the utilization of domestic resources. 
(4) The government announced that the foreign exchange rate would be 
stabilized at 400 won to the dollar. 
The August 1972 reforms marked the beginning of a radically different 
approach to economic policy in South Korea. From 1964 ,ntil 1972, whole­
sale price inflation had averaged more than 10 percent a year. In the face of 
this inflation, a number of measures were taken to stimulate savings and use 
of the banking system and to maintain the international competitiveness of the 
economy. Most significant of these measures was the maintenance of very high
bank deposit rates and frequent devaluations. The new policy stressed price
stabilization, low interest rates, and a stable exchange rate. It was recognized, 
however, that to switch from a regime of rapid inflation, high interest rates,
and frequent devaluations to a more stable regime could only be accomplished 
at the cost of financial disaster for most ind'astrial firms in South Korea, which 
were heavily indebted, unless special measures were taken. Thus the govern­
ment sponsored a massive debt roll over, not only of loans in the nationalized 
banking sector but of private, unorganized money-market loans as well. 
The basic plan was to concentrate much of foreseen price increases in 
1972 and pursue a rigid stal,ilization program in 1973. In 1972 utility and 
fuel prices were raised so that 1t1ese government monopolies would not require
future subsidy. As of August 1972, however, the government announced that 
utility prices would be frozen indefinitely. The money supply increased sharply
in the last half of 1972 as credit was expanded to accommodate the internal 
debt roll over, but the government announced a price stabilization plan for 
1973 which included limited increases in the money supply and a reduction in 
the rate of growth of government expenditures. The government pledged its 
efforts to hold the rate of inflation of wholesale prices to 3 percent or less. 
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Many of the government pronouncements were aimed at cutting expectations of 
future price increases which, if successful, was expected to help stabilization. 
Although GNP grew slowly in 1972, exports increased sharply, by 48 per­
cent, from $1,132 million in 1971 to $1,676 million. Imports, however, grew 
only 3.5 percent in 1972, compared with a 21 percent increase in the previous 
year. Since service receipts also expanded rapidly because of increased tour­
ism, the overall balance of payments deficit on current account (net goods 
and services) was reduced from $1,018 million in 1971 to $541 million in 
1972. Gold and foreign exchange reserves reached $740 million at the end of 
the year, an increase of about $170 million over 1971. 
This improvement in the balance of payments was made possible by the 
combination of two factors: (1) Enhanced international competitiveness of 
Korean industries due to gradual devaluation of the won from 317 to about 
400 to the dollar between December 1970 and June 1972, and the relative 
appreciation of the Japanese yen and other key currencies based on the 
Smithsonian Agreement; and (2) the slowdown in domestic economic activi­
ties which not only reduced the demand for imports but also induced domestic 
industries to expand into foreign markets. 
In 1973, the growth of real GNP increased to 16.5 percent. The mining 
and manufacturing sectors grew about 30 percent while exports exceeded the 
previous year's total by nearly 100 percent. The price stabilization plan, how­
ever, was endangered by very high prices for imported fuels, grains, and indus­
trial raw materials. 
The continued growth of the economy of South Korea and its export 
potential seem to x assumed among South Korean government officials and 
businessmen. They o&Ien talk of GNP of $1,000 per capita and exports exceed­
ing $10 billion by the early 1980s. If the performance over the last decade con­
tinues unabated, these optimistic expectations are certain to be fulfilled. 
NOTES 
I. Only the manufacturing establishments whose capital exceeded one million won 
are included in this estimate. The total authorized capital of such companies in Korea at 
the end of 1940 amounted to approximtely 1,725 million won. See the Bank of Korea, 
Annual Economic Review of Korea, :948, pp. 1-100. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Money supply figures for this period, including bank deposits, are not available. 
But according to the end-of-year money supply estimated by the Bank of Korea in 1955, 
currency in circulation gradually declined from 74 percent of the money supply in 1945 
to 58 percent in 1949. 
4. Thee dollar values of exports and imports were estimated by applying the aver­
age official exc;hange rate of 0.68 won to one U.S. dollar in 1949 to the current price won 
values of exports and imports in Table 2-3. 
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5. Exports for 1950 were inflated because of large exports by consignment from 
Pusan to Japan just after the outbreak of war. Thus the decline between 1950 and 1951 
is somewhat overstated. 
6. Nathan and Associates (1954) estimated South Korea's GNP for 1952 and 1953 
at $1,384 million and $1,721 million. 
7. The currency denomination was changed from hwan to won at 10:1. 
8. Both domestic savings and gross investment discussed in this chapter are exclu­
sive of grain inventory changes. 
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After World War 1I and during the Korean War, private foreign trade was 
almost nonexistent apart from a small amount of private barter. The govern­
ment was the major exporter of a limited range of primary products, and 
imports were strictly controlled. Nearly all imports were financed by grant
assistance or won redemptions by the United Nations Command during the 
Korean War, and the government itself was the major importer both before 
and during the war. A multiplicity of exchange rates applied to a variety of
transactions, and a black market in U.S. currency and military payment cer­
tificates flourished. By the end of the Korean War, the official exchange rate
represented a serious over-valuation of the won despite six major devaluations 
since 1945. The official rate applied to a very narrow range of transactions 
and was less than one-quarter of the free market rate on export dollars. We
would describe the period 1945 to 1953 as a Bhagwati-Krueger Phase I 
regime "characterized by heavy reliance on quantitative controls leading to an 
increasingly over-valued exchange rate." 
The first six or seven years after the Korean War brought sporadic
growth of real GNP, widely fluctuating exports, rapidly growing imports, and 
an increasing trade deficit financed by UN and U.S. grant assistance. The 
trade and payments regime required increasingly complex measures to obviate 
an over-valued exchange rate. 
The multiplicity of exchange rates increased war. onafter the Ratesforeign exchange loans varied by type of commodity imported. Foreign ex­
change certificates issued for earning exchange through exports were traded on 
the free market and resulted in separate rates for a variety of types of export, 
25 
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the most important distinction being drawn between Japanese export dollars 
and other export dollars. Foreign exchange was allocated by various auction 
and bidding procedures, by lottery, and by an exchange tax system. Advance 
deposits were required for certain imports. 
A variety of export promotion schemes was used during this period: a 
deposit system to avoid exchange risk, Ri export-import link system, direct 
export subsidies, a variety of preferential loans for exporters and export 
producers, and tariff exemptions. An increasingly complex system for import 
quotas evolved and tariffs were raised in 1957. Thus the period 1953 to 1960 
can be described, in terms of the Bhagwati-Krueger scheme, as Phase II. In 
this chapter we attempt to describe the trade and exchange regime during the 
Phase I period, 1945-1953, and the Phase II period that followed. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BARTER SYSTEM, 
1946 TO 1953
 
In 1946 and 1947, barter trade took place at South Korean ports between 
foreign merchants (mainly Chinese from Hong Kong and Macao) and 
Korean exporters. The Koreans, who lacked both experience and capital, acted 
mainly as brokers for the foreign merchants. 
In June 1947, the Chosun Exchange Bank was established for the pur­
pose of stimulating and facilitating private foreign trade. One technique was 
to encourage the evolution of barter trade into a more efficient form of trade 
called "trust shipping." Under this system, an exporter submits the documents 
for export goods (after shipment is made) to the Chosun Exchange Bank. 
Having collected 10 percent of the value of the goods as a guarantee, the bank 
delivers the shipping documents tj the skipper of the ship. He in turn hands 
them to a foreign exchange bank in the importing country which passes them 
on to the importer. Once the importer sells the goods, he buys and ships the 
goods ordered by the Korean exporter for importation into South Korea and 
submits the shippi.ng documents to a foreign exchange bank in his country.
The shipping documents aft then delivered to the exporter through Chosun 
Exchange Bank channels and his 10 percent guarantee deposit is returned. 
The Chosun Exchange Bank established relations with foreign exchange 
banks in other countries and developed a variety of additional trade settlement 
procedures. In 1949, South Korea's trade with Japan began to be settled by 
back-to-back letters of credit (L/Cs) and escrow L/Cs, which were means of 
assisting barter trade through commercial banks. In the case of back-to-back 
L/Cs, a Korean exporter, upon receiving notice of a bank letter of credit from 
importer A in Japan, opened a reciprocal L/C to A in Japan on the basis of 
the original L/C. Thus the Korean exporter could use his export proceeds 
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only for importing from A in Japan. The escrow L/C method allowed the 
exporter to use his export proceeds for importing from traders other than A 
in Japan. The Korean exporter deposited his export proceeds into an escrow 
account in Japan and was able to use the deposit to pay for his imports from 
any Japanese trader. In June 1950, the Korea-Japan Open Account was 
established in accordance with the "Financial Agreement for Trade" between 
the Republic of Korea and Occupied Japan. South Korea's trade with Japan 
was settled through the Open Account without any foreign exchange payment 
until a deficit of $2.5 million was accumulated. After establishment of the 
Open Account, South Korea's trade with Japan became more important than 
its trade with Hong Kong, and the trade settlement method was changed to a 
regular L/C basis. 
The sudden outbreak of war on June 25, 1950 reduced foreign trade for 
some time. Export goods stocked at Pusan were shipped to Japan on consign­
ment, but other export activity virtually ceased because of war damage, trans­
portation bottlenecks, domestic inflation, and other economic disruptions. 
Though there was practically no private import trade in the latter part of 1950, 
it became very active in 1951 when the government began to encourage im­
ports to meet wartime shortages. 
THE BANK OF KOREA, 1950 
In 1950, the Chosun Exchange Bank was absorbed by the newly formed Bank 
of Korea. The Bank of Korea Law promulgated a new foreign exchange con­
trol system that required all private foreign exchange holdings to be deposited 
at the Bank of Korea where they were insured against exchange loss through 
their denomination in dollars. 
Foreign exchange deposit accounts were classified into four categories: 
government, export, general, and special. Government accounts received de­
posits of government-owned foreign exchange. Export accounts contained 
lposits of foreign exchange by registered exporters and industrial end-users 
who had acquired foreign exchange through auctions and loans from the Bank 
f Korea. General accounts held deposits by foreign diplomatic organizations,
roreign firms, religious organizations, and individual foreigners and residents 
ipproved by the Monetary Board. Special accounts were established for de­
posits of U.S. currency and -ilitary payment certificates. 
The Bank of Korea generated fareign exchange assets of its own through 
Jollar redemption of won advances made to UN forces during the Korean 
Nar, and through foreign exchange earnings from tungsten exports, the sale 
f which was a government monopoly. Redemption of won advances by the 
United Nations Command was the most important source of foreign exchange 
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during the Korean War. Foreign exchange from this source amounted to $62 million in 1952 and $122 million in 1953, or about 62 and 70 percent
of total foreign exchange receipts in those years. In addition to receiving
foign exchange from these two sources, the Bank of Korea acted = a broker 
for the sale of U.S. aid dollars for imports of private-use commodities sfter 
the Korean War.' 
EXCHANGE RATES, 1945 TO 1963 
The int official rate was set at 0.015 won2 to one U.S. dollar in October 1945,
equivalent to the yen exchange rate in Japan. It wa. raised to 0.05 won to the 
dollar in July 1947. The official rate did not apply to private trade during most 
of the period; rather, trade was conducted through the deposit system of the 
Bank of Korea which involved dollar-denominated deposits. In any case,
most trade was barter. The official rate applied only to settlements of militarygovernment liabilities against the private sector and other minor transactions 
until late 1952 when it was extended to some private transactions. 
As tables 3-1 and 3-2 show, the official exchange rate was adjusted many
times as domestic prices rose rapidly between 1945 and 1953. Despite thesefrequent adjustments, the price-deflated exchange rate exhibited no noticeable 
trend because of the rapid inflation. The price-deflated rate reached a peak of 
about 252 won to the dollar (in 1965 won) in early 1949 and another peakin May-June of 1950,3 but the price-deflated rate during the Korean War and 
even after the December 1953 devaluation of 300 percent was far below its 
prewar highs. 
From December 1948, a separate exchange rate was established fordepositing won into the Counterpart Fund Special Account, in accordance 
with the "Agreement on Aid between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea," signed on December 10, 1948. 
Under the original "Agreement between the Government of U.S.A. and 
the ROKG Regarding Expenditures by Forces under Command of the Com­
manding General, Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations," 
won advances to UN forces for local currency expenditures were to be repaid
in dollars by the United Nations Command (UNC) at the official exchange 
rate effective on the date of such advances from the Bank of Korea. Although
the agreement applied to advances made from the time the agreement was 
signed in July 1950, not many redemptions occurred until the "Agreement on 
Economic Coordination between the- ROK and the Unified Command" was 
signed in May 1952. Even after that, the redemption of won advances wasdelayed, mainly because of a dispute between the Korean Government and 
United Nations Command over the applicable exchange rate.4 
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In February 1953, however, a new agreement stipulated that new won 
advances would be redeemed within 20 days jf the month following an ad­
vance. The Combined Economic Board (CEB), which had been established 
in accordance with the Agreement on Economic Coordination, settled on an
exchange rate of 18 won to the dollar for the redemption of won advances 
made prior to January 7, 1953. The CEB also agreed to readjust the exchange 
rate on won advances whenever increases in domestic prices made the rate 
unrealistic. Generally, the exchange rate applied to redemption of won ad­
vances was negotia!td with each particular redemption. Negotiatcd rates were 
usually more favorable to the United Nations Command than the official ex­
change rate but much lower than the free market rates. 
ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
AND MULTIPLE RATES, 1952 TO 1960 
The large inflow of U.S. grant aid, United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency (UNKRA) assistance, and government receipts of foreign exchange
from United Nations Command (UNC) sources created difficulties in allo­
cating foreign exchange to various industrial sectors that lasted for some time 
after the war. Since private exports were very small compared with total re­
ceipts of foreign exchange, most imports in the 1950s had to be financed 
either by U.S. aid or by government-held foreign exchange (KFX). 
UNKRA and U.S. aid (excluding technical assistance) amounted to ap­
proximately $1.9 billion, or about 72 percent of total imports from 1953 to 
1960. Of this amount, a large proportion was allocated to private traders and 
end-users for imports of raw materials, semifinished products and investment 
goods. In addition to this official aid fund for commercial imports, the 
government allocated a large amount of government-held KFX to private
traders and industries for commercial imports. The UNC also sold dollars 
directly to the private sector as a means of procuring won currency from 
November 1954 to August 1955. The major means of allocation in the early
post-Korean War period was a system of special foreign exchange loans and 
a bidding system for sales of KFX and UNC and U.S. aid dollars. 
Special foreign exchange loans to private traders, first instituted in 
December 1952, were finally discontinued in July 1954. Loans totaled ap­
proximately $96.1 million and financed about 45 percent of total imports (or 
75 percent of private imports) in the same period. The special foreign ex­
change loans were financed mainly by foreign exchange receipts from redemp­
tion of won advances and tungsten exports. There were two different special
loan funds. The first was allocated by industry to exporters and raw material 
end-users on the basis of export performance and raw material needs. The 
TABLE 3-1 
Nsml R mbp Roms al Wm b U. D w is Son& KanM, INS ft 1M 
(current won to the U. dollar) 
Agreed Rates Free Market Ratese 
Official Counterpart UN Japan Other Other 
ectiveDo 
Oct. 1, 1945 
July 15, 1947 
Oct 1, 1948 
Dec. 15,1948 
June 14, 1949 
Nov. 1, 1949 
Dec. 1, 1949 
Jan.1. 1950 
Apr. 1, 1950 
May 1, 1950 
May 15, 1950 
June 10, 1950 
June 15, 1950 
June 25, 1950 
Oct. 1, 1950 
Nov. I, 1950 
Dec. 1, 1950 
Mar. 11, 1951 
May 1, 1951 
Nov. 10, 1951 
Avg. 1952 
Aug. 28, 1953 
Dec. 15, 1953 
Exchange 
Rate 
0.015 
0.05 
0.44 
0.45 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
1.8 
1.6 
1.6 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
18.0 
Deposit 
Ra 
-
-
0.45 
0.45 
0.5 
0.6 
0.8 
0.9 
1.1 
1.1 
1.4 
1.4 
1.8 
2.5 
2.5 
4.0 
4.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
18.0 
18.0 
-
Finance 
Offce 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
18.0 
18.0 
Export 
Dollan 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Export 
Dollarse 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Dollars on US. 
Import A/Cv Greaacks 
-
- -
- 0.74 
- na 
- 2.17 
- 2.55 
- 2.33 
- 3.48 
- 2.98 
- 2.28 
2.28 
2.42 
-. 2.42 
- 2.42 
- 2.58 
- 3.42 
- 6.12 
- na 
- 9.83 
- 18.21 
- na 
- 26.4 
- 38.7 
MPC 
-
0.5 
a& 
1.64 
1.93 
2.31 
2.57 
2.35 
2.03 
2.03 
1.79 
1.79 
1.79 
2.27 
3.32 
4.32 
na 
6.38 
12.85 
na 
17.6 
29.3 
Price bndw 
(1965 = 100) 
0.016 
0.171 
0.297 
0327 
0.357 
0.475 
0.511 
0.565 
0.597 
0.592 
0.592 
0.615 
0.615 
0.615 
1.11 
1.27 
1.47 
2.77 
2.74 
4.52 
8.41 
10.8 
11.8 
Nov. 10, 1954 18.0 18.0 18.0 77.7 74.0 51.5 65.6 53.0 17.3
Dec. 13, 1954 18.0 18.0 31.0 80.9 78.0 65.4 
 71.1 57.6 17.8Jan. 10, 1955 18.0 35.0 43.0 92.3 83.5 59.8 77.2 62.9 23.6Apr. 18. 1955 18.0 35.0 50.0 75.6 46.6 46.6 74.8 60.5 24.1June 27, 1955 18.0 35.0 48.0 80.2 56.3 59.0 75.3 57.7 27.7Aug. 8, 1955 18.0 35.0 51.0 95.0 82.0 75.0 80.2 66.2 32.3Aug. 15, 1955 50.0 50.0 5G.0 95.0 82.0 75.0 80.2 66.2 32.3Avg. 1956 50.0 50.0 
- 107.0 100.8 84.7 96.6 81.0 36.6Avg. 1957 50.0 50.0 
- 112.3 105.7 84.5 103.3 84.5 42.5Avg. 1958 50.0 50.0 
- 122.5 101.5 89.3 118.1 102.9 39.9 
--. 195! 50.0 50.0 
- 139.9 124.7 113.5 125.5 114.9 40.8Jan. 20, ,960 50.0 65.0 - 164.1 132.0 11 ).0 132.0 122.3 42.4Feb. 23. 1960 65.0 65.0 ­ 171.8 138.7 129.3 144.9 129.2 43.2Jan. 1. 1961 100.0 100.0 
- 156.3 141.6 132.0 139.8 120.6 48.2Feb. 2, 1961 130.0 130.0 - 1479 145.4 
- 148.3 128.9 50.6Avg. 1962 130.0 130.0 - NT NT - 34.0 126.5 56.0Avg. 1963 130.0 130.0 
- 169.8 
- 174.5 147.8 67.5May 3, 1964 256.5 256.5 
- 314.0 
- 285.6 236.2 95.0Mar. 22, 1965 256.5 256.5 - 279.0 
- 316.0 263.0 97.0
Avg. 1966 271.3 271.3 
 -
- 302.7 277.3 108.8Avg. 1967 270.7 270.7 ­
-
- 301.8 276.3 115.8Avg. 1968 276.6 276.6 
­
-
- 304.1 278.1 125.2Avg. 1969 288.2 288.2 ­
-
- 323.6 302.1 133.7Avg. 1970 310.7 310.7 
-
-
- 342.8 333.2 145.9 
NoTm: MPC-military payment certificates; na-not available; NT--no transactions.
 Souc E: Bank of Korea; Korean Traders Association; USAID. Korea Mission.
 
a. Monthly and annual averages.b. Rate applied from Oct. i. 1950 to Aug. 15, 1955; rate paid UN soldiers raised to 50 won Nov. 10. 1954; rate for other UN transactions
raised to 31 won Dec. 13, 1954; the two rates made identical Ja~a. 10, 1955. 
c. Figures represent: nonpreferential dollar rate until 1955; export dollar rate on L/Cs, Dec. 1955 to Jan. 1961; and the rate on exportdollar certificates, Feb. 1961 to May 1961. Export dollar rate from 1963 represents the effective free market rate (i.e., the oftiai rate plusexport premium). Export premium market ended with exchange rate reform. March 1965.d. Separate rate on missionary and 3ervice dollars effective from Sept. 1954 to Jan. 1961. 
e. Seoul index. 1945 to 1954; national index thereafier. Monthly and annual averages. 
pie. D.A TABLE 3-2Exthmp a ,of Wa i *.Sem, in Ssob K,, 
1945 b 19?0 
(1965 constant won to the U.S. dollar) 
Agreed Ratcs Free Maiket Rates­
t 
Effective 
Date 
Oct 1, 1945 
July 15,1947 
Oct. 1, 1948 
Dec.15, 1948 
June 14, 1949 
Nov. 1, 1949 
Dec. 1, 1949 
Jan. 1, 1950 
April 1, 1950 
May 1, 1950 
May !5,1950 
June 10, 1950 
June 15, 1950 
June 25, 1950 
Oct. 1. 1950 
Nov. 1, 1950 
Dec. 1,1950 
Mar.11, 1951 
May 1,1951 
Nov. 10, 1951 
Avg.1952 
Aug.28, 1953 
Dec. 15, 1953 
Official 
Exchange 
Rate 
93.8 
29.2 
148.1 
'37.6 
252.1 
189.4 
176.1 
159.3 
150.8 
304.1 
270.3 
260.2 
292.7 
292.7 
162.2 
196.9 
170.1 
90.3 
91.2 
132.7 
71.3 
55.6 
152.5 
Counterpart 
Deposit 
Rate 
-
-
-
137.6 
126.1 
105.3 
!17.4 
141.6 
150.8 
185.8 
185.8 
227.6 
227.6 
292.7 
225.2 
196.9 
272.1 
144.4 
219.0 
132.7 
71.3 
366.7 
152.5 
UN 
Finance 
Gflfveb 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
225.2 
196.9 
170.1 
216.6 
219.0 
132.7 
71.3 
166.7 
152.5 
-
-
Japan 
Export 
Dollars 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Other 
Export 
Dollarse 
-
-
-
--
-
-
-
-
Other 
Dollars on 
Import A/Ca 
-
-
-
-
-
-
--
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
U.S. 
Greenbacks 
-
249.2 
a 
607.8 
536.8 
553.8 
615.9 
499.2 
385.1 
385.i 
393.5 
393.5 
393.5 
232.4 
269.3 
46 .3 
416.3 
358.8 
40.9 
402.9 
244.4 
328.0 
NMPC 
168.4 
ma 
459.4 
406.3 
452.1 
454.9 
493.6 
342.9 
342.9 
291.1 
291.1 
291.1 
204.5 
261.4 
2 9.9 
293.9 
23. 
2 3 
284.3 
163.0 
248.3 
Nov. 10, 1954 104.0 104.0 104.0 
Dec. 13, 449.1 A27.7 297.7 379.2 306.41954 101.1 101.1 174.2 454.4Jan. 10, 1955 438.2 367.4 299.4 323.676.3 148.3 182.2 391.1Apr. 18, 1955 353.8 253.4 327.1 266.574.6 145.2 207.5 313.7 193.4 193.4 310.4 251.0June 27, JL955 65.0 !26.4 173.3 289.5 203.2 213.0 271.3 206.3Aug. 8, 1955 55.7 108.4 157.9 294.1 253.9 232.2Aug. 15, 1955 248.3 205.0154.8 154.8 154.8 294.1 253.9 232.2 248.3 205.0Avg. 1956 136.6 136.6 
­ 292.3 275.4 231.4 263.9 221.3Avg. 1957 117.6 117.6 
-
Avg. 1958 264.2 248.7 198.8 243.1 198.3125.3 125.3 
- 307.1Avg. 1959 254.4 223.8 296.0 257.9122.5 122.5 
- 342.9 305.6Jan. 20, 1960 117.9 153.3 278.2 307.6 281.6
- 387.0 311.3 280.7 311.3 28.4Feb. 23, 1960 150.5 150.5 
- 397.6 321.1 299.3Jan. 1, 1961 335.4 299.1207.5 207.5 
- 324.3 293.8 273.9 290.0Feb. 2. 1961 250.2256.9 256.9 
­ 292.3 287.4Avg. 1962 - 293.1 254.7232.1 232.1 
Avg. 1963 192.6 
- NT NT 
- 239.3 225.9192.6 
­ 251.6May 3, 1964 - 258.5 219.0270.0 270.0 
- 330.5 
- 300.6 248.6Mar. 22, 1965 264.5 264.5 
­ 287.6 
- 325.8 271.1Avg. 19C6 249.4 249.4 
­ -Avg. 1967 - 278.2 254.9233.8 233.8 
-Avg. 1968 220.9 - 260.6 231.6220.9 
-
- 242.9 222.1Avg. 1969 215.6 215.6 
-
- 242.0 226.0Avg. 1970 213.0 213.0 
-
- 235.0 228.4 
NoTE: MPC-militar. payment certificates: na-not available: NT-no transactions. These figures are the nominal exchange rates dhown iTable 3-1 deflated by the "tholesaleprice index (1965= 100) included in the same table.SoICacL: Bank of Korea; Korean Traders Association: USAID. Korean Mission. a. Monthly and annual averages.b. Rate applied from Oct. I. 1950 to Aug. 15. 1955: rate paid UN soldiers raised to 50 won Nov. 10. 1954; rate for other UN .ramgtiowraised to 31 won Dec. 13, 1954: the two rates made identical Jan. 10, 1955.c. Figures represent: nonpreferential dollar rate until 1955: export dollar rate on L/Cs. Dec. 1955 to Jan. 1961; and thedollar certificates. Feb. 1961 to May 1961. Export dollar rate fPom rae as on1963 represents the effecive free marketexport premium). Export premiam market ended with exchsnge rate rate (i.e.. the ocial rae plasreform. March 1965.d. Separate rate on missionary and servic- dollars cffectiv from Sept. 1954 to Jan. 1961. 
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second was allocated to major domestic industries for imports of capital 
goods. The loans were to be repaid in dollars after 60 days for imports from 
Japan and after 90 days for imports from other areas. 
In the allocation of special foreign exchange loans, borrowers were rc­
qlred to make an initial deposit at the Bank of Korea in won equal to the 
loan at the official exchange rate. In the case of the first special loan fund, 
when shipping documents were delivered, the borrowers were required to make 
an additional deposit equal to the difference between the official exchange 
rate and a special rate for each cormodity, depending on the domestic-price/ 
import-price ratio. These special rates ranged from 15.5 to 29.6 won to the 
dollar compared with an official rate of 6.0 won to the dollar from November 
1952 until the end of the war in 1953. The official exchange rate was applied 
in the case of the second loan fund. 
From August 1953, however, all applicants to the first loan fund were 
required to deposit 20 won per dollar and those to the second loan fund 18 
won per dollar at the time of loan allocation. In addition to these requirements, 
first loan-fund applicants were to make a one-year time deposit of 4 won per
dolJar and second loan fund applicants were to make a notice deposit of 4 won 
per dollar. 
After this system was discontinued, foreign exchange was allocated by
competitive bidding. Bidding accomplished the sale of $5 million of KFX on 
October 18, 1954 and of nearly $40 million of UNC and U.S. military aid 
dollars from November 29, 1954 to August 8, 1955. In 1954, bids for won 
per dollar ranged from 46.1 to 69.3 won while the official rate remained at 18. 
From August 29, 1955 until May 1957, the official means of allocating
KFX was by lottery at the official exchange rate. From May 1957 to August 
1958 a modified bidding system was reestablished. Foreign exchange was 
allocated to those applicants who offered ,he largest advance won deposits 
when the total amount of such advancer was equal to or less than the total 
amount of foreign exchange to be allucated at the official exchange rate. If 
total advance deposits exceeded the won equivalent of the total value of 
foreign exchange to be allocated, allocation was first made to industrial end­
users and traders with a past record of importing respective commodity items 
in the allocation of U.S. aid, nonproject dollars. Remaining funds were then 
allocated to other applicants, with priority given to those who were willing to 
purchase the most national bonds. 
After August 1958, the bidding system of allocating foreign exchange 
was replaced by a combined foreign exchange tax and bidding system in 
accordance with the Temporary Foreign Exchange Tax Law of 1958. Under 
the tax system, a basic tax rate of 15 won per dollar was applied to all foreign 
exchange purchases. In the allocation of foreign exchange for commercial 
imports only, foreign exchange was allocated to those applicants who paid the 
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biggest additional tax (above the basic rate) by using a competitive bidding 
system. Only licensed exporters and importers were eligible for the foreign
exchange sales while industrial end-users were not. 
These complicated methods of allocating foreign exchange created an 
effective exchange rate for most imports that was substantially above the 
official rate. The major exception was in the al'ocation of project-related U.S. 
aid funds where the counterpart deposit rate was applied. The exchange rate 
for counterpart deposits was almost the same as the official exchange rate 
except for the first eight months of 1955 (Table 3-I ).
For some time after the Korean War the official exchange rate was only
applicable to government transactions, project-related foreign assistance, sales 
of foreign exchange to students studying abroad, and after August 1955, sales 
of won to the United Nations Command. The official rate was, however, 
important to the South Korean government since it was the rate applied to 
won redemptions from and won sales to the United Nations Command. For 
this reason, the government resisted devaluation of the official exchange rate. 
Strong pressure was applied, however, by the United States, using its leverage
by delaying release of aid funds and special foreign exchange stabilization 
grants as incentives to devaluation. The result of all this pressure was two 
big devaluations. The official exchange rate was raised from 6.0 won to the 
dollar to 18.0 won on December 15, 1953. The rate of 18.0 won to the dollar 
was maintained through August 15, 1955, when the rate was changed to 50.0 
won. The official rate of 50.0 won was in effect until February 1960 (Table
3-I), when it was raised to 65.0 won to the dollar. 
Special exchange rates applied to export earnings. The rates on exports 
were much better for expoiters than the official rate. These rates emerged be­
cause of import entitlements attached to certificates earned for exports to vari­
ous areas under various types of financing. The certificates %ere traded in a 
free market. 
Two basic rates applied to export earnings: one on Japan export dollars 
usable only for imports from Japan and another on other export dollars. The 
free market rate on foreign exchange earned from exports to Japan was higher
than the rate on foreign exchange earned from export to other countries, as 
shown in Table 3-1. The difference was caused by government attempts to 
limit imports from Japan to the amount earned from exports there. 
The difference between Japan and other export dollars was even further 
accentuated. A higher free market rate prevailed for preferential export dol­
lar (those linked to imports of popular items) than for general export dollars 
from 1953 to August 1955. A higher rate also prevailed for export dollars on 
a letter of credit (L/C) basis than on export dollars on adocuments-against­
payment (D/P) basis from August 1955 to January 1961. The free market 
rates on Japan and other export dollars shown in the table reprcs(.nt the rates 
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on nopreferentlal export dollars through August 1955 and thereafter rates on 
export dollars on an L/C basis. 
In addition to export dollar rates, there was a free market rate on dollars 
used for missionary transactions and service payments and receipts s which 
was much lower than the rate on export dollars. 
Multiple exchange rates on export and other dollars were formed in the 
curb markets prior to 1957 wasand the system given legal support from 
December 1957 onwards. In other words, the Monetary Board ru!ed that 
foreign exchange could formally be transferred from one trader's import 
account in the Bank of Korea to another's, and that missionary dollars could 
be transferred to export accounts with the government's approval. Starting in 
December 1957, the Bank of Korea actually acted as a broker for transactions 
of privately owned foreign exchange at the market exchange rate. 
The multiplicity of exchange rates and means of allocating foreign ex­
change from 1953 to 1960 is staggering to comprehend: special foreign
exchange loans of two types, bidding, lottery, foreign exchange tax system!, 
won redemption rates, a counterpart deposit rate, a variety of export dollar 
rates, special rates for mis.,ionary transactions, and prior to August 1955, two 
rates for sales of won by the Bank of Korea to the UNC. one for conversion 
of UN soldiers' pay and another for all other transactions. Other rates shown 
in Table 3-1 are black market rates for U.S. currency and U.S. military pay­
ment certificates (MPC). 
TARIFFS 
In 1946, a uniform tariff rate of 10 percent was imposed by the United States 
Military Government on all imports except those financed by foreign assis­
tance. In early 1949, the government began a tariff reform program that cul­
minated in a new Inw on customs duties effective January 1950. The aims of 
the new system were to increase government tariff revenue and to provide 
greater protection for domestic industries. The new customs code listed more 
than a thousand import items and specified the tariff rate applicable to each. 
The new simple average of all tariff rates was around 40 percent. The basic 
structure of tariff rates was as follows: 
(I) no duties on food grains and noncompetitive equipment and raw 
material imports required for industrial, educational, cultural, and sanitation 
facilities; 
(2) a 10 percent duty on essential goods for which domestic production 
was small relative to demand and on unfinished goods not produced in Korea; 
(3) a 20 percent duty on unfinished goods produced in Korea; 
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(4) 5 30 percent duty on finished goods not produced in Korea;(5) a40 percent duty on finished goods produced in Korea;(6) 50 to 90 percent duties on scmiluxury goods; and(7) more than 100 percent duty on luxury goods. 
Under the new tariff system, the same tariff rates applied to both commercial
and aid-financed imports after September 1950. Duties from aid-financed 
imports became an important source of government revenue during and after 
the Korean War. 
In 1952, the government announced tariff exemptions on imports of
machinery and equipment required for certain majcr industries, including
electric power, shipbuilding, metalworking, machinery, chemicals, oil refining,
textiles, mining, and fishing. For the shipbuilding, machinery, and mining in­
dustries, tariff exemptions were expanded to imports of required raw materials.
In 1957, changes in tariff rates resulted in a 4.1 percentage point increase 
in the simple average rate. Since the structure of domestic production changed
significantly after 1950, some adjustments of tariff rates were made to protect
domestic industries. The basic structure of tariff rates remained the same,
however: lower rates on raw materials than on semifinished goods, and lower 
rates on noncompetitive finished goods thar an competitive finished goods. 
IMPORT CONTROLS 
An import and export licensing system was instituted in April 1946. The
stated purpose of the system was to prevent the import of nonessential goods
and the export of essential domestic products. Until the import quota system
was adopted in February 1949, the government simply announced imports
that could be licensed and those that were prohibited. There was no attempt
to control the quantity of any imports which could be licensed. 
When the import quota system was instituted, the government began to
control both the types and quantities of imports on the basis of a comprehen­
sive commodity demand and supply program. The quota system was applied
quarterly from 1949 to 1953 and semiannually after November 1953. Import­
able commodities were classified at three levels (section, group, and item).Substitution of item quotas within the same group was usually possible with
the approval of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Import quotas were 
also specified separately with respect to imports from Japan and imports from 
other areas. 
After devaluation in August 1955. the Ministry of Finance announced
that the import quota system would be replaced by a more flexible system ofimport licensing. The semiannual trade program which was stibsequently 
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drawn up contained a list of item that could be imported under license. in 
1956 the program Included a list of automatically approved items for which 
licemses would be issued by the Ministry of Finance witbout authorization by 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). The program also listed re­
stricted items that did require the MCI's permission. Items that were neither 
restricted nor automatically approved were presumed to be prohibited frc.n 
import. In the trade program for the first half of 1957, the government added 
many new items for import and included a detailed specification for each 
imported item. 
The trade program was applicable only to South Korea's normal trade 
transactions, and excluded United States aid-financed imports. Such imports 
were administered by the Ministry of Reconstruction in accordance with the 
annual project and nonproject assistance programs agreed upon between the 
South Korean government and the USAID mission. Therefore, the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry had to prepare the semiannual trade program in 
coordination with the U.S. commodity assistance program. 
EXPORT PROMOTION 
The multiple exchange rate system, which favored exporting, arose from the 
grant of import entitlements to holders of foreign exchange earned by export, 
or from the export-import link system as it isknown in South Korea. The first 
such scheme was the preferential export system adopted in June 195 1.Under 
this system, exporters of so-called nonessential domestic products' were given 
the right to use I to 10 percent (average 5 percent) of export earnings for im­
porting about 40 different popular items not normally approved for import.
The system was reinforced in 1953 and early in 1955 by increasing the propor­
tion of export earnings that could be used for importing popular items. The 
system was abolished in late 1955. 
After 1955, the multiple exchange rate system was maintained by sales 
of dollar-denominated deposits held by exporters in the Bank of Korea. With 
the dollar deposit system, exporters were insured against exchange risk, since 
their foreign exchange earnings took the form of dollar-denominated deposits 
at the Bank of Korea. Deposits could be sold to importers at a market price, 
generally higher than the official exchange rate. The deposit system was aban­
doned in 1961 when attempts were made to unify the exchange rate. 
In addition to the multiple exchange rate system, exports were favored 
through tariff exemptions on imports of raw materials (as of 1959), direct 
subsidies for some exports, and preferential credit. On Janiuary 20, 1955, the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry announe-d the provision of 3.9 million 
won for export subsidies in that year. Export subsidies were paid on five items: 
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50 won per ton of kaolin exports, 42.5 won per ton of sgalmatolite, 100 won 
per ton of flourite, 1,500 won per ton of dried anchovy, and 700 won per ton 
of dried fish. In 1956, export subsidies were suspended when the government 
failed to provide for them in the budget. The export subsidy regulation was 
not implemented until 1"61 when an allowance was made in the budget. 
Exporters also received preferential credit terms on trade credits (credits
which enable exporters to receive payment in local currency before delivery 
to final users in importing countries), foreign exchange loans for importing
capital goods and raw materials, and production loans in local currency. Trade 
credits for exports were given preference in the allocation of domestic loans 
and were managed outside the quarterly loan ceilings which were palrt of the 
price stabilization efforts of the late 1950s. Export credits were made at 
preferential interest rates, and in assessing the collateral value of export letters 
of credit (L/Cs) or shipping documents, the market exchange rate rather than 
the official rate was used. 
In addition to the export credit system, a series of arrangcments gave ex­
porters preferential access to foreign exchange loans. Beginning in June 1950,
foreign exchange loans were granted to exporters on the basis of export L/Cs. 
These loans made it pos.it)le for an exporter to import even before his export
proceeds became available. The system was abolished after the adoption of 
the special foreign exchange loans in December 1952. 
The fir,,tspecial foreign exchange loan fund, which operated front De­
cember 1952 to July 1954, gave preference to exporters. Initially, more than 
half of the funds were allocated on the basis ef past export performance. For­
eign exchange loans allocated to exporters could be used for importing con­
sumer goods. The export incentive effect of the special foreign loan system,
however, declined in the later stage because of the continuous increase in the 
proportion of the first special loan fund allocated to industrial cnd-uscrs rather 
than to exporters. 
Beginning in September 1959, credit was made available for up to 75 
percent of production costs of exporters through an export operating loan fund 
of 200 million won financed by counterpart funds. The interest rate was 10 
percent with a term of less than ayear. 
Another method of encouraging exports is implicit in the system under 
which traders are licensed. Under the Trade Transactions Law of 1957, all 
exporters and importers were required to register at the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry. A prerequisite for registration was a minimum export of $3,000 
for exporters and a minimum export of $10,000 for importers in 1958. This 
form of trading system is unusual in that the importer's registration was granted 
according to his export performance. Minimum exports for registration were 
raised in 1959 to $5,000 for exporters and $20,000 for importers. To maintain 
the status of exporters and importers, traders had to sustain an annual export 
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TABLE 3-3 
MajaWr d Iecook" 
Description Dates Applicable 
Tariff exemptions on imports of raw materials and spare parts 1959-72 
Domestic indirect and direct tax exemptions 1961-72 
Accelerated depreciation 1966-72 
Tariff and tax exemptions granted to domestic suppliers 
of exporting firms 1965-72 
Wastage allowance subsidies 1965-72 
Import entitlement linked to exports 1951-55, 
1963-65, 
and 
1966-71 
Reduced rates on public u'ilities 1967-71 
Registration as an importer conditional on export performance' 1957-72 
Dollar-denominated deposits held in Bank of Korea 
by private traders' 1950-61 
Korean Trade Promotion Corporation 1964-72 
Monopoly rights granted in new export markets 1967-71 
Direct export subsidics 1955-56 
and 
1961-64 
Export targets by industry 1962-72 
Credit subsidies 
Export credits4 i 950-72 
Foreign exchange loans 1950-54 
and 
1971-72 
Production loans 1959-72 
Bank of Korea discount of export hills 1950-72 
Import credits 1964-72 
Capital loans by medium industry bank 1964-72 
Offshore procurement loans 1964-72 
Credits for overseas marketing activities 1965-72 
NoT: Though many of these incentives applied after 1972, this table is up to date 
only until 1972. 
a. Minimum export by trader wishing to register as an importer increased from 
$10,000 in 1958 to $300,000 in 1970. 
b.Fiom December 1957 to 1961, these deposits could be sold legally. Black markets, 
however, were well developed long before 1957. 
c. Authority existed from 1962, but was not widely used until 1967. 
d. The rate on export credits was gradually lowered over the whole period. 
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performance exceeding a certain standard. Minimum exports were $10,000 
for export business and $50,000 for import business in 1958. A year later 
minimum requirements for registration weie raised by 100 percent. 
Table 3-3 lists the major export incentives that were offered Korean 
firms from 1950 to 1972. Though most of them were not applied until after 
1960, some had already appeared by that date. 
END OF AN ERA 
By 1960, foreign trade and economic institutions had progressed from the 
complete disarray of the early 1950s. However, the bureaucratic mechanisms 
that governed trade and payments were complex and cumbersome. Despite full 
recovery from the Korean War, the South Korean economy began to stagnate 
in the early 1960s for reasons given in Chapter 2. As political repression led 
to deepening disenchantment mith the Rhee regime, the stage was set for the 
student revolution of April 1960 and the economic changes that followed. 
NOTES 
I. Allocating U.S. aid dollars to private importers was no problem until after the 
Korean War. During the war U.S. aid mainly took the form of civil relief goods im­
ported and distributed directly by the U.S. military authorities. 
2. Fifteen won in currency used at that time. There have been two currency reforms 
since 1945: a 100:1 revaluation in February 1953 and a 10:I revaluation in June 1961. 
All won figures in this volume are converted to current denominations. 
3. These peaks reflect the period in which the official exchange rate was adjusted 
upward on the basis of an average black market exchange rate or a weighted average 
price of dollars derived from Bank of Korea dollar auctions. These auctions, held in 1949 
and early 1950, were not a major allocation mechanism; rather, they were a means of 
testing the market price of foreign exchange so that the official ,ate could be adjusted. 
4. Because of this delay, the South Korean government suspended won advances 
beginning December 15, 1952, and advised the UNC to redeem the accumulated ad­
vances and to procure won currency from the Bank of Korea. In return, the UNC 
stopped the supply of petroleum products for civilian use. 
5. Missionary transactions included remittances by foreign religious organizations 
for charities in Korea. Service dollars were those earned by providing services to UNC. 
These dollars could be transferred to the import account with the approval of the gov­
ernment. 
6. The total of 57 items included starfish, dolls, lacquerwares, and nuts. 
Chapter 4 
Both the Chang Myon civilian government that came to power after the student
revolution of April 1960 and the military government that supplanted it fol­lowing the coup of May 1961 were basically reformist. On the domestic front,
the military government reformed the budget process, the taxation machinery,
and the currency system. Just prior to the coup, the civilian government had
attempted to unify the exchange rate system and had devalued the won inJanuary 1961 from 65 to 100 won to the dollar and again in February from100 to 130. The military government continued the pursuit of exchange rate
reform and achieved complete unification of the system by June 1961. Otherinnovations included the institution in 1961 of a system of opecial tariffs tohelp soak up margins on restricted imports, a currency reform in 1961, and 
an easing of import restrictions in 1962. 
The reforms of 1961-62, however, were not successfully carried out. The 
currency reform was largely a mistaken attempt to sterilize what were thoughtto be currency hoards. Each family was permitted to exchange old currencyfor new up to a limited amount. The reform was expensive, caused massive
confusion and did not accomplish the stated objectives. The multiple exchange
rate was reinstituted in 1963 and import controls were strengthened. By 1963,the exchange rate system had reverted to a Bhagwati-Kreger Phase 11 regime.
After the general election in early 1964, the nominally elected civiliangovernment instituted a substantial set of reforms in 1964 and 1965 that wereto be accompanied by a phenomenal economic performance. In May 1964,
the won was devalued by almost 50 percent from 130 to 257 won to the dol­lar. This move was a prelude to the adoption of the unitary fluctuating ex­
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change rate r stem that was introduced in March 1965. The exchange rate 
gradually stabilized at about 270 won per dollar in August the same year that 
the Exchange Bank intervened in the market. Quantitative restrictions were 
also eased. Between latc 1964 and early 1965, importable items were in­
creased from about 500 to 1,500 and 'he number of prohibited items was 
reduced. Special tariffs were raised to help soak up margins on restricted im­
ports and import prcdeposit requirements were strengthened.
A second major effort was devoted to interest rate reform. In September
1965, the ceiling on commercial bank lending rates was raised from 16 to 26 
percent with the result that the domestic supply of loanable funds available 
through the banking system increased rapidly, and additional investment de­
mand spilled over into demand for foreign loans. This led to a great increase 
in private capital imports. 
A third element of the liberalization package was an effective stabiliza­
tion program. Collection of direct taxes was improved, rates were adjusted
upward, and expansion of the money supply was strictly limited. Beginning
in 1964, the government eliminated all deficits from the general budget and 
constrained itself to limited, sporadic short-term borrowing. 
A fourth clemcnt of the reform was an intensification of the degree and 
number of subsidization programs for exports. Subsidized credit for exports
became particularly atractivc in contrast to the new and higher irterest rates 
which had been raised by the interest rate reform. 
By 1966, South Korea had moved from Phase II into Phase IV. The 
continuation of this new phase isdiscussed in the next chapter. In this chapter 
we discuss in detail the foreign exchange and trade policies that accompanied
the two liberalization episodes (1961-62, 1964-65) and their consequences. 
DEVALUATION AND EXCHANGE RATE 
UNIFICATION 
The Chang Myon government attempted to unify the exchange rate in 1961 by
changing the foreign exchange deposit system, in use since 1950, to the foreign
exchange buying system in which all foreign exchange earnings were sold to 
the central bank at the official exchange rate. Foreign exchange deposits by
residents were not authorized except for international airlines and shipping
companies. Those who surrendered foreign exchange earnings to the central 
bank were given nontransferable exchange certificatqs valid for 90 days. (Al­
though not legally transferable, the certificates were sold on the curs market.)
Holders of exchange certificates were entitled to buy from the central bank 
at the official rate an amount of foreign exchange equal to the certificates' 
value. Concomitant with the unification of rates, the official exchange rate 
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was raied twice-from 65 woa to the dollar to 100 won on January 1,1961 
and to 130 won on February 2, 1961. 
Although exchange rate reform of 1961 made the multiple exchange rate 
system illegal, multiple rates remained in use for a while afterward through
sales of certificates on the curb market. The fixed single official exchange rate 
of 130 won to the dollar was only Slightly higher than the most frequently
quoted rates on United States aid and KFX import dollars in late 1960 and 
was lower than the market exchnme rate on export dollars. As Table 3-1 re­
veals, the free market rates on Japan and other export dollars were 156.3 won
and 141.6 won to the dollar in January 1961. Beginning in February 1961,
the export dollar certificates were traded on the curb market at declining ratesbut at rates higher that, the offlcial exchange rate. The free market for exportdollar certificates ceased to function after June as a result of intensified con­
trol by the military government followed by the abolition of the certificate sys­
tem on July 20, 1961. 
CHANGES IN TRADE POLICY, 1961 TO 1963 
With the adoption of a unitary fixed exchange rate in June 1961, the differen­
tial between the import price and the domestic price became greater for someitems restricted by import quota. Thus in July 1961, a Temporary SpecialCustoms Law was enacted to capture the windfall profits that would otherwise 
accrue to importers receiving import licenses for restricted items. Under thelaw, about 700 items subject to import quotas were classified into four cate­
gories, I to IV, in order based on the ratio between the domestic price and the
c.i.f. import price and the estimated degree of nonessentiality. A temporary
special tariff was imposed on these classified import items in addition to regu­
lar tariffs. The special rates were 100 percent of import value on category 1,
50 percent on category 11, 30 percent on category Ill, and 10 percent on 
category IV. Adjustments were made periodically in the classification of 
items. 
Import controls were revised twice in 1961. In the first half of 1961, the 
commodities proposed for import were listed in four classes: (1) automatic
approval (AA) items that could be financed by any foreign exchange source 
without Frior approval of the Ministry of Commerce and Induitry; (2) AA
ripeciad items that could he inanced only by export earnings without prior
ajpoval of the Ministry; (3) restricted import items linked to specific com­
mdity expor that required approval for imports; and (4) prohibited im­ports. The total number of importable items listed was 1,581, including 35
restricted items as shown in Table 4-1. Commodities not listed could not be 
i without MCI approval. 
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TABLE 4-1 
Nmdlr d impe himsb lemb.m.d Tni Ihrepmb I 
191 f 1967 (Fie NOl) 
Automatic Semi- Total 
Approval Restricted restricted Importable Prohibited 
First half 1961 1,546a 35b - 1,581 305 
Second half 1961 1,015 17 - 1,132 355 
First half 1962 1,195 119 - 1,314 366 
Second half 1962 1,377 121 - 1,498 433 
Firs half 1963 776 713 - 1,489 442 
Second half 1963 109 924 - 1,033 414 
First half 1964 na na na 1,124 617 
Second half 1964 na na 
 na 496 631
 
First half 1965 1,447 92 19 1,558 624 
Second half 1965 1,495 124 4 1,623 620 
First half 1966 2,104 125 II 2,240 583 
Second half 1966 2,307 127 12 2,4.16 386 
First half 1967 2,950 132 - 3,082 362 
NoT-r: The numbers of importable and pohibited items for 1961 to 1963 and the 
first half of 1967 were based on the original semia qnual trade programs while b-Zakdowns 
for all other periods are based on final revised programs.
SouacE: lank of Korea, Monthly Statistical .teriew, June and December, 1961 to 
1963; Bank of Korea, Review of the Korean Economy, 1964 to 1966; and Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, A Ten-Year History ol Trade and Industrial Policy, 1960-1969. 
a. Includes 309 special items that could be imported only by export earnings. 
b. Inuicatcs import items linked to specific exports. 
In the trade program for the second half of 1961, prepared for the first 
time by the military government, commodities were grouped in three cate­
gories: (1) AA items that could be importWJ without prior approval of the 
Ministry of Commeice and Industry; (2) restricted items that could be im­
ported with official approval; and (3) prohibited items. The total number of 
importable items (restricted and AA items) was significantly reduced in the 
second half of 1961 compared with the first half, wile the number of pro­
hibited items inc,,,ased. 
In order to promote procurement from the United States, the trade 
program for the second half of 1961 differentiated aid-financed imports from 
KFX (foreign exchange held by the Bank of Korea) imports. The program
stipulated that AID commodities could not be imported with KFX but only 
with AID funds. The differentiation continued, in principle, until 1970. 
Throughout 1962, both the number of AA items and the total number 
of importable items were increased over the quotas of late 19o1. In the frst 
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half of 1963, however, the number of AA items was sharply reduced, while 
the number of restricted items was increaed. These stronger restrictions re­
flected the sharp decline in KFX holdinp that year. 
The Law Prohibiting Sales of Special Foreign Products, enacted by the 
military government in 1961, was represented as an attempt to restrict the 
inmpot or smuggling of luxuries. The law banned domestic rales of a number 
of foreign items such as foreign-made- cigarettes, coffee, cosmetics, aad high­
quality cloth. 
Various efforts were made to increase export incentives during this pe­
riod. A new system of subsidies, adopted in September 1961, classified export 
commodities into four categories for payment of subsidies; 25 won per dollar 
for special category exports (new commodity exports and net exports by 
bonded processing), 20 won for Category I, 15 won for Category i, and 
10 won for Category Iil. Subsidy payments in 1961 totaled approximately 
307 million won. In 1962 the number of cxporis supported by subsidies was 
expanded. and total payments reached 566 million won. Though the next 
.v-ar a higher rate was paid on manufactured exports, other rates were cut, 
and the list of items eligible for subsidy was shortened. The net result was a 
reduction in total subsidies paid to 354 million won. As a percent of the value 
of exports at the official exchange rate, subsidies came to about 6 percetft in 
1961, 8 percent in 1962, and 3 percent in 1963. 
The preferential interest rate on export credits was gradually reduced 
from 13.8/ percent per annum in 1960 to 8 percent in 1963, thus increasing 
the implicit export subsidy. This rate was well below the commercial bank 
loan rate of 16 to 17.5 percent. 
Tax relief for exporters was instituted in 1961 by removing the domestic 
commodity tax from exports and by exempting exporters from the business 
activity tax. Income tax incentives included a 30 percent reduction of tax on 
income from exports and a 20 percent reduction on income from sales of 
goods and services to the United Nations Command and tourist services. The 
tax reductions on income from exports and other foreign exchange earning 
activities were raised to a uniform rate of 50 percent effective January I, 1962. 
Another facet of the military government's export strategy was the insti­
tution of full-scale export targets in 1962. Before the beginning of each year, 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was to set the new year's targets on 
the basis of past export performance and new export forecasts for separA'A 
commodities. Annual export taq,;ts were usually classified by commodity, 
region, and country of destination. Commodity targets were assigned to indus­
trial associations and firms, and the regional and country targets to South 
Korean tra&., and diplomatic missions abroad. The Ministry maintained an 
"export situation room" to check actual performance during the year against 
the annual targets. In addition, an Expanded Export Conference, which was 
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chaired by the President and attended by ministers, government ,icla,
benkers, and exporters, usually met several times during the year to delibet.e 
on the annual targets. 
RETURN TO MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATES, 
1963
 
In 1961 and early 1962, the military government followed very cxpansiopary
fiscal and monetary policies which led to inflation in 1962 and 1963. The eco­
nomic situation was exacerbated by a bad harvest in 1962 and a consequent 
upsurge in imports of grain. The resulting decline in foreign exchange hold­
ings brought a return to a multiple exchange rate system in 1963 through the 
institution of a full-scale export-import link and the emergence of an import­
rights premium market. The trade program for imports was made much more 
restrictive in the first half of 1963 when automatic approval items were cut 50 
percent. In the second half of 1963 automatic approval items were nearly

eliminated, restricted items increased eightfold 
 and total importable items 
reduced by almost one-third (Table 4-1 ). 
Under the link system, exporters were given the right to use I(0 percent
of their export earnings for imports. In early 1963, raw materials for exports
and for five-year plan projects, as well as scrap iron and cement, could he 
imported without import entitlement obtained through export. Once the import
of these items increased sharply, however, the government removed ali exccp­
tions on July 31, 1963. The free market premium rate on import rights grad­
ually rose from 32 won per dollar in January 1963 to 65 won in April 1964. 
The rise in this premium prompted the government to enact the Temporary
Special Excess Profits Tax Law to levy 50 won per dollar on sales of dollars 
acquired by the government through U.S. supporting assistance and PL 480 
aid after December 196. The effective exchange rates on both exports and 
imports became, therefore, much higher than the official exchange rate. 
EXCHANGE RATE REFORM, 1964 TO 196S 
The exchange rate reform, announced on May 3, 1964, began with a large
devaluation from 130 won to 257 won. For a while thereafter, foreign ex­
change certificates (which were earned by exports and carried an import en­
titlement) continued to sell at a premium above the official exchange rate of 
about 255 won to the dollar. 
On March 22, 1965, the government announced the actual implementa­
tion of the unitary fluctuting exchange rate system. The government felt con­
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MO that the rate would not fluctuate widely since relative price stability had 
been att;;,d by the second half of 1964. As an extra precaution, standby 
credits of $9.3 million were made available by the IMF for a foreign exchange
stabilization fund. The unitary fluctuating exchange rate system worked in the 
following way: 
(I) Residents who earned foreign exchange by exports or sales to the 
United Nations Command -were required to surrender their exchange earnings
for exchange certificates which were valid for a month from date of issue. 
They could be freely traded on the exchange market, but on expiration they 
had to be sold to exchange banks for won currency.(2) Those who required foreign exchange had to present foreign ex­
change certificates when import licenses were issued by the Bank of Korea. 
(3) The official exchange rate was announced every day by the Bank 
of Korea on the basis of exchange certificate prices quoted in the free exchange 
market. 
(4) The foreign departments of commercial banks were authorized to 
act as brokers for transactions of certificates. (5) The Bank of Korea had authority to intervene in the certificate 
market when the market price of certificates fluctuated sharply owing to 
seasonal or speculative factors. 
Immediately after the announcement of the new foreign exchange rate 
rystem, the first market exchange rate on certificates was formed at 270 won 
to the dollar. The exchange rate on certificates, however, declined gradually 
to 256 won to the dollar at the end of April 1965. The rate began to rise again 
in May. and by the end of the month the market exchange rate was quoted at 
280 won per dollar. 
On June 22, 1965, the Bank of Korea first intervened in the market by
increasing the supply of exchange certificates. In the beginning, intervention 
could not completely remove fluctuations in the market exchange rate since 
the Bank supplied only a limited amount of additional certificates from KFX 
holdings. But from August 22, 1965 through 1967. the exchange rate was 
completely pegged at around 271 won to the dollar by sales of certificates by
the Bank. 
LIBERALIZATION OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS, 
1964 TO 1966
 
After the May 1964 devaluation, the balance of payments situation improved
markedly and trade restrictions were gradually liberalized. As shown in Table 
4-1, between the last half of 1964'and the firt half of 1965, the number of 
INTENSIFICATION OF EXPORT INCENTIVES 
items eligible for importation increased substantially from :sbout 500 to 1,500. 
Thereafter, the list continued to increase rapidly as did the number of auto­
matic approval items. The number of prohibited items showed a marked 
decline from the second half of 1965 to the first half of 1967. 
Also after the May 1964 devaluation, a new Temporary Special Tariff 
Law was enacted to soak up margins between c.i.f. import prices and domestic 
prices of restricted import items. About 2,200 import commodities, for which 
the "foreign exchange ratio"' exceeded 30 pcrcent, were classified in categories 
I and 11.The special tariff was imposed on the differetice between the domestic 
wholesale price of an imported good and the landed price of that import plus 
regular tariff, commodity tax, incidental expenses, and normal profit. A tariff 
rate of 90 percent was applied to category I and 70 percent to category II. 
To administer the special tariff, the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of 
Finance made a monthly survey of domestic wholesale prices of import com­
modities. On the basis of this price survey, the list of items for the special 
tariff was expanded from about 2,200 in 1964 to about 2,700 after 1965. 
Those items to which a regular tariff did not apply were, however, exempted 
from the special tariff. 
In 1964 an import prepayment deposit requirement was introduced. The 
requirement was reviscd from 100 to 255 won per dollar, or to 100 percent 
of import value, with the exchange rate change in 1964. After March 1965 the 
import prepayment deposit system was transformed into a system under which 
all commercial importers were required to deposit foreigi exchange certificates 
equivalent to the value of imports at the time of the opening of the L/C. 
INTENSIFICATION OF EXPORT INCENTIVES 
Along with the exchangc reform and import liberi ilization, the period 1964-66 
saw marked intensification of export incentives (Table 3-3). Direct export 
subsidies were abolished in 1964, but other incentives grew in number and 
importance. Particular emphasis was placed on an expansion of credit incen­
tives. The preferential rate on export credits was reduced from 8 percent in 
1963 to 6.5 percent in February 1965, and to 6.0 percent in June 1967, fur­
ther increasing the implicit export subsidy. The Bank of Korea lowered the 
discount rate on export bills from 4.5 percent to 3.5 percent in 1966. This 
rediscount of bills was enormously profitable for commercial banks which 
financed nearly all export credits through rediscounting bills. 
In 1964, the number of types and the volume of preferential loans for 
export increased substantially. In addition to export credits and operating 
loans from counterpart funds, the following preferential loan arrangements 
existed: 
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(I) loans for suppliers of U.S. offshore procurement (mainly for Vict 
Nam); 
(2) credits for importers of raw materials and equipment for export 
Industries; 
(3) export usance (credits to exporters who ship without L/Cs but 
receive paymet after shipment); 
(4) export industry promotion loans; 
(5) Medium Industry Bank equipment loans for conversion of factories 
to export production; and 
(6) Medium Industry Bank equipment loans for specialized export 
industries. 
In addition to the preferential loans listed in Table 4-2, a standby credit 
system was instituted in 1965 for supporting the overseas marketing activities 
of export firms. The standby credit, which was a type of L/C for service 
transactions, could be opened by the Bank of Korea for (I) guaranteeing the 
opening of an export L/C by an overseas branch to its domestic head firm and 
the settlement of the export L/C, (2) guarantee money for international bid­
ding and contracts, and (3) other financial guarantees for foreign exchange 
earning activities of overseas branches. The domestic firms were required to 
submit foreign exchange certificates or a foreign exchange payment guarantee 
issued by a foreign exchange bank for opening the standby credit. 
In 1964, government support for foreign market development was gradu­
ally intensified. The Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) was 
founded and quickly expanded its overseas branch network to increase the 
sales of Korean products in foreign markets. In addition, the government sent 
special trade missions to many foreign countries and concluded trade agree­
ments with a number of them from 1964 to 1966, including India, Burma, 
Cambodia, Italy, Austria, West Germany, Japan, and Mexico. The govern­
ment also authorized the Korean Trader's Association to collect 1 percent of 
the value of all c.i.f. imports from importers for use in export promotion. 
In 1965, the long-established practice of giving preference to exporters 
in the granting of import licenses was expanded and formalized. Exporters 
were given automatic right to import raw materials duty free up to certain 
limits. The limits established for each export commodity were based on a 
technically determined ratio of required raw materials to output plus an addi­
tional factor called a wastage allowance. The wastage allowance is administra­
tiveky determined and is varied from time to time. Since it applies to raw 
materials which ate generally limited by import controls or subject to high 
duties, the markups between import price and domestic price are quite large. 
That portion of the wastage allowance not used in production could be sold 
locally (since, unlike in other countries, these imports could be sold legally), 
sometimes at great profit to export industnies. 
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In order to increase the domestic value-added content of exports. export
incentives were extended to producers of internediate goods used in the pro­
duction of exports through a system of locd letters of credit (i./Cs). The 
local L/C system came into cffect in the second quarter of 1965 as the result 
of a revision of the Foreign Exchange Control Regulation. The local L/C 
system enabled exporters to issue local L/Cs to domestic producers of export
goods and intermediates ror export products on the basis of export L/Cs re­
ceived by the exporters. The local L/Cs issued by exporters could be settled 
in foreign exchange certificates when export shipment was made. Doinstic 
producers with local L/Cs could get the same treatment as exlp)rtcrs in obtain­
ing preferential bank loans, import licenses for necessary raw materials, and 
exemption front import duties and the business activity tax. 
In the latter part of 1966, an export-import link system was reintroduced. 
The main purpose of the system was to increase exports with low profit mar­
gins and to develop new export markets by linking export performance with 
the import rights either for popular consumer items or for imports of inputs
for exported commodities. For instance, the exporters of woolen yarn and 
fabrics, sweaters, and clothing were given the rights to import raw wool and 
mohair at a rate of 25.5 to 85 percent of their export earnings (depending on 
the export commodity). Exporters of radios and electronic products were 
given the import rights to television accessories, exporters of chinaware the 
import rights to porcelain, exporters of domestically assembled watches and 
exporters to Switzerland the import rights to Swiss watches. 
Finally, an additional tax incentive granted to exporters in 1966 was a 
special method of accelerated depreciation. 
EFFECTS OF THE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS 
The attempt to unify exchange rates in 1961 and to effect other reforms failed 
because the policies of the newly established military government, which were 
at first inflationary, became more restrictive and complex as a result of a very
bad harvest in 1962. The reforms of 1964-65 were accompanied by very suc­
cessful economic performance across the board. Consider the exceptional 
nature of the changes that took place between 1964 and 1966: 
(I) an average annual growth rate of real GNP of 9.6 percent; 
(2) a decline in the rate of inflation from 35 percent in 1964 to 10 
percent in 1965 and 9 percent in 1966 (wholesale price index); 
(3) the ratio of domestic saving increased from 5.7 to 11.7 percent of 
GNP; 
(4) exports increased by more than 40 percent per year; 
(5) mining and manufacturing output increased at about 14 percent 
per year; 
Export credit 
Loans for suppliers of U.S. 
offshore procurement 
Credit for import of raw materials 
for exports 
(Payment guarantee) 
(Domestic usance-foreign exchange) 
TABLE 4-2 
Phered sI a for Expe 
(millions of won) 
Outstanding Credit Annual 
(December31) Interest 
1964 1965 1966 Rate 
1,857 3.866 3,628 6.5 
526 655 1,192 6.5 
6,684 6,325 9,975 
(4,101) (4,005) (5,417) 3.0 
(2,588) (2,320) (4,558) 6.0 
, 264 to 16 
Term 

90 days 

90 days 
60 days 
90-1 35 days 
Other Conditions 
150 won through Feb. 65 and 200 
won thereafter per dollar to exporter 
or export goods producers on the basis 
of exi- '.'Zs or supply contracts. 
200 won per dollar to suppliers to 
Korean troops in Viet Nam and ISO 
won per dollar for other suppliers on 
the basis of supply contracts. 
Commercial bank guamnmtee at the 
time of L/C opening, up a %,of 
annual export earnings. 
Export industries with export L/C or 
contracts. 
Exportusance 
Export industry promotion loans 
Export industry operating loans 
(counterpart funds) 
690 
77 
190 
456 
63 
170 
431 
41 
186 
6.5 
26 
18A 
90-120 days 
90 days 
I year 
120 won per dollar to exporters on 
DIP and D/A basis an exporters 
with consignment sales arrangement. 
120 won per dollar to export goods 
producers (Net export earning duid 
exceed 30%). 
A maximum of 10 million won to each 
exporter or export goods producer. 
Equipment loans for conversion 
into export industryLoans for export specializing industry - - 603 - 1 301493 1313 years5 yers 
A maximum of 10 million won to 
each small and medium industrialistspecified by Ministry of Commerce1and Industry 
Total 10,024 12,138 16,560 
Souncx: Bank of Korea. 
a. Includes 2 percent credit guarantee charges. 
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(6) bank time and savings deposits increased about 4 times in 1965 
constant prices; and 
(7) government revenue increased from 7.3 percent of GNP to 10.8 
percent. 
It would be a mistake to attribute all of these achievements directly to 
liberalization. Industrial growth was actually very rapid in 1962 and 1963, 
before the successful liberalization began. In 1964, in fact, growth of manu­
facturirng and mining slowed to 6.9 percent, down from 15.7 percent the year 
before. Social overheads and services grew at 3.0 percent in 1964 compared 
with 7.4 percent in 1963 and 8.9 percent in 1962. GNP growth in 1964 was 
a healthy 8.3 percent, only because of a particularly good harvest; value added 
in agriculture grew by 15.5 percent. 
The liberalization episode was impressive because it was accompanied by 
such a rapid decline in ihe rate of inflation. The May 1964 devaluation of 
about 50 percent (from 130 won to 257 won to the dollar) was not inflation­
ary largely because of the monetary and fiscal stabilization program. Another 
fact is important here also: the devaluation was more de jure than de facto, at 
least with respect to exports. The multiple exchange rate system and the vari­
ous taxes and subsidies on exports resulted in an effective exchange rate for 
exports which was little changed after the 1964-65 devaluation. Consolidation 
of exchange rates since the 1964-65 liberalization eliminated the multiple 
exchange rate premia and was accompanied by suspension of payments of 
direct export subsidies (for statistical details, see the next chapter). Since the 
devaluation was not really de facto, there was relatively little upward pressure 
on prices of export goods. 
The sharp rise in the bank deposit rate in 1965 also helped to curb infla­
tionary pressures. The great rise in savings and bank deposits substantially 
reduced the velocity of circulation of the money supply. 
The rapid growth of exports certainly cannot be attributed entirely to 
liberalization, since the trend dates from 1959. In 1960 exports increased from 
$20 to $33 million and have not ceased to grow to the present time. Various 
export incentives were intensified and the effective exchange rate on exports 
increased by about 11 percent, but this did not spur a noticeable intr.ase in 
the rate of growth of exports. The most that can be said is that liberalization 
probably laid the groundwork for continued rapid growth of exports over the 
following decade and that without those efforts, such phenomenally rapid ex­
port growth could not have continued. Likewise, the exchange liberalization, 
the interest rate reform, and the fiscal reforms probably laid the basis for a 
decade of rapid growth in GNP which would not have been possible otherwise. 
These hypotheses are reexamined at the end of this book after a discus­
sion of other statistical evidence. Unfortunately, no clear answers emerge. the 
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evidence is more suggestive than definitive. Nevertheless, much of the evi­
dence, however imperfect, s ams to indicate that the trade and exchange rate 
policies of the Korean goverrment throughout the decade following the fint 
attempts at liberalization, rather than the liberalization package by itself, were 
important contributors to the rapid growth of the South Korean economy. 
NOTES 
I. Foreign exchange ratio = (domestic wholesale price of imported goods) minus(regular tariff + commodity tax + normal expenses) divided by (normal foreign ex­
change price of the import on c.i.f basis). This formula was basically an ettimate of thepremium which could be obtained by an importer licensed to import a restricted item. 
Chapter 5 
Further ENOrts a allaatg 
From 967 to 1972 the growth of GNP, exports, and imports continued at a 
very rapid pace. While foreign private capital imports replaced foreign assis­
tance as the major source of foreign savings, the exchange rate, which hadbeen pegged at 270 won to the dollar by the Bank of Korea since August 1965, 
was allowed to devalue gradually beginning in 1968. The rate reached 326 in
June 1971 :ind then 370 following a further devaluation of 13 percent. Laterin 1971, gradual devaluation was allowed to resume and it continued until 
June 1972 when the rate was pegged at about 400 won to the dollar. 
A follow-up trade liberalization program, launched in 1967, switched thepositive-list approach to trade controls to a negative-list approach ind revised 
the tariff structure so as to eliminate some of the very high rates. Another 
tariff reform, discussed throughout much of 1972, was instituted in early 
1973. 
In August 1972, a new set of economic policy reforms was announced. 
These reforms included a set of regulations to govern the so-called unorga­
nized money market, reductions in bank interest rates, price itabilization efforts,
continued stabilization of the exchange rate, reduction in export incentives,
and liberalization of import controls. 
Despite these and other attempts at further liberalization and reform,
resort to the old price-distorting policies and controls was common. A number 
of factors were involved. First, any adverse trends in the balance of payments
prompted a return to the old methods. For example, when import demand in­
creased sharply in late 1968, the government placed additional import items 
on the restricted list and increased export incentives. 
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Secondly, as debt service payments began to rise, even though foreign
exchange holdings seemed quite adequate in the late 1960. and early 1970.,
concern over future debt repayments increased along with afear for the vulner­
ability of the basic balance of payments. Restrictions on capital movements 
were strengthencd in 1970. 
Finally, and probably most important, certain vested interests in the busi­
ness community had much to lose from further liberalization and favored a 
return to price-distorting mechanisms. Since these interests wiekled consider­
able political power, the tariff reform of 1967 brought few real changes.
although the initial proposals of the Ministry of Finance would have substan­tially simplified the tariff structure. The btisiness interests, many of them ex­porters who benefited greatly from tariff exemptions and wastage allowances,
exerted pressure through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and thusfostered a bureaucratic struggle between the two ministries. For gtood measure,
related business groups staged a sit-down protest against the tariff change in
the offices of the Ministry of Finance. 
In another demonstration of their influence, the vested interests exerted 
strong pressure on the Ministry of Finance just prior to the June 1971 deval­
uation. The pressure came mainly from large firms with heavy foreign debtsbecause devaluation would greatly increase the burden of rcpaying their for­
eign loans, which were denominated in dollars. The holders of foreign debt 
were compensated by increased availability of local loans. The government
also felt it had to peg the exchange rate at its new value rather than continue 
with agliding peg. 
From 1967 to 1972, pressure to extend export subsidies increased while
monopoly rights for new export markets and products were granted in 1967
and 1968. Exporters were ranked according to performance and the more
successful were given better administrative treatment. Freight and power ratediscounts were given to large exporters, wastage allowances were expanicd,
and interest rate subsidies on loans to exporters grew very rapidly. In e.arly1973, however, some of the subsidies were reduced or eliminated. 
The period from, 1967 to early 1973 can be characterized as a prolonga­tion of Phase IV while attempts to consolidate reforms continued. But SouthKorea did not quite achieve a completely liberalized Phase IV regime because
reforms were periodically retarded by adverse economic developments and byincreasingly effective political resistance from certain business interests opposed 
to further reform. 
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EFFORTS TO LIBERALIZE TRADE, 1967 
TO EARLY 1973 
Trade liberalization was attempted in 1967 through a chag from the poi
tiv-Ilit system of import controls to the negative ha,' and through tarif
reform. The first of these meastu was much more successful than the second 
The bmic impetus for the attempted liberalization was the marked increau 
in foreign exchange holdinp in 1966 brought about by a rapid expansion ol 
commodity exports, increased service earnings expatriated by South Korear
nationals in Viet Nam and West Germany, and a larger inflow of foreign loam (including cash loans).
As shown in Table 5-I, the new negative.-list program greatly enlargedthe number of Automatic Approval (AA) items for import. More than half ol 
the 30,000 commodities specified in the SITC (Standard International Tradc 
Chasification) manual became AA items since they were excluded from the
negative list. Prohibited or restricted items numbered .36 under the old sys­
tem and 12,872 under the new. This discrepancy, howc' cr. is misleading sinceitems omitted from the positive list had to be treated a hoc and often were,in fact, prohibited or restricted. If these additional items are taken into ac­
count (see figures in parentheses in Table 5-1) the total number prohibited
and restricted under the positive-list system comes to 26,484. The increase inimports resulting directly from liberalization was approximately $27 millionin the final five months of 1967 and $68 million or 20 percent of total importsin 1968 according to estimates by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
TABLE 5-1TeedJ Iupu~hsNI urn Iefe mmd aftr Adeplsa .1 the 
Nqpm.U0 Trade Flepm 
New Programs 
Program Ended Effective from 
July 24, 1967 July 25, 1967 
Probibedimport items 
 244 (26,148)b 2,617
Restricted import item 92 10,255
Automatic Approval import items 3,760 17,128
Total 4,096 30,000 
SouIct: Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
a.The clasiicatio of commadities was based on the SITC Manual published bythe United Nations. It was roughly equivalent to the classification in the old program.b.Total number of prohibited items, i.e.. those explicitly prohibited plus those pro.
ibides because they weue not listed in any category. 
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Although the govemmcnt originally announced that it wuuld giedually 
cxpod trade liberalization from the start made in the second half of 1967, the 
sermnianual trade prgrams adopled in 1968 and afterwards showed a gradual 
increase in the number of restricted items (Table 3-2). The increase in the 
number of restricted items became more prominent beginning the second half 
of 1968 as import demand expanded greatly during 1968 and 1969. 
Even under the negative-list system. imports of machinery from counitries 
with which South Korea showed a trade deficit (Japan, for example) required 
prior approval of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, regardless of the 
specification3 in the trade program. The neptive-list system applied only to 
new, not used, comnod:ties. Used commodities were subject 1o a more 
restrctivc set of rules. 
The tariff reform announced on November 29. ! )67 eltectic tl. first of 
ihc year was presumably intended to simplify the system along lines suggested 
by Ronald McKinnon. In his consultant's r,:port (1967). Profess r McKinnon 
proposed a low uniform tariff rate L)f about 20 percent fo most imports and a 
higher rate (maximum 90 percent) on a selected group of indu, tries lha: 
South Korea really wanted to protect. Hc also proposed that high tariffs on 
finished goods should be replaced with commodity taxes applicable to both 
domestic and imported goods. 
In the end, however, the bash: idea of a low, uniform tariff combined 
with modestly higher rates for the protection of a selected, small number of 
industries was not implemented with the result that the new customs law was 
much the same as the old. The bisic rates in the new law are compared with 
TABLE 5-2
 
Import Pregrm for BEdre Wems, 19%7 So 1976
 
Automatic 
Prohibited Restric ed Approval T(1al 
Second half 1967 (final) 118 402 792 1,312 
First half 1968 (original) 116 386 810 1,312
First half 1968 1final) 71 479 756 1.312 
Second half 1968 (final) 76 508 728 1,312 
Firm half 1969 (final) 75 514 723 1,312 
Second half 1969 (final) 74 530 708 1,312 
irst half 1970 (final) 73 526 713 1,312 
Second half 1970 (original) 73 524 715 1,312 
NoTr: The claulcation of import items is based on the United Nations' SITC 
Manual. The total shown in the thble ii, an aggregation of 30,iO0 subitems. 
Sovace: Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
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fhe old ales by majm section of the HTN (Bruwsch Tariff Nomncwature) 
duilatoin InTable 5-3. lTe tw number of bsic cmamodies sbjec to 
duties wb increased from 2,044 to 3,019. The new rats were lshdy higher
than the old in all major ectiom of the BTN ckmwilkatiio, except for rocticas 
14, 18,Jmd 19. The highest tariff rate inthe old law, 250 percent. wits rw 
reduced to 130 percent. 
TABLE 5-3
 
chaqus imL40 TOW naow bbdee M afte Tam Bab, i%7
 
(simple average rate) 
BTN 	.Sction 
I. Live animals and nnimal products 
2. Vegetable products 
3. Animal &vegetable fats and oils 
4. Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits,
 
vinegar, and tobacco 

S. Mineral products 
6. Products of the chemical and allied :adustries 
7. Artificial resins and plastic materials 
8. Raw hides and skins, leather, fur skins
 
and articles thereof 

9. Wood and artciles of wood 
10. Paper makin, " paper and paperboard 
and articles thereof 
1I.Textiles and textile articles 
12. 	 Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sunshades, 
whips, riding-crops, etc. 
13. 	 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
asbestos, mica, etc. 
14. Real pearls, precious stones and metals 
15. Base metals and articles thereof 
16. Machinery and mechanical appliances 
I'. Vehicles, aircraft, vebsels, etc. 
1. Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking and precision 
instruments and apparatus, etc. 
19. !'rms and ammunition 
20. Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
21. 	 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques 
Total number of items 
NoTE: TN-lrussels Tariff Nomenclature. 
Souace: Official Tarif Tables, 1964 and 1968. 
Old Rate New Rate 
(percent) (percentI 
32.5 38.4 
38.5 36.8 
39.6 42.3 
84.3 95.1 
15.9 25.2 
27.6 29.7 
32.4 34.5 
55.2 58.1 
40.1 44.2 
43.0 54.2 
59.0 71.0 
74.3 82.9 
48.9 53.8 
43.7 36.1 
32.9 35.6 
27.4 30.6 
39.6 36.2 
44.4 40.4 
54.7 37.7 
78.9 81.9 
0 0 
(2,044) (3,019) 
EFFORTS To LIBERALIZE TRADE, 1967 TO EARLY 1973 61 
Weighted average tariff rates by major product "ionps in the old and new 
schedules are compared in Table 5-4. The table also compares the actual tariff 
rates (the ratio of all actual tariff collections to c.i.f. imports) by major pid­
uct group. While statutory tariffs declined for most categories, actual tariff 
collections increased because of the pattern of exemptions. It should he noted, 
however, that the old and new tariff rates sown in Table 3-4 include both 
the regular tariff rates and the special rates levied to soak *upmargins on con­
trolled imports, while the simple average tariff rates shown in Table 5-3 
represent only the regular tariffs. 
Although the legal rate structure remained basically the same, the new 
1968 law allowed for greater administrative flexibility. Administrative duties 
could be levied on restricted commodities whrn imported in excess of quotas.
Under certain conditions, emergency duties, coantervailing duties, and so­
ca~ed beneficial duties could be levied. The government had the authority to 
change statutory rates by as much as 50 percent by administrative decree. 
TABLE 5-4
 
Weighled Average TarW IRake Comn.zld:
 
Major Product Groups, Old sed New Schedules
 
(percent) 
Actual Tariff 
Collections per Unit 
Statutory Tariffs of c.i.f. Value 
Product Group 1966 1968 1966 1968 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 33.4 11.528.5 14.2 
Pro.:essed foods 55.2 54.1 6.6 25.5 
Tobacco and beverages 132.6 106.3 22.3 40.3 
Mining and energy 11.8 13.5 6.2 7.7 
Construction materials 34.5 25.0 8.1 12.7 
Intermediate products 1 31.9 6.840.7 12.7 
Intermediate products If 51.8 44.7 10.6 14.4 
Nordu:able consumer goods 74.2 43.2 12.6 9.0 
Consumer durables 74.5 73.7 20.4 14.4 
Machinery 25.5 47.0 8.7 7.5 
Transport equipment 12.8 19.:3 1.4 1.6 
Scraps and unclassifiable 25.4 33. 8.3 18.2 
Noncompetitive imports 21.9 16.9 21.9 9.2 
Weighted Average 43.1 9.940.6 15.6 
NoTE: Statutory and actual tariff rates include both the regular and specias tariff 
rates. The average tariff rates were first obtained for 231 nonservice input.output sectors,
weighted by actual imports and then aggregated into the major product groups using total 
supply weights for respective years. 
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Even after the adoption of the new regular tariff schedule, the special 
taris were still effective. The system of tarit! exemptions under the new law 
remained almost the same as before. Imports of raw nweral for the produc­
tion of exports, capital goods for export production and other major industries,
and capital goods imports by foreign-own4 enterprises were exempt from 
custom duties. Since exemptions were substantlal and growing, mainly because 
of increased exports and increased tariff exemptions related to exports, the 
legal tariff structure did not have the same significance as it might have had 
in other countries. 
The government made sone adjustments. however, to the list of tariff 
exemptions in the period following the tariff reform. For instance, in October 
1968 the government removed 14 commodities from the customs-exempt list, 
including cement and petroleum. In addition, machinery and equipment for 
fertilizer and automobile plants and highway construction were transferred 
from the tariff-exempt list to the tariff-reduced list. 
As import demand increased rapidly in late 1968, the government
tightened import prepayment deposit requirements for some categories of 
imports, and further raised the amount of prepayment per dollar of import in 
1969. Prepayment requirements for non-aid-financed imports on an L/C basis 
from "specified areas" (within 10 days shipping time, mainly Japan) were 
raised from 150 percent in the second half of 1968 to 200 percent in 1969 on 
items whose basic tariff rates were in the range of 30-49 percent, except for 
13 items. In 1970, all prepayment requirements were set equal to the 1968 
level regardless of source. The prepayment requirements for imports on a 
documents-against-payment (D/P) basis were raised from 30 to 50 percent
in 1969 on im"'rts from the "specified areas"; however, for imports from 
other areas the 5 percent prepayment requirement was maintained as before. 
In addition, items whose basic tariff rates exceeded 50 percent and nonessential 
and luxury commodities designated by the United Nations Economic Com­
mission for Asia and the Far East were excluded from the list of items im­
portable on a D/P basis. 
For imports on documents-against-acceptance (D/A) and on a usance 
basis, an annual ceiling was established for each year. In 1969, the prepayment 
requirements were raised from 10 to 30 percent on D/A imports from the
"specified areas," while a 30 percent prepayment requirement on usance im­
ports was maintained. Prepayment requirements for D/A and usance imports
from all areas were unified at 30 percent in 1970. 
In late 1972 and early 1973, some additional liberalization measures 
were taken. The number of automatic approval items was increased by elimi­
nating some of the previously restricted items from the negative list, and the 
number of quota items was also reduced, while quota amounts pcr restricted 
item tended to increase. 
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In early 1973, the special tariff, which had been u.ed to tax large dif­ferences between international and domestic market prices for some imports.
was completely abolished. There was also a general tariff reform. effectivefrom February 5, 1973, which changed regular tariff protection to encourage 
new import substitution industries and reduce protection of old industries,Tariff rates on heavy industrial and chemical products an~d intermediate goods
were raised, while thc previous high rates on finished goods, particularly textileproducts, were generally reduced by about 1O to 50 percentage points. TheMinistry of Finance announced that the reform brought about a reduction inthe simple average tariff rate from 38.8 to 31.3 percent. The tariff reform,
however, increased administrative authority to adjust the tariff rates within100 percent of the legal ratc. In fact, the tariff authorities established the ad­
ministrative rates on sonic imported raw materials much lower than the legal
rates, in order to minimize the domestic cost-push effect of increases in inter­
national prices of major industrial raw materials which took place if, 1973.Domestic commodity tax rates on both imported and domestically produced
commodities, particularly on electrical appliances and other household goods, 
were also reduced by about 10 to 15 percentage points. 
GROWTH OF EXPORT SUBSI)IES 
Export incentives continued to grow from 1967 to early 1973 (Table 3-3).
Preferential loans became an increasingly powerful tool for export promotion
after the interest rate reform of 1965. Since the reform raised ordinary bankloan rates to 26 percent per annum (at which rate the excess demand forloans was still positive) while leaving the rates on export loans unchanged,interest subsidies implicit in the preferential loans for export incrcas,.d consid­
erably after September 1965. Because of the increased differential between
commercial bank interest rates and preferential export rates and the prolifera­tion of various preferential loans for exports, the implicit interest subsidies for 
exports increased from approximately 1.3 billion to 15.3 billion won, or from7.6 won per dollar of export to 17.3 won between 1965 and 1970.2 As a per­
centage of total exports valued at the official exchange rate, interest rate sub­
sidies increased from about 3percent in 1965 to 6 percent in 1970. 
Table 5-5 shows the growth of the various subsidized loan schemes fir 
expcrts between 1967 and 1970. Loans for offshore procurement and creditfor imports of capital equipment grew rapidly beginning in 1967. In 1968 and1969, the export industry operating loans (financed from the Counterpart
Fund) and export industry promotion loans were abolished. In their place, the government introduced loans for domestic production of raw materials used 
TABLE 5-5
 
Pefentail L s for Exports, 1967 ft 1n0
 
AnnualOutstanding Credit 
Interest(million won as of December 31 
Rate!967 1968 1969 1970 (percent) Term 	 Remarks 
I. 	Export credit 6,618 8,072 11,866 19.129 6.0 90-435 days 200 won per dollar through "69. 
220 won in '70 and 260 won in "71 
2. 	 Loans for suppliers 
of U.S. offshore 
procurement 3,399 3,567 5,291 4.510 6.0 90 days 150 won per dollar ,hrough '68. 
180 won in '69 and 220 won in '70 
3. 	 Credit for imports 
of raw materials 
for export 17,835 20,239 31,868 49,981 1.5 60 days Green card exporters exempted from 
guarantee fees 
(Payment guar­
antee) (11,292) (8.859) (14,201) (21.244)
 
(Domestic usance­
foreign exchange) (62-) (29) - - 6.0 90-135 daVs Foreign exchange value of imports 
(Import loans) (6,481) (11,351) (17,666) (28.737) 6.0a 90-135 days Won equivalent of imports 
4 Export usance 652 550 1,986 4.463 6.0 90-120 days Won loan per dollar equivalent to 
export credit 
5. 	 Loans for export - - 35 154 6.0 90-120 days Won loan per dollar equivalent to 
export credit 
6. Foreign exchange 
loans for import of 
capital goods for 
export industries 1,849 7,802 10,297 21,372 12.0 3-5 years 80 v-,,cent of import value through 
7. Export industry 
promotion loans 61 368 28 7 26.0 Xi days 
o8 and 90 percent in "69 
Abry,'ished in 1969 
8. Export industry 
operating loans 
(Counterpart Fund) 193 - - 18.0 I year Abolished after 1968 
9. Equipment loans for 
conversion into 
expoit industry 1.531 2,237 2.536 2,826 12.0 5 years A maximum of 10 million won to 
those industries specified by the 
10. Loans for export 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
specializing 
industries 
11. Loans for production 
292 563 742 807 12.0 5 years 
of raw materials - - 134 833 6.0 90-120 davs 220 xon per dollar in "69atZ.J 70 
12. Loans for preparing 
agricultural and 
fishery products 
for export 
Total 
-
32,430 
-
43,398 
3.413 
68.196 
4,001 
108,083 
12.0 90-180 days 70 percent of required funds 
SouacE: Bank of Korea- Medium lndtvury Bank. 
a. Raised to 9.0 percent per annur. Iune 1971. 
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In producing exports and for procesinl of agricultural and fishery products 
for export In May and September 1969 (rows II and 12, Table 5-5). 
The flexible wastage allowance grew in importance as an incentive to ex­
port during the late 1960s as the proportions of wastage allowed gradually 
increased for many industries. The Korean Traders Association (1969) esti­
mated that the implicit subsidies arising from the wastage allowances on 
imported raw materials averaged 12.7 won per dollar export, or about 4.6 
percent of the official exchange rate in 1968. The amount of subsidies per 
dollar, however, showed a wide variation by type of export commodity. For 
instance, the subsidies implicit in wastage allowances were as high as 48 to 59 
won per dollar of export (about 17 to 21 percent of the official exchange 
rate) for woolen fabrics, rayon fabrics, and footwear. Business firms and 
trade associations have lobbied persistently for increased wastage allowance. 
The total amount of tax concessions for export grew rapidly from 1965 
to 1970 (Table 5-6). Relief per doilar of export more than doubled in those 
six years. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, importer's licmnses were granted only to 
firms whose export performance met minimum standards. The minimum ex­
ports required for a license, which were set at $30,000 in 1964, were raised to 
$100,000 in 1966, $200,000 in 1969, and $300,000 in 1970. In addition, in 
1969, traders were graded in four classes (blue-, white-, yellow-, and red-card 
holders) on the basis of annual export performance. High performance 
traders were given a number of special benefits, including exemption of col-
TABLE 5-6 
Tax Comceutou for Exports, 1965 to 1970 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Internal tax (millions of 
won) 2,838 5,021 7,724 11,127 17,207 26,330 
Regular and special tariff 
(millions of won) 2,962 5,333 8,224 19,261 22,551 34,700a 
Total tax relief 
(millions of won) 5,530 10,354 15,952 30,388 39,758 61,030 
Total exports" 
(millions of dollars) 175.1 250.3 334.8 486.2 658.3 882.2 
Tax relief per dollar 
of export (won) 31.6 41.4 47.6 62.5 60.4 69.1 
SoutcE: National Tax Administration 
a.Preliminary figures. 
b.Includes military goods sales abroad. 
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lateral for regular and special tariffs. relaxation of tax surveillance, and prefer­
ential treatment in foreign exchange allocations for overseas activities. 
Certain exporters were given nvanopoly rights in new export miarkets or 
for the export of new commodities. The system origin:, ted in 1962 but was not 
applied to many comnodities until 1967. Monopoly rights were given, among
others, for the following commodities: arrowroot wallpaper (all countries). 
processed brassware (Japan). apples and pears (Taiwan), silk for sashes 
(Japan), artificial eyelashcs (EEC). oak leaves (Japan), and rice cake 
(Japan). 
Finally, railway freight rates on export minerals were given a 30 percent 
discount beginning in 1967. Export industries with power-recciving capacity 
of less than 200 KWH whose electric power costs amounted to more than 20 
percent of total manufacturing costs were granted a 39 percent discount on 
electricity charges. 
As a follow-up on the August 1972 reforms, many export incentives 
w,:re reduced. The 50 pircent reduction in tax on corporation and individual 
business income earned from export business was abolished. The government 
also announced a gradual adoption of a tarill-rebale system under which 
tariffs arc collected at first on all imports but collections for imported raw la­
tcrials for exports arc refunded later when actual exports occur. Until 1975, 
imports of raw materials for exports were granted tariff exemptions at the time 
of customs clearance, and tarilfs plus some penalty were imposed later when 
importers did not fulfill export obligations. Finally, the preferential interest 
rate on export credit was raised from 6 to 7 percent. This slight increase, con­
bined with the general reduction in ordinary bank loan rates, reduced the im­
plicit subsidies from preferential loans to the export sector. 
EXCHANGE RATES 
From August 1965 through 1967, the exchange rate was pegged by the Bank 
of Korea at about 271 won to the dollar. Beginning in 1968, the won was al­
lowed to devalue gradually, at a rate believed to be sufficient to maintain 
purchasing power parity. The rate had reached 326 by June 1971, ain an­
nual rate of increase close to 9 percent, when an abrupt devaluation of 13 
percent brought the rate to 370. Until the end of the year, the rate remained 
at this value and then after further gradual devaluation, the won was pegged 
at about 400 to the dollar in June 1972. 
The U.S. dollar, meanwhile, underwent two devaluations. The first, of 
about 10 percent in early 1972, resulted from the Smithsonian Agreement of 
December 1971. The second, also 10 percent, stemmed from a parity fjange
for the dollar in February 1973 and from the subsequent flotation of other 
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currencies against the dollar in the spring of 1973. These changes hd the 
effect of devaluing the won with rspec to currencies other than the dollar. 
Since most of South Korea's foreign trade is carried on with countries other 
than the United States, these changes in the value of the dollar made a great
difference in the cost of Korea's imports and the prices of her exports.
Table 5-7 lists exchange rates on a purchasing-power-parity basis taking
into account the changes in the value of the won with respect to major cur­
rencies other than the dollar. Thus for 1972, the official rate averaged, over 
the ycar, 391.8 won to the dollar. The purchasing-power-parity rate was254. 1,and the purchasing-power-parity rate adjusted for changes in the value 
of other currencies was 271.9 won to the dollar. 
In 1972 and early 1973, the Korean currency was very strong. Pre­
viously 1965 had been regarded as the year when the. exchange value of the 
TABLE 5-7 
Oficial Eelamne Rae at Plreula Power Parity, 19%5 to 1973 
(1965 prices) 
1973 
1965 1970 1971 1972 (April) 
1. Oflicial exchange rate
 (won per dollar) 265.4 310.7 347.7 391.8 398.9
 
2. Tradc-wcightcd average WPI of 
major trading partners 
(1965=100) 100.0 112.8 114.2 117.2 128.9 
3. Korea's WPI (1965=100) 100.0 146.0 158.4 180.7 187.7 
4. 	 Purchasing-power-parity 
exchange rate I x 2 - 3 265.4 240.0 250.7 254.1 273.9 
5. Trade-weighted effective' devalu­
ation due to foreign currency
 
realignments (percent) ­ - - 7.0 10.0 
6. 	Purchasing-power-parity 
exchange rate including foreign 
currency realignments 265.4 240.0 250.7 271.9 301.3 
7. 	Annual increase (percent) - 2.4 4.5 8.5 10.8 
SOUNCE: Table 5-8; Bank,of Korea, hfonthly Statistics, April 1973; Economic Plan­
ning Board, "Monthly Report Sn Economic Trends" (Briefing material for the President,
in Korean), June II, 1973; U.S. Department of Commerce, Commerce Today, April 2, 
1973, p. 4. 
a. Exchange rates of the won vis-h-vis other major currencies were expresed in terms 
of dollars using the dollar rate for major currencies prevailing in the base period, 1965.
Them rates in terms of dollars were averaged using trading shares as weights Inaweighted­
average calculation. 
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won placed Korea in its strongest competitive position ever. Yet compared 
with 1965, the purchasing.power-psity exchange rate in April 1973 was 13 
percent higher. It was FaIiculadY favorable fer exports, not only because of 
the various devaluations both of the won and the dollar, but also because of 
relative rates of inflation. Wholesale prices in Korea's major trading partners 
increased about 10 percent by April 1973 compared with the average for 
1972, while the South Korean index showed an increase of oaly 4.6 percent 
during the same period. 
Between 1970 and April 1973. the purchasing-power-parity rate adjusted 
for currency realignments increased significantly (see line 7 of Table 5-7). 
fly 1972, the rate was 13 percent higher than it had heen in 1970 and by 
April 1973 it was 26 percent higher. 
QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES 
OF THE RESTRICTIVENESS OF TilE TRADE 
AND PAYMENTS REGIME, 1953 TO 1970 
Tables 5-8 and 5-9 show how the trade and payments regime has varied in 
degree of restrictiveness, both for exports and imports, and how various mea­
sures of effective exchange rates have changed over time. 
Table 5-8 analyzes the effective exchange rate for exports. To obtain 
these figures, the average export dollar premium and total subsidies per dollar 
of export are added to the official exchange rate. For the period 1958-61, an 
excess of the average free market price of export dollar certificates over the 
official exchange rate was taken as export premium per dollar. In 1963 and 
1964 a premium emerged because of the export-import link and the free mar­
ket salc of import entitlements attached to export dollars. 
The won value of total export subsidies increased greatly over the decade 
of the 1960s from 1.2 to 86.5 won per dollar of export. Direct subsidies were 
imporsant briefly from 1961 to 1964, but internal tax exemptions, customs 
duties exemptions, and interest rate subsidies were all important throughout 
most of the decade. Subsidies on freight and power rates, monopoly rights, 
and administrative incentives are not quantified in Table 5-8 because they are 
relatively small.2 
Table 5-9 lists the components of the effective exchange rate on imports. 
Two separate effective rates are determined, one based on legal tariff rates, 
and the other including an adjustment for exemptions from the legal tariff 
rates. In addition to an adjustment for tariffs, the foreign exchange tax and 
total premia on export dollars per dollar of imports are added to the average 
official exchange rate. The total adjustment based on actual tariffs, labelled 
total actual tariffs and tariff equivalents per dollar of import in row B8 of 
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TABLE 54 
PIAk -- WSdlhtmi .'d: f" _"--- " - uibe
-adowmIb Mbapsu. IM b Iff/ 
1951 1959 1960 1961 
A. 	Offcial exchange rate (won per dollar) 50.0 50.0 62.5 127.5 
0. 	Average export dollar premium (won per 
dollar) 64.0 84.7 83.9 14.6 
C. 	Export subsidis 
I. Direct subsidy payments (mil. won) - - - 307 
2. Internal tax exemptiom (mil. won) na na na na 
3. Customs duties exemptions (mil. won) na na na na 
4. Interest rate sub0idies (mil. v,on)* 19 25 38 39 
5. Total export s.rbs ,lies (I-4) (mil. won) 19 25 38 346 
' 6. 	Total exports (mi! dollars) 16.5 19.8 32 8 40.9 
7. Won subsidies pet Jollar export (5+6) 
(won) 1.2 1.3 1.2 8.5 
D. 	Effective exchange rate on exports 
(A+B+C7) 115.2 136.0 147.6 150.6 
E. 	Korea's wholesale price index (1965=I00) 39.9 40.8 45.2 51.2 
F. Price-level-deflated effective exchange rate 
on exports (D-E) 288.7 333.3 326.5 294.1 
G. 	 Average wholesale price index of major 
,trade pIrtners (1965=100) o 	 97.2 97.7 97.9 98.3 
H. 	Purchasing-power-parity effective exchange 
rate on exports (FXG) 280.6 325.6 319.6 289.1 
Table 5-9, fluctuated between 1958 and 1965 from 14 to 38 won to the dol­
lar. Between 1965 and 1970, however, it remained remark.ably steady at about 
25 won to the dollar. Le~al average tariffs and tariff equivalents on imports 
increased markedly, from 23.3 won per dollar of import in 1962 to 72.0 won 
in 1970. The increasing level of customs duty exemptions, however, kept 
actual tariff collections per dollar of imports almost constant. The adjustments 
for obtaining effective rates of exchange do not male allowance for price 
premia resulting from quantitative restrictions, although these are taken into 
account in the effective rates of protection calculated in Chapter 10. This 
omission should not, however, be very important, since the special tariffs, 
originally instituted in July 1961, tend to soak up such premia because of 
the way they are administered. 
The effective exchange rates for both exports and imports are deflated 
by two price indexes: the South Korean wholesale price index and a purchas­
ing-power-parity index. The latter is the ratio of the South Korean wholesale 
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1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
130.0 130.0 224.3 265.4 272.3 270.7 276.6 288.2 310.7 
- 39.8 39.7 - - - - - ­
566 354 350 - - - - ­
310 527 992 2,838 5,021 7,724 11,127 17.207 26,331) 
255 571 1,197 2,692 5,333 8,224 19,261 22,551 34,70tr 
47 248 719 1,330 2.571 4,935 7,395 9,690 15,280 
1,178 1,700 3,258 6,860 12,925 20,883 37,783 49.448 76,310 
54.8 86.8 119.1 175.1 250.3 334.8 486.2 658.3 882.2 
21.5 19.6 27.4 39.2 51.6 62.4 77.7 75.1 86.5 
151.5 189.4 281.4 304.6 322.9 333.2 354.3 363.3 397.2
56.0 67.5 90.9 208.8 T. 5.8 225.2 133.7 145.9 
270.5 280.6 309.6 304.6 296.8 287.6 283.0 271.7 272.3 
97.6 98.3 98.5 1(H).O 102.8 104.0 105.6 108.8 112.8 
264.0 275.8 305.0 304.6 305.2 299.1 298.8 295.6 307.2 
NOTE: na-not available. 
SouacEs: Bank of Korea; Ministry of Finance; USAID, Korea Mission. 
a. Interest rate subsidies were calculated by estimating the average interest rate on all out­
standing loans to business firms at about 26 percent. This was taken :,s an estimate of the 
equilibrium interest rate, and interest rate subsidies were taken as the :,ubsidy element of all 
loans at less than 26 percent. The estimate of the average interest rate on loans was derived 
from Kim Mahn Je (1970). 
b. Includes military goods sales abroad. 
c. Estimated by applying the average rate of tariff exemptions on imports of raw materials 
and capital goods for export in 1968-69 to the value of c.i.f. imports for exports in 1970, because 
actual exemption figures not available. 
d. An average of wholesale pri, indexes in the United States and Japan, weighted by 
Korea's annual trade volume with the respective countries. It is noted that Korea's imports from 
and exports to the United States and Japan generally increased from about 43 percent of Korea's 
total trade volume in 1958 to 83 percent in 1970. 
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TABLE 5-9 
Pvke.Iavell4kilefti ud lPwurs*.N4ww4%rlly EEleilie 
Lumumg uON$lom. 35s6b3It" 
195 1959 196, 1961 
A. Official exchange rate Iwon per dollar) 50.) 50.0 62.5 127.5 
B. Tariff A tariff equivalents 
I.Aclmal tariff collections (mil.won) 
2. "t ariff cxemlptions (mil. won) 
2,969 
na 
3,559 
na 
5,150 
na 
5,306 
na 
.4. Foreign exchange tax (mil. won) 
4. lremiums for total exports (mil. won)" 
1.425 
I.Oib 
4,722 
1,677 
5,(46 
2,75Z 
251 
597 
5.Total actual tariffs and tariff equivalents 
(1+3+4) (ril. won) 5,450 9.958 12.948 6.154 
6. Total legal tarilfs antitariff equivalents 
(l-+ 2­ 3 14) (mil.won) Ia na na na 
7. Total c.i.t. imports (ril. dollars) 37 S.2 303.11 343.5 316.1 
M. Actual tariffs and tariff cquivalents per 
dollar imlort (5-7) (won) 14.4 32.8 37.7 19.5 
9. L.egal tariffs and tariff equivalents per 
dollar import (6-7) (won) na na na na 
C. iltfective exchange rate on impcrts 
I. Official exchange rate plus actual tariffs 
per dollar of import 64.0 82.8 100.2 147.0 
2. Official exchange rate plu-,legal tariffs 
per dollar of import na na na 111 
D. Pricc-level-deflated eflective exchamge ate on 
imports (detlated by line E in Table 5-8) 
I. ('I +E from Table 5-8 (actual basis) 160.4 202.9 221.6 287.1 
2. C2-E front Table 5-8 (legal basis) na na na n.: 
E. Purchasing-power-parity effective exchange 
rate on imports 
I. DI X G from Table 5-8 (actual basis) 155.9 198.2 216.9 !82.2 
2. D2 X G front Table 5-8 (legal basis) na na na -a 
price index to a wcighted average wholesale price index of major trading 
partners (the United States and Japan). The effective exchange rate deflated 
by the South Korean wholesale price index is called the price-level-deflated 
effective exchange rate while the effective exchange rate deflated by the pur­
chasing-power-parity index is denoted the purchasing-power-parity effective 
exchange rate. As an indicator of the incentive effect for exports and the rela­
tive price of imports, the purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rates 
are the most meaningful. 
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1962 1963 1964 1%5 1966 1967 1969 1969 1970 
13(1) I10.0 214.3 265.4 271.3 270.7 276.6 288.2 410.7 
6,847 6.708 8.509 12.847 18.IO)3 25,413 37,1881 44,72.1 50,924 
2,919 5.464 7,236 9,682 20.295 32.374 66,41 I 86.244) 92,(81 )P' 
79 - - - - - ­
- 3.455 4,728 - . -. .. . 
6,926 I1), 163 13,237 12.847 18,(W 25,413 37,881 44 124 50.924 
9,845 15,6-7 20,473 22,529 38,298 57,787 104,292 1.10,964 142,924 
421.8 560.3 404.4 463.4 716.4 996.2 1,462.9 1,823.6 1,9)H5.4) 
16.4 18.1 32.7 27.7 25.1 25.5 25.9 24.5 25.7 
23.3 27.9 50.6 48.6 53.5 58.0 71.3 71.8 72.0 
146.4 148.1 247.0 293.1 296.4 296.2 302.5 312.7 336.4 
153.3 157.9 264.9 314.0 324.8 328.7 347.9 360.0 ,82.7 
261.4 219.4 271.7 2')3.I 272.4 255.8 241.6 233.9 230.6 
273.8 233.9 291.4 it-: 'i 298.5 283.9 277.8 269.3 262.3 
.55.I 215.7 267.6 293.1 280.0 266.0 255.1 254.5 260.1 
276.2 229.9 287.0 314.0 306.9 295.3 293.4 293.1) 295.9 
NOTE: na-not available.
 
SoumpE: Table 5-8.
 
a. Average premium per dollar export given in Table 5-8 multiplied by total value of exports 
for ,ich year. 
b. Estimated by applying the average ratio of tariff reductions and exemptions to the value 
of c.i.f. imports in 1968-69 to the value of imports for 1970. 
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The bias toward export promotion in the trade and payments regimeis clearly revealed by a comparison of purchasing-power-parity effective ex­
change rates for exports and imports (Table 5-10). The effective exchange
rate for exports exceeded the effective exchange rate for imports by a wide
margin in every year except for 1961-62 and 1965. In the periods 1958 to1960 and 1963 to 1964, the major difference in effective rates for exports
and imports was caused by the export dollar premium. The devaluations ofJanuary and February 1961 were soon followed by exchange rate unification.The net effect on the export side was that the price-deflated effective exchange
rates declined rather than rose between 1960 and 1961. Thus, the devaluation 
was more than offset by the elimination of premiums as far as exports were
concerned. On the import side, the price-deflated effective exchange rate of 
won to the dollar increased sharply as the result of the devaluation. Thus, the
effective rates for exports and imports were brought closely into line in 1961 
and 1962. 
In 1963 and 1964, export dollar premia emerged again through the mar­ket for import entitlements, and the effective exchange rates for exports andimports again diverged sharoly. The devaluation of May 1964, from 130 to257 won to the dollar, the float in the spring of 1965 to 271 won to the dollar,
and the 1964 unification of rates again brought the effective rates for exports
and imports into line. Despite the enormous nominal devaluation between1963 and 1965 (about a 115 percent increase in the won/dollar rate)purchasing-power-parity effective won/dollar rate for exports 
the 
rose only about11 percent. On the import side, however, the devaluation was more effective. 
After 1965, the export and import rates moved increasingly out of linebecause of rapidly growing export subsidies. Export subsidies as a percent ofthe effective exchange rate are compared with actual tariffs and tariff equiva­lents as a percentage of the effective exchange rate in Table 5-10. By 1970,
about one-fifth of the effective exchange rate for exports represented subsidies
of one form or another. 
The quantitative estimates, outlined in tables 5-8 through 5-10, confirmthe impressions of our analysis of individual trade and exchange rate policies
-liberalization efforts in 1961-62 and 1964-65, followed by rapid backslid­ing in 1963 and gradual backsliding from 1967 to 1971. This pattern emerges
most clearly in looking at columns D and E of Table 5-10. The premia and
subsidies as a percentage of the effective exchange rate on exports follow thepattern of the liberalization efforts. Column G shows, however, that tariffs andtariff equivalents declined steadily as a percentage of the effective exchange
rate on imports from 1959 to 1970 (except for a sligit increase in 1967). The
major reasons are the elimination of the foreign ex.hange tax in 1962, thegradual shift of imports towaid capital goods with low or zero tariffs, and theincreasing tariff-exempt importation of raw materials for export industries. 
____________ 
TABLE 5-10
 
Comparison of Purchasing-Power-Party Effective Exchmnge Ratrs
 
for Exports and Imports, 1953 to 1970
 
Purchasing- Purchasing-
 Percentage Components of Effi-- Percentage Components of Effec­Power-Parity Power-Parity tive Exchange Rate on Exports tive Exchange Rate on ImportsEffective Effective 
Exchange Exchange Official Tariff and OfficialRate Rate Ratio Exchange Tariff Equiv- Exchangeon Exportsa on Importsb (A--B) Premiae Subsidiesd Rate alentsf Rates(A) (B) 
 (C) (D) 
 (E) (F) 
 (G) (H)
1958 280.6 155.9 1.80 55.5 1.0 43.5 22.51959 77.5325.3 198.2 1.64 62.2 1.0 36.8 39.61960 60.4296.6 216.9 1.37 56.7 0.8 42.51961 289.1 282.2 1.02 37.6 62.49.7 5.6 84.7 13.2 86.81962 264.0 255.1 1.03 0.0 14.1 85.9 11.21963 88.8275.8 215.7 1.28 21.3 10.3 68.71964 12.2 87.8305.0 267.6 1.14 14.11965 9.7 76.2 13.2 86.8304.6 293.1 1.04 0.0 12.8 87.21966 305.1 280.0 9.4 90.61.09 0.0 15.9 84.11967 8.4 91.6297.4 266.0 1.12 0.0 18.2 81.81968 8.6 91.4298.8 255.1 1.17 0.0 21.9 78.11969 295.6 254.5 1.16 0.0 8.5 91.5 20.6 79.4 7.8 92.21970 307.2 260.1 1.18 0.0 21.8 78.2 7.6 92.4 
a. Based on row H, Table 5-8. 
b. Based on row El, Table 5-9. 
C.Row B, Table 5-8, as percent of row D. 
d. Row C7, Table 5-8, as percent of row D. 
e. Row A, Table 5-8, as percent of row D.f. Row B8, Table 5-9, as percent of row CI. 
g. Row A. Table 5-9, as percent of row C 1. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
From 1967 until Jure 1971, the effective exchange rate for exports was main­
tained by gradually increasing export subsidies. Attempts were made to liber­
alize import controls and tariffs but these foundered. A devaluation of the won 
in June 1971, two dollar devaluations in 1972 and 1973, and a yen revalua­
tion caused the balance of payments to improve markedly and export subsidies 
were partly dismantled in early 1973. 
Under increasing pressure from business interests the government in late 
1972 adopted a basically different strategy--one in which price irflation and 
interest rates would be reduced and the exchange rate held stable. Though the
short-run response of the economy and the balance of payments has been satis­
factory, prior devaluations and a worldwide economic boom have been moreimportant factors than the reforms in producing the desired result. It remains 
to be seen whether these policies will succeed in the long run. The strength of 
the won may be eroded by continuing high costs of petroleum, grains, and
other natural resources that Korea imports in large quantiti,:s. It may be im­
possible to keep prices in check and further devaluations may be required to 
keep the economy growing at a rapid pace. 
NOTES 
I. Under the positive-list system, only those items listed in the trade program couldbe imported or exported, subject to specifications made in the program. But under the
negative-list system, the trade program lists only those items whose imports or exports
are either prohibited or restricted. Therefore, unlisted items in the negative-list program
represent Automatic Approval items, whereas the unlisted items in the positive-list 
program are either prohibited or restricted. 
2. See Table 5-8 for details on interest rate subsidies.
3. Subsidies by the wastage allowance on imported raw materials are considered 
to be included in internal tax and customs duties exemptions, since the tax and customsduties exemptions include exemptions for the proportion of wastage allowance (both
technological wastage loss and additional allowances). 
Chapter 6 
ExprtMWn the Growth 
and Srtueof thu Economy 
Very rapid growth of exports has been the outstanding feature of South 
Korea's economic performance over the 1960s and early '70s and has been a 
significant determinant of the growth and structure of the South Korean 
economy as a whole. 
PATTERN OF EXPORT GROWTH 
Table 6-1, which gives exports and export growth rates from 1953 until 1972,
shows that rapid growth began in 1959 and averaged 38.5 percent between 
1958 and 1972. Exports in 1973 reached $3.2 billion, almost a doubling over 
the previous year. 
Table 6-1 demonstrates the relative unimportance of U.S. procurement
for Viet Nam which only began in 1967. The growth rate of exports exclusive 
of exports to South Viet Nam was even more rapid than growth in total ex­
ports, except in 1967 and 1968. Nevertheless, exports, net of sales to Viet 
Nam, grew at rates of 28 and 42 percent, respectively in 1967 and 1968-a 
very creditable performance by any standard. In 1972, exports to Viet Nam 
accounted for less than 3 percent of the total. 
As Table 6-2 shows, 78 percent of South Korean exports in 1961 were 
primary products-mainly tungsten, coal, dried laver (seaweed), and fish. By
1971, 86 percent were manufactured products and only 14 percent were pri­
mary products. Though total exports expanded more than 40 times between 
1961 and 1972, manufactured exports expanded almost 170 times in those 
77 
78 EXPORTS AND THE GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 
TABLE 6-1 
Export Growth, 1953 to 1973 
Exports Net 
Year 
Total Growth 
Exports Rate 
($ million) (percent) Year 
Total 
Exports 
($ million) 
of Sales 
Growth to Viet Growth 
Rate Nam Rate 
(percent) ($ million) (percent) 
1953 
1954 
40 
24 
-
-40 
1963 
1964 
87 
119 
58 
37 
87 
119 
58 
37 
1955 18 -25 1965 175 47 175 47 
1956 
1957 
25 
19 
39 
-24 
1966 
1967 
250 
335 
43 
34 
250 
320 
43 
28 
1958 
1959 
1960 
17 
20 
33 
-II 
18 
65 
1968 
1969 
1970 
486 
658 
882 
45 
35 
34 
455 
622 
835 
42 
37 
34 
1961 
1962 
41 
55 
24 
34 
1971 
1972 
1,132 
1,676 
28 
48 
1,068 
1,624 
28 
52 
1973 3,271 95 3,225 99 
SouccE: Bank of Korea, Economic Slatistics Yearbook, various issues. 
years, a rate of growth averaging more than 60 percent per annum. Admit­
tedly, the growth started from a very small base, but it continued even after 
exports had reached a substantial percentage of GNP. From 1967-when 
exports were almost 9 percent of GNP-to 1972, the growth rate of total ex­ports averaged 38.2 percent and manufactured exports 44.5 percent.
Table 6-3 lists the major manufactured exports of the period 1961-72.In 1961, they were plywood, cotton fabrics, and plates and sheets of iron and 
steel. The growth of exports oi thse products was rapid over the next decade 
and they remained important in 1972. Electrical machinery and apparatus,
clothing, footwear, and wigs were not exported at all in 1961, but by 1972
they accounted for 39 percent of total exports and 45 percent of manufactured 
exports. 
The largest market for Korean exports in the early 1960s was Japan, and
from 1965 onwards the most important has been the United States (Table
6-4). Though of very little significance as an export market in the 1950s and 
very early '60s, the United States absorbed more than 50 percent of Korea's 
exports in 1968, but has become a somewhat less important customer in recent years. Since 1965, Japan has taken about one-quarter, and the remaining
quarter has been split between other Asian countries and Europe. In 1973, 
exports to Japan were expected to increase substantially. The several revalua­
TABLE 6-2 
Structure and Growth Rates of Exports, 1961 to 1973 
Total Export Transactions a Primary Product Exports Manufactured Exports 
Annual Growth Percent Annual Growth Percent Annual Growth 
Year 
Amount 
($ million) 
Rate 
(percent) 
Amount 
($ million) 
of 
Total 
Rate 
(percent) 
Amount 
(S mi'iion) 
of 
Total 
Rate 
(percent) 
1961 42.9 32.5 33.5 78.0 - 9.4 22.0 60.8 
1962 56.7 32.2 41.4 73.0 23.6 15.3 27.0 62.2 
1963 84.4 48.8 40.8 48.3 -1.4 43.6 51.7 184.8 
1964 
1965 
1966 
120.9 
180.5 
225.8 
43.2 
49.3 
41.7 
58.6 
68.1 
96.1 
48.4 
37.7 
37.6 
43.6 
16.2 
26.4 
62.3 
- 112.4 
159.7 
51.6 
62.3 
62.4 
42.9 
80.3 
42.1 
1967 358.6 40.2 107.4 29.9 11.8 251.2 70.1 55.4 
1968 500.4 39.5 113.5 22.7 5.7 386.9 77.3 54.1 
1969 702.8 40.4 147.7 21.0 30.1 555.1 79.0 43.4 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1,003.8 
1,352.0 
1,807.0 
42.8 
34.7 
33.7 
164.4 
189.1 
222.7 
16.4 
14.0 
12.3 
11.3 
15.0 
14.1 
839.4 
1,162.9 
1,584.3 
83.6 
86.0 
87.7 
51.2 
38.5 
36.2 
1973 3,254.2 80.2 381.0 11.8 71.1 2,872.8 88.2 81.3 
SoUtRcE: Economic Planning Puard, Major Economic Indicators, various issues. 
a. These figures are based on records of settlements of export transactions kept by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. They usually
exceed other export figures cited in this volume (e.g., tables 2-7 and 6-1 ), which are determined on a customs clearance basis. 
TABLE 6-3
 
Major Manufactured Exports, 1961 to 1973
 
(amounts in millions of dollars) 
Plates &Sheets Electrical
 
Cotton Fabrics, of Machinery 
 Wigs &Plywood Woven Iron &Steel &Apparatus Clothing Footwear Human Hair 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percentof Total of Total of Total of Total of Total of Total of TotalYear Amount Exports Amount Exports Amount Exports Amount Exports Amount Exports Amount Exports Amount Exports 
1961 1.2 2.8 0.9 2.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01962 2.3 4.1 1.8 3.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.1 2.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.01963 6.3 7.5 4.3 5.1 8.3 9.8 0.9 1.1 4.6 5.5 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.01964 11.4 9.4 11.1 9.2 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.3 6.6 5.5 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.21965 18.0 10.0 10.5 5.8 10.2 5.7 3.3 1.8 20.7 !1.5 4.2 2.3 2.3 1.31966 29.9 11.7 10.1 3.9 7.1 2.8 8.3 3.2 33.4 13.1 5.5 2.2 12.0 4.71967 36.4 10.2 12.6 3.5 0.9 0.3 9.3 2.6 59.2 16.5 8.1 2.3 22.7 6.31968 65.6 13.1 13.3 2.7 0.8 0.2 21.8 4.4 112.2 22.4 11.0 2.2 35.1 7.01969 79.2 11.3 18.6 2.6 3.6 0.5 42.3 6.0 160.8 22.9 10.5 1.5 60.2 8.61970 91.4 9.1 26.4 2.6 7.6 0.8 48.5 4.8 213.6 21.3 17.3 1.7 100.9 10,11971 124.3 9.2 31.0 2.3 20.1 1.5 74.3 5.5 304.3 22.5 37.4 2.8 69.9 5.21972 153.6 8.5 34.8 1.9 68.1 3.8 137.4 7.6 442.2 24.5 55.4 3.1 73.8 4.11973 270.8 8.3 56.5 1.7 129.3 4.0 345.3 10.6 749.9 23.0 106.4 3.3 81.5 2.5 
SOURCE: Economic Planning Board, MajorEconomic Indicators,various issues. 
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TABLE 6-4 
-:ports by Country, 1960 to 1973 
(percent of total exports) 
United Other Rest of 
States Japan Asia Europe World 
1960 6.7 63.4 11.6 14.1 4.3
 
1961 9.4 50.2 23.3 8.4 8.6
 
1962 21.8 42.8 22.3 11.5 1.5
 
1963 28.0 28.6 33.3 9.1 1.0
 
1964 29.7 31.9 23.3 13.1 2.0
 
1965 35.2 25.1 23.9 12.2 3.6 
1966 38.3 26.5 15.4 13.6 6.2 
1967 42.9 26.5 13.9 10.4 6.4 
1968 51.7 21.9 11.5 8.0 7.0 
1969 50.1 21.4 13.0 8.9 6.5 
1970 47.3 28.0 9.8 9.1 5.7 
1971 49.8 24.5 10.4 8.2 7.0 
1972 46.7 25.1 11.3 10.1 6.7 
1973 31.7 38.5 10.3 11.8 7.8 
SOURCE: Economic and Statistics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 184-185; 1970, pp. 296-297; 
1966, p. 264; 1962, p. 220. 
tions of the yen vis-A-vis the dollar and the gradual devaluation of the won 
with respect to the dollar from December 1970 to June 1972 left the won in a 
very favorable position with respect to the yen in 1973. This has stimulated 
exports from Korea to Japan. 
NET FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTENT 
OF EXPORTS 
Many of South Korea's exports have a particularly high import content-for 
example, cotton, woolen, and synthetic textiles; plywood; wigs; steel; and 
electronics. Some require more natural-resource-based raw materials than can 
be produced locally, except at very high cost, such as iron ore, cotton, wool, 
leather, round wood for plywood, and human hair (in sufficient quantities). 
Others require industrial raw materials that are not produced locally in ade­
quate amounts despite attempts to produce import substitutes for petrochemi­
cals, synthetic yams, plastics, and sophisticated electronic components. Though 
the import content of silk textiles, fertilizers, cement, tiles, and a range of 
primary products is low, for most exports it is high. 
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It is difficult to determine the total import content (direct and indirect)
of South Korea's exports. The Ministry of Finance publishes figures only on 
the direct import content of exports, including imports for bonded processing 
and an estimate of other private imports used directly in exports.' Import 
content is estimated for the years 1967 to 1973 as follows: 
967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
 
40.0% 43.7% 43.9% 44.3% 46.3% 36.8% 42.3% 
The Korea Productivity Center (1970) produced estiniLtes of 32.2 percent 
and 41.7 percent for 1967 and 1969 for the direct import content, based on a 
survey of 45 commodities accounting for 85.4 percent of total exports. The 
Korea Trade Research Center of Seoul National University (1969) produced 
estim.ates of both the direct and indirect import content using the 1966 input­
output matrix. They also computed an implicit "charge" for imported capital 
inputs. For 1966, they estimated the direct and indirect import content at 
40.0 percent and for 1968 at 44.4 percent. 
All observers apparently agree that the import content of Korea's exports
increased during the late 1960s, despite the incentives given aftLr 1965 to 
domestic suppliers of exporting firms, but did seem to fall off in the early '70s. 
South Korean exports are import intensive largely because of the particu­
lar products in question rather than because of the processes used to produce 
them. Since manufactures tend to be more import intensive than primary 
products, and the former are more important relative to the latter, the import 
content of South Korea's exports is high. Another factor in the high import 
content of exports is the greater import intensity of manufactured exports
relative to all manufactures. In the table below, we contrast the results from 
the 1970 input-output estimates oi the direct import intensity of total produc­
tion with the Korea Productivity Center results for direct import intensity in 
1969:2 
Korean Productivity 
1970 lnput-Cutput
Estimates of Direct 
Center Estimates 
of Direct Import 
Import Intensity of Intensity for 
General Production Exports in 1969 
(percent) (percent) 
Primary products 1.2 1.1 
Food, beverages, and tobacco 10.9 0.2 
Other manufacturing 25.0 53.8 
All commodities 14.2 41.7 
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We see that exports are more import intensive than general production, butthat the differences are far smaller when corrected for the type of products
exported or produced. In fact, for primary products and processed foods,
exports are less import intensive than general production.
Although the import intensity of Korean exports is higher than for pro­duction in general, it is not appropriate to characterize South Korean exports
as resulting largely from bonded processing. Value added domestically is quite
substantial. The degree of import content and its tendency to increase in the1960s does take some of the bloom off of Korea's spectacular export per­formance. Yet even if allowance were made for this fact by adjusting SouthKorean exports and their growth downward, the performance would still be
remarkable by any standard of international comparison. 
RANGE OF EXPORT INCENTIVES 
As we have mentioned before, the number and variety of export incentives 
used in South Korea is striking (Table 3-3). Although some of them predate
the mid-1950s, most incentive programs have been introduced and graduallyintensified since the end of the Korean War. Their net effect has been an
effective exchange rate for exports that has exceeded that for imports.
Another means of encouraging exports is implicit in the government's
method of administering the various export subsidies and targets. Rather thandealing with each individual exporter, the government has worked Jtrough
exporters' associations composed of all the exporters in a particular industry.For example, wastage allowances, import entitlements, preferential loans, and 
export targets were often allocated to an association, which in turn devised
methods of parceling the incentives and targets a:nong its members. These
associations, moreover, have tended to serve as informal cartels for allocatingdomestic sales and this arrangement has enabled firms to charge somewhathigher prices in local markets. In some instances these higher prices reflect the
absence of tariff and internal tax exemptions and for some commodities (e.g.
wigs), there is almost no domestic market. Nevertheless, the presumption re­
mains that for a limited range of commodities there is an element of monopolyin domestic pricing. For these commodities, price discrimination betweendomestic and foreign sales potenti.lly subsidizes exports. This problem is dis­
cussed in more detail in Chapter 10. 
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EXPORT SENSITIVITY TO SUBSIDIES 
AND EXCHANGE RATES 
The value of a number of subsidies to exports was calculated as part of the 
determination of the purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rates on 
exports and imports (tables 5-8 and 5-9). In Table 6-5, the purchasing­
power-parity effective exchange rate on exports is divided into thrce com­
ponents: (1) that due to the official exchange rate, (2) that due to premia
resulting from the multiple exchange rate system, and (3) that due to a num­
ber of export subsidies. Subsidies include direct subsidies, tax rebates, utility
rate rebates, and the value of subsidized credit for exports. In Table 6-5, the 
three components of the effective exchange .ateare deflated separately, while 
only the aggregate series is deflated in Table 5-8, line H. 
These data can be used to estimate the sensitivity of exports to exchange 
rates and export subsidies. Statistically, there are a number of problems, the 
TABLE 6-5
 
Efective Exchange Rate on Exports, Purchming-Power-Purity Basis, 1955 to 1970
 
(won per dollar)
 
Export Effective 
Official Premia Due Subsidies Exchange
Exchange to Multiple per Dollar RateYear Rate Exchange Rates of Exports on Exports 
1955 99.7 159.9 0.0 259.6 
1956 132.1 139.8 0.0 271.9 
1957 118.1 139.1 0.0 257.2 
1958 121.8 155.9 3.0 280.7 
1959 119.7 202.8 3.1 325.6 
1960 135.4 181.7 2.6 319.7 
1961 244.8 28.0 16.4 289.2 
1962 226.6 0.0 37.5 264.1 
1963 189.3 58.0 28.4 275.7 
1964 232.2 43.0 29.6 304.8 
1965 265.4 0.0 39.2 304.6
1966 256.3 0.0 48.7 305.0 
1967 243.1 0.0 56.0 299.1 
1968 233.3 0.0 65.5 298.8
1969 234.5 0.0 61.2 295.7
1970 240.2 0.0 67.0 307.2 
SouRcE: Same as Table 5-8. 
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main difficulty being that from 1955 to 1970 the effective exchange rate for 
exports remained remarkably steady. This was particularly true after 1964.Although the effective official exchange rate has varied dramatically from year
to year, subsidies and export premia have also changed in such a way as tokeep the effective exchange rate for exports relatively constant. Another factor 
affecting our estimate is that exports after the Korean War were very small for 
a country of South Korea's size and GNP per capita. Much of South Korea's 
export growth in the late 1950s and early '60s was a matter of catching up
after the devastation of two major wars in little more than a decade. Since
the extraordinarily rapid rate of growth indicates that exporting was extremelyprofitab!e 
-- pievailing exchange rates, it is plausible to hypothesize that South
Korean exports were constrained more by the capacity to produce goods thanby the relative profitability of producing for export instead of for domestic 
markets. 
The sensitivity of exports can be tested by using exports of manufactured 
goods (XGM) as the dependent variable, and nonagricultural output (YNA),
the official exchange rate on a purchasing-power-parity basis (ORD), and all
other export incenives (i.e., a combination of multiple exchange rate premia
and subsidies denoted by SUBX) as explanatory variables. If the whole period1955 to 1970 is included, the results are very poor. From 1957 Lo 1970, we 
obtain the following result: 
XGM = -241.4847 + 0.3323YNA + 0.26290RD + 0.1471SUBX (6-1)(-3.92) (11.29) (1.70) (1.27) 
Estimation Technique: Cochranc-Orcutt Iterative Technique 
R2 = 0.9900 
d = 1.3742 
p = 0.8701 
The coefficient of YNA is highly significant, which indicates that general
capacity in nonagriculture is the most significant factor explaining exports.That is, the general capacity of the economy to produce is probably an im­portani determinant of exports. The elasticity of manufactured exports with 
respect to changes in the exchange rate (ORD) is 2.14 and with respect to 
export subsidies i. 0.95. The coefficients of the official exchange rate ORD
and the subsidy level for exports SUBX, however, are not significant.
This result can be greatly modified, however, if the time span is changedfi'om 1957-70 to 1963-70. The coefficient of ORD becomes 1.713 and the 
tratio is over 13.8; the coefficient of SUBX becomes 1.305 with a t ratio of10.9.3 With such a short period, however, the degrees of freedom are limited. 
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The exchange rate variable, ORD, and the subsidy variable, SUBX, are almost 
constant and show fairly limited variation from 1963 to 1970, making the
results still more suspect. Finally, the inplied elastvti#'. for the exchange rate
and subsidy variables from 1963 to 1970 are enormous, equal to 6.16 forORD and 4.69 for SUBX. Any period beginning before 1963, however, givesinsignificant results for the coefficients of ORD and SUBX4 
It seems reasonable to infer that the responsiveness of exports changed
sharply after 1963, but the period is too short for accurate estimation of 
parameters. We may infer that before 1963 sensitivity to exchange rate policy
was lacking because export,, particularly manufactures, were insignificant and 
because the system of multiple exchange rates then in use was very inefficient. 
After !963, both goveinment officials and private entrepreneurs were more 
export oriented. Mu! liple exchange rates gave way to a system that relied moreheavily on high official exchange rates combined with export subsidies, par­
ticularly in the form of tax and tariff relief (TaUle 6-5). Exports became very
much more sensitive to exchange rate policies and despite rapid inflation, the 
rate on exports was maintained at a high level after the reforms of 1964 by a
combination of official devaluations and growing export subsidies. 
Another factor that may have fostered the increased responsiveness of 
exports after 1963 was the reduced risk of exporting once the exchange ratefor exports was stabilized after 1964. As the predictability of export earnings
increased, it became more reasonable for individual entrepreneurs to concen­
trate on exports. 
MEASURING STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall discuss the use of input-output data
and national accounts to evaluate the role of exports in the growth of the 
Korean economy, particularly in relation to the other sources of output growth,
namely domestic demand expansion and import substitution. Our analysis ex­
tends from 1955 to 1968. We could not extend it beyond 1968 because at the
time the research was done, 1968 was the last year for which an input-output 
table was available. 
The analysis of structural change in South Korea is based on a series offive input-output tables. That for 1955 was prepared especially for this study
and gives information at a 29-sector level of detail.5 Those for the remaining
observation years-1960, 1963, 1966, and 1968-provide the information in 
a 117-sector breakdown.' Because of this difference, it is not possible to 
present the same information fo" all five observation years.
The input-output tables distinguish between competing and noncompeting
imports. The former are defined as items that are also produced domestically; 
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the latter as items not produced in Korea in the year for which the table was 
compiled. By virtue of this definition, the list of items classed as noncompeting 
changes from table to table. Failure to adjust the statistics year by year to a 
common list of noncompeting imports would lead to a severe understatement 
of the degree of import substitution practiced, for much of it has come through
introducing the production of formerly noncompe:ing imports (e.g., petroleum
products). We have adjusted the data so that virtually all imports are treated 
as competing. The original data with explanatory documentation are available 
from the authors. The tables provided here are confined to aggregated data 
and present most of this data in terms of shares and/or compositions within 
total figures; this mode of presentation seems of greater relevance to the gen­
eral reader than the presentation of the raw statistics. 
A study of structural change is most meaningfully conducted in terms of 
real, i.e., constant price, magnitudes: thus it was necessary to deflate the cur­
rent price input-output statistics into constant price figures. A procedure often 
followed in other studies of this type is to deflate all magnitudes for a sivcn 
observation year by the same index, say the GDP deflator. While this pro­
cedure does suffice to insure that, on average, changes over time are not mis­
stated because of price level changes, it fails to take account of relative price
changes. In our deflation procedure, output deflators at the 117-sector level 
were used to estimate inter-sectoral relative price changes, while independen,
time series on the general wholesale price level, the wholesale price level of 
imported commodities, the price level of exports, and the exchange rates on 
imports and exports were used to determine aggregate price level changes for 
imports, exports, and domestic sales. The resulting figures at constant domestic 
market prices incorporate, insofar as possible given the limitations of the price
indexes, changes over time both in the average price level and in !he structure 
of relative prices. These constant price statistics were further deflated by the 
nominal protection rates estimated for 1968 to yield a set of input-output 
statistics at constant world market prices. 7 Deflation to constant world market 
prices was carried out for commodities only; there are no estimates here of 
magnitudes for nontradables measured in some equivalent of constant world 
market prices.
For our basic indicators of structural change, we split the growth of 
production of a sector over time into three categories: domestic demand 
expansion (DE), export expansion (EE), and import substitution (IS).
There are a number of ways to accomplish such a decomposition, depending 
upon whether one examines first differences or deviations from proportional
growth and upon how one relates imports to other elements in the system." 
Here we shall report on one set of estimates that uses a particular mode of 
decomposition. Though we have experimented with a variety of methods, they
all lead to the same general conclusions reported here.9 
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The decomposition begits with the fundamental supply-demand balance 
equation of input-output analysis: 
x,., = Wi, + C., + Zil + E, - Mi, (6-2) 
where X1,, = gross output in sector / in period t; 
Wilt = intermediate demand for the output of sector f in period t; 
m = private plus government consumption demand for the output of 
sector f in period t; 
Zi,, = investment demand (including net stock accumulation) for the 
output of sector f in period t; 
Ej~j = export demand for the output of sector f in period t; and 
M1.1 = imports of items classified in sector f in period t. 
We shall define import substitution as a change in the ratio of imports to 
domestic demand. Let mj, be defined as Mj,,/Dj,,,where 
Dj,, = Wlt + C,, + Z,, (6-3) 
is total domestic demand for the output of sector j in period 1. Letting I = S 
denote the first period, from (6-2) and (6-3), we may write 
Xis = (I - in,,) Djs + Ej1,. (6-4) 
For the second period (T), from (6-2) and (6-3) we may write: 
XJ ,T = DJ,T + EJ,T - MJ,T. (6-5) 
If we add mj . Dj,., and subtract the same quantity on the right hand 
side of (6-5), we have 
Xjlr = (1 - mr, 8) . D,, + EjT + m, 8 . DJT - M,,T. (6-6) 
Subtracting (6-4) from (6-6) yields 
(xJT - X1,H) = ( - m, 8 ) ' (D T - D,.S) + (Ej,. - E,8,) (6-7) 
+ (rn?,S - MJ,, ) ' Oj.r 
or 
AXj = (I - mjs) • ADj + AEj - &mj" Dj,T (6-8) 
where A is the difference operator and 
(I - mj,,) •ADj = contribution of domestic demand expansion (DE); 
AE, = contribution of export expansion (EE); 
- Amj. Dj,.r = contribution of import substitution (IS). 
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Equation (6-8) gives the breakdown of growth into that due to expan­
sion of domestic demand, that due to export expansion, and that due to 
import substitution. The contribution of domestic demand is the domestic 
demand coefficient (I - il,,) times the change in domestic demand (&D,)
for the sector j. The contribution of exports is merely the increase in exports, 
and the contribution of import substitution is minus the change in the import 
coefficient (am) times domestic demand (D.r) in period T for sector j. 
We shall use equation (6-8) to decompose the change in output into its 
component parts. It is important to recognize, however, that any decomposi­
tion is essentially a descriptive device and involves some arbitrary choices. 
For example, the choice of the first period as the base for defining the import 
ratio is wholly arbitrary. Use of the second period's import ratio-an equally 
arbitrary choice-as the reference point would give 
AXj = (I - injt,r) . ADj + AE, - Amj Dj.s. (6-9) 
If the import ratio declined over time, then both measures of import substitu­
tion would be positive, but that based on the first period's import ratio would 
he greater if domestic demand has grown (i.e., - Am• DI,T> - A nj.1 Dj.s).
Conversely, the contribution of domestic demand to growth will be smaller 
when the first period is taken as the base. The bias in either case results from 
using values for two discrete points in time, which means that we face an index 
number problem.10 
There are several ways to circumvent this problem, a number of which 
were tried. The approach reported here is the use of "chained" measures. 
Rather than apply the decomposition simply to the data for 1955 and 1968, 
we have separately decomposed the change in output over each interval for 
which we have input-output data; the estimates for each interval are then 
summed to give the growth contribution estimates between 1955 and 1968. 
The same method was applied to decompose changes in output between 1960 
and 1968. 
As well as being sensitive to the index number problem, measures of 
import substitution are also sensitive to the level of aggregation employed.
Estimates based on highly aggregated data reflect both changes in the condi­
tions of supply within individual subsectors producing uniquely defined 
products and changes in the pattern of domestic demand. For example, there 
may be no import substitution in the sense defined above when one sums the 
estimates for individual sectors, and yet the ratio of aggregate imports to total 
domestic demand may have changed because of shifts in the composition of 
demand. In our s.:'dy of trade policy, we are primarily interested in the import
substitution stemming from changes in the conditions confronting suppliers. 
We have therefore estimated the growth contributions at the 1!7-sector level. 
The aggregate estimates presented below are thus aggregates of the growth 
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contributions for individual rectors rather than growth contributions calculated 
from data aggregated over the sectors. While this removes the effect of changes 
in the composition of demand among the 117 sectois, the effects of demand 
shifts within individual sectors remain in the estimaes. 
The measures defined above give the direct contributions of import sub­
stitution and expott expansion to the growth of a sector's output. However, 
part of the growth of intermediate demand for a sector's output may also be 
attributable to import substitution or to export explnsion, albeit in other 
sectors which require the output of the particular sector as intermediate input. 
The total, direct plus indirect, effect of import substitution and export expan­
sion can be calculated through the use of the inverse input-output matrix. 
Below we shall estimate both the direct and the total growth contributions. 
Only the .ormer are relevant to assessing how producers within individual 
sectors have responded to incentives policies. The latter are, however, relevant 
to measuring the contributions of import sibstitution and export expansion to 
the economy's growth. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOUTH KOREA'S 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Estimates of contributions to growth based on constant world prices are pre­
sented in Table 6-6. For the period 1955 to 1968 all sectors are grouped in 
five broad aggregates. These appear in Part I of the table. For the period 
1960 to 1968 the tradable goods sectors were grouped according to the eleven 
categories shown in Part 2. The two intermediate product categories show, 
there indicate different stages of processing, I being at a lower stage than II 
The first two industries listed are primary and the remaining nine are manu­
facturing industries. 
Tradable goods were also grouped according to the four trade categories
shown in Part 3. This classification includes: 
(X) 	 Export industries (exports greater than 10 percent of total pro­
duction); 
(IC) Import-competing industries (imports greater than 10 percent of 
total domestic supply); 
(XIC) 	 Export and import-competing industries (exports greater than 10 
percent of total production and imports greater than 10 percent of 
total domestic supply); and 
(NIC) 	 Non-import-competing industries (all other sectors). 
The figures in Table 6-6 are the absolute growth contributions divided 
by the respective changes in output; thus they state the proportion of the 
change in output that is attributable to each cause. 
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TABLE 6-6 
DkEet md lm0kted Combbolhiem to Ecomsmi Grow 
(percent of total growth of sector) 
Domestic Demand Export Import 
Expansion Expansion Substitution 
Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total 
Part1. 1955-68: Broad Sectors 
1. Primary 	 109.2 94.7 4.0 19.4 -13.2 -14.2 
2. 	 Manufacturing 80.0 72.5 13.7 22.0 6.3 5.5 
3. Social overhead 91.4 86.7 8.8 12.3 -0.2 0.9 
4. 	Services 96.4 86.7 5.0 14.9 -1.4 -1.6 
5. 	Other 81.5 70.9 35.9 46.4 -17.4 -17.3 
Total 89.0 80.3 11.2 20.2 -0.3 -0.6 
Part2. 1960-68: Industrial Groups 
1. 	Agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing 108.1 94.9 -0.1 15.9 -7.9 -10.8 
2. 	 Mining and energy 88.1 70.6 15.9 28.2 -3.9 1.2 
Primary 106.5 92.9 1.2 16.9 -7.6 -9.8 
3. 	Processed food 90.4 87.8 7.8 11.7 1.8 0.5 
4. 	Beverages and tobacco 93.8 88.9 4.0 9.9 2.2 1.1 
5. 	 Construction materials 86.4 84.8 5.6 7.4 8.0 7.8 
6. 	Intermediate products 1 68.2 54.0 17.0 32.3 14.8 13.6 
7. 	 Intermediate products I! 84.6 72.1 10.4 25.6 5.0 2.4 
8. 	 Nondurable consumer 
goods 57.1 53.0 36.2 40.2 6.8 6.8 
9. 	Durable consumer goods 81.2 78.1 23.2 27.2 -4.4 -5.3 
10. Machinery 141.1 139.5 8.0 12.2 -49.0 -51.8 
11. Transport equipment 141.7 144.6 0.2 4.2 -41.9 -48.8 
Manufacturing 81.7 74.0 15.1 24.3 3.2 1.7 
Part3. 	 1960-68: Trade Categories 
I. 	Export goods (X) 45.4 37.9 52.7 60.4 1.9 1.8 
2. 	Import-competing goods 
(IC) 	 109.3 97.5 0.5 16.1 -9.8 -13.6 
3. Non-import-competing 
goods (NIC) 93.5 85.3 1.4 10.9 5.1 3.9 
4. 	Export and import­
competing goods (XIC) 90.7 76.7 47.2 61.8 -37.9 -38.5
 
All commodities 88.2 79.0 1.4 22.4 0.3 -1.4 
Noml: All results are aggregated from 117-sector input-output data, except for 1955­
60 which is from 29-sector data. Totals may not reconcile because of rounding. Figures
for 1955 to 1968 are based on constant domestic market price data, and all other figures 
are baed on constant world market prices. 
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The most striking result of this analysis is the predominance of export
expansion over import substitution. From 1955 to 1968, 20.2 percent of total 
growth was attributable directly and indirectly to export expansion, while -0.6 
percent was due to import substitution. Thus, on balance, there was negative 
import substitution but substantial export expansion. Naturally, expansion of 
domestic demand was the most important factor, accounting for more than 
80 percent of total growth. From 1960 to 1968, export expansion was rela­
tively even more important, and accounted for 22.4 percent of growth com­
pared with -1.4 percent for import substitution. 
Another striking conclusion to be drawn from Table 6-6 is that export
expansion generated considerable domestic backward linkages while import
substitution did not. The average contribution of export expansion for either 
the 1955-68 or 1960-68 period almost doubles when indirect effects are 
taken into account. That is, growth of exports generates substantial demand 
for domestically produced intermediate goods.
It is of interest to compare the relative importance of time periods with 
respect to export expansion and import substitution. The following figures
show the total contribution of each to the growth of aggregate commodity 
output for each subinterval: 
1955-60 1960-63 1963-66 1966-68 
Export expansion 12.9% 6.3% 31.4% 21.3% 
Import substitution 10.2 -6.9 8.9 -6.6 
Export expansion contributed more to the growth of commodity output in 
each subperiod than did import substitution. The combined contribution of 
export expansion and import substitution was greatest from 1963 to 1966, the 
same period in which the major policy reforms were carried out and rapid
growth began. Growth of primary exports and import substitution in manufac­
turing had characterized the earlier period but after 1960 manufactures domi­
nated the growth of exports and there was less import substitution than there 
had been in the late 1950s. 
The figures below show the direct contributions of export expansion and 
import substitution to the growth of manufactured output alone: 
1955-60 1960-63 1963-66 1966-68 
Export expansion 5.1% 6.2% 29.4% 13.0% 
Import substitution 24.2 0.9 14.4 -0.1 
The late 1950s is seen to have been a period of major import substitution 
in manufacturing when exports played a relatively minor role in Korea's indus­
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trialization. Export growth is again seen to have made its major relative con­
tribution from 1963 to 1966. Both these and the preceding figures for import
substitution clearly reflect the effect of the high capital inflow that financed 
large imports of capital goods in the late 1960s. 
We turn now to the estimates of direct contribution by individual indus­
tries, an analysis that can only cover 1960 to 1968. Table 6-7 shows the share 
of direct trade effects (i.e., export expansion plus import substitution) in the 
output change of each of the eleven industrial groups listed in Part 2 of Table 
6-6. 
The importance of trade effects was greatest for intermediate products 
and consumer goods (groups 6, 7, 8, and 9). Along with agriculture and 
processed food (groups 1 and 3) these industries were also the major sources 
of the growth of total domestic demand and output. Because of rapid growth
of investment, import substitution (a rise of import shares) in investment 
goods production (groups 10 and 11) was negative. Thus the growth of the 
investment goods industries was almost wholly due to domestic demand. Ex­
ports contributed more than import substitution to the growth of every group(except group 5, construction materials). It is also remarkable that for every 
group 1963-66 stands out as having been the period when exports contributed 
most. 
While import substitution played a relatively modest role in each indus­
try's growth over the eight years, it did predominate in some industries during
shorter intervals. Furthermore, the relatively low share of import substitution 
from 1960 to 1968 in the aggregate for manufacturing need not imply that it 
was unimportant to the 92 individual sectors. Nonetheless, in only 12 out of 
the 80 manufacturing sectors was import substitution responsible for more 
than 20 percent of the sector's growth. Sectoral import shares actually in­
creased, lei,'ing to negative import substitution, in 39 of the manufacturing 
sectors and in 8 of the 12 primary sectors. Export expansion, on the other 
hand, was tale source of more than 20 percent of the growth of 20 manufactur­
ing sectors. The contribution of domestic demand expansion was more than 
80 percent of the individual sector's growth in well over half of the manufac­
turing sectors (53 out of 80); thus the importance of domestic demand growth 
observed in the aggregate carries through for the individual sectors as well. 
COMPARISONS WITH "NORMAL" 
DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS 
The contributions of the respective sources to Korea's growth may be com­
pared with a set of norms developed by Chenery (1969). Chenery used a 
somewhat different, though similar, set of measurements, which will now be 
TABLE 6-7 
Dkeet Trade Effeef by Induptry, 190 to 1963 
Absolutes Valut of: Period of Highest Contribution to Sector's Own Growth 
Trade Expor Import Export Expansion Import Substitution 
Groulb Effect Expansion Substitution Period Share Period Share 
1 -8.0% -0.3 -16.7 1963-66 2.8% 1963-66 17.0%2 9.6 7.3 1.7 1963-66 -37.1 1966-68 2.93 6.2 2.2 1.2 1963-66 11.4 1960-63 26.44 12.0 2.9 -0.7 1963-66 24.1 1963-66 12.45 13.6 1.4 2.1 1963-66 10.9 1963-66 20.16 31.8 27.7 24.1 1963-66 23.2 1-063-66 49.87 15.4 13.3 6.3 1963-66 23.9 1966-68 7.18 43.0 39.3 7.3 1963-66 96.0 1960-63 27.99 18.8 3.8 -0.7 1963-66 27.0 1960-63 50.410 
-41.0 1.5 -9.1 1963-66 47.4 1963-.66 -16.911 
-41.7 0.1 
-12.5 1963-66 1.8 1966-68 -11.8 
a. In billions of won at constant 1965 world prices.
b. These industrial groups are described in Table 6-6. 
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developed. Let m'j., = Mjt, (Djo, + El,t); that is, define import substitution in 
relation to the change in the ratio of imports to total demand including the 
sector's exports. Then for the first period, we may write: 
XJ.s = (i - m'1,s). D,.e + (1 - &'1,s) ' Ejm. (6-10) 
For the second period, we write 
XJr = (1 - m'1,8) DT + (I - M',j,). Eir+ m'J1 s (6-11) 
' (D,r + El,r) - Mi~r. 
Chenery classifies growth by sector in terms of the deviation of its growth from 
that of overall income. Let .'.be the ratio of total income in the second period 
to that in the first. Then multiply tfle first period's equation by Aand subtract 
from the second period's equation: 
8Xj,T = (I - M'j,s) 8Dj,.r + (I - m'j1 s) ' SE,T (6-12) 
Domestic Export contribution 
demand 
contribution 
+ (ins - n'j,,) • (Dj,. + E,?) 
Import 
substitution 
contribution 
where 8 is the "deviation" operator such that 8Y? = Yr- AY,, for any 
variable Y. 
The figures shown below give the total, i.e., direct plus indirect, contri­
bution oi each source to the deviation from proportional growth of industrial 
output (as defined by Chenery) from 1955 to 1968, using the Chenery mea­
sure just developed. The norms are derived from cross-country and time series 
data for developing countries and they correspond to the growth of per capita 
income from $100 to $200. 
Domestic Export Import 
Demand Expansion Expansion Substitution 
All country norm 50% 18% 32% 
Large country norm 55 24 21 
Korea (1960-68) 60 38 2 
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The industrialization of a "normal" country is considerably less dependent 
upon export expansion and considerably more dependent upon import sub­
stitution. 
Another instructive comparison is that of structural changes in aggregate
magnitudes for the South Korean economy with those observed in other coun­
t.ic at roughly the same level of per capita income. The most recent com­
parative study of changes in economic structure is that of Chenery (1970 a, 
b), where pooled cross-section and time series data are used to estimate re­
gressions from which structural "norms" may be inferred.12 In Chenery's clas­
sification, "industry" equals manufacturing plus construction plus other in our 
TABLE 6-8
 
Observed Structure InSouth Korea and Structural Norms
 
for Less Developed Countries
 
Observed Structural Shares 
1955 1960 1966 1968 1972
 
I. Per capita GNP $79 $86 $113 $133 $179 
2. Capital inflow ratio to GDP 7.7% 8.5% 9.0% 11.8% 4.9% 
3. Share of investment in GDP 12.0 10.9 21.9 27.1 20.8 
4. Share of exports in GDP 1.7 3.4 10.5 13.3 21.0 
5. 	 Share of manufacturing 
exports in GDP 0.4 1.2 7.5 9.3 17.8 
6. Imports as percent of GDP 10.0 12.7 20.4 26.5 26.1 
7. Primary share of GDP 48.0 42.2 40.1 33.2 32.0 
8. Industry share of GDP 13.0 15.6 21.6 24.1 26.0 
9. Utilities share 'f GLP 3.5 5.3 6.1 7.7 7.5 
10. Serv;-, snare of GDP 35.5 36.9 32.2 35.0 34.5 
.3tr,4tralNorms According to Chcnery Equations 
Actual Zero 
Capital Inflow Capital Inflow 
Large ,ountries 
1. Per capita GNP $79 $179 $79 $179 
2. Share of investment in GDP 14.4% 20.2% 12.8% 19.2% 
3. Share of exports in GDP 9.8 10.8 16.0 14.8 
4. 	Share of manufacturing 
exports in GDP 1.4 2.9 0.5 2.3 
5. Imports as percent of GDP 17.6 15.8 16.1 14.8 
6. Primary share of GDP 52.8 33.5 55.4 35.3 
7. Industry share of GDP 14.4 24.9 11.7 23.1 
8. Utilities share of GDP 5.2 7.1 5.6 7.4 
9. Services share of GDP 27.6 34.5 27.3 34.2 
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TABLE 6-8 (concluded) 
Large Manufacturing Countries 
Actual Zero 
Capital Inflow Capital Inflow1. Per capita GNP $79 $79 $79 $1792. Share of investment in GDP 10.3% 23.1% 12.2% 24.3%3. Share of exports in GDP 8.1 10.9 9.9 12.04. Imports as percent of GDP 15.8 15.8 9.9 12.05. Primary share of GDP 51.7 33.5 51.1 33.16. Industry share of GDP 17.0 24.4 19.2 25.87. Utilities share of GDP 2.9 8.2 3.4 8.5 
8. Services share of GDP 28.4 33.9 26.3 32.6 
SOURCES (Observed Structural Shares):Line 1. For 1955 through 1968, GNP in 1965 prices from Bank of Korea, NationalIncome Statistics Yearbook, 1971; divided by midyear population estimates from Bank ofKorea, Ecoaomic Statistics Yearbook, 1971, to get per capita GNP in 1965 won. Anexchange rate of 278.7 won per dollar was used, equal to the legal exchange rate times 
our estimate of average nominal protection in 1965. The estimate for 1972 was derivedfrom that for 1968, the ratio of 1972 GNP to 1968 GNP (both in 1970 prices), and theratio of midyear population in 1972 to that in 1968. The sources for the latter were re­spectively the August, 1973 Monthly Economic Statisticspublished by the Bank of Korea 
and the Economic Statistics Yearbook for 1973.Lines 2-4, 6. Bank of Korea, Monthly Economic Statistics, August, 1973, Table 91(at current mar!'et prices). The capital inflow ratio equals imports minus exports dividedby GNP plus imports minus exports.
Line 5. For 1955 through 1968. current price input-output data. For 19'2, derived 
from trade statistics.Lines 7-10. Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, Table 144 (Indus­trial Origin of GDP at Current Factor Cost). 
classification, fnd "utilities" equals social overhead less construction. The datagiven in Table 6-8 for South Korea are consistent with his definitions; they aretaken from the current price national income accounts. 
The figures shown in Table 6-8 for structural norms at per capita in­
comes of $79 (corresponding to 1955) and $179 (corresponding to 1972)
require some explanation. They have been estimated from the Chenery regres­
sions in which the explanatory variables include: the log of per capita income
and its value squared, the log of population and its value squared, the ratio
of the foreign capital inflow to total domestic resources, and three dummy
variables corresponding to three different time periods.'2 We have providedtwo sets of estimates. One is based on the Korean values of per capita income,
population, and the observed capital inflow ratio. The other set was similarly
obtained from the regressions except that the capital inflow ratio was fixed at 
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zero. The difference between these sets of figures indicates the effects on the 
structural norms of foreign capital inflows dt the rates observed in Korea. 
Both sets of estimates are derived using the appropriate values for the dummy
variables based on the year from which the data were taken. With its popula­
tion of 32.4 million in 1972, Korea falls in Chenery's large county (LC) and 
large manufacturing country (LMC) samples; thus estimate, a-om the regres­
sions over both samples are given. To summarize, the figures pertain to the 
"typical" structure of an economy of Korea's (then) per capita income and 
size, either based on the observed capital inflow rate or a zero capital inflow 
rate. 
In Table 6-8, we see that Korea's structure in 1955 differed substantially
from both the LC and LMC norms. This is understandable given the disrup­
tion caused by the Korean War. The most striking irregularity in Korea's 
structure in 1955 is the very low share of exports in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The share of imports was also very low. Industrial production wasbelow the norm and services uutput was exceptionally large as a share of GDP. 
By 1972, Korea's exports as a percent of GDP were nearly double the 
norm for a country of her size, per capita income, and dependence on foreign
capital. The ratio of import- to GDP was also unusually high, while the indus­
try share was somewhat above the norm. Because 1972 was, in relative terms, 
a recession year, the investment rate in that year was nearly normal. However,
from 1969 to 1971 it averaged 28.4 percent, well above the norm. Part of the 
reason for the exceptionally high 1972 export ratio relative to the norm is 
that Korea isbeing compared with othcr countries equally dependent on capi­
tal imports. However, even if we compute the norm by assuming that the 
trade deficit were zero, Korea's export ratio is still much higher than usual. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From these comparisons with the norm, it appears that (1) the share of pri­
mary production was probably low.r than normal during the 1960s; that (2) the pace of industrialization was more rapid than in other countries;
that (3) the growth of exports, especially of manufactures, was unusually
fast; and that (4) the growth of investment was very large and far too quick
to be attributed merely to high capital inflows. Exports were not retarded by
capital inflows as much as the regressions that determine the norms might
suggest; nor can the rapidity of their growth be explained away as simply the 
result of "catching up to the norm." 
The foregoing discussion of exports has been largely descriptive. The 
rapid growth of exports, the ensuing alteration in the structure of the economy,
and the responsiveness of exports to incentives are no proof of efficiency. 
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Likewise, the growing import content of South Korea's exports is no conclu­
sive indication of inefficiency-it may merely demonstrate that Korea's com­
parative advantagc lies in exporting commodities that happen to be import
intensive. There is no reason to believe that more backward integration in 
exports would be any more efficient than a further expansion of existing types
of exports or a venture into new export lines. 
Efficiency in exports in particular and in trade and foreign exchange
policy in general will be discussed in Chapter 10. 
NOTES 
1. See Ministry of Finance, Foreign Trade of Korea, various issues. 
2. The 1970 input-output figures are given in Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics 
Yearbook, 1973, p. 359. The Korean Productivity Center data comes from p. 29 of 
Korean Productivity Center (1970). 
3. 	 The full equation, obtained by the Cochrane-Orcutt technique is:
 
XGM = -651.5 + 0.3357YNA + 1.713ORD + 1.305SUBX
 
(-17.0) (61.7) (13.8) (10.9)(R2 - 0.9997 and Durbin-Watson = 2.3205). If ordinary least-squares are used, the 
coefficients of ORD and SUBX become significant whenever the period is 1964-70. Be­
fore 1964, however, the data do not reveal any significant relationship. 
4. Nak Kwan Kim has used quarterly data on exchange rates, export subsidies, rela­
tive prices in Korea and abroad, and demand in major export markets in an attempt to 
estimate export equations for specific commodities from 1965 to 1970. For electrical ma­
chinery, 	 knitted outergarments, plywood, -nd wigs, exchange rate or export subsidy
variables are significant and explanatory with high elasticities. For woven cotton fabrics, 
neither exchange rate nor subsidy vriables are important, but exports of these products 
are controlled by quota. See Kim (1972). 
5. The compilation of the 1955 input-output table was conducted under the super­
vision of Sae Min Oh, Chief, Input-Output Research Section, Bank of Korea, and was 
financed by grants from the University Committee on Research in the Humanities andSocial Sciences and the Council on International and Regional Studies, Princeton 
University. 
6. These were published in 1970 in mimeograph by the Bank of Korea in its Korean 
Input-Output Tables for 1960, 1963, 1966 and 1968. 
7. An Annex describing the deflation procedure in detail is available from the au­
thors on request. This Annex also explains how a number of independent statistical 
series (e.g., national income accounts, various price indexes, the index of manufacturing
output) can be systematically "filtered" through a time series of input-output statistics 
to check the consistency of a large body of economic data for a particular country. Hav­
ing performed this analysis, we have great confidence in our input-output estimates at 
constant prices at the 29-sector and higher levels of aggregation. The Annex also dis­
cusses the projection back in time of an index of nominal protection based the 1968on 
nominal protection rates and observed changes in domestic prices relative to export and 
import prices. 
8. Chenery (1960, 1962) was the first to erploy this type of analysis. Our decom­
positim is closer to that employed by Lewis and Soligo (1965), however. They define 
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imlpor substitution in relation to total demand, including exports. Their definition is 
approprate if the level of aWegation is such that there is considerable reexport activity 
within broadly defined sectors. Since we are working with highly disaggregated data, the 
"reexport" specification s incorrect. 
9. Details an available from the authors on request. 
10. See Fam (1971).
 
1I.These categories were employed in Balassa and Associates (1971).
 
12. Chenery has subsequently revised the regressions presented in the papers cited; 
the latest set of regressions, communicated privately to the authors, have been used here 
to estimate normal structural shares. 
13. Total domestic resources arc equal to GNP plus imports minus exports. 
Chapter 7 
the Exchange Rate Regime 
Beginning in 1965, the South Korean economy became increasingly depen­
dent on foreign borrowing. Foreign loan arrivals rose from $183.0 million to$787.4 million between 1966 and 1971, or close to 10 percent of GNP in1971.1 In 1965, a heavy proportion of the loans came from public sources 
overseas. Between 1968 and 1971 more than two-thirds of all foreign loan
arrivals were commercial, mainly suppliers' credits for import of capital equip­
ment ir:mi the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and WestGermany (tables 7-1 and 7-2). The sources of public loans also shifted 
markedly, from a heavy reliance in the early 1960s on United States AID grants and development 13ans on very soft terms to greater reliance in the 
later '60s on Japanese, IBRD, and Asian Development Bank loans on rela­
tively hard terms. The increasing emphasis on commercial loans and the shift 
of sources of public loans has greatly increased the cost of foreign capital
imports. All loans greater than one year are denominated in foreign currency,
the dollar, the mark, thc yen, the franc, or the pound. 
OFFICIAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN 
CAPITAL IMPORTS 
The rapid increase in foreign commercial loans and the shift to more expen­
sive sources of public loans has recently become a matter of concern to Korean 
officials. Throughout most of the 1960s, however, the government had strongly
encouraged the import of private foreign capital as a major policy tool in 
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TABLE 7-1
 
Ansvk el Freip Caphl ind OAN GnmU, 1966 to 1971
 
(millions of dollars)
 
1966 1967 1963 1969 1970 1971 
A. Foreign capital arrivals. 197.3 296.0 562.1 697.4 709.8 830.3 
1. Three years and longer 197.3 239.3 355.5 640.3 653.7 691.5 
a. Govt. and multilateral 
instit.$lons4oans 72.8 105.6 70.2 220.9 217.0 317.0 
b. Privateloans 110.2 124.0 268.4 403.5 371.5 331.6 
c. Equity 
2. One to three years 
a. Trade credits 
14.3 
-
-
9.7 
56.7 
54.7 
16.9 
206.6 
166.6 
15.9 
57.1 
27.1 
65.2 
56.1 
31.1 
42.9 
138.8 
49.3 
b. Bank loans - - 40.0 30.0 25.0 89.5 
c. Cash loans - 2.0 - - - -
B. Officialgrants 164.9 157.4 150.7 178.7 121.2 103.9 
1. AID supporting assistance 61.6 47.1 43.4 28.6 17.0 12.4 
2. PL 480 68.3 56.7 63.8 100.7 55.6 47.7 
3. Japan P.A.C.b 
4. Technical assistance 
29.3 
3.7 
37.4 
5.5 
30.0 
7.5 
32.1 
3.9 
28.2 
3.9 
16.6 
5.2 
5. Other 2.0 10.8 6.0 13.4 16.5 22.0 
Total 362.2 453.4 712.8 876.1 831.0 934.2 
NOTE: Subitems may not add exactly to total&because of rounding. 
SouacE: Economic Planning Board; USAID. 
a.Gross basis. 
b. Property and claim fund as provided in the Korea-Japan Diplomatic Normalization 
Agreement of June 1965. 
dealing with the balance of payments. The Foreign Capital Inducement Law 
was promulgated in January 1960 at a time when the Development Loan Fund 
(DLF) of USAID was the only source of foreign loans to Korea. 
In early 1962, the government selected 9 major five-year plan projects 
(involving 19 businesses) that required foreign capital. The government then 
sent an economic mission to the United States, West Germany, and other in­
dustrialized countries in Europe to negotiate financing for the selected projects. 
In July 1962, the government enacted two supplements to the Foreign 
Capital Inducement Law. One provided procedures for imports of capital 
goods by using long-term export credits of capital exporting countries and 
the other established procedures for grunting repayment guarantees on foreign 
loans. As a safeguard, all foreign loans, investment proposals, and repayment 
guarantees had to be approved by the Foreign Capital Inducement Delibera­
TABLE 7-2 
Foreip Loss aid i duent Aueemcu, 1959 l 1971 
(millions of dollars) 
1959-62 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971A. Public loans 73.5 9.1 35.4 76.7 153.5 73.8 .61.9 233.2 159.21. UJ.A. 398.849.9 9.1 29.8 71.5 95.0 32.0 28.x2. Japan 114.9 59.4 120.7
- - -
- 44.9 29.9 18.6 11.3 8.93, West Germany 9.6 
-
87.04.4 5.2 13.6 
­
-4. MID,AD-- - 13.3 13.2
-
- -
- 11.85. Others 89.5 60.0 165.914.0 
- 1.2 
­
- 11.9 3.5B. Commercial loans 17.5 17.4 7.01.9 55.3 63.3 78.1 105.1 155.4 483.9 622.8 325.8 347.91. U.S.A. 
- 33.8 6.3 3.32. Japan 
-
-
3.4 21.0 153.5 217.3 179.7 143.50.4 70.8 67.13. West Germany 1.4 16.6 16.4 
36.2 110.0 71.9 56.2 126.9
- 22.7 39.5 48.64. France 
-
48.1 3.7 15.72.5 20.5 
­ 11.2 12.55. U.K. 29.3 129.0 4.9 6.30.5 ­
- - 0.7 1.8 53.56. Othen 56.2 68.2 22.0
- 2.4 19.7 4.0 
- 44.4 89.0C. Direct Investment 2.1 100.3 13.2 33.35.4 0.8 21.8 2.0 20.9 32.0 48.71. U.S.A. 86.3 55.92.1 5.4 0.4 21.0 1.9 18.5 17.02. Japan 15.1 50.1 23.1
- - -
-3. Others - 1.7 8.5 26.7 22.2 28.2
-
- 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.7 6.5 6.9 14.0
Total 4.677.5 69.8 99.5 176.6 260.7 250.1 577.8 904.6 571.3 802-6
NOTE: IIRD-ltemational Bank for Reconstruction and Development: ADB-Asian Development Bank. Loans ae for terms of thawyears or more. Subitems may not add exactly to totals because of rounding.SoUvtM: Economic Manning Board, MajorEconomic Indicators. 
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ton Committee, which was chaired by the Minister of the Economic Planning
Board. 
Tax concessions were also granted to stimulate foreign loans and tech­
nology imports, including full and partial exemptions from individual income 
or corporation income tax on the foreign lender's interest income accruing
from approved foreign loans and from income tax on payments made to for­
eigners who provided technical services. Direct foreign investment was en­
courag d by full exemption from individual or corporation income tax of the 
foreign investor's income for the first 3 years, a 50 percent reduction in tax for 
the next 5 years, full exemption from customs duties on imported capital goods
for approved foreign investment projects, and no capital gains taxes on foreign 
investment. 
Because of the positive measures of the government to attract foreign
capital, foreign loans and investments "finalized" increased sharply after 1962 
and amounted to $222.7 million at the end of 1963 as shown in Table 7-3.2 
As already mentioned, foreign loans finalized at the end of 1960 were only
about $18.8 million. At the end of 1963, commercial loans finalized amounted 
to $127.5 million, larger than the $84.4 million of finalized foreign public
loans. Actual "arrivals" of the foreign loans and equity investment were, how­
ever, relatively small in 1961-63 as shown in Table 7-3, since finalized foreign
loans and investment generally required a year or more before the goods and 
services financed by the foreign capital actually arrived. 
In 1966 a new Foreign Capital Inducement Law revised and stream­
lined various past laws. The major changes were as follows: (1) Restrictions on foreign direct investment were re noved. First, for­
eign investors could invest without any floor on the amouni" the old law had
specified that domestic investors must own at least 25 percent of the equity
in a given enterprise. Secondly, the maximum limit on annual profit repatria­
tion of 20 percent of invested capital was removed completely.(2) If foreign-financed firms threatened default on repayment of loans,
the government was authorized to supervise their management and property
and to take any measures necessary to achieve solvency.(3) Enterprises benefiting from government-guaranteed loans were re­quired to float authorized stock within 5 years from the date of approval of 
the government repayment guarantee.(4) Govey.wnent repayment guarantees were limited so that the annual 
debt service araing from such loans was not to exceed 9 percent of total an­
nual foreign eiychange receipts. 
(5) Priemty and special tax benefits were to be given to loan project
applicants whko used domestic capital goods for more than 50 percent of the 
loan amount contracted. 
(6) Tax concessions given to enterprises with foreign equity were also 
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TABLE 7-3
 
Sia of FanpCpWihiuc.id, 1961 to 1963
 
(millions of dollars) 
Loan ArrivalsLoans 

Finalited Cumltive 
through Before through

1963 1961 1962 1963 1963
 
Public loans-Total ( 12 cases) 84.4 4.7 3.0 42.8 50.5 
AID 616 4.7 3.-O 27.-8 35.5' 
IDA 14.0 - - 12.4 12.4 
West Germany 8.8 
­- 2.6 2.6Commercial loans (24 cases) 127.5 - 18.03.5 21.5 
West Germany 20.9 - 10.6- 10.6Italy & France 38.3 - - - -
United States 17.3 - 3.5 6.6 10.1Japan 38.7 - ­ - -
Britain 0.6 -
- 0.6 0.6 Switzerland 9.3 -
­ 0.3 0.3 
Sweden 9.3 - ­ -

The Netherlands 
 2.1 - ­
-
Direct & joint investment
 (7 cases) 10.5 - 4.8
0.6 5.4 
United States 6.6 - 0.6 4.-8 5.4West Germany 3.0 - -

Japan 
 0.6 - -. 
Hong Kong 0.3 - -

Grand total 222.7 
 4.7 7.1 65.6 77.4 
SouacE: Bank of Korea. Annual Report /or 1963, p. 132. 
slightly changed in the new law. Foreign enterprises were fully exempted from 
the individual income tax, the corporation tax, and the property tax for the 
first 5 years, and given a 50 percent exemption for the next 3 years. Tariff
and commodity tax exemptions on the import ot capital goods by foreign 
investors remained unchanged. 
The main rationale for the new Foreign Capital Inducement Law was togive more favorable treatment to foreign direct investment. The new law made 
no substantial changes affecting foreign loans. However, the inflow of foreign
loans was greatly accelerated after 1965. The interest rate reform of 1965increased incentives to borrow from abroad and the system of commercial 
bank guarantees on repayments of foreign loans authorized in 1966 stimulated 
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foreign lending. Since the interest rate reform of 1965 caused the rate on or­
dinary commercial bank loans to jump from 16 to 26 pecent per annum, it 
greatly widened the interest rate gap between domestic bank and foreign loans. 
The Korea-Japan Diplomatic Normalization Agreement of June 1965 
was also important in increasing foreign capital inflows. According to the 
Agreement, South Korea was to receive the Property and Claims Fund from 
Japan, totalling $500 million ($300 million in grants and $200 million in 
public loans) over the next 10 years. In addition, the Japanese Government 
was to make available $300 million for commercial loans to South Korea. 
Initial grants and loans were received in 1966. 
FOREIGN CA1 ITAL IN SOUTH KOREA'S 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The iailow of foreign capital of all types (total foreign savings) was substan­
tial between 1960 and 1972 (Table 7-4). In 1960, foreign saving accounted 
for almost 80 percent of total investment and 8.5 percent of GNP. Foreign 
TABLE 7-4
 
Foreign Capital and Grow Investment, 1960 to 1972
 
(billion won, current prices)
 
Foreign Saving Foreign 
Total as Percent Saving as
Foreign Foreign Foreign of Gross Percent of
Year Transfers Borrowing Savings Investment GNP 
1960 22.06 -1.07 20.99 78.3 8.51961 29.51 
-4.22 25.29 65.2 8.5 
1962 30.73 7.22 37.95 83.4 10.9 
1963 33.73 18.63 52.36 58.0 10.71964 44.03 5.10 49.13 48.1 7.0 
1965 53.95 
-2.42 51.53 42.2 6.41966 59.58 28.05 87.63 39.0 8.5 
1967 60.94 51.92 112.86 40.2 9.2
1968 62.54 121.79 184.33 43.1 11.5 
1969 70.86 158.16 229.02 36.9 11.01970 55.96 193.35 249.31 35.4 9.6
1971 59.32 294.68 354.00 44.0 11.2
1972a 66.71 148.32 215.03 26.7 5.6 
Soutcz: Bank of Korea, Economic Statltics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 298-299. 
a. Preliminary 
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saving as a percent of total investment declined substantially over the decade 
so that by 1972 it accounted for less than 35 percent of total investme.,t. As 
a percentage of GNP, however, foreign savings had not shown any downward
trend until 1972; previously they had fluctuated year-to-year around an aver­
ag of about 10 percent of current price GNP. The average gross capital­
output ratio from 1960 to 1970 was 2.5. Given this ratio, the average contri­bution to growth has been about 4 percentage points a year during the 1960s. 
Since the average rate of growth wah about 10 percent over the decade, with­
out foreign savings the growth rate might have been closer o 6 percent and
total output in 1970 about 30 percent less than it actually was.
Rough estimates of the contribution of foreign capital to Korea's growth
were also made by another method. We assumed that the increment in output
each year due to foreign capital was the same as the estimated increment in
output due to total investment in that year. The incremental capital-output
ratio in this method was not assumed to be constant, but an increasing function
of total investment. The contribution of foreign capital is expressed by thedifference in 1971 GNP had there been no foreign capital imports from 1966 
to 1970. The calculations were made for total foreign s,,'ings, total foreignborrowing (foreign savings less transfers from the rest of the world), and
total foreign commercial borrowing (excluding borrowing from public
sources). The results arc (in billions of current won) as follows: 
Actual 1971 GNP 3,151.55
Estimated 1971 GNP without foreign
 
savings, 1966 to 1970 
 2,759.99 
Estimated 1971 GNP without foreign 
borrowing, 1966 to 1970 2,924.65 
Estimated 1971 GNP without foreign
commercial borrowing, to 19701966 3,023.01 
These calculations assumed that the relationship between output growthin the nonagriculzural sectors of the economy and investment in those sectors
could be estimated by an ordinary least squares regression of real GNP in
nonagricultural sectors on previous year's GNP and the previous year's real gross investment (equation 8-2 in Chapter 8). The results show that withoutforeign savings (which include foreign aid in the form of transfers and loans)between 1966 and 1970, total output in 1971 would have been about 12.4 percent less than 3it actually was. Without foreign commercial borrowing(which includes no foreign aid flows), the level of output would have been
only about 4.1 percent less. The contributions of foreign capital in the late 
1960s were relatively modest because the incremental capital-output ratio 
rese in those years. The marginal contributions of investment to output de­
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tined. However, if one measures the contribution of foreign savings during
the entire decade of the '60s, the diflerence in output is quite large. Output in 
1971 would have been about a third less. That is, almost one-third of 1971 
output can be attributed to foreign savings during the previous decade. For­
eign borrowing, however, has not made nearly so substantial 2 contribution. 
M3st foreign savings in the early 1960s took the form of aid transfers, while 
foreign borrowing only became large a few years later when capital productiv­
ity was considerably reduced. 
COST OF CAPITAL IMPORTS 
Although the contribution of foreign borrowing to South Korea's economic 
growth was modest, the costs of these capital imports incurred during the 
1960s are making themselves felt a decade later in the form of debt service 
payments. As foreign debt accumulates, with more than $2 billion outstand­
ing at the beginning of 1971 (including all debt with a maturity greater than 
one year), debt service payments have grown very rapidly, reaching $326.6 
million in 1971 or about 28 percent of total export earnings.4 
The expected high level of debt service payments in the remainder of the 
1970s will introduce a good deal of inflexibility into Korea's balance of pay­
ments. Wth so much foreign exchange required to service loans, imports mustbear a greater share of the burden of adjustment if foreign exchange earnings 
do not grow as rapidly as they h:-ve in the past.
Given the rapid rise in debt service and the experience of other countries 
burdened with large debt service payments, South Korea may find it necessary
to renegotiate its outstanding debt. Projections by the Economic Planning
Board and the aid donors show that by 1976 debt service including interest 
on contemplated borowings should total about $650 million. However, ex­
ports have grown so rapidly since these projections were calculated that by1976 the debt service ratio should be well below 20 percent. Although the 
costs of imported fuel and international loans have increased, they have been 
more than offset by the extremeiy rapid growth of South Korea's export earn­
ings. Nevertheless, heavy debt service obligations may pose future difficulties. 
For according to the formula in Frank 2nd Cline (1971), the critical ratio of 
debt service to export earnings in 1976 will be about 17.8 percent. If thisfigure should be exceeded by the actual debt service ratic, a rescheduling of 
the debt will be quite likely.5 
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ON FOREIGN CAPITAL
 
We have seen how South Korea's rapidly increased borrowing from abroad
and her shift to more costly sources of capital may make balance of payments
adjustment more difficult and costly in the 1970s unless the foreign trade deft­
cit is reduced. According to classical marginal economic analysis, however,
,the more relevant question is whether the rate of return on foreign financedinvestment has exceeded the rate of interest on foreign borrowing. If it has,
then in theory foreign borrowing is profitable and should be encouraged.
But this approach ignores a number of macroeconomic factors that
might determine the cost of foreign borrowing. First, there is the problem of
reducing ihe trade deficit and of generating the trade surpluses eventually
required to pay back principal and interest on foreign borrowing. Second, sav­ings must increase rapidly enough not only to repay foreign loans, but also tofinance sufficient domestic investment to maintain satisfactory rates of growth.
Third, to the extent that foreign loans are the debts of government or de­faulted by private investors under government guarantee, the government musthave sufficient command over resources through taxation or local borrowing
to pay its debts and finance its own domestic expenditures. Fourth, local firms
that borrow large amounts abroad may be particularly vulnerable to credit 
squeezes and large devaluations. Finally, dependence on foreign borrowing
and the debt servicing obligations that follow make balance of payments ad­justment to short-run cyclic factors more costly and difficult.6 
Even if these other factors are ignored, the classical view of foreign bor­
rowing begs a number of questions in a world in which monetary, fiscal, and
exchange rate policy can affect real rates of interest which do not necessarily
reflect relative factor scarcities in different countries.7 Under conditions of dif­ferential rates of inflation and differing degrees of monetary restraint among
countries, social and private real rates of interest may diverge and lead to too 
much or tca little foreign borrowing.
Our argument assumes that the U.S. dollar is the international reserve 
currency and that the world economy is one in which a Fisherian "real in­
terest" analysis applies, i.e., one in which rates of inflation may vary from
country to country but remain fairly Fteady within each country where expec­
tations adjust to steady rates. In this theoretical framework, we argue that
the real social cost of foreign borrowing in a country like Korea is the nominal
rate of interest on foreign-currency-denoniinated foreign loans less the rate
of inflation of prices of internationally traded goods. The nominal rate of in­
terest must be so adjusted because repayment of a loan represents a future
cost, either as foregone imports, or as additional exports to save or earn the 
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necessary foreign exchange. If the prices of internationally traded goods go up,
then the cost of servicing the loan is reduced by the amount of the price infla­
tion. Symbolically, we write for the real social cost of foreign borrowing (r.): 
r. = F. -rip (7-1) 
where r. is the nominal rate of interest on foreign loans and ri, is the rate of 
price inflation of internationally traded goods. 
The private real interest cost to the local borrower, however, may be 
quite different. The nominal rate of interest on foreign borrowing must be 
adjusted by the local rate of price inflation and the rate at which the local cur­
rency devalues. The local borrower repays the loan in terms of local currency
which must be converted into dollars at the future rate of exchange. As such, 
the real cost of repayment declines when the local price level increases and 
increases when the local currency is devalued. The formula, then, for the real 
private interest cost of the loan r, is 
rp = r. - r1. +-r. (7-2) 
where rd, is the rate of domestic price inflation and r. is the rate of local cur­
rency devaluation. 
If the real private cost of foreign borrowing is less than the real social 
cost, then foreign borrowing will be excessive if local borrowers incur debt 
up to the level at which the real rate of return equals the real private cost of 
foreign borrowing. This is illustrated by the marginal efficiency of investment 
schedule as shown in Figure 7-1. The optimal level of foreign borrowing is 
F, at which point the real social cost of foreign borrowing equals the rate of 
return on investment. The actual level of foreign borrowing will tend toward 
F2, the level at which the rate of return equals the private cost of foreign bor­
rowing and which exceeds the optinal level. The social and private costs of 
foreign borrowing will thus only be equal if 
re = r, - r4, (7-3) 
or if the rate of local currency devaluation equals the rate of domestic price 
inflation less the rate of inflation of prices of internationally traded goods. 
EFFICIENCY OF FOREIGN BORROWING 
The effect of a divergence between the real social and real private interest costs 
of a foreign loan on efficiency of investment can bt: shown in terms of a Fish­
erian analysis of consumption, investment and interest rates. For purposes of 
this analysis, we assume a single commodity world and two discrete time pe­
riods. The analysis may be generalized to multiple time periods, but the basic 
results should remain the same. 
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FIGURE 7-1 
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Figure 7-2 shows a Fisherian diagram with consumption in period I on 
the horizontal axis and consumption in period t + I on the vertical axis. If 
there is no saving and no investment, output in period t is OG, and output
in period t + 1 is OE. Output in both periods is equal (OG = OE), and con­
sumption in both periods is the same and equal to output. 
The curve ABC is a transformation curve, the slope of which is one plus
the single period rate of return on capital. The curve HI is a social indifference 
curve, the slope of which is the marginal rate of substitution between consump­
tion in period t and period t + 1 or one plus the rate of time preference. The 
optimal distribution of consumption between period I and period t + I is 
shown by the point B. The optimal level of savings and investment in period I 
is given by the distance FG. Total output in period t + 1 is the same as total 
consumption in period t + 1 and equal to OD. The equilibrium or optimalinterest rate is the same as the optimal rate of return on capital and the opti­
mal rate of time preference. All are equal to the slope of the trrnsformation 
curve ABC at B minus unity (or the slope of the indifference curve HI at B 
minus unity). 
The analysis so far assumes 'that there is no foreign borrowing. If foreign
capital is available at a rate oj interest less than the equilibrium interest rate 
as shown in Figure 7-2, foreign borrowing can increase consumption in both 
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periods t and t + I and increase the level of social welfare. The possibility is 
depicted in Figure 7-3. 
In Figure 7-3, the slope of the line MN isone plus the rate of interest 
on a foreign loan (i.e., foreign capital import). The availability of foreign 
loans allows for any combination of consumption in periods I and t+ I along 
the line MN which is tangent to the transformation curve ABC. The optimal 
combination of consumption in periods t and t+ 1 is representec by point B' 
which lies above and to the right of B, indicating that it is possibl,' to achieve 
greater consumption irtboth periods when foreign borrowing is permitted. 
Total foreign borrowing in period t is given by the distance KF' while 
domestic saving is F'G. Total income in period * is OG and consumption OF'. 
In period t + 1, tota product (domestic) is OD', and LD' represents domestic 
savings. Foreign savings is negative and also equal to LD' which represents 
payments of principal and interest on the original loan KF'. The foreign bor­
rowing is efficient when the rate of interest on the foreign borrowing is less 
than the domestic equilibrium rate without foreign borrowing. 
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Suppose, however, we complicate our analysis by allowing a local money
supply and price inflation. We assume a simple quantity theory. The govern­
ment through its central bank determines a money supply and this in turn 
determines the price level for our single commodity. The foreign price of the 
commodity is assumed to be the numeraire so that the foreign price of one 
unit of the good is always unity. Suppose the existence of an exchange bank 
that exchanges local currency for foreign currency and vice versa at a rate 
determined by the government. To keep matters simple, suppose also that the 
exchange bank acts as an export and import agent. When it receives local cur­
rency, it purchases the domestic good and sells it abroad to obtain foreign cur­
rency to make payments abroad. When it receives foreign currency, it imports
goods from abroad and sells them domestically to obtain local currency.
We assume that the exchange bank carries no reserves from period to 
period. Therefore, payments and receipts of foreign currency must balance. 
It local currency proceeds are not sufficient to make payments equal receipts,
the government taxes local entrepreneurs in kind and turns the proceeds over 
to the exchange bank which then exports the commodities to obtain foreign 
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currency to make payments. Ifpayments are less than receipts, the exchange 
bank imports commodities with the excess receipts and the goods are distrib­
uted as subsidies to private individuals. 
Given this simple model, suppose the price level rises from period tto 
pei-'od t+ 1.Let po+ I/p, be the ratio of prices in the two periods. On the other 
hand, suppose the exchange rate between the foreign and domestic currency 
remains the same. If foreign loans are denominated in the foreign currency 
and the rate of interest on the foreign loans is r, the real value of the loan re­
ceipt interms of local currency isL/pt and the real value of the local currency 
repayments is L(I +r)/p,+ where L is the amount of the loan in terms of 
local currency. The ratio of payments to the original amount of the loan in 
real terms is 
(0+r) p ( +r-r ) + (Ap/pj+,) (Aplpt+l -r) (7-4)Pt + I Pt 
( +r- &)
Pt 
where Ap - p, +I - pl. The approximation indicates that the real rate of inter­
est to the domestic borrower i. nearly equal to the rate of interest r on the 
foreign loan less the rate of inflation &p/pt.This situation is denicted in Fig­
ure 7-4 where the slope 3f the line MN is the ratio of repayment in real terms 
to the original amount of the loan in real terms or approximately equal to 
(I + r-Ap/p,). 
Private entrepreneurs, acting on the basis of the privatc real rate of inter­
est (assuming that they anticipate the inflation), borrow an amount KF' from 
abroad, expecting to reach the consumption point B'. The actual interest rate 
in terms of the good (the rate which the exchange bank must pay abroad), 
however, is represented by the slope (1 + r) of the line M'N'. The local cur­
rency proceeds of the exchange bank are not enough to purchase the amounts 
of goods required to pay the foreign loan. The local currency proceeds are 
D'P in terms of goods. In order to repay the loan, the government taxes local 
borrowers by an amount PL to meet the full repayment represented by DYL. 
The actual consumption point is B" rather than B'. The actual consumption 
point B" represents less consumption in both periods than could be achieved 
if private entrepreneurs acted on the basis of the real foreign rate of interest. 
For example, the point B which lies above and to the right of B" could be 
achieved if the entrepreneurs acted under the correct assumption as to the 
interest rate. 
The only way to reach the optimal point B, given the rate of price infla­
tion, is to devalue the local currency at a rate equal to the rate of inflation. 
The real value of the local currency receipts of the loan are L e/pt and the 
real value of the local currency repayments is L(I + r) el+ 1/pt+I where 
115 REAL PRIVATE AND SOCIAL COSTS OF FOREIGN BORROWING 
FIGURE 7-4 
Indclewy k C updm ovw Ti 
Ct+1 
cM
 
D6
 
t. -- ' I '10 
I I 
I II 
I I 
I I
 
I I

I I
 
0 K F'G Ct 
et is the exchange rate. The ratio of the two is equal to (1 + r) if and only if 
egipt = et+ 1/pt+l or I + Ap/pt is equal to 1 + Ae/ej. 
In this model, when the rate of devaluation equals the rate of inflation, 
an efficient investment pattern is achieved. The analysis assumes that the inter­
national price is the numeraire and it can easily be generalized to a situation 
in which international prices increase. In that case, efficient investment occurs 
only when the local currency devalues at a rate equal to the difference between 
the rate of domestic inflation and the rate of inflation of international prices­
that is, when the real private and social interest rates are equal. 
REAL PRIVATE AND SOCIAL COSTS 
OF FOREIGN BORROWING 
In Table 7-5, we have estimated the private aad social real interest costs for 
Korea from 1965 to 1970. They indicate that, if the appropriate domestic 
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TABLE 7-5
 
fdvs adSked Red Imm Cm, 1911 f 1910
 
1965 1966 1967 1968 !969 1970 
Nominal interest rate 
on foreign loans@ 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.9 7.1 7.0 
Less: rate of inflation of 
prices of internationally 
traded goods t, -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 
Equals: estimated real social 
interest cost of foreign loans 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.6 4.8 4.7 
Nominal interest rate on 
foreign loans 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.9 7.1 7.0 
Less: rate of domestic 
price inflatione -11.3 -11.3 -11.3 -11.3 -11.3 -11.3 
(-8.5) (-8.5) (-8.5) (-8.5) (-8.5) (-8.5) 
Plus: rate of devaluation" 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
E3quals: estimated real private 
cost of foreign loans -2.5 -2.4 -2.0 -2.2 -1.0 -1.1 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.8) (0.6) (3.8) (1.7) 
a. Weighted annual average rate of interest on foreign loan agreements. 
b.Rate of inflation from 1965 to 1970 of wholesale prices of major trading partners, 
using wholesale price indexes weighted by irade volume. 
c. Rate of inflation of GNP deflator of Korea, 1965 to 1970. Figures in parentheses 
are rate of inflation of wholesale price index over the same period.
d.Average rate of devaluation exchange rate, 1965 to 1970. 
price index is the GNP deflator, the private real interest cost has been 5.8 
percentage points lower than the social real interest cost and that there has 
been a powerful incentive to import foreign capital at an excessive rate. In 
fact, the real private interest cost of foreign loans has been substantially nega­
tive. If the wholesale price index is used, however, the divergence between 
private and social costs issmaller, but still 3 percentage points. 
The price index used for prices of internationally traded goods was a 
weighted average of U.S. and Japanese wholesale prices. This is probably a 
slight overestimate of the rate of price increase for South Korea's traded goods. 
Japanese export prices have tended to increase less rapidly than the wholesale 
price index while U.S. export prices have probably increased slightly more 
rapidly than wholesale prices. The difference, however, between growth in 
Japanese export prices and wholesale prices has probably been somewhat 
greater than the difference in growth of U.S. export prices and wholesale 
prices." If South Korean export and import prices indexes were available, 
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they would probably show somewhat more divergence between private and 
social real interest costs than those shown in Table 7-S and thus somewhat 
more of an incentive to borrow abroad beyond the optimal level. 
The rate of devaluation used in the computations in Table 7-5 was the 
average rate of devaluation between 1965 and 1970. This includes a period 
from August 1965 to the end of 1967 when the exchange rate was pegged at 
about 270 won to the dollar and rapid growth of foreign commercial borrow­
ing began. Interviews with businessmen suggest that at that time, there was 
no expectation that the exchange rate would change as much as it did during 
the late 1960s. If this is true, the large influx of foreign capital may have been 
due in part to an underestimate of the real private costs because of an cxpecta­
tion of a stable exchange rate. The value of the won, however, gradually fell 
between the beginning of 1968 and mid-1971, at which time there was a 
sharp devaluation. Nevertheless, during 1968 and 1969, foreign commercial 
borrowing continued to grow rapidly. In 1970, however, the demand for for­
eign loans was reduced sharply. Perhaps by 1970, it had become clear to 
businessmen that movement in the value of the won was not temporary and 
that the true cost of foreign borrowing was likely to be greater than they had 
originally expected, although government ceilings on foreign borrowing may
have been chiefly responsible for the slow growth of foreign borrowing in 
1970. 
In 1971 and 1972 also, the demand for foreign commercial borrowing 
seems to have slackened. According to businessmen interviewed, their desire 
for foreign loans was curbed by the devaluation of June 1971 and by the re­
introduction of the rapidly gliding peg iw,early 1972. 
FOREIGN BORROWING AND SECTORAL 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
We have shown how a failure to devalue at a sufficient rate, given domestic 
price inflation, is likely to lead to excessive foreign borrowing and investment. 
We now note also that, because of the institutional nature of capital markets,
low real private interest rates on foreign loans may distort the sectoral alloca­
tion of resources. 
In particular, foreign commercial loans are often most easily available in 
the form of supplier credits. Thus, loans are often tied to purchases of capital
equipment abroad. Of course, this is often true for public loans as well. This 
has two effet: First, low-cost foreign loans favor those sectors that are rela­
tively heavy users of foreign capital equipment. Second, low-cost foreign loans 
relative to local commercial loans may be a form of negative protection to the 
local capital goods industries. 
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TABLE 7-6 
end lmi C, of Dndmule 8i repLAE, 
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1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Non"l local iWen rates: 
Commercial bank prime rate 18.5 26.0 26.0 25.8 24.0 24.0
Korea Developmet Bank 
... rateon equipment loans 9.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 12.0 12.0 
Real local interet rate equals
nominal rate less rate of 
inflation of 8.5 percent for 
wholesale price index (11.3 
percent for GNP deflator)
 
for 1965-70
 
Commercial bank prime rate 
 10.0 17.5 17.5 17.3 15.5 15.5 
(7.2) (14.7) (14.7) (14.5) (12.7) (12.7)Korea Development Bank
 
equipment rate 
 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 
(-.8) (-0.3) (-0.3) (-0.3) (0.7) (0.7)
Real private interest cost 
of foreign loans 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 1.8 1.7 (-2.3) (-2.4) (-2.0) (-2.2) (-.0) (-I.!) 
NoTe: Figures in parentheses are based on use of the GNP deflator. All other realinterest rates are based on the wholesale price index.SouncE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1971, pp. 133-135. 
Table 7-6 compares local real interest rates with the real private interest 
costs of foreign borrowing. Local real interest rates tend to be much higher,
particularly those on commercial bank loans. Local capital equipment sup­pliers are thus at a disadvantage in that available sources of financing carry
higher real interest costs than financial sources for purchase of foreign equip­
ment. This disadvantage can be viewed as an effective tax on local equipment
producers. This effective tax can be quantitatively assessed by measuring the 
difference in present value of a stream of repayments required to service two 
types of loan, a loan to purchase foreign equipment and a loan to purchase
domestic equipment. (See the appendix to this chapter for mathematical 
details.) 
Table 7-7 gives the percentage subsidy implicit in the purchase of 1,000 
won of forign machinery financed by a foreign loan instead of 1,000 won of 
domestic equipment financed by a domestic loan. Both KDB equipment and 
commercial bank leans in two different years, 1965 and 1970, are considered.' 
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TABLE 7-7 
alV etof IYom k " I'M WM. lam 
1965 1970 
Foreig loan 775.4 813.4 
Commercial bank loan 917.4 1,009.9
KDB equipment loan 765.9 808.8 
NoTe: Terms are 5 years repayment, 20 percent down. Dis­
count rate is 15 percent. 
For KDB equipment loans, the cost of financing capital goods purchases
whether locally or by foreign loan is about the same. For bank loans, however,
the difference in cost is very great. The cost (present value of repayments) offinancing a 1,000 won loan was )17.4 for a commercial bank loan, or 18 per­
cent greater than the cost of a foreign loan. In 1970, the difference had grown
to 24 percent. This means that local sellers were subject to an implicit tax of18 to 24 percent when competing against foreign capital goods financed
abroad when commercial bank loans were the source of local finance. 
These estimates do not take into account the government's special loanfund instituted in 1967 for financing purchases of domestic machinery. Verylittle credit was provided at first under this program, and there were adminis­
trative difficulties at the outset. After a couple of years, however, this special
loan fund grew in importance and offset some of the interest rate distortions 
that had favored foreign-r.,ade machinery purchases. 
DISCONTINUOUS DEVALUATION 
AND GLIDING PARITY 
We have.not yet distinguished between discontinuous devaluations and gradual
changes in the exchange rate. In South Korea, discontinuous devaluations oc­
curred in February 1960, January and February 1961, May 1964, and June 
1971. The rate was allowed to float for a while in the spring of 1965, between
1968 and June 1971, and again beginning in early 1972 until June of that year. Thus, Korea has alternated between a policy of gradual devaluation and 
an adjustable exchange rate peg. Both policies have been aimed at maintaining
the purchasing power parity of the won by adjusting for the effects of domestic 
and international price inflation. 
Whatever the effects of the two policies on commodity exports and Am­ports might be, the effect of pegged rates with discontinuous devaluations on 
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the capital side of the balance of payments is likely to be destabilizing under 
conditions of rapid domestic inflation. First, if borrowers of foreign capital 
come to expect fixed rates accompanied by occasional large devaluations, they
will set a very high premium on guessing when the next devaluation will take 
place. If no devaluation is expected for a few years, the demand for foreign
capital will be very great. Borrowers will attempt to borrow as much capital 
as possible when the exchange risk is believed to be low and conversely the 
demand for foreign loans may fall off sharply when expetations of an im­
minent devaluation are high. Thus, the demand for foreign loans will be very
unstable and will fluctuate in response to rumors of devaluation. This effect,
of course, occurs on the commodity side, but to a much lesser degree. When 
domestic producers expect a devaluation in the near future, the current de­
mand for imports will be high and the short-run supply of exports will fall off. 
But the extent to which imports can be accelerated and exports held back may
be limited by transportation and storage facilities. The cost of investing in 
transport and storage facilities to handle large short-run fluctuations in stocks 
as a hedge against devaluation may be very high. There is no comparable cost 
on the capital side. Increasing one's portfolio of foreign loans involves only
the interest charges on the loans. 
Second, pegged exchange rates with discontinuous devaluations distort 
the term structure of foreign loans. There is an increased premium on short­
term credits in preference to long term. When credits are denominated in for­
eign currency, short-term credits with frequent roll-over substantially reduce 
the exchange risk to the borrower when large devaluations may take place.
On the other hand, if borrowers expect devaluations to be gradual, continuous,
and in line with the divergence between domestic and international price infla­
tion, they have no reason to shift foreign loan portfolios to short-term loans 
as a hedge against devaluation. 
Finally, pegged rates with discontinuous devaluations cause large and 
discontinuous changes in the value of foreign loan liabilities. In other words,
producers and traders who have guessed incorrectly and find themselves 
holding large foreign loan liabilities may suffer large losses in their net real 
asset positions. Whenever large amounts of foreign loans are outstanding,
abrupt and Kege devaluations can substantially affect the asset positions offirms and individuals. Those who suffer such losses are likely to resist further 
devaluations, as they have in Korea, and thus devaluation becomes a politi­
cally dangerous and increasingly difficult measure to implement. As a result,
domestic inflation quickly erodes the purchasing power parity of the exchange 
rate and corrective action becomes longer delayed and more problematical.
As an alternative to gradual devaluation or to pegged exchange rates 
with discontinuous devaluation, a flat surtax on imports could be imposed
together with the same flat subsidy on exports. This would be equivalent to a 
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devaluation for commodity transactions. Since capital transactions and trans­
fer payments would continue to take place on the basis of the nondevalued 
official exchange rate, the political problem that would otherwise arise from 
deterioration of the net asset position of borrowers of foreign capital could be 
avoided. The objection, however, to this approach is that real interest rater 
in terms of won would remain low and the social opportunity cost t,yun
loans would continue to be greater than the private real interest cost of foreign
loans. While flat surcharges and subsidies on commodity transactions may help
maintain a realistic exchange rate for exports and imports, the dcmand for 
foreign loans would continue to exceed equilibrium.
To achieve an efficient level of foreign capital inflow and efficient use of 
foreign loans, a gliding parity approach to exchange rate adjustment has in 
our view a good deal of merit. Since a gliding pirity offers no excessive incen­
tives to borrow abroad, capital movement stability is more likely to be 
achieved. Real domestic interest rates, however, may exceed the real rate on 
foreign loans even if purchasing power parity is maintained. Thus, if purchases
of domestic equipment are usually financed through domestic loans and im­
ported equipment through foreign loans, the domestic machinery industry may
remain at a disadvantage. If, however, the same real domestic interest rate 
had been maintained during the 1960s, while the official exchange rate was 
adjusted to maintain parity, then at least the disincentive to domestic ma­
chinery purchase would have been reduced, since the divergence between real 
interest rates on foreign and domestic loans would have been narrowed. 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND FOREIGN LOANS 
Exchange rate policy in South Korea has facilitated the inflow of foreign loans, 
perhaps excessively, and has resulted in a net disincentive to local machinery
producers. In fact, a local guarantee program favors imported machinery. 
Domestic borrowers of foreign loans can obtain Korea Development Bank 
or commercial bank guarantees on repayment (both amortization and interest 
payments) in 2ccordance with the Foreign Capital Inducement Law. This 
system greatly facilitates the import of foreign loans since foreign lenders are 
guaranteeW. repayment regardless of the domestic borrower's credit standing.
Secc;,'d best solutions in place of gliding parity include either an interest
equalization tax or quantitative restrictions on capital flows. The main rationale 
for an interest equalization tax would not be the common notion that it would 
equalize domestic and foreign loan interest rates, but rather that it would 
equalize the real interest cost in terms of won and the real interest cost in 
terms of dollars. A differential between foreign and domestic interest rates 
may reflect real differences in opportunity costs of foreign and domestic cap­
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Ital. The differential between real dollar and real won interest cost of foreign
loans, however, represents adivergency between social and private costs. Controls on foreign borrowing have been in effect since 1962 when the
Foreign Cupital Inducement Deliberation Committee was set up in the Eco­
nomic Planning Board. In practice, however, foreign loan applications were
generally encouraged if they could meet minimal criteria and no strict limits 
on foreign borrowing were enforced. Recently, however, an IMF standby
agreement loas Lequired the Korean government to issue letters of intent to
strictly limit foreign capital movements by loan categories based on the term
of the loan. The strictest limitations were placed on one- to three-year loans,
while very long term loans were given liberal treatment. The effect of IMF 
pressure can be seen in the 1970 figures for loan arrivals and agreements(tables 7-I and 7-2). After increasing more than three and a half times between 1966 and 1969, foreign capital arrivals increased by less than 2 per­
cent in 1970. Foreign commercial loan agreements, which increased almost 
ten times between 1964 and 1969, actually decreased in 1970. These restric­
tions on foreign capital imports may not be applied in the most evenhanded 
or efficient way, but they have virtually stopped the extremely rapid growth
in foreign capital imports. 
As part of the revision of economic policies in August 1972, domesticinterest rates were lowered. At the same time, foreign interest rates had begun
to creep up with the net result that the incentive to borrow abroad has been 
reduced. Furthermore, since South Korea's export continue to grow very
rapidly, and since imports in the early 1970s have on the average grown muchless rapidly, the need to borrow abroad to finance a trade deficit has abated. 
The domestic machinery industry has begun to develop and special govern­
ment-sponsored credit programs have spurred sales. Thus, the need to finance
capital goods purchases abroad has become relatively less important. The days
of very heavy foreign borrowing, excessively encouraged by distortions ininterest rates, wild probably come to an end in this decade. During the 1960s,
however, the high degree of reliance on capital imports made important con­
tributions to South Korean growth. 
APPENDIX: CALCULATION OF IMPLICIT 
SUBSIDIES ON FOREIGN LOANS 
For the purchaser of foreign equipment, the present value per w,.i of a loan 
can be expressed in the following way: Let 
A. - down payment required on the purchase of equipment, expressed as a 
fraction per dollar lent 
A, 	 - amortization payment in year f expressed as a fraction per dollar lent,for t = I,..., T, where T is the maturity of the loan. 
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If et is the exchange rate (won per dollar) and p, is the domestic price index, 
then 
Ao*- Ao'-e. (75po (7-5) 
and 
At* = 
P1 (7-6) 
are the down payment and amortization payment, respectively, in real won terms. The present value per won of a loan to purchase the foreign equipment 
is 
A*/0 I )YPV= Y rp (iAr*)/I + (7-7) 
1=0 1-7l v( 
where r, is the real private rate of interest given in equation (7-2). The dis­
count rate pis the real opportunity cost of domestic capital.
The present value per won of a loan used to finance the purchase of 
domestic equipment is 
T T 1-1PVd= I B/ (i +p)'+rd 1 (I -1B,) / (I +p)' (7-8) 
where Bo is the down payment ratio and Bt for I = 1, ... , T the amortization 
rate, respectively, in real won terms. rd is the real rate of interest on domestic 
loans. 
The differential between the present value per won of a loan used topurchase domestic equipment (7-8) and a loan used to purchase foreign
equipment (7-7) is the implicit subsidy rate to the purchases of the foreign
equipment or the implicit tax rate on purchases of domestic equipment. 
Implicit tax rate on domestic producers (79)
of capital equipment = PVa - PV,. 
Even if the price of domestic equipment is lower than the price of foreign
equipment and the domestic and foreign equipment are equal in quality, the
effect of the real interest rate differential may make it profitable to purchase
the foreign equipment. That is, the implicit tax rate in (7-9) could more
than make up for the difference in price. 
These implicit tax rates or subsidy rates can be incorporated into a sec­
toral analysis of effective protection in much the same way as other taxes and 
subsidies are (see the previous chapter). 
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NOTES 
1. This includes arrivals of loans of maturity greater than one year. Foreign loan 
arrivals are shown in Table 7-1 and include all the items under row A except for equity 
(direct) investment %hich came to be important only in 1970. "Arrivals" indicates the 
amount of credit actually drawn by local importers as distinct from the amount of bor­
rowing based on completed loan agreements. Separate statistics are kept for arrivals 
and for agreements. 
2. A loan is "finalized" when an agreement is signed, while loan arrivals may be 
delayed for several years after finalization. 
3. This estimate is smaller than it would be if we assumed a constant incremental 
capital-output ratio. 
4. USAID, Korea Mission. 
5. Among 145 observations taken elsewhere during the 1950s and '60s, the critical 
debt service indicator was correct more than 90 percent of the time in predicting resched­
uling. See Frank and Cline ( 1971 ). 
6. For a more detailed discussion of these and other factors see Frank (1970). 
7. For references to the literature about differential rates of price inflation under 
fixed exchange rates and how they may stimulate capital movements which are not 
necessarily in the direction of higher marginal efficiency of capital, see Willet (1970). 
8. See McKinnon (1971). The price indexes used by McKinnon are taken from 
unpublished estimates by the U.S. Department of Labor. Export and import price indexes 
are not generally available for the major world-trading economies. Unit-value indexes, 
which are sometimes used as price indexes of traded goods, are usually quite unreliable. 
9. Present value of 1970 loan is in terms of 1965 present value, using 1970 relative 
interest rates. 
Chapter 8 
OW oun~~ Policy Wlrism 
In this chapter w, use an econometric model to test a number of hypotheses
about the effects of commercial policy variables on macroeconomic behavior. 
Some other relationships are investigated such as the interest rate elasticity of 
savings and foreign capital imports. The basic model derived in this chapter
is used in the next chapter to determine by simulation techniques the effect 
of commercial policy variables on the growth of the economy. 
THE BASIC MODEL 
In matrix form, the basic model can be expressed as follows: 
B" ,*+ A,+r +r,#,, +r 2 # + r3 0 3 +e=0 (8-1) 
where B is a square matrix, *j is a column vector of endogenous variables, 
*, is a column vector of lagged endogenous variables, 011, 02t, and ,#3are 
each vectors of exogenous variables, ej is a column vector of error terms, and 
r1, r 2, r3 and A are matrixes. The exogenous variables 0i#are called basic 
commercial policy variables; #2 are derived commercial policy variables, and 
*,sare other exogenous variables. 
The endogenous variables of the system are described in Table 8-1. All 
of them are measured in terms of constant 1965 won. The exogenous variables 
are shown in Table 8-2 and except for rates and ratios, population, and 
dummy variables, all are shown in termq of 1965 constant won. Tables 8-3 
and 8-4 show the matrix structure of the basic model expressed in equation 
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TABLE 8-I
 
fbiemus Vaibbim of lb Model
 
,, -- YNA : Nonagricultural value added 
2= . : Gross national product 
oj= DTR8 Direct tax revenues 
04,= INT, Indirect tax revenues, excluding customs duties 
#5,j SGs Government savings 
06,l = GCI Grain consumption 
07,j = IVG, Investment in grain inventories 
0s,. = MG : Imports of grain 
o, = ILG : Level of grain inventories
 
o= SCI Corporate savings
 
il.,- YDP: Disposable income of households 
012,9 = SHII Household savings 
013,9 = INA : Nonagricultural gross fixed investment 
014,1 = 11 Total gross fixed investment 
015, " CK# Foreign commercial loans 
0 = DCt Consumption expenditures 
0 = MC, Imports of consumption goods 
0 = MK : Imports of capital goods
019.= XGMj: Manufactured exports 
020. = X : Total export of goods 
021., MIt Imports of intermediate goods 
022,. = M, Total import of goods 
023.9 = SKI Short-term capital movements and changes in foreign reserves 
024,. = IV : Inventory investment 
(8-1). To faci~tate discussion of the model the endogenous variables (and 
therefore equations of the model) arc separated into six groups. Group 1 
contains two equations, one of which determines nonagricultural output and 
an identity which involves the determination of total GNP. Group 2 contains 
three equations relating to direct and indirect tax revenues and government 
savings. Group 3 contains four equations relating to grain consumption, grain 
imports, and grain inventories. Group 4 involves equations for household 
savings, corporate savings, fixed investment, foreign loans, and domestic con­
sumption. Group 5 contains five equations relating to exports, imports, and 
short-term capital movements. Group 6 contains two identities, one concern­
ing the balance of payments and the other concerning savings and investment. 
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TABLE 8-2
 
Kzegmm Vukbi ofe Madel
 
Basic commercial policy variables 
#1.1,g = ORD# : Official exchange rate on purchasing-power-parity basis 
01,2, = XPX, : Export premium per dollar of exports 
1.0.1= SOx, : Subsidies per dollar of exports 
#1,4,. = TAM. : Tariffs and foreign exchange tax per dollar of imports 
D' rived commercial policy variables 
-2,1,8 = XPM : Export premia per dollar of imports 
102,2, = SUBM : Tariffs and tariff equivalents per dollar of imports 
02,3,4 = SUBX : Subsidies and subsidy equivalents per dollar of exports 
02,4,3 = SXDT, Total subsidies on exports in the for, 
of internal tax relief 
, TAR : Total tariffs and foreign exchange taxes 
102,11,1 MARDEVg: Average rate of devaluation averaged over current year 
and the two previous years 
Other exogenous variables 
03.1.8 = YAt Agricultural value added
 
03.24, = G1 Current government expenditures
 
03.3,1 = IAg Investment in agriculture
 
03,4,t = PK : Government capital improvements 
03,15.1 = NFl, Net factor incomes from abroad 
= MSTt Net service imports (including factor payments), 
and net transfer payments abroad 
03,7= RPG : Wholesale price of grains relative to overall wholesale 
price level 
0 = POP$ Population
 
03,9,t = GPt Grain production
 
03,10,g = RD, Rate of interest on domestic savings deposits
 
,,.tt = LR : Rate of interest on domestic commercial bank loans
 
#63,12.t = RF : Rate of interest on foreign commercial loans
 
-03,13,t = RINFI : Current rate of inflation (GNP deflator)
 
03,14,4 = RINFI_. : Lagged rate of inflation (GNP deflator)
 
03,15.t = CKDMt : Dummy variable used in foreign commercial loan
 
(CK) equation
 
3,1a.t = MNCt : Imports of nonclassified goods
 
03.173t = NTOSHj : Transfers from government and corporate sectors
 
to households
 
03a184 = XGPt : Exports of primary products
 
#a,19,5 = RT : Current account transfers from abroad
 
03,20,4 = I : Constant term
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TABLE 8-3 
a IMis (r f nwginsi V.1 
I 
YNA 
2 
Y 
3 
DTR 
4 
INT 
5 
SG 
6 
GC 
7 
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8 9 
MG ILG 
10 
SC 
II 
YDP 
12 
SH 
I YNA I 
2 Y - I Group I 
J DTR I 
4 INT 
5 SG 
/i 
-I 
I 
-I I 
Group 2 
6 GC l I 
7 IVG I -i3 
8 MG 
-I -1 G 
9 ILG l I 
1os" /3 I 
I I YP 
12 SH 
13 INA 
-I 
f 
I I 
3 
I 
/3 
I 
/3 I 
/3 Group 4 
14 1 
15 CK 
16 DC 
-I 
17 MC 
18 MK 
19 XGM / 
20 X Group 5 
21 Aft 
22 M 
-I 
23 SK 
24 IV 
-l 
-I Group6 
THE DATA 
The data used to estimate the basic model and its variations are for the most part compiled by the Bank of Korea and published in their annual series,Economic Statistics Yearbook. The data for all variables were compiled for 
the period 1955 to 1970 or for 16 years. Some data date from 1953. Thus all
equations, except those contining lagged variables, could be run on 16 
annual observations or more. 
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13 
INA 
14 
I 
15 
CK 
16 
DC 
17 
MC 
18 
MK 
19 
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20 
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22 
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23 
SK 
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5SG 
Group2 
6 WC 
7 IVO 
8 MG Group 3 
9 ILG 
10 SC 
II YDP 
12 SH 
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17 MC j3 I 
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19 XGM G20 X I I Group5
21 MI p 1 
22M 
- -l - I 
23 SK 
-1 16 G24 IV 1 1 -1 1 roup6 
All of the endogenous variables and most of the exogenous variables 
are in terms of constant 1965 won. Since many of the variables used in the
model (e.g. imports of goods by type, capital imports of various kinds, and 
tax variables) are not given by the Bank of Korea in constant 1965 won, wedeflated the Bank constant price or dollar data in a variety of ways. Exchange
rate variables were adjL.cd by a purchasing-power-parity index. Adjustments 
were made to other Bank data; for example, domestic savings was adjusted
to exclude changes in grain inventories and include transfers from abroad. A 
TABLE 8-4
 
Dalk Mabize d gm Mam.msd
 
F, Matrix
 
A Matrix 
 Basic Commercial r, MatrixLaggEadogenous Variables Policy Variables Derived Commercial Policy Variables 
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Logarithm to base e of INA-,. 
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deuied description of the data sources and adjustments to the data isgiven
Inthe appendix to tis chapter. 
BASIC HYPOTHESES AND TESTS 
Hypotheses tested in fitting the. basic model and its variations include the fol­
lowing general types: 
(I) 	 exchange rate variablN affect savings and investment behavior di­
rectly as well as exports, imports, and capital flows;(2) 	various types of tariff and tariff equivalents and export subsidies havedifferential effects on imports and exports;(3) 	private savings are sensitive to both nominal interest rate changes and 
expected rates of inflation;(4) 	 foreign loans are sensitive to nominal interest rates, expected rates ofinflation and expected rates of devaluation.
 
Hypotheses of these types are 
tested using the conventional tests of sig­
nificance. The results are described below. In addition, we 	 tested the generalhypothesis that the basic structure of the economy changed after the 1964devaluation and liberalization. For all equations for which there were enoughdegrees of freedom, we ran regressions over the sample period 1964 to 1970as well as over the whole period for which data were available to determine
whether the structure was changed. We also tested all our equations using
eleven observations from 1960 to 1970 and fourteen observations from 1957to 1970 when possible. The rationale for the 1960-70 period is that 1960 is
the year Rhee was overthrown and the first year of attempted economic re­form. The 1957 to 1970 period isused to determine whether the post-Korean-War years 1953 to 1956 were so significantly affected by reconstruction thatdata 	from these years bias the results. In choosing what we call our "bestresults," we chose the longest sample period for which the results seemed tobe stable. If the regression coefficients changed markedly, however, when ashorter sample period was used, we chose the results from the shorter sample
period.
All of the equations of the model were estimated initially using ordinaryleast squares or the Cochrane-Orcutt technique if there seemed to be signifi­
cant autocorrelation of the error terms. Various types of simultaneous estima­tion were then used to determine whether the simultaneous nature of the
model seriously biased the estimated coefficients. 
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FURTHER DESCRIPTION AND ESTIMATION
 
RESULTS
 
Grmp 1: Deftrubals of GNP. 
The first two equations of the model concern output in agriculture and 
nonagriculture. Output in nonagriculture sectors YNA is assumed to be re­
lated to nonagricultural investment INA in previous years.1 In the estimated 
relationship, there was strong evidence for decreasing returns to investment. 
That is, the higher the level of investment, the greater seems to be the net
incremental capital-output ratio.2 The best results among several functionalforms tried seem to be for the following equation for nonagricultural output: 
YNA = -281.8254 + 0.9413 YNAI (8-2) 
(-2.96) (10.02) 
+80.0668 log,. (INA.- I) 
(2.64)
 
Estimation Technique: Ordinary Least Squares
 
Sample: 1957 to 19713 
R2 = 0.9960 
d = 2.2310 
The t statistics are given in parentheses under each of the coefficients of 
variables in the equations. R2 is the coefficient of determination and d is the
Durbin-Watson statistic. The strength of decreasing returns in nonagriculture 
can be indicated by comparing incremental capital-output ratios when non­
agricultural investment runs about 50 billion won in constant 1965 prices, asit did in the late 1950s and early '60s, as opposed to investment of about 400billion won in constant 1965 prices, as in 1970. The capital-output ratio is
approximately 1.6 when investment is 50 billion and about 2.0 whenwon 
4investment is 400 billion won.
The second equation in Group I is an identity'relating total output Y to
agricultural output YA and nonagricultural output YNA. 
Y= YNA + YA (8-3) 
Group 2: Govesmem Tazsm it S.vgs Eipundua. 
The regression equations for government direct and indirect tax revenues 
were very well behaved. They exhibited very high coefficients of determination 
and were generally stable, regardless of the sample period used. 
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The dependent variable in the direct tax regression was potential taxa­
tion. That is, direct tax exemption for exporters SXDT w.,e added to actual 
direct tax revenues DTR to get potential direct taxes. Th,- results were a 
foilom: 
DTR + SXDT = -63.6088 + 0.1104Y (8-4) 
(-7.14) (16.42) 
Estimation Technique: Cochrane-Orcutt Iterative Tochnique 
Sample: 1953 to 1970 
R2 = 0.9946 
d =0.9741 
p = 0.88085 
For indirect taxes INT, excluding tariffs and foreign exchange taxes, the results 
were: 
INT =-16.2991 + 0.1193YNA (8-5) 
(-3.63) (15.86) 
Estimation Technique: Cohrane-Orcutt Iterative Technique 
Sample: 1953 to 1970 
R2 = 0.9787 
d = 1.4114 
p = 0.4968 
The regression results indicate a very high degree of elasticity of both 
direct and indirect tax revenues over the entire period 1953 to 1970. The 
average elasticity for direct tax revenues was 2.53 and for indirect tax rev­
enues 1.40. Since direct tax exemptions grew rapidly, particularly in the last 
half of the 1960s, potential tax revenues (excluding exemptions) were even 
more elastic. The average for direct taxes was 2.79.6 
Government expenditure G is assumed in our model to be exogenous, 
and governmen savinp SG is specified as an identity. 
SG= DTR+INT+ TAR-G (8-6) 
where TAR is tariffs and foreign exchange taxes. 
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Gmup T:beGral. Seo. 
Grain consumption was assumed to be dependent on income Y, the 
relative price of grains RPG, total population POP, and the split between rural 
and urban population. Since urban population has been growing quite steadily 
along with total population, any measure of the relative rural-urban popula­
tion is highly correlated with total population and the usual problems asso­
ciated with multicoinearity arise. The coefficients on the two correlated 
variables are extremely sensitive to the sample and the estimation technique 
used. We finally concluded that the best results could be obtained by using 
the population variable only. The results are: 
GC = 6.5619 + 0.02696Y - 31.3328RPG + 7.8016POP (8-7) 
(0.20) (1.58) (-2.21) (5.18) 
Estimation Technique: Ordinary Least Squares 
Sample: 1955 to 1970 
R 2 = 0.9582 
d = 1.7957 
The income variable Y and the population variable POP are also quite col­
linear, and this probably accounts for the lack of significance of the coefficient 
of the Y variable. Nevertheless, we felt a priori that the income variable should 
be retained. 
The implicit average income elasticity for grain consumption from 1955 
to 1970 is 0.1031 and the price elasticity is -0.0422. As one would expect, 
grain consumption is relatively price and income inelastic. Population growth 
is the major factor in determining growth in consumption. 
Korean domestic savings figures are very much affected by changes in 
grain inventories. The harvest comes in late in the year and most of the pro­
duction isheld in inventories at the end of the year. Fluctuations in the level 
of grain inventories are more a function of grain production than anything 
else. Grain imports also affect the levels of grain inventories, but, for the most 
part, changes in inventory do not represent conscious savings decisions but are 
more a function of the effect of weather osi the size of the harvest. 
Since changes in grain inventories are such an important component of 
savings, we estimated their level ILG as a function of grain production GP 
and grain imports MG. The best results are: 
ILG = -77.9743 + 0.5782MG + 0.7196GP (8-8) 
(-7.25) (7.52) (12.07) 
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Estimation Technique: Ordinary Least Squares 
Sample: 1955 to 1970 
R2 = 0.9607 
d = 1.9033 
Once the level of grain inventories is determined by the stochastic equation(8-8), investment in grain inventories lVG is determined by the identity 
IVG = ILG - ILG_, (8-9) 
Imports of grain are determined also as grain consumption GC plus inventory
change IVG less production GP. Production of grain assumed beis to 
exogenous. 
MG = lVG + GC - GP (8-10) 
Group 4: Seviap sad Iavesmen Bdeavior. 
Savings are classified as household and corporate. Household savingsSH is expected to be a function of the expected real rate of interest un localsavings deposits and disposable income of households YDP. The basic speci­
fication is: 
SH = a. + a, YDP + a2RRD* (8-11) 
Of course, the expected real rate of interest RRD* is not an observable vari­
able. We assume, however, that the expected real rate of interest is a functionof the current nominal rate of interest RD less the expected rate of inflation.The expected rate of inflation, is assumed to be a function of current and past rates of inflation RINF.7 
RRD* = RD - boRINF- bRINF-1 (8-12) 
If (8-12) is substituted back into (8-11), we obtain the following result: 
SH = a. + a,YDP + a2RD ­ boa2RINF - ba 2RINF_1 (8-13) 
This is the equation which was estimated with the following result: 
SH = -71.5504 +O.08578YDP + 193.0218RD (8-14) 
(-4.47) (4.23) (2.94) 
- 44.7071RINF - 35.0608RINF., 
(-2.48) (-2.87) 
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Estimation Technique: Cochrane-Orcutt Iterative Technique 
Sample: 1955 to 1970 
R 2 = 0.9550 
d = 3.0033 
p = 0.7070 
The results were only somewhat different for other sample periods, but all 
sample periods reveal a high degree of significance for the real interest rate. 
The average interest rate elasticity over the sample period is 1.82. a very high
interest rate elasticity.
Corporate savings SC, which form the bulk of private savings in South 
Korea, were assumed to be a function of nonagricultural value added, the 
expected real rate of interest on savings deposits, the average rate of protec­
tion on imports, and the average rate of subsidy on exports.8 The rationale for 
including rates of protection or subsidy was that high levels of protection and 
subsidy' should increase profits and lead to higher savings. The level of tariffs 
and tariff equivalents and subsidies per dollar of export did not seem to affect 
savings in any consistent or significant fashion. Furthermore, rates of inflation 
did not seem to possess much explanatory power and frequently carried the 
wrong sign in the regression. The best results were obtained using only two
variables, nonagricultural value added YNA and the rate of interest on savings 
deposits RD. 
SC = -0.5689 + 0.0730YNA + 115.2640RD (8-15) 
(-0.16) (10.51) (4.13) 
Estimation Technique: Ordinary Least Squares 
Sample: 1960 to 1970 
R2 = 0.9827 
d = 1.6131 
Both nonagricultural value added and the rate of interest were highly signifi­
cant for all sample periods and various specifications. For business savings,
the average interest rate elasticity is 0.34 over the sample period. Household 
savings seem to be substantially more interest rate elastic, but the significance
of deposit rates for corporate savings is nonetheless substantial (a t ratio of 
4.13). The rate of inflation was not a significant explanatory variable. Thusit seems that in Korea, corporate savings depend on the nominal rate of inter­
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est rather than on the expected kel rate of Interest (in contrast to household 
savings). The remon may be that although inflation reduces real interest costs,
it also may be associated with increased profit rates which have a positive
effect on corporate savings and investment. The two effects tend to cancel 
each other so that corporate savings show little sensitivity to the rate of 
inflation. 
Disposable income of households YDP is determined by the identity: 
YDP= Y- SC- INT- TAR- DTR + NTOSH (8-16) 
That is, disposable income of households is total income less retained earn­ings, less taxes, and plus net transfers from the government and corporate 
sectors to households. 
Investment in South Korea is financed by four main sources, private
savings channeled through the commercial banking system in the form of 
deposits, government savings channeled through both the commercial banks 
and a series of development finance institutions,' retained earnings, and bor­
rowing from abroad. 
The demand for loans from both commercial banks and developmentfinance institutions far exceeds the available supply of loanable funds even at 
the relatively high interest rates that marginal borrowers must pay.10 Loans 
are rationed since legud interest rate ceilings cannot clear the market. The 
restlt is that much investment is financed through the unorganized money
market and by borrowing from abroad. Since interest rates are controlled 
and credit is rationed, we decided to include as an independent variabl, for 
the nonagricultural investment equation the total level of savings largely
available to government or channeled through the banking system. This in­
cludes government savings SG, public capital imports PK, corporate savingsSC, and household savings SH. It does not include other sources of savings
such as foreign commercial loans, reductions in foreign exchange reserves,
and inven'tory disinvestment. The other explanatory variables tried were cur­
rent and lagged income growth, the real local commercial bank loan rate, the
real rate of interest on foreign loans, average tariffs and tariff equivalents perdollar of imports, export subsidies per dollar of export, and effective ex­
change rates. 
Of all these explanatory vadiables, current and lagged income growth and 
available savings (SG + PK + SC + SH) seemed to give the only good results. 
Import tariffs and export subsidies did not eem to have a direct impact oninvestment demand. The loan rates, foreign and domestic, were not good
explanatory variables although the domestic loan rate was nearly signifcant atthe 5 percent level for some regressions. The lack of strong significanct- ,! thedomestic ic,,n rate is probably due to the wide variety of loan rates at diqerent
types of banks and for different purposes. With such a variety of subsidized 
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rates and the pvalence of credit rationin& it is expected that official loan 
rates would not have substantial explanatory value. The equation which wefelt best for purposes of simulation, however, did include the domestic loin 
rate and was as follows: 
INA =-19.0111 + 0.5802(YNA - YNA_-,) + 0.7525(YNA -1 (8-17)
(-1.39) (2.97) (3.39) 
- YNA -2) + 0.7263(SG + PK + SC+ SH) - 36.8952RLR 
(4.44) (-1.08)
 
Estimation Technique: Cochranc-Orcutt Iterative Technique
 
Sample: 1957 to 1970 
R2 = 0.9948 
d = 1.7044 
p = 0.5643 
where RLR is the expected real rate of interest for domestic loans. The cx­pected real rate of interest is the nominal rate less the expected rate of infla­
tion which is assumed to be approximated by last year's rate of inflation: 
RLR = LR - RINF_1 (8-18) 
Since a large component of nonagricultural investment is available savings,
the problem of simultaneity (discussed later) is particularly acute for this
 
equation and requires further investigation.
 
Total investment I equals nonagricultural investment INA plus invest­
ment in agriculture IA.
 
I = INA + 1A (8-19) 
The next equation in Group 4 is a demand equation for foreign loans.
Although, in principle, foreign loans over three years require approval from
the Economic Planning Board, the Board has encouraged investors to borrow 
abroad. Beginning about 1970, however, concern over the rising level of debt 
service payments led the IMF to insist on restriction of the flow of foreign
capital, and the restrictions imposed seemed to be effective. 
The demand for foreign loans is assumed to be a function of the level of 
total fixed investment i, the expected real rate of interest on domestic loaus 
RLR, and the expected real rate of interest on foreign loans RRF. That is, 
CK = a. + all + a 2RLR + a3RRF + a4CKDM (8-20) 
where CKDM is a dummy variable equal to unity for 1970 and zero for all 
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odir yem. The expected rate of interest on foreip loans involves not only 
th expected rate of inflation but the expected rate of devaluation. We assume 
that the expecte rate of devaluation is approximaed by the average of the 
current and two previous years' rates of devaluation. Thus 
RRF = RF - RINF. +(RDEV + RDEV-. + RDEV_ 2)/3 (8-21) 
Equation (8-19) was cstimated as follows: 
CK = -23.7637 + 0.26341 + 148.5346RLR (8-22) 
(-7.06) (7.86) (2.87) 
-77.5319RRF - 27.8443CKDM 
(-2.02) (-3.06) 
Estimation Technique: Ordinary Least Squares 
Sample: 1959 to 1970 
R2 = 0.9847 
d = 2.5668 
The demand for foreign loans is sensitive to both the domestic and foreign 
loan interest rate. The average elasticities are 0.326 and -0.477. The signifi­
cance of the dummy variable indicates that the restrictions on foreign borrow­
ing had a significant effect in 1970. 
The final equation in Group 4 is an identity for domestic consumption 
expenditure, 
DC = Y - SC - SH - SG - IVG + RT + NFi (8-23) 
Consumption equals income less savings, both private and government, less 
inventory investment in grains, plus net transfers and net factor incomes from 
abroad. 
Gro5: Import sod Expot Eqandes. 
Group 5 contains three import equations, an export equation, and two 
identities. Imports of consumption goods are assumed to depend on various 
components of the effective exchange rate for imports and the level of domes­
tic consumption. Initially, the effective exchange rate for imports was broken 
up into three components: (I) the official rate, (2) tariffs and tariff equiva­
lents, and (3) the total value of export premia per dollar of import. The 
coefficients for parts 2 and 3 were not significant and were unstable with re­
spect to the sample used for all of the import equations. Thus parts 2 and 3 
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were combined into a single variable called SUBM. For imports of consump­
tion goods MC, the two parts SUBM and ORD were combined, sinco there 
was no significant difference between their coefficients. The best results arc: 
MC = -8.1035 + 0.0596DC - 0.1055(SUBM + ORD) (8-24) 
(-2.15A' (11.75) (-5.43) 
Estimation Technique: Ordinary Least Squares 
Sample: 1955 to 1970 
R'-= 0.9163 
d = 1.2058 
where DC is domestic consumption. This equation results in an average elas­
ticity of -2.10 for the effective exchange ralc of imports, SUBM + ORD." 
For capital goods imports, a somewhat different model must be used. 
Most capital goods enter duty free and by special channels such as foreign aid 
loans or loans from abroad. The official exchange rate is the most relevant 
exchange rate to use. Since most foreign loans are tied to capital goods imports, 
we would expect the level of foreign borrowing to be an important determi­
nant of capital goods imports. The level of investment is also a determinant of 
the magnitude of capital goods imports. The best regression results for MK,
imports of capital goods, are obtained with foreign commercial loans CK, in­
vestment 1,and the official exchange rate ORD as explanatory variables. 
MK = 3.881 +0.3610CK+ 0.33111 -0.08530RD (8-25) 
(0.61) (2.22) (6.58) (-2.44) 
Estimation Technique: Ordinary Least Squares 
Sample: 1955 to 1970 
R2 = 0.9876 
d = 1.6974 
The elasticity of capital goods imports with respect to ORD is -0.36. 
For imports of intermediate goods, we used the official exchange rateORD and total tariffs, tariff equivalents, and export premia per dollar of im­
port SUBM as the commercial policy v3riables. Other explanatory variables 
are gross national product Y and exports X. Manufactured exports XGM is 
used as a separate explanatory variable, since we believe that in general ex­
ports of manufactures are more intensive in their use of imports than other 
elements of expenditure on GNP. The resulting equation is: 
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Mi = 9.9287 + 0.1772Y + 0.361OXGM - O.3714SUBM (8-26) 
(0.42) 	 (3.53) (1.67) (-2.53) 
- 0.2197ORD 
(-2.68) 
Estim !ion Technique: Cochrane-Orcutt Iterative Technique 
Sample: 1955 to 1970 
R2 = 0.9893 
d = 1.5915 
p = 0.2554 
The average elasticity is -. 46 for the official exchanne rate ORD and -0.80 
for SUBM. One would expect a higher elasticity for SUBM if tariffs and 
tariff equivalents are levied selectively on commodity items with higher than 
average elasticity. 
As Chapter 6 indicated, the export equation was the most difficult to 
estimate. The estimation procedures and results were discussed at some length 
in that chapter and we merely repeat the best results here for sake of com­
pleteness. 
XGM = -241.4847 + 0.3323YMA + 0.26290RD (8-27) 
(-3.92) (11.29) (1.70) 
+ 0.1471SUBX 
(1.27) 
Estimation Technique: Cochrane-Orcutt Iterative Technique 
Sample: 1957 to 1970 
R3 = 0.9900 
d = 1.3742 
p = 0.8701 
where XGM is export of manufactured goods. 
The last two equations of Group 5 an idntities giving the value of total 
imports and exports: 
M = MG + MC + MK + MI +MNC (8-28) 
X = XGM + XGP 	 (8-29) 
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Grop &Deooni sd Supply R- ,. 
The final group of equations contains two identities. The first is the bal­
ance of payments identity relating movements of short term capital and
changes in monetary assets SK to the demand and supply of foreign ex­
change.
 
SK = M -- MST- X - CK - PK (,-30) 
where MST is net service imports plus net transfer payments abroad. The 
second identity makes inventory change the equilibrating item for aggregate
demand and bupply or between savings and investment 
IV = SG + SC + SH + M + MST - X - 1 (8-31) 
SIMULTANEOUS ESTIMATION 
So far we have only discussed the results of single equation estimation tech­
niques and have not yet attempted simultaneous estimation. There is someheuristic justification for this. A glance at the B matrix in Table 8-3 reveals a 
structure that is very nearly triangular. 2 The system is triangular cxcept for 
one block of equations, the IVG, MG, and ILG equations. (See the block with 
dotted lines in the B matrix of Table 8-3.) It is well-known that ifa structureis triangular (i.e. recursive) and the errors across equations arc uncorrelated,
ordinary least squares estimation is a consistent estimation technique. A slight
generalization of this theorem is easy to prove: if the system is block-triangular
and the errors across blocks arc uncorrelated, each block may be treated as a
simultaneous system and consistent estimation of each block results in con­
sistent estimation for the system as a whole. 
With this in mind, we attempted to estimate the block of equations, IVG,MG, and ILG, as a simultaneous system. This system can be written as 
follows: 
IVG = ILG -ILG_- (8-32) 
MG = IVG +GC - GP (8-33) 
ILG = #MG + yGP + yo + e (8-34) 
where e is an error term. It we substitute (8-32) into (8-33) and (8-33) 
in turn into (8-34) and solve for ILG, we obtain the following result: 
1-) (GC- ILG- ) + (Y ' P) GP + -- (8-35)
0-0.0-0 
(i-PJ) 
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This equation can be estimated ov regressi ILG on the combination variable 
(GC - IXG -1) rnd on GP. The result is 
IL(, = -139,51 + 0.654(GC-ILG_ ) + 0.625GP (8-36) 
Estimation Technique: Ordinary Least Squares 
Sample: 1955 to 1970 
R2 = 0.8460 
d = 1.52 
he original structural coefficients, fl, -/. and j, can be estimated then by in­
direct least squares by solving the following equations: 
0- - 139.51 (8-37)(I-fl) 
= 0.654 (8-38)(I-fl) 
= 0.625 (8-39)(1-fl) 
The solution gives the following estimate of the structural equation (8-34): 
ILG = -79.17 + 0.395MG + 0.773GP (8-40) 
Comparing this result with the ordinary least squares result in equation (8-8), 
we see that the constant term changes relatively little, the coefficient of MG is 
reduced and the coefficicnt of GP increases. 
If all the equations are regarded together as one large system, estimation 
is impossible because observations are too few. For example, consider the 
problem with a two-stage least squares approach. There are 35 exogenous and 
lagged endogenous variables. There are, however, a maximum of 18 observa­
tions from 1953 to 1970. Thus it is impossible to regress any if the cndoge­
nous variables on all the exogenous and lagged endogenous variables. Some 
technique has to be found to reduce the number of instrunental variables 
(exogenous and lagged endogenous). 
A method for choosing instruments has been proposed hy Fisher (1965). 
Some exogenous variables of the system of equations may Add little causal 
information to the equation and hence be of little value in reducing the bias 
in estimation. Thus Fisher suggests the use of a causal ordering system for the 
set of all predetermined variables. 
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Our ordering system is similar to Fisher's and works as follows: 
(I) 	 The predetermined variables in equation i are called zcro-order causal 
varipbles for equation i. 
(2) 	 For each endogenous variable in an equation (other than the depen­
dent 	variable), we may deterinc the set of predetermined variables 
in the equation explaining that endogenous variable. Each set of such 
predetermined variables are first-order causal variables. 
(3) 	 For each equation j explaining an endogenous variable in equation i. 
there are a set of endogenous variables. The predetermined variables 
in the equations explaining this set of endogenous variables are secand­
order cat;al variables. The predetermined variables in the equation for 
a lagged endogenous variable contained in equation i also calledarc 
second-order causa i variables. 
The causal ordering descrited here may &x defined more precisely in a recur­
sive fashion. 
It is 	very difficult to choose a set of predetermined variables as instru­
ments. If one chooses too few, the simultaneous equations' bias to the esti­
mates is likely to be a problem. If one chooses too many instruments, the 
endogenous variables, when rcgresscd on the instruments, arc nearly predicted
perfectly, a problem of lack of degrees of freedom. We decided to run two 
sets of two-stage least squares estimates, one with the Fisher instruments of 
zero- and first-order causal variables, and another with a larger set of instru­
ments up to the second order of causality. 
In addition to the Fisher instruments, Fair (1970) suggests that when the 
errors in an equation arc serially correlated a consisicnt estimation procedure 
requires the addition of all lagged variables in the equation as instruments. 
Table 8-5 lists the instruments which arc used for each equation. Tables 
8-6 and 8-7 give the results using the two different sets of Fisher instruments, 
the first set using zero- and first-order causal variables and the second set using
variables through the second order of causality. Note that for the YNA cqud­
tion, there are no other endogenous variables in the equation. Thus two-stage 
least squares and ordinary least squares are equivalent. Note also in Table 8-5 
that for the INT, SC, and XGM equations, there are no second-order causal 
variables. Thus the two-stage least squares estimates are identical wheth.r or 
not second-order causal variables are included. When only the Fisher first­
order causal variables are included, the ILG equation does not have enough
instruments so that the equation is underidentified. It is only possible to esti­
mate with two-stage least squares when second-order instruments are included. 
Finally, when instruments through the second order of causality arc used, it is 
not possible to estimate the INA equation. There are too many instruments 
and no degrees of freedom. 
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lnkswomm vmiald 
Stochastic Zero- and First-
Equation Order Instruments 
YNA YNA-_..,INA-1_ 

DTR SXDT, YA 

INT YNA- 1, INA-, 

GC RPG, POP, VA 

ILG GP 
SC RD, YNA INA - 3 
SH RD, RINF. RINF_1, 
NTOSH, TAR 
INA PK, TAR, G, RD, 

RINF, RINF_1. 

YNA - 1,INA_. 

YNA -2 
CK RLR, RRF. CKDM. 

IA
 
MC (SUBM + ORD), 

NFI. RT 

MK ORD, RLF, RRF, 

CKDM, IA

MI SUBM ORD, YA, 

SUX 

XGM SUBX,ORD, 
VNA_. , INA-, 
TABLE 8-5 
on dw Bobk of Ca Ordu 
Second-Order 
Instruments 
INA, PK 
YNA, INA_. 
-
YNA_,,INA_ 
ILGI RPG, POP, 
-
YA, RPG, POP, 
SXDT 
YNA -.., INA-., 
SXDT, NTOSH 
YNA. , YNA _.,PKn
YA, RD, RiVF, 
RINF., TAR, G, 
ILG_1 
YNA 1, YNA_., PK 
YNA-, INA-
Additional 
Instruments
 
Due to
 
Autocorrelation
 
(DTR + SXDT)_, 
Y-1
 
INT_ 
RINF_., RD-,, 
SH- 1 , YDpj
 
PK.-, (SG + SC +
 
SM)_1, YNA_
 1 
RLRj 
SUBMn,, ORD-,, 
MI_ 1, Y 1,. XGM 
SUBX_, ORD-,. 
XGM_1 
The results using two-stage least squares with first-order instruments are
almost identical to the ordinary least squares results except for the GC, CK,
MK, and MI equations. When second-order instruments are used, only the 
coefficient of the CK variable in the MK equation is substantially different 
from the ordinary least squares result. Furthermore, all the equations listed 
in Table 8-7 still have large degrees of freedom except for the CK equation.
We must conclude that the problem of simultaneity is not great for our Korean 
econometric model. 
TABLE 8-6 
Twalv LadSq..mmh whh hhEoFrkiOrkw Imbmmml vub wk 
DTR = -61.5843 + 0.1092Y - SXDT 
(-6.56) (15.26)
INT = - 17.2787 + 0.1202 YNA 
(-3.76) (15.84) 
GC = 111.8904 + 0.0964Y - 40.4563RPG 
(1.30) (1.81) (-1.78) 
+2.2082POP 
(0.50)
SC = -0.5678 + 0.0725YNA + 116.5768RD 
(-0.16) (10.41) (4.16) 
SI, = -69.6454 + 0.08412YDP + 192.2094RD (-4.43) (4.16) (2.92) 
-45.1081RINF - 34.9772RINF_. 
(-2.48) (-2.85) 
Estimation 
R2 d Technique 
.9944 0.9381 TSCORC 
.9792 1.4411 TSCORC 
.9006 0.8621 TS 
.9827 1.6273 TS 
.9549 3.0123 TSCORC 
INA = -1 9 .0076+0.582(YNA 
- YNA 1 )+ 0.7525(YNA - YNA ..) 
(-1.39) (2.97) 
+ 0.7263(SG + SC + SH) - 36.8973RLR (4.44) 	 (-1.08) 
CK 	 - -24.9579 + 0.28891 + 115.0503RLR
 
(-6.23) (5.31) (1.50)
 
-52.846IRRF - 32.4248CKDAt 

(-0.93) (-2.69)
 
MC = -7.3710 + 0.0548DC
 
(-1.84) (7.44)
-0.09356(SUBM + ORD) 
(-4.02) 
MK = 0.7415 + 0.2091CK + 0.36371 
(0.11) 	 (1.00) (5.60) 
- 0.07400RD 
(- !..?') 
MI = 18.0854 + 0.1564 Y + 0.4503XGM 
(0.74) (2.98) (1.99) 
- 0.3586SUBM - 0.19750RD 
(-2.39) (-2.39)
XGM = -242.4649 + 0.3332 YNA + 0.26420RD 
(-3.94) (11.26) (1.71) 
+ 0.1480SUBX 
(1.27) 
.9948 1.7044 TSCORC 
.9834 2.7436 7'S 
.9101 1.0454 TS 
.9861 1.6003 TS 
.9890 1.6074 TSCORC 
.9900 1.3756 TSCORC 
Non: TSCORC stands for two-stage least squares with Cochrane-Orcutt iterations.TS stands for ordinary two-stage least squares. 
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TABLE 8-7 
Tw4 LeW Ulmw Ihdoof wk Flids 
5euid4kdw Ilum.vold Vaisiids 
Estimation 
Ru d Technique 
DTR = -66.2773 + 0.1119Y - SXDT .9944 0.9745 TSCORC 
(-6.46) (15.24) 
GC = 17.5453 + 0.03193 Y - 33.3742RPG 
(0.47) (1.67) (-2.27/
 
4.7.3280POP .9577 1.7572 TS
 
(4.28) 
ILG = -92.5178 + 0.6702MG + 0.7853GP .9477 1.6311 TS 
(--6.30) (5.04) (10.15) 
SH = -72.2550 + 0.08657YDP + 192.7797RD 
(-4.49) (4.26) (2.93)
 
-44.6751RINF - 35.0964RINF-1 .9550 2.9992 TSCORC
 
(-2.50) (-2.87)
 
CK = 	-23.6744 + 0.26151 + 151.0420RLR 
(-7.02) (7.73) (2.89) 
-79.3805RRF- 27.5013CKDM .9847 2.5466 TS 
(-2.05) (-3.01) 
MC = -8.3930 + 0.0597DC 
(-2.25) (11.67) 
- 0.1049(SUBM + ORD) .9162 1.2160 TS 
(-5.41) 
MK = 	 1.5311 + 0.2117CK + 0.37171 
(0.23) (1.15) (6.63)
 
- 0.0846ORD .9866 1.6893 TS
 
(-2.33)
 
MI = 	10.3928 + 0.1760Y + 0.3672XGM 
(0.44) (3.50) (1.69)
 
- 0.3700SUBM - 0.21880RD .9891 1.5930 TS
 
(-2.51) (-2.66)
 
NoTE: TSCORC istwo-stage least squares with Cochrane-Orcutt iterations and TS is 
ordinary two-stag least squares. 
APPENDIX: DATA USED IN THE 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Most of the data used for the regressions in this chapter are compiled by the 
Bank of Korea and published in their Economic Statistics Yearbook. A de­
scription of the raw data and their sources is contained in Table 8-8. 
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TABLE 8-8
 
Dudedm o f3mw Dem. md Smm
 
Data in billions of constant 1965 won 
RY : Gross national product; BOK, ESY 1971, pp. 10-I I'
RYNA : Value.added in nonagricultural sectors, ibid., pp. 14-15
RI : Gross domestic fixed capital formation, ibid., pp. W.-l I
RIA : nve~tment in agriculture, ibid., pp. 28-29
RNFI Net factor income from rbroad, ibid., pp. 10-I I
RGRC Grain consumption, BOK National Accounts Division
RIVG Grain inventory investment. ibid. 
RILG Grain inventory leve!, ibid.RMG Imports of goods, including freight and insurance; 110K, ESY 1971, 
pp. 44-45RXG 
RMOS 
Exports of goods, including freight :ind insurance, ibd.
Imports of services, other than freight and insuranct, ibid.
RXOS Exports of services, other than freight and insurance, ibid.
RT Net transfer receipts from abroad on current account, ibid. 
Data in billions of current won
 
CY : Gross national product, ESY 1971, pp. 8-9
CYDP Personal disposable income, ibid., pp. 36--37
CSH : Savings by households and private nonpro"tt institutions, ibid., 
pp. 22-23 CSC : Gross savings (including capital consumption allowances)
by corporations and unincorporat.d enterprises, ibid.CGS Gross savings by government, including government enterprises, 
ibij.CSTD Statistical discrepancy between savings and gross do.istic 
capital formation, ibid.CDTR Direct tax revenues, ibid., pp. 38-39
 
CITR Indirect taxes, ibid.
 
CGT : Government transferm in the private sector, ibid.
 
Data ir,current millions of doliars 
DMGS Imports of goods and services, ESY 1971, pp. 266-267DMG Imports of goods, including freight and insurance, ibid.
DCKL : Long-term private capital imports, ibid.
 
DCKS Short-term capital imports, ibid.
DM 4 Net reduction in foreign assets of monetary institutions, ibid.
 
DXG3 : Total exports of goods, Ministry of Finance, Foreign Trade 
of Korea, MOF, FTOK annual through 1971
DAIGR : I iports of grain (SI 1C 04), ibid.
 
(continued) 
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TABLE -8 (concluded) 
DUC Imports of consumption goods (SITC 0. I, 732.1,; excluding 04), 
ibid.
 
DUK Imports of capital goods (SITC 7, excluding 732.1). ibid.
 
DMI Imports of intermediate goods (SITC 2, 3, 4, 5,6), ibid.
 
DXGM Exports of manufactured goods, ibid.
 
Exchange rate and export premia in won per dollar" 
OR Exchange rate 
RXS Export premium per dollar of export 
Tariffs, tariff equivalents, export subsidies, and export premia 
in billions of won, current prices" 
TM Tariffs and tariff equivalents 
PX Total export premiums 
SX Total export subsidies
 
SXTAXD: Export subsidies in form of direct tax relief
 
SXTAXI : Export subsidies in form of indirect tax exemption
 
Price indexes 
WPI Wholesale price index, ESY 1971, pp. 314-315
 
WPIG Wholesale price index for grains, ibid.
 
WPIOG Wholesale price index for commodities other than grains, ibid.
 
WPITP Wholesale price index for major trading partners. International
 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics' 
Other data 
PR Farm population in millions of persons, ESY 1971, p.6 
PU Nonfarm population in millions of persons, ibid. 
NRD Nominal interest rate on time deposits one year and longer, 
ESY 1971, p. 135 and ESY 1960 
NRF Interest rate on business loans in United States, United States 
Department of Commerce, Survey ol Current Business 
NLR Commercial bank lending rate, ES) 1957-71 
Nolm: BOK-ank of Korea; ESY-Economic Statistics Yearbook, published by
BOK; SITC-Standard International Trade Clausification. manual published by the 
United Nations. 
a.Where series is not continuous to 1953 in ESY 1971, it was traced as far back as 
possible in earlier yearbooks. The revised figures for 1970 were obtained from 30K, 
Monthly Economic Statistics, August 197 1. 
b.Sources for these items are mainly primary, including files of the Ministry of 
Finance, 90K, and USAID. Korea Mission. 
c.Wholesale price indexes for the United States and Japan were averaged by using 
weights derived from their respective shares in total trade. 
APPENDIX: DATA USED IN THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 151 
Table 8-9 gives the transformations to the raw data which are requiredto obtain the values of the endogenous and exogenous variables for the model.Much of the raw data are curreet price data and must be deflted to obtain
values in tarms of constant won. Direct and indirect tax revenues. private sav.ings, government savings, government transfers to private sector, and subsidiesin the form of direct and indirect tax exemptions are all deflated by a GNPdeflator (i.e., multiplied by RY/CY as in Table 8-9). Imports of goods of
various types are deflated by the overall import price deflator u.sd in deter­
mining real GNP (i.e., multiplied by RMG/DMG). Capital imports are de-
TABLE 8-9 
Tmusformatios of Raw )ata 
Endogenous variables 
YNA " R YNA
 
Y "RY
 
DTR 
-(RY/CY). CDTR 
INT = (RY/CY)'(CI7"R-71)
 
SG =(RY/CY). CGS
 
GC = RGRC
 
IVG = RIVG
 
MG = (RMG/DMG). DMGR
 
ILG = RILG
 
SC = (RY/CY). CSC
 
YDP = (RY/CY). CYDP
 
SH = (RY/CY). (CH+CSTD)-RIVG
 
INA = RI-RIA
 
I = RI
 
CK = ((RMG+RMOS) / DAGS). DCKL
 
DC = Y-SC--SH-IVG-SG+RNF,
 
MC = (RMG/DMG). DMC
 
MK = (RMG/DMG). DMK
 
XGM = (RXG/DXG). DXGM
 
X = RXG
 
MI = (RMG/DMG). DMI 
M = RMG
 
SK = ((RMG+RMOS) /DMGS) . (DMA +DCKS)

IV = SG+SC+SH-I+M+RMOS-RXOS-RT-X
 
Basic commercial policy variables 
ORD = OR .(WPITP/WPI)

XPX = RXS .(WPITP/ WPI)
 
SOX = ((SX' iOOO)/DXG) 
. (WPITP/WPI)
 
TAM = ((RM IOOO)/DMG) (WPITP/WPI)
 
(continued) 
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TABLE 8-9 (concluded) 
Derived commercial policy variables 
XPU = (PX. iOOO/DMG).(WPITP/WPI) 
SUM = XPM+TAM 
5UBX = sOX+XPX 
SXDT = (RY/CY) SXTAXD 
TAR = (RY/CY). TI 
MARDEV= (RDEV+RDEV_,+RDEV_-.)/3 
where
 
RDEV " RRtl~ 
and 
R ORD+ (SUBM"RMG+SUBX RXG) I(RMG+RXG) 
Other exogenous variables 
YA = RY-RYNA 
G = IN7'+7AR DTR--SG 
IA = RIA 
I'K = M'+RMOS-RXOS-RT-X-CK-SK 
NFI = RNFI
 
MSI = RAfOS--RX TV-R7' 
RPG = WPIG/ WIPIOG 
POP = PR+PU 
GP = RGRC4 RIIVG-(RAfG/DMG ). DMGR 
RD = NRD 
LR = NLR 
RF = NRF 
RINF = (GNPD-GNPD_ 1)/GNPD_ 
where 
GNPD = C')'/RY 
MNC = Af-C-MK-MI-MG 
NTOSH = Y-INT-TAR-DTR-SC-YDP 
XGP = (RXG/DXG) . (DXG-DXGM) 
flated by the price deflator for imports of goods and services (i.e., multiplied
by (RUG + RMOS)/DMGS). Nonclassified imports MNC, consumption DC, 
inventory investment IV, government expenditure G, public capital imports
PK, and net transfers of other sectors to households NTOSH arc all defined in 
terms of the other variables so that the deflation procedures do not alter any 
of the identities of the model. The basic commercial policy variables are de­
flated by a purchasing-power-parity index which is the ratio of the Korean 
wholesale price index to the wholesale price index of major trading partners. 
Tables 8-10A through 8-10G give the actual values of the raw data 
used and Tables 8-11A through 8-11D give th: valoes of the derived endo­
genous and exogenous variables. 
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Ibw IuSahIn [FABLE 8-IA m d Cr..g I9lS Wen 
Year RY R YNA RI RIA RNFI RGRC RIp(; 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
421.93 
447.36 
474.54 
480.47 
218.60 
228.30 
250.50 
268.20 
35.28 
41.66 
48.98 
52.77 
4.04 
3.45 
4.53 
5.07 
9.42 
7.56 
7.75 
7.38 
-
162.87 
161.04 
36.13 
3.53 
0.95 
-- 11.32 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
522.73 
551.69 
575.84 
589.07 
613.61 
292.20 
305.40 
332.20 
345.10 
345.10 
61.31 
57.79 
59.29 
61.71 
65.26 
6.48 
5.35 
5.99 
6.97 
8.35 
7.59 
7.59 
7.75 
7.38 
5.79 
156,64 
180.61 
186.66 
176.40 
192.47 
16.90 
9.45 
-3,73 
2.04 
6.81 
1962 
1963 
634.97 
693.03 
382.60 
422.50 
84.05 
105.95 
6.72 
10.28 
6.48 
6.79 
194.39 
186.53 
-15.25 
22.93 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
750.31 
805.85 
913.82 
995.16 
1127.32 
436.00 
494.20 
567.90 
668.30 
796.50 
93.33 
117.64 
190.63 
232.09 
325.63 
10.66 
13.67 
23.16 
19.24 
23.82 
6.53 
7.65 
13.08 
21.53 
22.24 
218.38 
229.01 
235.12 
238.91 
239.97 
20.85 
-0.15 
8.4() 
-- 12.40 
-- 12.47 
1969 1306.19 935.80 407.76 24.26 23.04 246.20 30.08 
1970 1422.33 1055() 416.76 25.06 10.17 253.51 14.34 
Year RILG RAIG RXG RAIOS RXOS RiT 
1953 36.13 91.67 20.64 I 83 13.30 49.92 
1954 39.66 64.57 6.82 2.12 9.50 34.92 
1955 40.61 86.95 4.91 2.57 13.83 39.84 
1956 29.29 100.88 6.98 3.69 10.19 74.63 
1957 46.19 117.12 7.09 6.61 13.80 83.07 
1958 55.64 99.87 5.65 7.25 18.87 75.50 
1959 51.91 80.02 6.29 7.85 21.20 54.59 
1960 53.95 90.40 9.69 10.24 21.39 61.311961 60.76 82.30 11.89 9.00 26.75 46.93
1962 45.51 112.90 15.45 7.43 27.87 63.74 
1963 68.44 143.56 23.78 9.98 22.80 66.65 
1964 89.29 104.83 32.51 9.93 23.49 50.96 
1965 89.14 120.15 47.80 9.44 29.12 53.95 
1966 97.54 192.87 69.09 13.54 51.59 58.29 
1967 85.14 263.59 87.82 17.73 82.81 59.76 
1968 72.67 374.93 133.66 35.56 99.97 63.01 
1969 102.75 468.83 183.02 47.40 122.38 64.65 
1970 117.09 513.69 252.93 64.85 127.72 45.23 
TABLE 8-100
 
NNW Dif h ONI of Weea Coma FIlm
 
Year cY CYDP CSH" CSC, CG.S, 
1953 48.18 44.14 3.44 2.24 1.11 
1954 66.88 60.23 2.97 3.31 0.35 
1955 116.06 106.33 3.87 5.00 1.32 
1956 152.44 140.25 -3.08 6.57 8.50 
1957 197.78 179.63 9.55 8.85 8.18 
1953 207.19 183.78 7.85 10.20 7.65 
1959 221.00 190.85 3.11 12.35 7.18 
1960 246.69 21.69 -2.65 13.11 11.91 
2962 296.82 260.16 2.51 17.25 14.10 
1962 348.58 295.71 -10.48 25.25 21.62 
'963 487.96 421.98 6.15 35.60 24.57 
1964 696.79 617.14 1.06 46.44 34.75 
965 805.85 696.87 2.30 62.66 49.74 
1966 1032.04 886.32 42.05 76.66 62.19 
1967 1242.35 1043.24 11.73 97.59 88.25 
1968 1575.65 1286.04 15.26 121.93 133.97 
1969 2047.11 1701.32 114.41 149.44 159.51 
1970 2545.92 2081.66 84.19 182.85 206.43 
Ycar CSTD I,  CDTR CITR CG7 
1953 - 0.99 1.70 0.42 
1954 - 1.27 3.29 0.50 
1955 - 1.90 5.22 0.50 
1956 - 2.32 6.74 0.61 
1957 - 4.37 10.42 1.93 
1958 - 4.89 12.64 3.08 
1959 - 6.02 16.19 2.17 
1960 1.92 6.46 18.73 1.51 
2961 2.18 8.44 19.98 0.64 
1962 2.58 9.09 28.65 3.23 
1963 3.62 12.18 30.94 0.0 
1964 3.14 16.63 33.92 -1., 
1965 5.06 22.14 47.13 0.35 
1966 14.16 38.03 72.31 5.27 
1967 22.71 53.46 98.66 3.69 
1968 28.36 81.00 147.71 23.22 
1969 33.11 115.01 196.90 31.75 
1970 45.58 145.01 250.37 7.84 
a. Includcs current account transfers from 
abrod. 
b.Iefore 1960, savinp were estimated as a 
residual. Since then separate estimation of savinp 
hs rewlted in a statistical discrepancy between sav­
inp and gros domestic capital formatlon. 
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TABLE 8-1OCbw Dub i MbhaU inia thaw PdvkDon, 
Year DAIGS DAIG DCKL DCKS DAfA I)XG 
1953 
- 345.40 ...... 40.101954 
­ 243.30 
­
.. 
 25.701955 337.30 327.60 0.0 -0.90 15.30 18.501956 394.00 380.10 0.0 -3.20 
- 18.70 26. 301957 466.20 441.30 0.0 2.90-- 4.10 26.701958 403,60 376.30 0.0 7.AX -45.30 21.3)1959 331.10 301.50 0.80 -0.60 -- 15.10 23.701960 379.20 340.60 2.60 0.60 - 14.50 36.501961 344.00 310.10 0.20 -- 2.() --30.30 44.801962 453.40 425.40 2.80 -6.70 5.50 58.201963 578.50 540.90 42.60 18.40 55.m(0 89.601964 432.40 395.00 10.30 -- 2.703,30 122.501965 488.30 452.70 19.10 
-2.50 
-16.20 180.101966 777.70 726.70 177.20 6.40 --119.20 260.301967 ;060.00 971.90 233.40 45.20 -118.20 
.345.401968 1546.60 1412.60 383.10 13.20 -- 3.00 503.6)1969 1945.00 1766.40 372.10 56.50 -95.00 689.601970 2149.60 1940.00 292.10 122.40 29.20 922.80 
Year DMGR DMC DAIK DAMI VXGMA 
1953 
.... 0.90 
1954 
­
- 1.201955 
-
1.406.36 25.42 
­
57.02 189.81 

1956 31.19 
 32.54 42.81 238.16 1.50
1957 84.33 40.98 41.94 .!35.57 3.101958 51.05 30.56 36.25 234.21 2.401959 17.53 16.08 41.81 209.75 3.(x)1960 20.56 17.00 40.07 217.15 5.501961 30.21 15.65 42.39 195.80 8.501962 33.55 20.10 68.56 291.56 10.601963 107.23 24.14 113.17 314.54 39.60 
1964 60.78 13.27 69.17 259.87 58.501965 54.44 16.28 73.23 319.66 107.001966 61.30 25.17 168.35 461.60 153.801967 76.57 40.48 305.27 573.79 215.401968 129.35 93.93 517.58 721.57 338.401969 250.33 129.84 571.64 870.90 481.601970 244.78 140.55 572.46 1025.44 651.50 
TABLE 8-10D 
14"tEu lu msa K,Wee po' IIDne 
Year OR R.S 
1953 6.50 0.0 
1954 18.00 8.50 
1955 30.00 48.10 
1956 50.00 52.90 
1957 50.00 58.90 
1958 50.00 64.00 
1959 50.00 84.70 
1960 62.50 83.90 
1961 127.50 14.60 
1962 130.00 0.0 
1963 130.00 39.80 
1964 214.30 39.70 
1%5 2,55.40 0.0 
1966 2'11.30 0.0 
1967 270.70 6.0 
1968 276.60 0.0 
1969 288.20 0.0 
1970 310.70 0.0 
TABLE 8-10E
 
Twls, TWW FIquhdenKs , md Lipa Subidies
 
in ElK. of W. at Cms Pikes
 
Year TAI PX SX SXTAXD SXTAXI 
1953 0.30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1954 0.84 0.22 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1955 1.15 0.89 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1956 1.50 1.39 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1957 2.38 1.57 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1958 4.39 1.36 0.02 0.0 0.0 
1959 8.29 2.01 0.03 0.0 0.0 
190 10.20 3.06 0.04 0.0 0.0 
1961 5.56 0.65 0.35 0.0 0.0 
1962 6.93 0.0 1.18 0.31 0.26 
1963 6.71 3.57 1.70 0.53 0.57 
1964 8.51 4.86 3.26 0.99 1.20 
1965 12.85 0.0 6.86 2.84 2.69 
1966 18.00 0.0 12.93 5.02 5.33 
1967 25.41 0.0 20.88 7.72 8.22 
1968 37.88 0.0 37.78 11.13 19.26 
1969 44.72 0.0 49.45 17.21 22.55 
1970 50.92 0.0 76.48 26.50 34.70 
TABLE 8-10F 
Year WPI WPIG WPIOG WPI-'P 
1953 - 493.10 
1954 - - - 94.70 
1955 27.80 25.70 28.30 92.40 
1956 36.60 41.1I0 34.30 96.70 
1957 42.50 47.24) 40.10 1( .40 
1958 39.90 38.70 39.60 97.20 
1959 40.80 33.90 42.60 97.7) 
1960 45.20 40.6) 46.I0 97.90 
1961 51.20 qO.30 51 14) 98.30 
1962 56.1 53.30 56.50 97.60 
I553 67.50 84.50 64.20 98.30 
1964 90.90 106.70 87.80 98.5) 
1965 1(W.(X) 1.00) I(1.) WAR).OO 
1966 108.80 105.0) 10,.40 10)2.80 
1967 115.81) 17.10) I15.70 4(M.O) 
1968 125.20 10.() 124.50 1015.60 
1969 133.70 152.70 130.80 308.80 
1970 145.90 168.60 142.51) 12.80 
TAB.I 8-1(Ki 
Other I)nla 
Year IR PU NRI) NRI" NLR 
1953 - -0 .)8) O.0369 0.1830 
1954 -- - O.)94) 0.)361 0.3830 
1955 13.33 8.09 1.1 201) 0.0370 O1.31830 
1956 13.45 8.85 0.12(00 0.0421) 1.1830 
1957 13.59 9.36 0.12(8) 0.0462 0.1830 
1958 13.75 9.86 0.120) 0.0434 0.1830 
1959 14.13 10.17 0.3 120 0.05) 0.1750 
1960 14.56 10.43 0.1(M) 0.0516 0.1750 
1961 14.51 11.19 0.1210 0.0497 .1750 
1962 15.10 13.34 0.151) 0.051M) 0.1640 
1963 15.27 1.92 0.151X) RO.)5O 0.1570 
1964 15.55 12.41 0.15(0) 0.0499 0.1590 
1965 15.81 12.94 0.1790 0.0506 0.1850 
1966 15.78 13.59 0.2640 0.0600 0.26(0 
1967 16.08 13.99 0.2640 0.0599 0.2600 
1968 15.91 14.84 0.2610 0.0668 0.2580 
1969 15.59 15.82 0.2390 0.0821 0.2400 
1970 15.35 15.96 0 7280 0.0848 0.2400 
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TABLE 8-11 A 
Year YNA Y DTR INT SG GC 
1953 218.60 421.93 12.268.67 9.72 
1954 228.30 447.36 8.50 J6.39 2.34 ­
1955 250.50 474.54 7.77 15.64 5.40 162.87
1956 268.20 480.47 7.31 16.52 26.79 161.04
1957 292.20 522.73 11.55 21.25 21.62 156.64 
1958 305.40 551.69 13.02 .1.97 20.37 180.611959 332.20 575.84 15.69 20.58 18.71 186.661960 345.10 589.07 15.43 2(,.37 28.44 176.40 
1961 345.10 613.61 17.45 29.41 29.15 192.47 
1962 382.60 634.97 16.56 39.56 39.38 194.391963 422.50 693.03 17.30 34.41 34.90 186.53
1964 436.00 750.31 17.91 27.:6 37.42 218.38 
1965 494.20 805.85 22.14 49.7434.2, 229.01
1966 567.90 913.82 33.67 48.(wQ 55.07 235.12 
1967 68.30 995.16 42.82 58.63 70.69 238.91
1968 796.50 1127.32 57.95 95.8578.51, 239.97 
1969 935.80 1306.19 73.38 97.10 101.78 246.20 
1970 1055.00 1422.33 81.01 111.43 115.33 253.51 
Year IVG MG ILG Sc YDP SH 
1953 36.13 
­ 36.13 19.62 386.55 -6.00 
'954 3.53 - 39.66 22.14 402.88 16.34 
1955 0.95 1.69 40.61 20.44 434.76 14.871956 -11.32 8.28 29.29 20.71 442.05 1.61 
1957 16.90 22.38 46.19 23.39 474.76 8.34 
1958 9.45 13.55 55.64 27.16 489.36 11.451959 -3.73 4.65 51.91 32.18 497.28 11.831960 2.04 5.46 53.95 31.31 507.88 -3.78 
1961 6.81 8.02 60.76 35.66 537.82 2.891962 -15.25 8.90 45.51 46.00 538.66 0.86
1963 22.93 28.46 68.44 50.56 599.32 -9.05 
1964 20.85 16.13 89.29 50.01 664.54 -5.561965 -0.15 14.45 89.14 62.66 696.87 7.51
1966 8.40 16.27 97.54 67.88 784.79 41.37 
1967 -12.40 20.77 85.14 78.17 835.67 39.99 
1968 
-12.47 34.33 72.67 87.24 920.11 43.681969 30.08 66.44 102.75 95.35 1085.55 64.05
1970 14.34 64.81 117.09 102.15 1162.96 58.16 
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TABLE 8-11A (concluded) 
Year INA CKI DC MC AIE 
1953 31.24 35.28 - 421.81 
-­1954 38.21 41.66 - 445.49 
­1955 44.45 48.98 
­
0.0 480.47 6.75 15.131956 47.70 52.77 0.0 524.69 8.6,W 11.361957 54.83 61.31 0.0 543.14 10.S8 11.131958 52.44 57.79 0.0 566.35 8.11 9.621959 53.30 59.29 0.21 579.19 4.27 11.101960 54.74 61.71 0.69 599.76 4.51 10.641961 56.91 65.26 0.05 591.83 4.15 11.251962 77.33 84.05 0.74 634.20 5.33 18.201963 95.67 105.95 11.31 667.14 6.41 30.041964 82.67 93.33 2.73 705.08 3.52 18.361965 103.97 117.64 5.07 747.69 4.32 19.441966 167.47 190.63 47'.03 812.47 6.68 44.681967 212.85 232.09 900.0061.94 10.98 82.791968 301.81 325.63 101.68 998.27 2493 137.381969 383.50 407.76 98.76 1102.62 34.46 151.721970 391.70 416.76 78.62 1187.75 37.22 151.58 
Year XGM X MI M SK IV 
1953 0.24 10.64 
- 91.67 

1954 0.32 
­
6.82 
- 64.57 
­ -19.55 0.37 4.91 50.38 86.95 3.82 22.67
1956 0.40 6.98 
 63.21 100.88 -5.81 9.11
1957 0.82 7.09 62.52 117.12 0.32 11.81
1958 0.64 5.65 62.16 99.87 -10.17 8.291959 0.80 6.29 55.67 80.02 -4.17 9.221960 1.46 9.69 57.63 90.40 -3.69 2.501961 2.26 11.89 51.96 82.30 -8.57 8.161962 2.81 15.45 77.38 112.90 13.22 15.461963 10.51 23.78 83.48 143.56 19.69 10.761964 15.53 32.51 68.97 104.83 -0.16 --3.661965 28.40 47.80 84.84 120.15 -4.96 0.991966 40.82 69.09 122,51 192.87 -29.94 1.1319S7 54.77 87.82 155.62 263.59 -1!137 7.691968 89.81 133.66 191.52 374.93 2.71 14.991969 127.82 183.02 231.15 468.83 - -10.22 
-0.401970 178.57 252.93 271.52 513.69 40.80 21.54 
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TABLE 3-11B 
sear ORD XPX SOX TAM 
153 ..... 
1954 - - - ­
i 9 55 99.71 159.87 0.0 11.67 
1936 132.10 139.77 0.0 10.43 
1957 118.12 139.14 0.0 12.74 
1959 121.80 155.91 2.29 28.42 
1959 119.73 202.82 3.03 65.84 
1960 135.37 181.72 2.37 64.86 
1961 244.79 28.03 15.00 34.42 
1962 226.57 0.0 35.34 28.39 
1963 189.32 57.96 27.63 18.07 
1964 232.22 43.02 28.84 23.35 
1965 265.40 0.0 38.09 28.39 
1966 256.34 0.0 46.93 23.40 
1967 243.12 0.0 54.29 23.48 
1968 233.30 0.0 63.28 22.62 
1969 234.53 0.0 58.35 20.60 
1970 240.21 0.0 64.08 20.29 
TABLE 8-11C 
Derived Commercial Policy Variables 
Year XPM SUBM SUBX SXDT TAR MA RDEV 
1953 -
- - 0.0 2.63 -
1954 - - - 0.0 5.62 -
1955 9.03 20.70 159.87 0.0 4.70 -
1956 9.67 20.10 139.77 0.0 4.73 -
1957 8.42 21.16 139.14 0.0 6.29 -
1958 8.83 37.25 158.20 0.0 11.69 -
1959 15.94 81.79 205.85 0.0 21.60 0.106 
1960 19.47 84.34 184.10 0.0 24.36 0.165 
1961 4.05 38.47 43.03 0.0 11.49 0.200 
1962 0.0 28.39 35.34 0.56 12.62 0.076 
1963 9.60 27.67 85.59 0.75 9.53 0.006 
1964 13.34 36.69 71.86 1.07 9.16 0.004 
1965 0.0 28.39 38.09 2.84 12.85 0.060 
1966 0.0 23.40 46.93 4.45 15.94 0.088 
1967 0.0 23.48 54.29 6.19 20.35 -0.002 
1968 0.0 22.62 63.28 7.96 27.10 -0.035 
1969 0.0 20.60 58.35 10.98 28.53 -0.024 
1970 0.0 20.29 64.08 14.80 28.45 0.001 
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TABLE 8-I I D 
0"w "usa"'aVa~m 
Year V.A G IA PK NFI AISr 
1953 203.40 13.84 4.04 
- 9.42 -61.39 
1954 219.10 28.16 3.45 - 7.56 -42.3U 
1955 
1956 
224.10 
212.20 
23.71 
1.77 
4.53 
5.07 
27.12 
18.58 
7.75 
7.38 
--31.10 
-81.13 
1957 230.60 17.47 6.48 19.45 7.59 -90.26 
1958 246.30 26.31 5.35 17.27 7.59 -87.12 
1959 
1960 
243.70 
244.00 
39.16 
31.71 
5.99 
6.97 
9.74 
11.25 
7.75 
7.38 
-67.94 
-72.46 
1961 268.50 29.60 8.35 14.25 5.79 -64.68 
1962 252.40 29.36 6.72 -0.69 6.48 --84.18 
1963 270.60 26.35 10.28 9.31 6.79 -79.47 
1964 314.30 17.01 10.66 5.23 6.53 -64.52 
1965 311.60 19.53 13.67 -1.39 7.65 -73.63 
1966 345.90 42.63 23.16 10.35 13.08 -96.34 
1967 326.90 51.16 19.24 8.36 21.53 -124.84 
1968 330.80 67.78 23.82 9.46 22.24 -127.42 
1969 370.40 97.24 24.26 57.64 23.04 -139.63 
1970 367.40 105.56 25.06 43.24 10.17 -98.10 
Year RPG POP GP RD LR RF 
1953 
- -
- 0.0480 0.1830 0.0369 
1954 - - - 0.0900 0.1830 0.0361 
1955 0.91 21.42 162.13 0.1200 0.1830 0.0370 
1956 1.20 22.30 141.44 0.1200 0.1830 0.0420 
1957 1.18 22.95 151.16 0.1200 0.1830 0.0462 
1958 0.98 23.61 176.51 0.1200 0.1830 0.0434 
1959 
1960 
0.80 
0.88 
24.30 
24.99 
178.28 
172.98 
0.1120 
0.1000 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.0500 
0.0516 
1961 0.98 25.70 191.26 0.1210 0.1750 0.0497 
1962 0.94 26.44 170.24 0.1500 0.1640 0.0500 
1963 1.32 27.19 181.00 0.1500 0.1570 0.0501 
1964 
1965 
1.22 
1.00 
27.96 
28.75 
223.10 
214.41 
0.1500 
0.1790 
0.1590 
0.1850 
0,0499 
0.0506 
1966 0.96 29.37 227.25 0.2640 0.2600 0.0600 
1967 1.01 30.07 205.74 0.2640 0.2600 0.0599 
1968 1.04 30.75 193.17 0.2610 0.2580 0.0668 
1969 1.17 31.42 209.84 0.2390 0.2400 0.0821 
1970 1.18 31.31 203.04 0.2280 0.2400 0.0848 
(continued) 
162 MACROWCONOM;C RIELATIONSHIPS AND POLICY VARIA5LES 
TABLE 8-11D (conduded) 
Year RINF MNC NTOSH XGP RT 
1953 .- -7.79 10.40 49.92 
1954 
1955 
0.309 
0.636 
-
13.00 
-8.16 
-9.77 
6.50 
4.54 
34.92 
39.84 
1956 
1957 
1958 
0.297 
0.193 
-0.007 
9.40 
10.21 
6.43 
-10.84 
-14.51 
-11.50 
6.58 
6.27 
5.01 
74.63 
83.07 
75.50 
1959 
1960 
0.022 
0.091 
4.33 
12.16 
-11.49 
-10.27 
5.49 
8.23 
54.59 
61.31 
1961 
1962 
1963 
0.155 
0.135 
0.283 
6.91 
3.09 
-4.83 
-18.63 
-18.43 
-18.09 
9.63 
12.64 
13.27 
46.93 
63.74 
66.65 
1964 0.319 -2.15 -18.67 16.98 50.96 
1965 0.077 -2.90 -22.95 19.40 53.95 
1966 0.129 2.73 -36.55 28.27 58.29 
1967 
1968 
0.105 
0.120 
-6.57 
-13.23 
-40.53 
-43.66 
33.05 
43.85 
59,76 
63.01 
1969 0.121 -14.95 -73.73 55.20 64.65 
1970 0.A42 -1.45 -63.67 74.36 45.23 
NOTES 
I. The implicit production function which we use is 
YNA, = (INA,., INA-s ..... INAt.r)
where INA, is the investment in nonagricultural sectors in period t. We also assume thatdepreciation takes place at a rate "ywith respect to earlier years investment and that in­
vestment enters the function t in a logarithmic form, i.e., 
YNA , = a +# [log.(INA .,) + 7 log.(INA, .,) . . . y r log.(INA,r)]Defined recursively, this becomes (approximately for very large T) 
YNA, = (a - a) + y YNA., - p log.(INA,.4The estimate of the coefficient y is the estimated depreciation rate.
2. The test for an increasing incremental capital-output ratio was suggested by 
Albert Fishlow.3. The sample period was extended to 1971, since preliminary data for 1971 were 
available for YNA. 
4. This is the incremental capital-output ratio on a net basis, i.e., allowing for esti. 
mated depreciation.
5. pis the coefficient of autocorrelation as estimated in the terminal iteration of theCochranc-Orcutt technique. 
6. These elasticities are estimated from the regression equations by multiplying the
coefficient of Y by the ratio of tIe means of DTR and Y or INT and YNA as the case 
may be. 
7. The current rate of inflation ar.d the rate of inflation lagged once were sufficient 
NOTES 16.
 
to explain epected rates of inflation. The rate of inflation lagged mor than mce h 
little explanatory power.
8. Several readen of the draft manuscript commented that they did not understandbow corporate savings could be affected positively by the interest rate. It is sometimes
argued, for example, that marginal efficiency of investment is the relevant variable be. cause corporations save only to invest in productive capacity. This is a common fallacy
and reprsnts a failure to understand the concept of reservation demand. Self-financedinvestment by a tightly controlled corporation, typical in Korea, represents a decision noeto distribute prof*&s for the purpose of increased consumption and a decision not to seekoutside bmncing, but rather to reutin pros for financing investment. As for the substi.tution effect, a higher interest rate makes self-financing more attractive than outside fi­
nancing for both working ar fixed capital and saving a heter choice than consumption.Of course the income effect works in the opposite direction so that the coefficient of theinterest rate has no a priori sign and must be determined empirically.9. For example. the Medium Industry Bank and the Korea )evelopment Hank.10. Loan rates of commercial banks were more than 24 percent over the htter1960s which corresponds to a real interest rate of more than 10 pet-cent.
I. These elasticities were determined with respect to percentage changes in thetotal effective exchange rate, i.e.. ORD -A SUIM. 
12. We made no attempt to specify the structure o that the syilem would be tri­angular. After the model was specified a priori we attempted to triangularize the matrix. 
Chapter 9 
Eaotsof n m Raft A'I 
on r ldt A ApproachIinulatis 
The econometric model estimated in the previous chapter establishes a frame­
work within which we can appraise the influence of commercial policy on the 
growth and structure of the South Korean economy. In chapters 6 and 7 we 
have already attempted to assess the effect of commercial policy on the effi­
cient allocation of investment. It is difficult, however, to use the analysis of 
efficiency to determine the total effect on growth. Most studies of the static ef­
ficiency loss that results front tariffs and quantitative restrictions indicate that 
the loss is at most only a very small fraction of current output. Far more im­
portant may be the consequences of commercial policy for savings and invest­
ment relationships, export and import patterns, availability of foreign ex­
change, and government budgeis. The strength of these relationships may have 
such hearing on the growth process that the growth effects very much outweigh 
the static efficiency effects. 
COMMERCIAL POLICY VARIABLES 
The basic commercial policy variables to be considered are: (1) the official 
exchange rate; (2) the export premium per dollar of exports which arises 
from a multiple exchange rate system that favors export earnings; (3) other 
subsidies and subsidy equivalents per dollar of exports; (4) tariffs and foreign 
exchange taxes per dollar of imports. All basic commercial policy variables 
are computed on a purchasing-power-parity basis. 
The basic commercial policy variables are combined to form a number 
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of derived commercial policy variables. The effsvtive exchange rate on importv
is a combination of the official exchange rate, tariffs and foreign exchange 
taxes per dollar of imports, and total export premia per dollar of imports.
That is. the cost of imports is raised above the official rate not only because
of tariffs and foreign exchange- taxes but also because som1e imptrts are fi­
nancd by purch4Vs of export dollars under the multiple exchange rate sys­
tem. The effective exchange rate on exports is a combination of the official 
exchange rate, the export dollar premium, and the total of other subsidies per
dollar of export. The overall effective exchange rate is defined as the weighted 
average effective exchange rate on exports and imports (where the weights 
are exports and imports). Finally, the rate of devaluation is defined as the 
percentage increase in the overall cffective exchange rate averaged over the 
current year and the two previous years. 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN BASIC 
COMMERCIAL POLICY VARIABLES AND TIlE 
BEHAVIOR OF ECONOMIC AGGREGATES 
A major effect of the commercial policy variables is the influence of fhe cffrc­
tive exchange rate for exports on export performance and of the effective ex­
change rate for imports on import demand. The export performance, of 
course, affects the availability of foreign exchange required to finance pur­
chases of imported capital goods for investment and imported raw materials 
and intermediate goods for current production. The demand for imports af­
fects the amount of foreign exchange required to finance a given level of pro­
duction or investment. 
The rate at which devaluation of the overall effective exchange rate takes 
place affects the real private cost of servicing foreign loans. The more rapid
the rate of devaluation, the greater the local cost of financing foreign loans 
and the lower the demand for foreign commercial capital imports. A drop in 
the level of foreign capital imports reduces the availability of foreign exchange
to finance imports for current production as well as for investment and reduces 
total savings and investment because of the reduction in foreign savings.
The way in which various effective exchange rates are maintained also 
affects macroeconomic relationships. To the extent that exports are encour­
aged by tax subsidies, either direct or indirect, the government budget is af­
fected. An increase in export subsidies of this sort, at given levels of govern­
ment expenditure, reduces government savings and hence total investment. 
Encouragement of exports by a multiple exchange rate system, however, does 
not have the same adverse effect on government revenues. 
Similarly, tariffs and foreign exchange taxes a'.ect government revenues. 
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If the aggregate elasticity of demand for imports isless tha unity, an increase 
Inthe average tariff rate increases government revenues and savings at a given
level of government expenditures. Purchase% of export certifcates which carry
import entitlement, while they add to the local currency cost of imports beyond 
the official exchange rate, do not yield government revenue in the same way 
as tariffs. 
The ne effect of all these relatiomnips and interactions isdifficult to 
determine a priori. The interactions are too complex. For example, an increase 
In import tariffs reduces the demand for imports and hence conserves foreign 
exchange but may reduce government revenues if the aggregate elasticitv: of 
import demand is greater than unity.' The conservation of foreign exchange 
makes more rapid ,growth possible when the supply of foreign exchange is 
limited, but a reduction in government revenues, if it curtails government sav­
ings and investment, hinders growth. Similarly, an increase in the rate of de­
valuation boosts export earnings while reducing import demand and thus 
fosters more rapid growth when foreign exchange is scarce. But by also re­
ducing the inflow of foreign commercial capital a higher rate of devaluation 
tends to retard growth. The net effect of various policies depends on a complex 
set of interrelations among the parameters of the aggregate behavioral func­
tions. In this chapter, we shall perform some expcriments on a simulation 
mode! using different policy strategies to attempt to determine the efficacy
of vali ous exchange rate policies in promoting growth. Our results will be 
analyzed to determine the important parameters and relationships. 
TIlE SIMULATION MODEL 
The basis of the simulation model is the econometric model estimated in the 
previous chirter. In more general form the model may be written as follows. 
tl "'"0 r.,., A t,"+ef 0B'0i + rI 1, + + = (9-1) 
where 0, is a vector of endogenous variables, 01, is a vector of basic commer­
cial policy variables, #2( is a vector of derived commercial policy variables, 
#3#is a vector of all other exogenous variable, in the model, o,-, is a vector 
of predetermined endogenous variables and ej is a vector of error terms. 
B, r, r., 1':, and a are matrixes of parameters of the model and are esti­
mated in the previous chapter. The variables in the system and the structure 
of the matrixes are given in tables 8-1 through 8-5. 
In addition to the basic econometric model set forth in (9-1), the simu­
lation model includes a number of equations that give the derived commercial 
policy variables as functions of the basic commercial policy variables and a 
number of inequality constraints which the system must satisfy. The first de­
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ied commercial policy variable, export prei per dollar of imptois, is ex. 
port premia per dollar of exports multiplied by total exports and divided by 
toa imports. 
#:.., XPM, = (XPX,' X,)/ M, (9-2) 
Total tariffs and tariff equivalents per dollar of imports, i.e., the differencebetween the official exchange rate and the effective rate on imports, is the sec­
ond derived commercial policy variabic and is the sum of tariffs and foreign
exchange taxes per dollar of imports and export premia per dollar of imports. 
= 
%6.., SUBM#= TAM, + XPM, (9-3) 
Similarly, total subsidies and subsidy equivalents per dollar of exports is the 
sum of export subsidies on exports and export premia per dollar oi exports. 
0'.3t = SUBXt = SOX, +'XPX, (9-4) 
Subsidies on exports in the form of internal tax relief is expressed as afraction of total export subsidies times a factor required to express these total 
subsidies ifi 1965 prices.2 
'2.4 1 = SXDT, = ajSOX,"X, a..,, (9-5) 
Total tariffs and foreign exchange taxes are equal to the effective tariff 
rate (i.e., total tariffs and foreign exchange taxes per dollar of imports) times 
total imports multiplied by the factor a',, required to express these revenues 
in terms of 1965 prices. 
02.54 = TAR, = TAM'M8*c0.1 (9-6) 
The rate of devaluation is the percentage rate at which the overall effec­tive exchange rate devalues. The overall effective exchange rate is a weighted 
average of the effective exchange rate on imports and exports. The effective 
exchange rates on exports and imports are 
RXI = ORDt + SUBX, (9-7) 
and 
RM, = ORD, + SUBMt (9-8) 
respectively. The overall or average effective exchange rate is 
Ro = (RX, "Xt + RMt •Mt) / (Xt + MI) (9-9) 
The rate of devaluation, then, is 
RDEV = (RI - Ro- 1 ) / R,- (9-10) 
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7 tug awrg rafe of dedluation isthe last deed commercil poliq
vaui*le: 
~*,,~ -MA4RDEV, = (RDEV, + RDEV,_, + RDEV,- 2)/3 (9-11)
The model isalso subject to anumber of inequality constraints. The firsiet of them refers to the level of foreign exchange reserves U the end of yeardenoted by LFXR. The level of foreign cxchange reserves is determined re­
cursively from period to period. 
LFXR, #I = LFXR, + .s LFXR, (9-12)
where the change in reserves in year t is denoted by a LFXR,.3 The lcvel offoreign exchange reserves must be greater than some minimum fraction of im­ports and less than some maximum fraction of total imports. 
LFXR. 1 31141 (9-13) 
LFXR, " 4A41 (9-14)
The purpose of these constraints is to require reserves which arc "adequate"but not "excessive" where the policy parameters a.3 and a4 define adequacy
and excessiveness in terms of a fraction of imports.
Similarly, inventory levels are constrained to be greater than 
a minimumfraction of total income and less than some maximum fraction of total income. 
LIV, +,_ a.,"Yt (9-15) 
LIV, I afYt (9-16)
where the level of inventories at end of year t is determined recursively as 
follows: 
LIV+ I = LIVI + IVt (9-17)
where IV is the level of investment in inventories in year t (excluding graininventories). Unless inventory levels are restricted to be greater than somefraction of total income, investment will not be constrained by availability ofsavings, i.e., investment could be financed by unlimited drawing down of in­ventories. The upper limit on inventories is to ensure that production is limited 
by total effective demand. 
METHOD OF SIMULATION 
The simulations of the model expressed in equations (9-1) through (9-17)were performed over the period 1960 to 1970 with several variations of thevalues of the basic commercial policy variables. These are: 
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Om, = ORD, offtiial exchange rate on apurchasing-power-parity basis; 
#i,:., = XPI',, export prcmia per dollar of cxports. 
#1.a. = SOX, subsidies per dollar of exports; 
=I.4,eTAM,, tariffs and foreign exchange taxes per dollar of imports. 
The parameters a,, a,, a4 . a.,. and a, are alo basic policy parameters.Thw were set at values we regarded as reasonable, given past experience.The proportion of export subsidies in the form of internal tax relief (a,) was,
in fact, set equal to its historical value for each year from 1960 to 1970. In 
the final simulations values of as through a, were set as follows: 
a3 = 0. 17, lower limit on foreign exchange as a proportion of imports; 
a4 = 0.35, upper limit on foreign exchange as a proportion of imports; 
a., = 0.05, lower limit on inventoric,- (excluding grains) as a proportion of 
output; 
aa = 0.14, upper limit on inventories (excluding grains) as aipropo)rti)n of 
output. 
Hiuorically, over the period 1960 to 1970, foreign exchange reserves rangedfrom 17 to 67 percent of total imports while inventories ranged from 10 to 14 percent of total GNP. If the historical upper limit on foreign exchange rc­
serves is maintained in the simulations, considerable reserves arc accumulatedfor some of the simulation runs. To translate excess reserves into cxtru growth, 
an upper limit of 35 percent, or four months' imports, is postulated as reason­
able. Similarly we use a lower limit of 5 percent on inventories as a percent of 
output to allow a tighter regime that facilitates faster depiction of inventories 
to finance investment. 
In addition to the variations in these values and parameters, we use twopolicy adjustment variables, EC# and IG,. ECI is an excess capacity variable 
that comes into play whenever foreign exchange reserves or inventories arcinadequate. We assume that the government will attempt to adjust to a balance
of payments crisis (inadequate reserves) or an inflationary gap (pressure oninventories inticating that desired investment exceeds savings) by pursuingdeflationary monetary and fiscal policies that generate excess capacity in the 
economy. IG# is a variable denoting a change in total investment induced bygovernment policies, including inflationary or deflationary monetary policy
and direct government investment. We assume that in addition to excess
capacity, the government is able to reduce investment when a balance of 
payments problem arises or an inflationary gap emerges. Conversely, when 
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mrw are excemlve or invenes large, the govetruvnt tries to increue 
total investment. 
The ndel is nonlinear because of the relationships (9-2), (9-6), (9-9),
and (9-10). Rather than use a general nonlinear solution technique such as 
Gau-Scldel, a special solution technique wus devised for s particular model 
which takes advantage of the rather simple nature c'.the nonlinearities. The 
nonlinea solution technique is described in the appendix to this chapter. 
At each period of time in the simulations, the constraints (9-13) through(9-16) are checked. If foreign exchange reserves are less than the required
minimum level relative to imports or inventories are below the minimum level
relative to income---nstraints (9-13) and (9-15) violated--the cxc's ca­
pacity variable EC, is increased and the level of investment is reduced by
lowering 1G. 4 If there are excess reserves or excess inventories--constraints 
(9-14) and (9-16) violated-investment is increased by increasing IG,.
These policy adjustmetits are continued in an iterativr fashion until the con­
straints violated are satisfied. Initially the p licy values EC, and IG, arc set 
equal to zero in each period; so if none of (he constraints are violated there 
is no excess capacity r nd no government-induced changes in investment. 
SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
Using the model dc.eribed above, two sets of simu!ation experiments were 
performed to determine the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates over 
the period 1960 to .970. The first set of experiments involved variations in 
the "pure" effective exchange rate, a complet.-ly unified exchange rate with 
no subsidies on exports and no tariffs or tariff equivalents on imports. With 
a "pure" effective exchange rate, there are no distortions of international prices
and tlie exchange rate regime is completely lieral. These experiments are 
designed first of all to determine how much can le gained by complete liberali­
zation and secondly to estimate various "equilibiium" exchange rates. 
Th.%second set of experiments involved vaiations, positive and negative,
in the basic commercial policy variables in comparison with their historical 
values. The official exchange rate (ORD) was varied between 80 and 120 
percept of its historical value. The exchange rate premium per dollar of ex­
port (XPX) was varied between 0 and 200 percent of its historical value todetermine the effect of the multiple exchange rate system. Subsidies per dollar 
of exports (SOX) were varied between 0 and more than 500 percent of their 
hiitcorical value, and tariffs and foreign exchange tax per dollar of imports(TAM) were varied between 0 and more than 300 percent of their historical 
value. 
In all of the experiments, we assume some "optimal" solution in the 
sense that there exists some combination of basic commercial policy variables 
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that maximizes a "well-behaved" utility function defined with respect to the 
endogemom macro-variables. We did not. however, attempt to define such a 
utility function and use optimization techniques to determine the maximum 
value of the utility functin. Rather, we looked at two separate "performance 
indicators" for each siri.ulation run: (I) the discounted v,,l'. of total GNP 
from 1960 to 1970, and (2) the dicounted value of consumption. Neither is 
really an appropriate measure of utility. The discounted value of consumption 
may be high because savings and investment are low in the last few years so 
that futuiv growth beyond 1970 is sacrificed for consumption from 19M) to 
1970. The discounted value of GNP may be high because consumption is low 
so that future growth beyond 1970 is bought at the price of low consumption 
from 1960 to 1970. One growth path, however, may domaiate another in the 
sense that both consumption and total income are higlwr. This is, in fact, the 
situation most frequently encountered in our simulation runs so that there i6 
no practical conflict between maximization of income or consumiption. 
The use of optimization techniques presents problems beyond the appro­
priate definition of a utility function. The model is complex and nonlinear., 
involving 40 equations and inequalities in each time period. Thus there ,rc 
more than 400 constiaints from 1960 to 1970 and they would impose formid­
able computational difficulties on a nonlinear optimization model. Simulation 
enables us to determine "near optimal" solutions. Furthcrmorc, we arc able 
to examine the time path of the macro-aggrcgatcs for selected sets of policy 
choices which would not be possible if we used an rptimization model. 
EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATES 
The first set of experiments were intended to determine the exchange rate that 
would iesult in a growth path which, if subsidies, taxes, and tariffs on foreign 
trade were eliminated, would be similar to the path the economy actually fol­
lowed from 1960 tc 1970. Variations above and below this "equilibrium" 
rate were also made ,- determine the behavior of the discounted value of out­
p tt anti cousumption during the same period. 
The first step was to set the official exchange rate so that the purchasing­
power-parity effective exchange rate (without tariffs and subsidies) was equal 
to the historical purchasing-power-parity effective rate (including taxes, tar­
iffs, and subsidies). This experiment yielded a growth performance somewhat 
inferior in GNP, but superior in consumption (Figure 9-1). The reason for 
the poorer growth in GNP is that government revenues from tariffs aad foreign 
exchange taxes are reduced and government savings decline. The economy 
runs into inflationary pressures, especially in 1968 and 1969. Investmr~ent tends 
to exceed available savings, both domestic and foreign. Reduction of inven­
tories violates the inventory (i.e., savings-investment) constraint in the model. 
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Deflationary fiscal and monetary policies redice investment and generate 
excess capacity, thus slowing the economy's growth. Consumption, by con­
trast, rises because reduced government revemnes lead to increased disposable 
income. 
The next step was to vary the "pure" effective exchange rate above and 
below the actual historical value of the effective exchange rate. The results 
in terms of the total discounted values of GNP and consumption are shown in 
Figure 9-2. If the "pure" rate is reduced to 99.5 percent of the historical 
effective rate, the results are slightly better, both for output and consumption, 
but the results are not significantly different. If the "pure" rate is reduced much 
below 99.5 percent, the results are worse, both for output and consumption. 
FIGURE 9-2
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For example, if the pure effective exchange rate is reduced to only 90 percent
of the historical values, the total discounted value of income drops by more 
than 4 percent and of consumption by about 2 percent. This poorer perfor­
mance is caused by a foreign exchange constraint encountere' :n the middle
of the decade. Investment must be reduced and excess capacity appears. Simi­
lady, if the pure effective exchange rate is raised above 99.5 percent of thehistorical levels, consumption and income growth are constrained by a lack of 
savings. Savings are insufficient because of the decline in foreign savings(M-X) brought about by the tendency of imports to contract more than 
exports when the pure effective exchange rate is reduced. 
Conventional economic wisdom asserts that the 1965 exchange rate was 
an equilibrium rate and that if its purchasing-power-parity value had been
maintained, it would have been unnecessary to increase export subsidies to
maintain balance of payments equilibrium. This hypothesis was tested in thefollowing way: The 1965 effective purchasing-power-parity exchange rate was 
converted to a pure exchange rate by eliminating export subsidies, import
tariffs, and foreign exchange taxes. The pure exchange rate was varied between 
90 and I 0 percent of the 1965 effective exchange rate for the years 1964 to 
1970. 
This experiment showed that when the pure exchange rate is set at 102 percent of the 1965 effective exchange rate, both the discounted value of total 
output and consumption achieve their maximum and the economy follows 
most closely its historical path. The discounted value of consumption is about
the same as the historical value, but the discounted value of income falls about 
1.2 percent short. This result stems from a lack of savings due to the reduction 
in government tariff revenues and hence in government savings. When the pure
exchange rate is set at 100 percent of the 1965 effective exchange rate, the 
growth of income and consumption is somewhat less than that achieved with
the 102 percent level (Figure 9-3). These results support the view that the
1965 rate was an "equilibrium" exchange rate in the sense that all tariffs and 
export subsidies could have been eliminated and the official exchange ratedevalued to approximately the 1965 rate on a purchasing-power.parity basis 
and the economy would have followed most closely the same path in terms of
all of the economic aggregates. Of course, maintenance of the 1965 rate on a 
purchasing-power-parity basis from 1964 to i970 would have required a con­
tinuous devaluation in line with changes in domestic and international price
inflation, that is, a gliding peg exchange rate. 
When the pure effective exchange rate is reduced much below the 1965 
effective rate during the period 1964 to 1970, say to 90 percent of the 1965 
rate, the foreign exchange constraint becomes binding, particularly in 1965. 
This results in considerably less growth in income and consumption.
The behavior of the discounted values of income and consuml ion is 
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erratic when the pure effective exchange rate is set between 93 and 102 per­
cent of the effective rate. Local maxima for both income and consumption 
occur at 93, 97, and 102 percent. At 93 percent, there arc some excess for­
eign exchange reserves in 1967. This helps growth. At 97 percent, excess 
foreign exchange reserves accumulate in 1966 and 1967. .'olicy variables then 
come into play, stimulating investment and increasing output. The result is 
more rapid growth iH those years, but it leads to an inflationary gap and a 
savings-investment constraint in 1968 and 1969. At 102 percent, excess for­
eign exchange reserves appear even earlier, in 1964, but the savings-investment 
constraint takes effect earlier and more persistently from 1966 through 1970. 
The erratic behavior, then, is caused by the interaction of the savings-invest­
ment and foreign exchange constraints. 
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MANIPULATION OF COMMERCIAL POLICY 
VARIABLES 
The next set of experiments attempted to determine an optimal set of com­
mercial policy variables. This required simulations in which the four basic 
commercial policy variables were changed over a considerable range from 
their historical values. The official exchange rate (ORD) was set at 80, 100, 
and 120 percent of its historical values for the period 1964 to 1970. Export 
premia per dollar of export arising from the multiple exchange rate system 
(XPX) were varied between zero and more than three times their historical 
values in successive steps. Other subsidies per dollar of export (SOX) were 
varied from zero to more than five times their historical values in sequence. 
Finally, tariffs and foreign exchange taxes per dollar of imports (TAM) were 
varied between zero and three times their historical values." More than 1,000 
experiments were run and the results demonstrate the responsiveness of the 
Korean economy to changes in commercial policy. Only a few of the more 
interesting are presented here.0 
TABLE 9-1
 
Discounted Value of Total Output with Official Exchange Rate
 
at Its Historical Value and Variations In Tariffs and Foreign
 
Exchange Taxes per Dollar of Import (TAM) and Subsidies
 
per Dollar of Export (SOX)
 
(billions of won at 1965 prices) 
SOX as a 
Percent of TAM as a Percent of Historical Value 
Historical 
Value 80 120 160 200 240 
0 5,830 5,891 5,920 5,985 nf 
40 5,852 5,886 5,928 5,999 nf 
80 5,850 5,882 5,938 6,015 nf 
120 5,840 5,887 5,952 6,026- nf 
160 5,839 5,897 5,953 6,013 nf 
200 5,838 5,880 5,928 5,988 nf 
240 5,820 5,853 5,894 5,937 nf 
280 5,795 5,813 5,869 5,868 nf 
320 5,752 5,776 5,807 5,820 nf 
Nom: nf-not feasible. 
a. Maximum value of discot!2ted value of output from 1960 to 1970. 
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MANIPULATION OF COMMERCIAL POLICY VARIABLES 
First, we discuss variations in export subsidies per dollar of exports. 
(SOX) and tariffs and foreign exchange taxes per dollar of imports (TAM), 
holding the official exchange rate constant at its historical values. Table 9-1 
gives the figures for the discounted value of output over the period 1960 to 
1970 and Table 9-2 gives the discounted value of consumption over the same 
period for this set of experiments. The figures marked a in these tables give 
the maximum values of discounted output and consumption. The optimal
value of discounted output exceeds the historical level, 5,860, by 4 percent; 
the optimal value of discounted consumption exceeds the historical level, 
5,421, by about 1 percent. The underscored numbtrs in tables 9-1 and 9-2 
represent combinations of values for TAM and SOX which result in both 
greater consumption and greater output over the period 1960 to 1970 than 
the historical values. Both the maximum value of output and the maximum 
value of consumption lie within the region for which both output and con­
sumption exceed historical values. Thus one could maximize the discounted 
value of output without lowering the discounted value of consumption below 
its historical value. Alternatively, one could maximize the discounted value of 
consumpti3n without lowering the discounted value of output below its his­
torical value. 
TABLE 9-2
 
Discrunted Value of Consumption with Official Exchange Rate
 
at Its Historical Value and Variations InTAM and SOX
 
(billions of won at 1965 prices)
 
SOX as a 
Percent of TAM as a Percent of Historical Value 
Historical 
Value 80 120 160 200 240 
0 5,396 5,407 5,398 5,408 nf 
40 
80 
5,416 
5,423 
5,411 
5,417 
5,411 
5,424 
5,424 
5,442 
nf 
nf 
120 5,425 5,428 5,441 5,458 nf 
160 5,433 5,443 5,452 5,462a nf 
200 5,442 5,443 5,447 5,458 nf 
240 5,440 5,437 5,438 5,439 nf 
280 5,435 5,423 5,433 5,410 nf 
320 5,418 5,410 "5,407 5,393 nf 
NotE: nf-not feasible. 
a. Maximum value of discounted value of consumption from 1960 to 1970. 
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The maximum discounted values of output and consumption occur at 
very nearly the same combinations of the values of SOX and TAM (with the 
official exchange rate held at its historical value). The level of tariffs and 
foreign exchange taxes per dollar of imports (TAM) is double the historical 
level and the level of export subsidies is somewhat greater than the historical 
level (+20 percent in the case of maximum output and +60 percent in the 
case of maximum consumption). The increased value of TAM results in in­
creased government revenues. Since the level of government expenditures is 
assumed to be exogenous, the effect is to increase government savings. The 
increase in the value of SOX tends to reduce government revenues, but since 
export subsidies are increased by a smaller percentage than tariffs, since ex­
ports are less than total imports, and since only part of export subsidies have 
a direct budgetary impact, the net effect is a substantial increase in government 
savings which increases total investment and accelerates growth. The increase 
in SOX and TAM both generates extra foreign exchange accumulation 
through increased exports and reduces imports. The accumulatio-, of foreign 
exchange also makes posible increased investment and growth. The time path 
of output and consumption is shown in Figure 9-4 for the case in which the 
discounted value of output is maximized. By 1970, the simulated value of 
outpu~t exceeds the historical value by 95 billion won (constant prices) or 
almost 7 percent. Furthermore, historical values of output and consumption 
in the simulation are almost equaled or exceeded every year from 1960 to 
1970. Thus the increase in SOX and TAM results in a dynamically more 
efficient growth path. 
The doubling of TAM does not involve very high tariffs and foreign 
exchange taxes. In 1970, for example, tariffs (there were virtually no foreign 
exchange taxes) were only abott 7 percent of in - arts so that doubling it 
would imply a tariff rate of about 14 percent. If tariffs and foreign exchange 
taxes are raised much above this level, however, the simulation run becomes 
unfeasible because some of the smaller import items turn negative. This result 
is inevitable whenever import demand functions are specified to be linear. 
Even if the specification were more realistic, the imposition of higher tariffs 
would probably lead to diminished growth by making the demand for imports 
very elastic. As tariffs are raised, import demand eventually decreases by a 
larger percentage; government tariff revenues drop; government savings are 
smaller; and investment and growth decline. 
If export subsidies are raised by more than 20 percent above historical 
levels, growth in output also declines. This occurs because of the reduction in 
government revenue and savings which in turn decreases investment. In the 
simulation run with export subsidies higher than 120 percent of historical 
values and tariffs double historical values, the savings-investment constraint 
is violated in 1966 and 1967. Investment hIs to be curtailed because savings 
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are deficient, and in consequence growth is correspondingly diminished. Sav­ings fall short because of the reduction in government revenues and savings.
If export subsidies are reduced to less than 120 percent of historicallevels, growth is also decreased, since fewer foreign reserves are accumulated 
through which imports needed for investment can be increased. The increase
in investment financed from accumulated reserves is smaller than it is for the 
optimal growth path.
Tables 9-3 and 9-4 show discounted values of output and consumptionfor simulations in which the official exchange rate is held 20 percent below itshistorical value and SOX and TAM are varied. Again the underlined figures
represent combinations of SOX and TAM which would have resulted in equal 
or better than historical values for both output and consumption. In this case, 
TABLE 9-3 
Discounted Value of Output with Official Exchange Rate 
at 80 Percent of Its Historical Value and Variations In 
TAM and SOX 
(billions of won at 1965 prices) 
SOX as a 
Percent of TAM as a Percent of Historical Value 
Historical 
____________________________________ 
Value 200 250 300 350 400 450 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
nf 
nf 
nf 
5,612 
5,663 
5,710 
5,754 
5,796 
nf 
nf 
5,731 
5,776 
5,819 
,863 
5,901 
5,922 
nf 
5,832 
5,879 
5,911 
5,951 
5,985 
6,018 
6,010 
nf 
5,964 
6,003 
6,029 
6,041 
6,042, 
6,019 
6,007 
nf 
6,046 
6,055 
6,065n 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
400 
450 
500 
5,810 
5,812 
5,827 
5,943 
5,961 
5,92 
5,977 
5,963 
5,962 
6,019 
6,034b 
6,032 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
550 
600 
650 
5,846 
5,831 
5,781 
5,900 
5,849 
5,808 
5,93-1 
5,883 
5,806 
5,9h5 
5,931 
5,918 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
N'Te: nf-not feasible. 
a. Maximum discounted value of output.
b. Maximum discounted value of output subject to the constraint that discounted 
value of consumption exceeds historical value. 
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TABLE 9-4
 
Dhonted Value ofConmmptlon with Ofidal Exchange Rate
 
at 80 Percent of It. Hktorkal Value and Variations
 
InTAM and SOX
 
(billions of won at 1965 prices) 
SOX as a 
Percent of TAM as a Percent of Historical Value 
Historical 
____________________________ 
Value 200 250 300 350 400 
______ 
450 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
nf 
nf 
nf 
5,217 
5,255 
5,293 
nf 
nf 
5,253 
5,286 
5,319 
5,355 
nf 
5,274 
5,306 
5,331 
5,363 
5.1 0 3 
nf 
5,312 
5,340 
5,362 
5,378 
5,390 
nf 
5,319 
5,332 
5,346 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
300 
350 
5,330 
5,366 
5,388 
5,412 
5,423 
5,431 
5,389 
5,397 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
400 5,387 5,438 5,426 5,417 nf uf 
450 
500 
5,403 
5,427 
5,4644 
5,455 
5,433 
5,447 
5,430 
5,456 
nf 
nf 
nf 
nf 
550 5,455 5,458 5,447 5,447 nf nf 
600 5,462 5,443 5,436 5,435 nf nf 
650 5,446 5,436 5,408 5,388 nf nf 
NoTE: nf-not feasible. 
a. Maximum discounted value of consumption. 
the maximum discounted value of output and the maximum discounted value 
of consumption require widely divergent policies. Output is maximized when­
ever export subsidies are increased 50 percent and tariffs 300 percent above 
their historical values. The discounted value of consumption, however, is far 
smaller than its historical value. The discounted value of consumption is maxi­
mized whenever export subsidies are raised 350 percent and import duties 150 
percent above historical values. The former case emphasizes tariffs; the latter 
case emphasizes export subsidies. In both cases, additional growth results from 
accumulations of foreign exchange reserves which allow increased investment. 
Increased export subsidies, however, lead to relatively more consumption be­
cause the reduction of direct tax revenues as a means of subsidy results in an 
increase of disposable income. 
Since the two objectives of output maximization and consumption maxi­
mization are divergent, one might determine the maximum discounted value 
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of output subject to the constraint that the discounted value of consumption be 
at least as great as its historical value. This point is reached wh.-never tariffs 
are 250 percent and export subsidies 350 percent above bistorical values. 
Perhaps an even better solution is achieved by increasing export subsidies 400 
percent above historical values while holding tariffs at 250 percent. A large 
jump in consumption follows but only a small loss in output. The values of 
output and consumption are roughly similar to those in the prior case in which 
the official exchange rate is equal to its historical value. The difference is that 
when the official exchange rate falls below its historical value, tariffs and sub­
sidies have to be raised to very high levels to increase the availability of for­
eign exchange. The high tariffs generate the revenue required to offset the loss 
in revenue caused by export subsidies. 
TABLE 9-5
 
Discounted Values of Outputand Consumption with Official
 
Exchange Rate at 120 Percent of Its Hstorical Value
 
and Variations InTAM and SOX 
(billions of won at 1965 prices) 
SOX as a Output 
Percent of TAM as a Percent of Historical Value 
Historical 
Value 0 10 20 30 40 
0 5,717 5,713 5,738 5,7450 ni 
10 5,690 5,717 5,726 5,740 nf 
20 5,697 5,707 5,713 5,729 nf 
30 5,684 5,693 5,714 5,712 nf 
40 5,671 5,694 5,702 5,688 nf 
SOX as a Consumption 
Percent of TAM as a Percent of Historical Value 
Historical 
Value 0 10 20 30 40 
0 5,373 5,366 5,376 5,376a nf 
10 5,358 5,370 5,370 5,374 nf 
20 5,365 5,366 5,365 5,370 nf 
30 5,358 5,359 5,367 5,361 nf 
40 5,352 5,362 5,361 5,348 nf 
NOTE: nf-cot feasible. 
a. Maximum values. 
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Table 9-5 gives the discounted values of consumption and output when 
the official exchange rate is set 20 percent greater than its historical value. In 
this case the maximum values of output and consumption occur %'th the 
same values of SOX and TAM. Furthermore, the maximum values are below 
historical values and far below the maximum values achievable when the of­
ficial exchange rate is set equal to or 20 percent below historical values (see
tables 9-1 through 9-4). In the experiments in which the level of the official 
exchange rate is kept high, foreign exchange is no problem. Growth is inhibited 
by a lack of savings. The maximum for both output and consumption is 
reached when export subsidies are set at zero and tariffs at only 30 percent of 
historical values. If export subsidies are raised or if tariffs are reduced, gov­
ernment revenue and savings decline and further exacerbate the savings-invest­
ment constraint. When tariffs are raised, some minor imports become negative.
Yet even if nonlinear import demand functions were specified, an increase in 
tariffs would probably lead to an elastic demand and less revenue which would 
also aggravate the savings-investment constraint. We conclude, then, that if 
the official exchange rate values had been greater, growth in output and con­
sumption would have been smaller. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The experiments performed on the simulation model suggest that commercial 
policy has been an important factor in South Korea's growth. They indicate,
however, that in promotiug exports through subsidies and low tariffs, the 
government has sacrificed revenues with the result that growth-has been less 
than optimal. This conclusion assumes that if government revenues had been 
increased, they would have been set aside, as savings, for investment. The 
South Korean government deserves credit for keeping the growth of current 
expenditures low and for channeling some funds into productive investments.
But the question remains whether they could have achieved a greater success 
had the revenues .t their disposal been larger. 
The experiments also support the view that the 1965 exchange rate was 
an equilibrium rate in the sense that all subsidies and tariffs could have been 
eliminated and the same historical growth still achieved. This definition of 
equilibrium exchange rate differs somewhat from the usual one, the rate that 
would equilibrate demand and supply of foreign exchange. This more tradi­
tional definition, however, is not very useful. Since monetary and fiscal policies
help determine the demand for and supply of foreign exchange, there may be 
one or more equilibiium exchange rates for each possible set of government
policies. It is more interiting to consider the optimal combination of policies 
---exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary. Our experiments show that the optimal 
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"pure" exchange rate is slightly higher than the actual (about 102 percent of 
the historical) and is combined with more expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies. If subsidies and taxes on exports and imports combined withare 
exchange rate policy, the optimal exchange rate is about equal to the historical 
rate. The optimal rate should be combined, however, with higher import duties 
(or fewer exemptions) and roughly similar export subsidies. 
APPENDIX: SOLUTION OF THE NONLINEAR 
SIMULATION MODEL 
The simulation model given by equations (9-1) through (9-17) is nonlinear 
because of equations (9-2), (9-6), (9-9), and (9-10). The way in which 
the nonlinear solution is obtained involves first the solution for YNAt. See 
equation (8-2). 
YNAt - 281.8254 + 0.9413YNA-,, + 8 0.0 6681og,. (INA,-,) 
+ ij,, - ECI (9-18) 
All the variables on the right hand side are predetermined; ,., is the estimated 
residual from the regression equation (8-2) and ECt is excess capacity, a 
policy adjustment variable. The value of the derived commercial policy vari­
able SUBXt can be determined from (9-4), since it is the sum of two basic 
commercial policy variables SOX, and XPX,. Then exports of manufactured 
goods can be determined from 
XGM, = -241.4847 + 0.3323 YNA, + 0.2629 ORD, (9-19) 
+ 0.1471 SUBX, + l9,t 
where ORD# is also a basic commercial policy variable and io. is the esti­
mated residual from regression equation (8-27). Equation (8-29) may be 
used next to determine the value of total exports X, as the sum of XGMI and 
primary product exports XGPI, which is exogenous to the model. Equation
(9-2) may be used then to obtain a first estimate of XPMt as follows: 
XPM$ = (XPXt •Xt)/M," (9-20) 
where Mt*is the actual historical value of imports in year t. This enables us 
to obtain initial first estimates of all the remaining derived commercial policy 
variables "2from equations (9-3) through (9-11 ). 
After initial estimates of the derived commercial policy variables have 
been determined, initial estimates of the endogenous variables of the linear 
econometric model (9-1) may be obtained recursively by inverting the B 
matrix. 
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tt= - B-Ir4,t - B-lr 202, - B-r (9-21) 
--B - t 
where t are the estimated residuals from the regression eq rations used to es­
timate the linear system. Note that although the exogenous variables, ,lt, 4t, 
and 4,.1 and the predetermined variables 0,-, will change from simulation to 
simulation, we continue to use the estimated error termt j derived from the 
regressions on the original data. The justification for this is the assumption 
that the error terms are assumed to be uncorrelated with the exogenous vari­
ables, and we would like to determine the path of the economy under differ­
ent assumptions concerning the values of the commercial policy variables. 
The solution of (9-21) results in a new estimate of total imports: 
Mt 1 = MCto + MK ,t + A1Iol + MG,,' + MNCI (9-22) 
which may differ fiom the original estimate M,0 . If this new estimate is sub­
0stituted in (9-20) for the original estimate M1 and the remaining derived 
commercial policy variables are determined from equations (9-3) through 
(9-11 ), we obtain a second estimate of the deried commercial policy vari­
ables 0,. Similarly, a second estimate of the endogenous variables Of is de­
termined by solving (9-21) recursively with 42.,.' substituted for ,02,to. This 
process is repeated as often as is necessary until the successive estimated values 
of total imports differ by an arbitrarily small amount. 
NOTES 
1. We must also assume that the supply of imported goods is infinitely elastic. 
2. In terms of the original data, 
az. = RY*" WPI,/(OR0",. WPITPs - CY,) 
3. In terms of our original data, the change in reserves is 
A LFXRI = -SKI + DCKS, • (RMG, + RMOS,)/DMGS, 
See tables 8-8 and 8-9 for definitions of the variables. 
4. Income and investment are reduced by 1:3. 
5. It should be kept in mind that export subsidies and tariffs were a relatively small 
percent of the effective exchange rate te.g., 13 percent and 9 percent, respectively, in 
1965); so that a doubling or tripling is equivalent to a much smaller change in the effec­
tive exchange rate. 
6. Export premia were very small during the period covered by the simulations. 
Variations in XPX, export premia per dollar of exports, did not make much of a differ­
ence to our experiments, so none of those results are reported here. 
Chapter 10 
OWd RmUDU AlloctMi 
Any foreign exchange regime can have a substantial effect on the allocation 
of resources.' Protective tariffs encourage the movement of resources into 
import substitution industries rather than into export industries or into strictly 
domestic production. The exchange rate also influences the allocation of re­
sources. Whcn overvalued, it discourages investment both in export and in 
import-substituting industries and makes investment in domestic enterprise
(i.e., nontradables) more attractive. In time, however, an overvalued cur­
rency leads to balance of payments pressure, which in turn prompts restrictions 
on imports. Controls on the use of foreign exchange, quantitative controls on 
imports and multiple exchange rates are some of the techniques available to 
government an,: all of them have substantial effects on investment incentives 
and the allocation of resources. 
It is difficult to determine whether the changes in the structure of prices
and incentives caused by the foreign exchange regime lead to more or less 
efficiency in resource allocation. Much of the literature on trade and develop­
ment presumes that any substantial deviation of the exchange rate from a 
unified equilibrium rate, large deviations in effective tariffs, and all import
controls cause resources to be allocated inefficiently. According to this view, 
world prices of tradable commodities reflect the true opportunity costs of 
producing them. Thus tariffs, controls, and multiple exchange rates, which 
distort world market prices, lead to inefficiencies. 
There are many reasons to question this view. The protection of infant 
industry, the need to raise revenues from tariffs, and the ability to achieve 
social and political goals through manipulation of the price mechanism argue 
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in favor of some divergence between world market and domestic prices. World
market prices, however, provide a standard by which the effects of the foreign
exchange regime on resource allocation can be appraised. Large divergencesfrom world market prices suggest the possibility, when other justifications are 
lacking, that allocation of resources is inefficient. 
STANDARD MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 
A simple measure of the divergence between world market and domestic 
prices is the legal tariff. If foreign supply is perfectly elastic, and if imports
are free from quantitative controls, and if domestic demand for a protected
commodity is great enough to sustain imports despite the extra cost, then thelegal tariff is both equal to and the cause of the divergencc between world
market and domestic prices. In Korea, however, the legal tariff is seldom agood measure of this discrepancy. First, quite a number of commodities are
exempt from duties, particularly intermediates imported for in the pro­useduction of exports. Many capital goods are exempted from legal tariffs as well.Second, a number of tariffs are virtually prohibitive, so that many commodi­
ties are not imported. Domestic production is sufficient to satisfy local demand 
at or below the world market price plus tariff. In these two cases, the legal
tariff overstates the actual degree of protection. Third, many imports are sub­ject to controls. The domestic price of such commodities can be higher thanthe world market price plus tariff if the demand at that price exceeds the 
amount of imports the quota allows. 
For our study of protection in Korea it was thus necessary to compare
world market and domestic prices directly. The divergence between the two 
can be expressed as a percentage of the world price: 
pd 
-pw 
pw 
where pd is the domeitic price of a commodity and pw is the world marketprice.2 We call t. the rate of nominal protection or nominal tariff rate to dis­
tinguish it from the legal tariff rate.3 
Neither legal nor nominal tariff rates provide clear indications of howtariffs or quantitative restrictions divert resources. A much better measure is
the rate of effective protection, because it takes into account the intermediates
required for production along with primary factors. Effective rates of protec­
tion measure protection in relation to the returns to primary factors engagedin separate processing activities. When intermediate inputs are traded, pro­tective measures influence resource allocation according to their effect on 
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factor returns in various processing activities. For example, if the value addedin automobile assembly is only 10 percent of the total value of the car, andif imported automobile parts are free of duties and ORs, while the tariff onthe final product is 100 percent, then the effective incentive to assemble auto­
mobiles is exceedingly high. For the effective rate of protection would be not100 percent but 100/(.10) or 1000 percent.
The general formula for thc effective rate of protection, trj, for activity 
jis: ' 
P j-
P, j ­11aiJ),i"liaupa 1, (10-2) 
or 
p,(I + ,j) - :1 1al'o, (I + 1) 1 (10-3) 
p... ­ iaip.q 
_J~rt,pij alit~jp,.-I 
p,,a j ajp,, 
where pj is domestic price of commodity j, p..) is its world market price,
a1 is the input-output coefficient giving the input of commodity i per unit ofoutput of commodity j, and t., is the nominal protection rate for commodity i.The effective rate of protection is the percentage difference between domesticvalue added-the numerator of the first term on the right-hand side of (10-2)
-and value added in world market prices-the denominator of the first term 
on the right-hand side of (10-2). Equation (10-3) shows that the effective 
rate of protection may also be expressed in terms of rates of nominal protec­tion on commodity / and the rates of protection on all the inputs into com­
modity j. For example, if the rate of nominal protection on all inputs is zerofi.e., tI. ­0 for all i), then the effective rate of protection is merely the tariff
rate divided by value added at world market prices. The higher the rate ofprottction on inputs i relative to the rate of protection on output j, the lowerthe rate of effective protection. 
This formula assumes that all intermediate inputs are tradable, so thatprotection affects only factor rewards in the specific processing activity. Whenthe existence of nontradable intermediate inputs is admitted, it becomes some­
what unclear whether protection affects only the factor rewards in the primaryprocessing activity or those in the domestic industries producing nontradables 
as well. Two conventions have grown up to compute effective protection wherethere are nontradable inputs. Under the Balassa convention, protected value
added includes only that in the specific processing activity (see Balassa andAssociates [1971]). Corden (1971) proposed an alternative formulation thattakes into account the indirectly generated value added in those domestic in­
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dustries which supply nontradable commodities. His argument is that protec­tion affects the factor rewards in the domestic nontradablc sectors as well.Thus one should measure the effective incentive to domestic resources in boththe final processing stage and in those industries which supply nontradableinputs. The Corden measure of effective protection is the percentage deviationbetween the value in domestic prices and that in world market prices of the
value added generated directly in the production of commodity j and indi­
rectly in the production of nontradable inputs into commodity j. One mustinvert that part of the input-output matrix referring to nontradable goods toperform the Corden calculation.-,
 
The interpretation of effective incentives 
as we have measured them isnot straightforward, for it is not clear whether a high incentive rate is indica­tive of a high level of incentives (i.e., high excess profits) for factors to moveinto a particular activity, or a high degree of inefficiency (i.e., wasteful use
of all resources used) in the production of a commodity, or a combination ofboth. High tariffs and other forms of protection may encourage some small
efficient producers to expand beyond an efficient scale. Excess profits of the
marginal producers may be eliminated, but inframarginal producers ma, bereaping profits in the form of producers' surplus. If domestic demand is lim­ited, however, the excess profits may remain for all producers. On the otherhand, the protected industries may be high-cost industries at all levels of out­put so that no excess profits are made by any producers. Similarly, low or
negative effective incentive :'atcs may indicate factor rewards below their
opportunity costs or a high degree of efficiency. "High" and "low" in this con­text are to be understood in relative terms rather than as absolute magnitudes.
Furthermore, effective protection rates may not even indicate the direc­tion in which resources will tend to flow in response to incentives. If this isgenerally true, the interpretation of effective protection becomes even more 
difficult." 
EXTENSIONS AND VARIATIONS USED
 
IN MEASURING PROTECTION
 
An important refinement made here is the notion of effective subsidy in con­trast to effective protection. Subsidies in the form of income tax exemptions,
accelerated depreciation, and special low interest rates to finance specific
activities are not included in the usual measures of effective protection, eventhough such subsidies may provide particular sectors with substantial incen­tives. Therefore, we have calculated rates of effective subsidy as well as rates
of effective protection. Subsidies affecting direct tax and interest liabilities do
not change value-added at world market prices; they do, however, affect the 
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composition of value-added and profits after taxes. These subsidies are in­
corporated into ameasure of effective subsidy in the following way: 
The total direct tax liabilities of all firms were reapportioned to each 
sector on the basis of its share in the total tax base; i.e., we assumed that each 
firm would have paid the average tax rate on its net income under a neutral 
tax policy. The difference between the reapportioned tax liability and a sec­
tor's actual tax liability is the estimated tax subsidy. The subsidy could, there­
fore, be negative as well as positive, depending upon whether the sector actu­
ally paid a higher or lower tax rate than the average; the algebraic sum of all 
estimated tax subsidies is zero. 
Interest subsidies were determined in analogous fashion. To compute 
the interest that would be paid under a neutral credit policy, we assumed that 
all sectors paid the same average interest rate on outstanding loans, that rate 
biing determined as the ratio of total inter'est payments by all sectors to total 
loans outstanding. The interest subsidy to a sector is thus the difference be­
tween total interest payments at the ave.rage interest rate and the actual inter­
est payments of asector. The algebraic sum of all interest subsidies is zero. 
Total direct tax and interest subsidies were added to value added in do­
mestic prices. 7 This adjusted value added is divided by value added at world 
market prices, and the ratio (minus one) is the effective subsidy rate. Since 
the sum of all subsidies is zero, the weighted average of all effective subsidy 
rates isequal to the weighted average of all effective protection rates, where 
the weights are world market price value added. 
Another important extension in this study is to calrulate two separate 
rates of protection or subsidy, one applying to domestic sales, the other to 
export sales. Prices to the producer of both outputs and inputs are quite differ­
ent for production for export. Specifically, exports particularly benefited from 
the following types of preferential treatment in addition to direct tax and 
interest subsidies: 
(1) 	 export production was completely exempt from indirect taxes on both 
inputs and output; 
(2) 	 imports of both intermediate and capital goods for export production 
were tariff exempt; 
(3) 	 exports received an additional subsidy for inputs in the form of a 
wastage allowance; 1 
(4) 	 a number of export sectors paid subsidized rates for railroad transport 
and electricity. 
All of these factors changed the prices paid for inputs used to produce exports 
and were taken into account in calculating the effective incentive rates for 
exports. In addition, exports were frequently priced below the domestic mar­
ket price. One reason for this difference might be that exported commodities 
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were of lower quality than those consumed domestically. But a more likely 
explanation is that monopolies or cartels among producers, sustained by im­
port quotas and tariffs, enforced discriminatory pricing. Finally, most tax and 
interest subsidies apply to production for export but not to production for 
domestic sale. All of the export incentives described in chapters 3.and 6 that 
were in effect in 1968 were incorporated in our estimates, except for import 
prepayment deposits and the implicit export-import link subsidy. Both of 
these measures were quantitatively unimportant in 1968. We should also note 
that special incentives to emergent import-substituting activities were taken 
into account as well. 
In total, a number of distinct measures of effective protection and sub­
sidy rates were calculated for Korea for 1968. Effective protection and subsidy 
rates were calculated by both the Balassa (see Balassa and Associates [19711) 
and Corden methods. In both cases, depreciation is deducted from value 
added. Estimates of effective incentives were obtained separately for export 
and domestic sales. 
THE DATA BASE 
Our estimates are based on 1968 domestic and world-market prices, 1968 
trade and output flows, and input-output coefficients from a 1966 input-output 
table. A synthetic input-output table for 1968 derived from the 1966 table is 
available. However, we believe that the double-deflation and trend extrapola­
tion method used to estimate the 1968 coefficients yields unreliable estimates. 
We prefer to use the 1966 coefficients in the belief that they are better esti­
mates of the 1968 coefficients than those of the extrapolated 1968 table. 
The 1966 table contains 299 producing sectors. The table was aggregated 
to 160 sectors, of which 150 are tradable-,, ,ods-producing sectors. Effective 
rates of protection and subsidy were calculated for these 150 sectors separately. 
The 150 tradable goods sectors were further aggregated in two different 
ways: (1) by eleven industrial groups, and (2) by four trade categories, 
namely export industries, import-competing industries, industries that export 
and are also import-competing, and industries that are neither export oriented 
nor import-competing (the latter industries called non-import-competing in­
dustries). Details of these industrial classifications appear in Table 6-6 and 
the accompanying text. 
Data on world market prices and domestic prices were obtained by 
means of a survey.9 A list of commodity groups for which price comparisons 
were to be made was prepared from the Bank of Korea's 1966 input-output 
data tabulated at the level of 2,000 commodity groups (comparable input­
output information for 1968 was not available). Of the 2,000 groups, price 
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observations were obtained for selected commodities in 365 of them, which 
in total accounted for 70.8 percent of aggregate commodity domestic sales 
and 78.2 percent of commodity exports in 1966. The principal criterion for
selecting a commodity group for inclusion in the survey was that it had a 
relatively large share in sectoral output. Priority further givenwas to non­
import-competing commodity groups, to products subject to quantitative re­
strictions, and to export commodities. 
The major sources of domestic price information were individual pro­
ducers, producers' associations such as the Korea Chamber of Commerce,
and various government agencies including the Ministry of Finance, the 
Economic Planning Board, the Bank of Korea, and the Korea Development
Bank. Export and import prices for those commodities actually exported or 
imported were obtained from domestic records of the transactions. Export
prices were not estimated for other commodities. For commodities not actu­
ally imported in 1968, import prices were estimated from Korea's export price(if relevant) or, in a majority of the cases, from wholesale prices (exclusive of 
indirect taxes) in Japan and, less frequently, in the United States. A single
price comparison was obtained for a majority of the commodity groups; bivw­
ever, in a number of cases, comparative price information for several com­
modities within a commodity group was collected. 
All world market prices are stated c.i.f., this being the appropriate basis 
for determining protection of sales on the domestic market. Domestic prices 
are ex-factory f.o.b. net of indirect taxes. 
Other data required to compute effective rates of protection and subsidy
included rebates on overhead charges (electricity and rail transport), indirect 
tax rates and exemptions, legal tariff rates and exemptions on imported inputs,
wastage allowance rates, direct tax credits and reductions, and interest rates 
actually paid. These data were collected from published sources where pos­
sible and through the cooperation of various Korean government agencies.
Tariff rates include those intended to soak up excess profits on imports subject 
to quanti:ative restrictions. Estimates of wastage allowanct subsidies, which 
could not be obtained directly from government, were pieced together from 
other sources. 
NOMINAL RATES OF PROTECTION 
AND QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS 
The 1968 price data gathered from the survey for the most part followed the 
pattern expected. In some cases the price data on domestic and foreign sales 
exhibited peculiar characteristics. Differences in quality between domestic 
and foreign products exnlained some of these peculiarities, and errors that 
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usually accompany this kind of price data may have accounted for others. 
In cases where domestic and foreign price comparisons indicated that these 
factors seemed to be involved, adjustments were made in the data where 
appropriate. The information used to make the adjustments included (1) the 
;eelationship between the price difference as shown by the survey and the legal
and actual tariff rates; (2) the relative importance of exports and imports
within the commodity group; (3) the type of import control imposed on the 
commodity. 
Domestic prices of imported products generally exceeded world prices.
Where they did not, the lower Oomestic price usually reflected poorer quality.
There were some exceptions, however. Negative nominal protection for all 
petroleum products, the most notable example, is explained by government
controls. All crude petroleum is imported and refined domestically in a regu­
lated industry. Local petrole'im prices provide substantial subsidies to do­
mestic consumers. 
As mentioned above, among goods for which both export and import
prices were available, export prices tended to be lower than import prices.
This can be explained by quality differences or market imperfections.
Goods primarily for export exhibited three different patterns. Fist, the 
export price of primary products tended to be higher than the domestic price.
Because this is not possible in perfectly competitive markets, except where 
government controls on exports appear to cause differential pricing, we as­
sumed that in most cases the difference stemmed from the inferior quality or 
packaging of the donestic product. Ginseng (a medicinal root) and dried 
seaweed, however, are special cases, because exports of both are controlled
by the government. The only commodity for which we could find evidence of 
an export tax was ginseng, where the nominal rate of protection on both do­
mestic and export sales was negative. A government monopoly buys up the 
entire ginseng crop at harvest and sells it at home and abroad for a much 
higher price than what it pays the fanner. The export price of dried seaweed 
is higher because almost all of it goes to Japan; the price is negotiated by the 
Korean and Japanese governments. In contrast to its involvement in the gin­
seng trade, the government acts only as a sales agent in the export of seaweed. 
In the second pattern exhibited by export commodities, export prices
tended to be the same as domestic prices. Exports conforming to this pattern
included both primary and manufactured products. 
The third pattern, which mostly applied to manufactured products,
showed the domestic price substantially higher than the export price. This 
might be explained in a number of ways. Many of these commodities, particu­
larly textiles, earn large tariff duty remissions and tax breaks for export sales. 
But when they are sold locally, they are subject to these duties and taxes. 
Consequently, export and domestic prices are bound to differ. In some cases, 
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however, pricing may have been noncompetitive and discriminatory. Negotia­
tions between the government and exporters' associations set export quotas 
fir by firm and the size of export subsidies. By acting through manufacturers' 
associations in the domestic market, the exporters may have been able to 
form a cartel for the restriction of sales. 
Nominal protection estimates gauge the relative importance of quantita­
tive restric,'ons in 1968. Since nominal protection seldom exceeded the legal 
tariff, it is t,:mpting to conclude that ORs added little to the protection pro­
vided by the tariff structure. However, to make this conclusion valid, it is 
necessary to separate the regular tariff from the special tariff which in many 
instances was used to mop up the scarcity premiums resulting from the QRs. 
Recall that the legal tariff rate was composed of two elements: the regular rate 
which was legislated and the special rate which was administered. 
Special tariffs were imposed on 123 commodity groups (out of a total 
of 365) within the sample; these accounted for 13.7 percent of total domestic 
sales within the sample. 
The weighted-average special tariff on the 116 manufacturers subject 
to it was 9Y percent compared with a legal tariff rate of 83.9 percent. 10 Thus 
the special tariff played a relatively modest role in the protection system. 3t 
least for manufactures. 
Among primary products, the weighted-average special tariff rate on the 
seven commodities subject to it was 207.1 percent. This result, however, was 
dominated by red pepper for which the special tariff was 217 percent. Without 
red pepper the weighted average of the special tariff for primary products was 
80.2 percent compared with a legal tariff rate of 81.1 percent. Thus QRs had 
more effect on primary products than on manufactures. 
Final judgment on the importance of ORs rests on a comparison of nom­
inal protection with the regular tariff rate (i.e., excluding the special tariffs). 
The following estimates are weighted averages over all roiamodities for which 
nominal protection exceeded the regular tariff re: 
Number z4 Nominal Regular 
Trade C-..'rdity Protection Tariff 
Category Groups Rate Rate 
X 5 64.9% 56.5% 
NIC 46 66.2 26.9
 
IC 22 41.5 18.0
 
XIC 4 98.6 38.7
 
All 77 62.6 26.6
 
Except for the commodity groups in the export category, QRs did afford 
some commodities significant additional protection. The major groups so 
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protected include barley and wheat, red pepper, chickens, wonted yarn, steel
sheet and wire rod, wire and cable, cotton shirting, several chemical productsincluding synthetic staple fiber, and several metal products including tools.These 77 commodity groups, however, accounted for only 11.4 percent oftotal domestic sales within the sample, so that in total effect, QRs were rela­tively unimportant, ,:ven though they were imposed on competitive importsin the markets for commodities representing 75.6 percent of all domestic
sales in the sample. (That figure, however, represents a biased estimate ofthe imposition of QRs relative to total domestic sales, for a commodity group'sinclusion in our sample was based, in part, on the imposition of QRs.) 
AVERAGE PROTECTION 
The average levels of incentives for agriculture, mining, and manufacturing
are summarized in tables 10-1 and 10-2. The averages of legal and nominalprotection are weighted by domestic sales volumes in world market prices,
while those for effective protection and subsidy are weighted by value-added 
:n world market prices. The results arc striking in a number of ways."1 First, nominal rates of protection are well below legal tariff rates, whichindicates considerable tariff redundancy. Tariffs are particularly redundant inmanufacturing, where the average legal rate of protection was 58.8 percent
and the average nominal rate was 10.7 percent (Table 10-1 ), compared withagriculture and mining where the spread is much narrower. Tariff redundancy 
TABLE 10-!

Average Incentive Rates by Major Industry Grouping, 1968
 
(percent) 
Total Manufac-
Agriculture Mining Primary turing ToWl 
Lverage legal protection 36.0 9.6 34.1 58.8 49.4Average nominal protection 16.6 6.9 15.9 10.7 12.6Average effective protection
Balassa 18.1 2.9 17.1 -0.9 9.9Corden 17.5 2.5 16.4 -0.7 8.4Average effective subsidy
Balassa 22.1 4.7 20.9 -6.5 10.0Corden 21.3 4.1 20.1 
--4.7 8.5 
SouaCE: All tables in Chapter 10 are drawn frum Annex tables 2.A through 2.C,Westpbal and Kim (1974). 
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TABLE 10-2 
Averge Incentive Rake InMmfactaa by Trade Caegoq, 1968 
(percent) 
Export & 
Export 
Industries 
Import-
Competing 
Industries 
Non-Import-
Competing 
Industries 
Import-
Competing 
Industries Total 
Average legal 
protection 53.7 55.4 64.! 46.3 58.8 
Aver.ge 
nominal 
protection 5.2 31.6 5.0 23.1 10.7 
Average effective 
protection 
Balassa -10.7 91.7 -16.1 45.2 -0.9 
Corden -8.! 50.2 -12.4 28.7 -0.7 
Average effective 
subsidy
Balassa -13.4 90.7 -23.7 37.9 -6.5 
Corden -10.2 49.6 -18.2 24.1 -4.7 
NOTe: Trade categories are defined in Chapter 6. 
within manufacturing was greatest in the export industries and the non­
import-competing industries (Table 10-2). In the export and non-import­
competing industries, the nominal tariff was only about one-tenth of the legal
tariff; while in the import-competing sectors, the implicit tariff was more than 
50 percent of the legal tariff. Given that quantitative restrictions played a rela­
tively minor role, tariff redundancy was natural in industries where there were 
few importsA2 The overall level of tariff redundancy in Korea is thus very
high for three reasons: many tariffs, though relatively low in absolute magni­
tude, are prohibitive; exemptions and reductions of tariff levies are common; 
and because much of Korean industry is export oriented, even though pro­
tected by tariffs on the domestic market. 
Second, agriculture is much more highly protected than mining or manu­
facturing. Average nominal protection is 16.6 percent for agriculture, 10.7 
percent for manufacturing, and only 6.9 percent for mining. The difference 
in effective protection between major industries is even larger. By the Balassa 
measure, for example, the average rate of effective protection for agriculture
is 18.1 percent, only 2.9 percent for mining, and a negative 0.9 percent for 
manufacturing. More protection for agriculture than for manufacturing is very
unusual in other countries. 
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Third, the average level of protection and subsidy is quite low in Korea
compared with other countries, because the exchange rate in 1968 was notgreatly overvalued. The level of protection for manufacturing is especially
low, a negative 6.5 percent according to the Balassa measure of effective sub­
sidy. The average level of effective protection for all sectors is only about 10 
percent. 
The low level of protection for manufacturing is partly influenced by theinclusion of processed food and beverages and tobacco in the manufacturing
sector (the line dividing processed food, in particular, from primary produc­
tion is quite arbitrary, for much of the food processing is done in the primary
sector). If these are excluded, the level of incentives to manufacturing in­
creases. The average effective subsidy rate is no longer negative, but slightly
positive (less than 1 percent). It nonetheless remains well below the average
for the primary, processed food, and beverage and tobacco sectors taken 
together.
 
INCENTIVES TO DOMESTIC AND EXPORT 
SALES 
Differential rates of effective protection for and subsidy to domestic sales com­pared with export sales are summarized in tables 10-3 and 10-4. Table 10-3
shows that in every industrial sector, except intermediate products I and 
transport equipment, effective protection for export sales is negative. The largepositive effective protection for intermediate products I is due almost entirely
to plywood, which receives substantial protection through the wastage allow­
ance on imported roundwood. Wood is extremely scarce in Korea and impoi Is 
are controlled. Plywood manufacturers are given generous wastage allowances
 
for export production so that they have substantial excess wood which they
 
can sell domestically or process into goods for domestic sale.
 
Table 10-4 also indicates a pattern of low and negative effective protec­
tion for exports. The rate of protection for the export sales of export indus­
tries (X) is soightiy positive, while for all other industries it is negative. Thisdifference, however, is again due to plywood. Exclude plywood and the aver­
age level of protection becomes negative.
The basic reason for the near zero or negative rates of protection for 
export sales is that exporters purchase tradable intermediate inputs at world 
market prices, just as they sell their products at world market prices. Im­ported inputs are automatically purchased at world market prices, since for 
exporters they ate duty free. Inputs purchased domestically are not more 
expensive than comparable imports, otherwise they would have been imported.
Thus exporters operate, so far as commodities are concerned, at world market 
prices. For nontradable, domestically produced inputs, however, nominal 
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TABLE 10-3
 
EOeCUe FOraecdm for .1 SubadY 00 EXpod a1M Dooeui Sdal by hIultry Gnap, 1968
 
(percent) 
Balassa Measure Corden Measure 
Industry@ Export Domestic Average Export Domestic Average 
Effective Protection 
Agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing -16.1 18.5 18.1 -15.3 17.9 17.5 
Processed food -2.7 -18.2 -17.0 -2.2 -14.2 -13.3 
Beverages and tobacco -1.9 -19.3 -18.6 -1.7 -15.5 -15.0 
Mining and energy -1.0 4.0 2.9 -0.9 3.5 2.5 Construction materials -5.2 - 11.5 -11.3 -3.9 -8.6-8.8 
Intermediate products ! 31.0 -25.5 -19.5 18.6 -18.8 -14.0 
Intermediate products 11 -0.2 26.1 24.2 -0.2 17.4 16.1 
Nondurable consumer 
goods -1.9 -10.5 -8.5 -1.4 -8.0 -6.5 
Consumer durables -4.7 64.4 51.0 -3.0 39.8 31.8 
Machinery -12.7 44.2 42.9 -4.6 29.5 28.0 
Transport equipment 53.1 163.5 163.9 -13.1 83.2 82.7 
Effective Subsidy 
Agriculture, forestry,
 
and fishing -9.9 
 22.5 22.1 -9.4 21.7 21.3 
Processed food 2.3 -25.2 -23.0 1.8 -19.6 -18.0 
Beverages and tobacco 14.5 -25.8 -24.2 12.6 -20.8 -19.5 
Mining and energy 3.0 5.1 4.7 2.7 4.5 4.1 Construction materials 5.9 -16.9 -15.9 4.4 -12.9 -12.1 
Intermediate products 1 43.4 -29.7 -21.9 26.0 -21.9 -15.7 
Intermediate products I! 17.5 19.6 19.5 11.6 13.1 13.0 
Nondurable consumer
 
goods 5.4 -20.6 -14.7 4.1 -15.7 -11.2
 
Consumer durables 
 2.4 38.2 31.3 1.5 23.6 19.5 
Machinery 5.2 31.5 30.9 1.9 21.0 20.2 
Transport equipment -22.8 158.7 159.1 -5.6 80.8 80.3 
a.Industrial groups are defined in Chapter 6. 
protection is positive. This makes the effective protection for the output for 
export of so:e industrios slightly negative.13 For other industries, effective 
protection is slightly positive because wastage allowance subsidies and utility
rebates outweigh nominal protection for nontradable inputs. Most wastage
allowance subsidies, about one-half of the total, go to plywood manufacture. 
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TABLE 10-4 
Efective Protection for and Subsidy to Export and Domeusic
 
Sales InManufacturing by Trade Category, 1968
 
(percent)
 
Balassa Measure Corden Measure 
Trade Categorya Export Domesic Average Export Domestic Average 
Effective Protection 
Export industries (X) 4.6 -18.0 -10.7 3.4 -14.0 -8.1 
Import-competing
industries (IC) -8.6 93.1 91.7 -3.9 51.1 50.2 
Non-import-competing 
industries (NIC) -0.8 -16.4 -16.1 -0.7 -12.6 -12.4 
Export and import
competing industries (XIC) -2.1 72.8 45.2 -1.4 46.1 28.7 
All manufacturing
industries 3.1 -1.4 -0.9 2.2 -1.1 -0.7 
Effective Subsidy 
Export industries (X) 13.5 -26.2 -13.4 9.8 -20.4 -10.2 
Import-competing

industries (IC) 35.3 90.7 50.2
91.4 15.8 49.6 
Non-import-competing
industries (NIC) 6.1 -24.3 -23.7 5.0 -18.7 -18.2 
Export and import­
competing industries (XIC) 
 8.7 55.0 37.9 5.6 34.8 24.1 
All manufacturing

industries 12.4 -8.9 -6.5 
 8.9 -6.5 -4.7 
a.Trade categories are defined in Chapter 6. 
Thus except for plywood and some minor exports, effective protection for 
export sales tends to be close to zero or negative.
In striking contrast, effective subsidy to exports is positive among allindustries except agriculture and transport equipment (see Table 10-3). When 
industries are grouried by trade category (see Table 10-4), the rates of sub­
sidy for their export sales are positive in all categories. This clearly demon­
strates the overwhelming importance of tax and credit preferences for exports
in the total system of export incentives. 14 Just as tax and interest preferences
raised effective incentives to export sales, they lowered them to domestic sales 
except in agriculture where virtually no direct taxes were levied. Tax rates 
were also below average in mining and energy. The average level of effective 
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subsidy to all manufactured export sales is 12.4 percent, and to domestic sales,
-8.9 percent. A bias in favor of export sales is rarely encountered in the in­
centive systems of developing countries, and this makes the Korean case all the 
more unusual. This bias is even greater than the 12.4 percent subsidy to ex­
ports, since the effective incentives to domestic sales were negative.
The rank correlation coefficient between eflective protection and eflective
subsidies (Bipssa measure) on sales to th,. export market is only .15, whichis barely significant at the .05 level. Thus the major explicit incentives to 
export activity not only came from credit and direct tax preferences, but thescpolicies also had apowerful influence on the inter-industrial structure of export
incentives. The rank correlation between these measures on sales to the do­
mestic market, however, is .95. The major incentive policy addressed to pro­duction for the domestic market was the structure of nominal protection rates,
and therefore estimates of effective protection are reasonably good predictors
of the net effect of all policy instruments operating within the protected do­
mestic market. There is virtually no correlation between effective subsidies to 
export sales and to domestic sales; there is thus no stable overall relationshipbetwcen the incentives offered a sector for its domestic sales and those for its 
exports.' r-
In the industrial sectors classified as export and import-competing(XIC), and in the import-competing sector (IC), the incentive was muchhigher to domestic sales thm', to exports, while in the export (X) and non­import-competing (NIC) sectors the was The explanation forreverse true. this marked difference appears to be the way in which newer export commodi­
ties are often promoted through linking highly profitable dimestic sales to
satisfactory export performance by individual producers. High levels of pro­
tection for the domestic market should thus be interpreted as an incentive to 
export various goods, for example certain kinds of textile products, fertilizers,
and electrical products. Most of these products appear in the former two 
classifications. 
Relative incentives are somewhat different in the primary product indus­
tries, where incentives are lower for export sales in general than for domestic
sales. The average effective subsidy rate for exports of primary products was
-2.7 percent and for domestic sales it was 21.6 percent. The bias against
exports is particularly marked in agriculture. However, the effective subsidy
rate for exports in nearly all the export mining sectors was positive and for 
domestic sales it was negative. 
VARIABILITY IN RATES OF PROTECTION 
Table 10-5 displays frequency distributions for various measures of incen­
tives at the 150-sector level. The degree of dispersion increases as the measure 
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of protection includes more of the incentive policies. That is, legal tariff rates 
have the least dispersion, nominal protection rates have more, effective pro­
tection rates even more, and cffective subsidies the most dispersion.
Rates c-f effective protection are subject to some extreme values, rangingfrom -18404.7 percent to +1929.1 percent."'1 The extremes occur in those 
sectors that have a near zero value-added in world market prices. Errors of 
measurement and aggregation can easily lead to extreme values when value
added is near zero. To remove the elfects of the extreme values, all sectors 
having a protection or subsidy rate greater than 5(X) percent on either the 
Balassa or Corden measure were eliminated from the sample and a cocllicicnt 
of variation (unweighted) was calculated for the reduced sample. The co­
efficient of variation for the Balassa effective protection rate dropped from36.7 to 3.2, but the relative ranking of the various measures of variability
remained the same except that between the Corden and Balassa measures ofprotection. Over the entire set of sectors, the Corden rates vary less than theBalassa rates, largely because the Corden measure defines value added in
world market prices more inclusively. As a result, there is less tendency to­
ward extreme values, since value added in world prices is greater in absolute 
value. The variability in export protection was much less than for domestic 
protection or subsidy. For the reduced sample, export variability was still less 
but not significantly so. 
Effective protection and subsidy rates are more variable than legal and
nominal protection rates because the value-added denominator of the former 
is substantially smaller than the value-of-output denominator of the latter and 
not because of an escalation of nominal rates at higher processing stages.
Average nominal protection for inputs is larger than nominal protection for
output in most industrial groups. The only one of the eleven groups in which 
there was any marked escalation of protection was transport equipment. At
the 150-sector level, there were numicous instances of both positive and 
reverse escalation of nominal protection, though reverse escalation pre­dominated. I 
Table 10-6 lists the 20 (of the 150) sectors that had the highest rates
of effective protection for domestic sales. For the most pait, these high rates of protection arose because of low value-added at world market prices, i.e., high
nominal protection of the output and low nominal protection of the inputs. In 
some cases, the high rates of protection can be traced to a single commoditygroup within the sector and do not characterize the sector as a whole. For 
example, the high rate for vegetables reflects a high rate of protection for just
one vegetable, red peppers, but this vegetable nevertheless accounts for a 
large portion of the average Korean food budget.
Most of the highly protected sectors are import-competing or both export
and import-competing industries. In nine cases, value added in exports at the 
prices received and paid by the producer (i.e., domestic prices) is negative 
TABLE 10-5 
Fnqmcy DWrwuU.. of laceudve Mmaw 
 in 1S0,%egw Sam* 
Value inPercent: 
 Effective Protection Effective Subsidy
GreaterThan or Less Legal Nominal Balassa CordenEqual to Than Balassa CordenTariff Protection Export Domestic Averagea Averagea Export Domes i Average. Average.
-00 -100 1 6 6 1 2 71000 6 13 3 2 3500o 1000 3 25 4 1 ! 4 S200 500 1 
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Over entire sample 1
 
Simple average 49.2 
 18.1 -3.5 -66.1 -31.1 23.7 10.5 
-115.4 -29.6 21.8 
Coefficient of
variationb .8 1.4 5.2 23.2 36.7 13.3 9.1 13.9 37.5 13.4t Over reduced sample€

W Simple average 48.0 13.1 -3.5 
 20.8 20.2 10.3 11.4 14.1 15.9 7.7Coefficient of
variationb 
.8 1.4 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.5 4.7 4.0 5.1 
a. These columns refer to weighted average effective incentives where weights are value added at world prices in domestic sales and 
export sales.b. Coefficien: of variation, standard deviation divided by the mean. 
c. Excludes those sixteen sectors for which one or more measures of effective incentives exceeds 500 percent or for which value addedin world market prices is negative. 
Sector 

Vegetables 

Raw salt 
Worsted and woolen yarns 
Cotton fabrics 
Silk fabrics 
Synthetic dyes 
Paint and printing ink 
Steel sheet and bars 
Steel pipes 
Galvanized and plated steel 
Insulated wire and cable 
TABLE 10-6 
Secan H2v! 11Ht Effective Pniectlo for Domesc ss, 1ms 
(percent) 
Negative Effective 
Value Subsidy 
Added Rate 
150.4 
113.9 
333.8 
176.2 
233.8 
C 141.4 
145.9 
131.9 
d -3186.6 
C 160.7 
• 1463.1 
Effective 
Protection 
Rate 
WorldPrice Value. 
Added 
Coefficient 
Nominala 
Input 
Protection 
Nominal 
Protection 
on Output 
139.7 
133.1 
383.2 
.59 
.59 
.08 
19.6 
23.8 
31.0 
91.0 
90.3 
60.4 
169.5 
260.6 
136.7 
144.8 
138.7 
-3417.7 
127.0 
1654.8 
.11 
.19 
.20 
.27 
.12 
-. 02 
.15 
.03 
11.1 
17.5 
32.1 
39.3 
13.0 
34.6 
27.8 
29.8 
27.9 
64.3 
53.3 
67.8 
28.6 
110.6 
42.6 
76.3 
Measuring instruments 114.9 120.6 .37 26.7 61.1Photographic materials f 1228.9 1274.6 .06 22.8 100.4Household electronic equipment 68.5 114.0 .38 46.0 72.1Electric appliances f 449.0 558.9 .15 35.8 113.5Watches and clocks 152.0 160.2 .29 36.1 71.7Machinery components 114.6 127.2 .33 30.2 62.0Transformers 195.8 225.2 .26 38.3 87.6Railroad equipment f 204.8 202.4 .09 39.7 55.1Motor vehicles t 241.8 247.7 .23 44.0 90.0 
NOTE: All protection and subsidy rates pertain to sales on the domestic market and are based on the Corden convention. 
a. Nominal input protectic: - l-tsaij in the notation used in equations (10-2) and (10-3).b. Value added negative for exports at world market prices, Balassa measure only. 
c. Value added negative for exports at both world market and domestic prices. Balassa measure only. 
d. Value added negative for all sales in world market prices and export sales in domestic prices, both Balassa and Cordenmeasures. 
e. Value added negative for all sales in world market plices with Balassa measure, for export sales only with Corden 
measure, and export sales in domestic prices.f. Value added negative for all sales in world market prices and export sales in domestic prices. Balass measure only. 
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under the Balassa convention. The implication in thee cases, to which we 
return below, is that exports are sold at a loss. In five cases, total value added 
is negative in world market prices. We doubt the inference that production in 
these sectors was absolutely inefficient. Rather, in these sectors world-price
value added is very small and slight errors of measurement or aggregation can 
result i n a negative magnitude. Nominal protection rates were estimated from 
a sample of commodities that was too small to cover the whole range pro­
duced in any one of the 150 sectors. Input-output coefficients are aggregates
for the whole sector and do not necessarily apply to the spcific commodities 
whose prices were measured. 
Exports may in fact be sold at a loss by private producers if export of a 
particular commodity raises profits on domestic sales, or if, in the more ex­
treme case, exporting makes it possible to gain access to the profitable do­
mestic market. For example, credit availability, import licenses for inputs, and 
favorable tax treatment were dependent, through government policies, on 
export performance. In such cases, the true subsidy to exports includes at least 
a part of the profits realized on the domestic market, for these profits could not
be fully realized under the Korean system except by exporting. We have not 
tried to incorporate this phenomenon in our measure of effective incentives to 
export sales, though it does show up in the average incentives to the sector's 
total sales. Of the nine commodities with negative value added for exports in 
domestic prices, all were well protected in the domestic market. All except
photographic materials were import-competing products with exports less than 
4.0 percent of output. Photographic materials exports were 20.6 percent of 
output, but were also import competing. 
EFFECTIVE INCENTIVES AND RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION 
If high levels of effective incentives reflect high profit rates, then investment 
should flow toward those sectors with high effective incentives. This would 
show up either in rapid import substitution or rapid growth of exports for 
goods with high levels of effective incentives. On the other hand, if there is no 
correlation between effective incentives and growth of the ratio of imports to 
total supply or exports to total production, then effective incentic's are more 
likely to reflect relative inefficiency. Table 10-7 lists rank correlation coeffi­
cients between various measures of effective incentives and resource allocation. 
Neither the share of exports in total output nor growth contributions of 
exports are significantly related to effective protection. However, export trade 
shares ard growth contributions are significantly and positively related to ef­
fective rates of subsidy. This result is striking, for it demonstrates the impor­
tance of tax and credit preferences among the various export subsidies, and 
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TABLE 10-7
Rak CWowl Codkcigb itwee Eective
laneevme ai Reinure. Alocegn
 
Share oi Growth
 
Exports in Contribution
 
Output of Exports
 
1968 1960-68
 
Exports
 
Effective protection to exports

Balassa 
-. 16 
-. 15Corden 
-. 13 
-. 06Effective subsidy to exports

Balassa 

.29 
.26Corden 
.28 
.32 
Growth 
Share of Contribution 
Imports in of Import
Total Supply Substitution' 
1968 1960-68
 
Imports
 
Effective protection to domestic sales
Balassa 

.32 
-. 14Corden 
.32 
-. 15Effective subsidy to domestic sales
Balassa 

.40 
-. 14Corden 
.39 
-. 15 
NoTE: The correlations were obtained at the 117-sector level wheretime series data on resource allocation are available. Correlation cocflicien!3of greater than .16, .20, and .27 (in absolute value) are significant at the.10,
.05, and .01 levels under a two-tailed test. 
a.These are the contributions of import substitution to total growth ofthe sector. See Chapter 6 for an explanation. 
suggests that export incentives had a positive influence on the expansion of 
exports.
Imports prompt the opposite conclusion. Since the correlation betweenthe share of imports in total supply and effective incentives is significant andpositive, it suggests that import substitution had progressed the least in thosesectors where the level of effective incentives to domestic sales was high. Thecorrelations between effective incentives to domestic sales and growth contri­
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butions are not significant, though they are negative, which is what we would 
expect if imp-rt substitution had progressed the least in sectors where incen­
tives were la, ,. Thus, elfective subsidies to domestic sales seem to indicatd 
relative inefficiencies while effective subsidies to exports seem to indicate profit 
incentives. 
Tables 10-8 and 10-9 present data at the 117-sector level for the major
exporting and import-substituting sectors. The exporting sectors within manu­
facturing are those that contributed 
-t-ore than 1 percent to the growth of 
manufactured exports between 1960 and 1968. The exporting sectors within 
the primary group are those that contributed the most to the growth of primary
exports. Import-substituting sectors have been identified only within manu­
facturing and are those that crn':ibuted more than I percent of the total im­
port substitution contribution to manufacturing ouput growth. Because of 
rising import shares in other sectors, the import-substituting sectors accounted 
for well over three times the total import substitution that took place within 
manufacturing. Some sectors arc classified as both major export and major
import-substituting, and they are designated in the tables. 
The pattern discerned in the correlation analysis does not hold uniformly
for the major export and import-substituting sectors; nonetheless regu­some 
larity is discernible. Most of the exporting sectors received positive effective 
subsidies to exports; several received subsidies that were higher than average.
The effective subsidy to exports exceeded the subsidy to domestic saleF in 13
of the 19 manufacturing sectors (compare the export subsidy rate ,'ith the 
average in Tabl" 10-8). In the other 6 sectors, however, subsidies were biasedin favor of domestic sales. Given that exports were sometimes subsidized by
linking sales and various preferences in the profitable domestic market to ex­
port performance, the export effective subsidy rate in these cases probably
seriously understates the incentives to export activity. 
Our analysis does not prove that resource allocation was affected by
policy or that it was relatively efficient; it merely demonstrates that the avail­
able inform'--tion is reasonably consistent with these contentions. Incentives 
policies are only one of many forces that determine changes in economic 
structure. It is therefore somewhat surprising to find any correlation at all in 
the hypothesized direction. However, we cannot reject the counter-hypotheses
that these correlations merely reflect errors of measurement or are meaning­
less because our data do not really measure what needs to be measured. 
FACTOR INTENSITY OF TRADE 
It is diffit " to assemble evidence about the efficiency of Korea's rapid growth
that is co. isive. The preceding aralysis demonstrates that the level and dis­
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persion of incentives was relatively modest, but it does not prove that resource
allocation was cfficient. Here we investigate the quertion of cfficiency by using
an additional partial measure: the reiative factor intensity of Korea's exports
and imports. Apart from considerations of natural resource and labor skill
endowments, Korea's comparative advantage, at least within manufacturing,
should lie in exporting products that are labor intensive and in importing
goods that are capital intensive. 
Our analysis of the factor intensity of Korea's trade follows the pioneer­ing work of Leontief (1954). Using labor and capital input coefficients at the117-sector level for 1968, we have calculated the direct as well as the totalfactor input requirements associated with Korea's exports and imports.' 8 Totallabor and capital requirements include both direct and indirect labor and
capital requirements by sector per unit of production, export, or import. Theindirect factor requirements are determined by inverting the input-output
table for 1966 at the 117-sector level. 
Imports can be treated in two different ways. First, all imports can beclassified by one of the 117 sectors and capital :and labor requirements calcu­lated as if the imports were produced using the Korean sectoral coefficients.Second, clearly noncompeting imports, i.e., imports not produced in Korea,
can be excluded and remaining imports classified by sector." ' The results re­ported here include noncompeting imports, except for a few primary products
not found in Korea, in the bundle of imports that is considered to be replaced.This procedure facilitates comparisons over time, since the imports considered 
to be noncompetitive in the compilation of the tables changed from year to 
year. 
In the calculation of the total factor input coefficients, the matrix of inter­
mediate input coefficients includes the requirements for those inputs that were
actually imported. Certainly it does not make sense to calculate the factor
requirements to replace some imports without also assuming that intermediateimports would also be replaced. 2'1 If total factor input coefficients for imports
and exports are to be consistent, the same input-output matrix must be usedin both cases. This does mean, however, that calculation of the total factorinput coefficients relating to exports assumes that all intermediate inputquirements would 
re­
be produced domestically. Given that some imports ofintermediate inputs were related to export production, our calculations over­
state the "actual" total factor employments associated with export activity.21 
For those years for which detailed input-output statistics are available,Table 10-10 exhibits the average direct and total capital and labor ratios for 
exports and imports of primary and manufactured products separately as well 
as for total imports and exports (including services and social overhead). For purposes of comparison, the comparable input coefficients for domestic pro­
duction are also shown. 
Sector 

Primary sectors-Total 
of which: 
Metallic ores 
Nonmetallic mimerals 
Industrial crops 
Fishing 
Total for sectors listed 
Manufacturing sectors-Total 
of which: 
Silk yarn 
Knit products 
Misc. metal products 
TABLE 10-8 
Eflectve Incenves to lajer Export Sector, 
(percent) 
Share in Total 
Export Output Share of ExportsG-owth Growth in Output 
1960-68 1960-68 1960 1968 
2.7 26.4 3.7 2.5 
1.7 .3 67.4 70.5 
1.0 .9 23.8 15.9 
1.0 1.7 4.8 6.1 
.9 2.7 11.0 6.3 
4.6 5.6 
97.3 73.6 2.6 11.4 
.
 
4.4 .6 48.4 83.7 
13.0 1.9 .0 57.8 
1.4 
.2 .8 25.7 
1968 
GrowthotRate

Contributionn 
1.2 
78.0 
13.6 
6.8 
3.7 
15.1 
90.1 
78.7 
74.3 
Export 
-2.7 
2.8 
2.8 
-39.3 
11.9 
12.4 
-5.2 
3.1 
8.4 
Effectiv 
Subsidy 
t. 
Average 
20.9 
-. 1 
-4.2 
3.5 
1.8 
-6.5 
-7.4 
9.8 
-1.8 
Other fabrics 5.1 
.8 .0Other manufactured products. 8.9 1.5 
36.2 72.8 20.0 1.113.0 59.0 69.0Lumber and plywoode 19.3 3.8 3.8 21.8
.7 42.6 57.6Processed seafoods 94.7 -6.65.1 1.4 17.4 33.6Worsted and woolen fabrics 42.0 -. 7 -57.21.1 
.3 
.2 10.6 39.7Apparel and acessoriese 11.3 3.3 -9.0 -2.31.1 29.7 39.4Electronics 7.9 -24.73.4 1.0 3.9 37.5 37.6Rubber products .3 62.83.7 1.2 5.5 22.5 34.0 
.6Misc. textile productse -- 44.62.0 
.7 8.5 24.8 32.0 1.8Rope and fishing netse 24.81.3 
.5 6.6 22.7 25.9 21.1 
-11.8Slaughtering, meat and dairy
products 
 2.1 1.1 
.5 10.0 22.2Cotton fabrics 28.2 -8.32.1 1.1 9.2 15.7 21.7Electric equipmentc 350.4 298.41.2 
.7 6.4 19.9 20.8t Cemente 22.9 155.51.4 1.7 1.2 8.2 9.2Processed tobaccoc 7.1 -13.42.3 4.5 
.1 4.5 5.9Petroleum productsc 1.9 6.1 18.5 -38.8
.0 3.7 3.7 2.1 -69.8Total for sectorv listed 91.0 32.4 
a.Sectors appear in order of the contribution of exports to :heir growth; see Chapter 6 for an explanation.b. According to the Balassa convention. 
c. Both a major export and a major import-substituting sector because of aggregation. 
Sector 
Manufacturing sectors 
Fertilizers 
Petroleum products 
Sewing machines 
Misc. electrical equipment
Hemp and flax yarns 
Electrical products 
Drugs 
Steel ingots 
Paper and paperboard 
Basic inorganic chemicals 
Cosmetics and toothpaste 
TABLE 10-9 
Efffetive Iceudves to Major Import-Sabomuaf Sedn, 1%98 
Share of Sector in: 
Import Sub- Growth Share of 
stitution of Manu- Imports in 
in Manu- factured Total Import Sub- Effectivefacturings Output Supply Contribu- Subsidy Rati#1960-68 1960-68 1960 1968 tiona Domestic Average
100.0 100.0 22.4 25.3 3.2 
-8.9 
-6.558.3 2.4 96.5 41.7 76.3 46.5 47.0133.1 8.2 1C.O 6.0 51.5 -73.1 
-69.83.2 .3 59.4 31.7 41.0 4.9 4.28.1 .7 58.0 7.2 34.9 -822.6 
-802.91.3 . 47.5 
.6 32.9 181.0 179.15.2 .5 64.9 13.4 31.6 82.6 78.418.5 2.0 36.9 14.3 28.8 
-36.4 
-36.311.0 1.3 28.8 7.4 26.5 -29.1 
-29.19.7 1.2 34.5 9.1 25.0 4.2 4.23.1 .5 51.3 42.1 21.8 32.8 32.32.8 
.4 60.0 1.8 21.8 3.0 3.0 
Cast and forged steel 4.2 .6 4.0 20.5Other manufactured products" 11.4 2.0 
26.0 
-17.3 
-17.278.3 21.4 19.7 47.4 21.8Refined sugar 1.4 38.6 19.9Electrical equipment" 
7.4 17.0 -50.6 
-49.34.3 .9 82.5 61.4 15.7 160.8 155.5Cemente 8.6 2.3 9.8 3.8Grain milling 11.6 -15.1 -13.48.6 2.5 5.9 6.0 11.2 -13.3 
-13.3Steel sheet and bars 6.8 2.1 48.3 48.7 10.3 1451.6 1592.8Rope and fishing netse 2.2 .7 12.7 6.4 9.3 
-20.2 
-11.8Glass products 1.6 .7 29.0 10.9 6.6 ­ 6.4 -15.9Misc. textile productse 2.0 1.0 11.7 2.9 6.4 31.7Apparel and accessories e 24.88.3 4.5 9.0 1.2 5.9 -37.5Other paper products 2.1 -24.71.2 14.3 5.5 5.6 -10.7Other clay and stone products 1.2 .7 -10.411.7 3.2 5.5Processed tobacco" -2 1.8 -21.25.7 6.1 7.3 .1 3.0 
-42.4 
-38.8t, Coal products 1.3 1.9 1.3 2.2 45.4Lumber and plywoode 1.7 5.2 2.6 
.0 45.4 
.4 1.0 
-46.6 
-6.6Total 332.7 51.4 
a. Sectors appear in order of the contribution of import substitution to their growth; see Chapter 6 for an explanation.b. According to the Balassa convention. 
c. Both a major export and a major import-substituting sector because of aggregation. 
TABLE 10-10
 
Factor lomdiy of Trade
 
Labor 
(thousand man-years 
per billion won of 
output measured in 
1965 constant 
domestic prices) 
Capitala 
(ratio of capital 
to output) 
Labor--Apipta Ratio& 
(thousand man-years per billion 
won of capital in world prices) 
1960 1968 1960 1968 1960 1963 1966 1968 
Direct factor requirements 
Primary products
Domestic output 
Expc-s 
Imports 
10.86 
7.54 
11.06 
10.74 
6.27 
11.28 
.65 
.92 
.67 
.63 
1.10 
.73 
16.60 
8.19 
16.58 
17.20 
6.89 
15.91 
17.08 
6.15 
16.13 
17.16 
5.69 
15.48 
Manufactured products
Domestic output 
Exports 
Imports 
Total factor requirements 
1.63 
1.87 
1.29 
1.53 
1.89 
1.54 
.55 
.69 
.62 
.58 
.53 
.66 
2.97 
2.72 
2.09 
2.89 
3.02 
1.93 
2.67 
3.24 
1.98 
2.64 
3.55 
2.33 
Primary products
Exports 
Imports 
9.84 
12.99 
8.29 
13.06 
1.49 
1.08 
1.73 
1.16 
6.55 
11.99 
5.75 
11.50 
5.13 
11.90 
4.81 
11.30 
Manufactured products
Exports 
Imports 
7.89 
5.06 
7.91 
5.56 
2.11 
1.84 
1.83 
2.03 
3.74 
2.77 
3.71 
2.40 
4.09 
2.40 
4.29 
2.74 
a. Capital includes inventories and is measured in world prices; output is measured in constant 1965 domestic prices. 
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In every observation ear, manufactured exports had higher direct andtotal labor-capital ratios than did manufactured imports. On the other hand,primary exports were more capital intensive than primary imports. A large
share of Korea's primary exports are capital-intensive minerals, whereas
minerals are only a small share of primary imports. Primary imports includo 
a large share of labor-intensive agricultural products.
Even though there wu a steady fall in the direct labor intensity of manu­facturing production, the composition of Korea's manufactured exports shiftedfrom 1960 to 1968 so as to increase the oaiect labor-capital ratio in manu­factured exports by approximately 30 percent. Korea's manufactured exports 
were less labor intensive than average manufacturing in 1960, but far morelabor intensive by 1968. The direct labor intensity of manufactured imports
was less than that of manufacturing production throughout the period. Thetotal labor-capital ratio for Korea's maufactured imports declined slightlybetween 1960 and 1968. Thus, at the same time that Korea's manufactured 
exports were becoming more labor intensive, her manufactured imports weretending to become a bit more capital intensive. The result was that in 1960, thetotal labor-capital ratio in manufactured exports was 35 percent higher thanthat in manufactured imports; by 1968, the ratio was more than 56 percent 
higher. 
The total labor intensity of exports was greater than the direct labor in­tensity. That is, intermediate products produced for export industries havebeen even more labor intensive than the direct production of the exports
themselves. 
VALUATION OF OUTPUT AND GROWTH
 
RATES AT 
WORLD MARKET
 
AND DOMESTIC PRICES
 
In order to use the input-output tables of 1955, 1960, 1963, 1966, andfor calculating contributions to growth, they 
1968 
were deflated to both constant
1965 domestic market prices and 
world market prices. At constant worldprik.s, the compound annual growth rates between 1955 and 1968 for pri­
mary, manufactured, and total commodity output were 5.5, 14.0, and 9.8percent. These growth rates are almost identical with those obtained when 
constant domestic prices are used as aggregation weights. This result is note­
worthy: similar comparisons in other countries have shown that the growth
rate in constant domestic prices often exceeds the rate of growth in constant
world market prices. 22 Growth rates are usually much higher when constantdomestic prices are used because it is usually !he highly protected sectors,i.e., those with high domestic prices relative to world market prices, that are 
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the fastest growing. In Korea, rates of protection were not very high and the
relatively more protected sectors did not grow very much more rapidly thanthe less proetecd. hat growth rmtes are nearly identical and very high,
whether measured in domestic or international prices, suggests that Korea'sgrowth hus been relatively efficient if world market prices are taken to reflect true opportunity costs and domestic prices represent real marfnal utilities.=Our figures also show one other respect in which the Korean economy
stands out: revaluation in worlk prices generally raises the contribution of theprimary sectors to total growth because these sectors are usually less protected
than manufacturing. In Korea, however, primary activity has received moreprotection than manufacturing (both nominal and effective), so that revalua­tion increases (if only slightly) the relative contribution of manufacturing.
The contribution of the primary sectors to the growth of total commodity out­put between 1955 and 1960 was 26.3 percent in constant domestic prices
and 25.0 percent in constant world prices. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Effective protection or subsidy rates may indicate either excess profits or grossinefficiency. If rates are low, however, they leave little room for much of either.
Tfie low average incentive rates and the relatively small dispersion in SouthKorea are presumptive evidence that Korean development has been efficient.This hypothesis is buttressed by other data. Domestic prices and inter­
national prices differ so little that the growth rate of the economy remains 
very high when measured by constant world prices instead of by domesticprices. Thus Korea's growth cannot be regarded as spurious in the sense thatgrowth was dominated by the inefficient production of overpriced goods.The emphasis in South Korea has been on the expansion of labor-intensive
manufactured exports. Of course, if all considerations of natural resource bias,labor skills, infant industries, and risk and uncertainty are taken into account,
it may have been more advantageous for South Korea to take a much differentpath. Nevertheless, the presumption is strong that a poor country like SouthKorea has acomparative advantage in labor-intensive expansion. Thus all the
evidence taken together suggests that South Korea has followed the path of 
efficicncy. 
NOTES 
I. This chapter summarizes a more extensive report on our investigation, pub­lished in Westphal and Kim (1974). That report discusses both methodology and resultsinfar greater detail. 
217 NOTES 
2. The world market price isexpressed illterms of domestic curency at the pre.vailing exchange rate. Note that this formula implies that nominal protection is equiva.lent. from a resource allocation point of view, to an actual tariff rate, were it to heimposed at the same level. As Rhagwati (19611 has shown, this is not always true wheremarkets are imperfect. In fact, when domestic production or quolas are monopolized,the nominal rate tends to be greater than the equivalent tariff. Thus our nominal pro­tection rates may be overestimates of the protective effects of QR, in an equivalent tariffsense. See also Shibata (1968) and Bhagwati (1968).3. As used here, legal and nominal tariffs correspond to the explicit and implicittariffs defined in Appendix A.4. This formula assumes all intermediate inputs are tradables.5.Ray (1973)
den method, (2) analyzes three different ways of measuring protection: (I) the Cor­whit Ray calls the Balassa method but is actually :,method tsed onlyin earlier writings of Balassa (e.g., 1963). and (3) what Ray calls the Scottsee Balassa 
measure but is actually th.:
measure used in more recent writings by Halassa. See Balassitand Associates (1971).

significance for 
Ray shows that the Scott (i.e., late Balassa) method has limited
resource allocation and that the Corden measure has even somewhatmore significance. In this study we use these two methods only.
An alernative to both the Balassa and Corfen 
measures of effective protection is ameasure called the domestic resource cost (DRC) of foreign exchange, which is eitherearned through exports or saved through domestic production. This measure, developedindependently by Bruno (1972) and Krueger (1972) attempts to calculate the real do­mestic resource cost of value added domestically for any particular product. It requiresthe calculation of shadow prices of domestic inputs, an exercise which we have not at­
tempted here.6. See Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973), Bruno (1973), and Ramaswami and Srini­
vasan (1970).
7. The adjusted value added so measured is an estimate of what value added in thesector would have been if there were no tax and credit preferences and net factor returnswere unaltered from their actual valhe under the incentives policies.8. For a definition of the wastage allowance, see Chapter 4.9. The survey was jointly financed by USAID, Korea Mission, and the EconomicPlanning Board, Republic of Korea, to whom we are grateful. %%-stphal and Kim (1974),
Annex Table I, presents the full results of the price comparison survey after necessary
adjustments by the authors. 
10. Figures were averaged by using domestic sales flows in world market prices as

weights.
1I. For comparisons with other countries. see Halassa and Associates (1971).12. Theoretically one would expect tariff redundancy only in products for which
there were no imports at all. Empirically, however, "products" 
are aggregations of sev­eral product lines and prices and tariffs are averages of the aggregates.
13. Positive nominal protection on nontradables is due to protection on inputs totheir production and to indirect taxes levied on their sale, even to exporters. 
to 8.4 percent of the total value of 
14. Total export subsidies in 1968 amounted
commodity exports. This figure excludes tariff and indirect tax exemptions, as these arenot subsidies in relation to prices at world market values. Direct tax subsidies were 1.1percent of total commodity exports while interest subsidies were 4.5 percent.15. These statements hold equally whether one uses the Balassa or Corden measuresof effective incentives. The rank correlations between Balassa and Corden estimates inevery particular case are very high, always well above .95.16. Negative rates of effective protection and subsidy less than - 100.0 in algebraic 
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value occur where value added inworld market prices Is negative, i.e., where the world
value of inputs exceeds that of the output. They thus indicate absolute inefficiency, as. 
suining thee are no errors of measurement. See Guisinger (1969).
17. Legal tariff rates, in fact, exhibit a pattern of positive escalation, that is, tariffs
rie with the stae of processing. Nominal protection rates, which are the relevant mes­
sores, do not exhibit positive escalation except in some cases.18. For estimates of the sectoral labor coefficients. we have relied upon the labor 
Input coefficient estimates provided along with the Bank of Korea's 1966 input-outputtable (Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1969, p. 383, Labor CoefficientsBased on Workers). These data are given at the 43-sector level only; we have assumed 
that the same labor input coefficient pertains to all of the sectors at the 117 level that
comprise a single sector at the 43.sector level. For estimates of the capital-output ratios 
we have relied upon Kee Chun Han's (1969) exhaustive retabulation of the 1968National Wealth Survey. By virtue of the estimation method, the capital-output ratiosfor the manufacturing sectors give marginal rather than average input coefficients. None­
theless, for estimates of average capital-output ratios in 1968, they are considered
superior to the average ratios obtained from the National Wealth Survey. We experi­
mente, i ,, , .veral other sets of capital-output ratio estimates; the basic conclusions are 
not seasitave to the set of estimates employed. Conatant 1965 price input-output data onproduction, exports, and imports were used to calculate factor input requirements. The factor input coefficients were deflated to obtain the proper input coeffi-.lnts per billion 
won of output in 1965 prices. The 1966 117-sector input-output matrix, deflated to 1965prices, was used to obtain total factor input requirements. We have omitted real estate
and ownership of dwellings, iron scrap, and other scrap from the calculation of input
requirements.
19. Details on these and related methodological issues and computational results 
are available from the authors. 
20. Estimates of input-output coefficients for noncompetitively imported intermediateinputs are not directly available from the original input-output tables. We applied a 
simple method of proportional estimation by row and column sums to estimate these 
coefficients. 
21. Calculations of the factor intensity of exports based on the input-output tablefor domestically produced inputs are given in Hong (1973). His results concerning the 
relative factor intensities of exports and imports are consistent with ours. 
22. See Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1970), pp. 70-76 and Balassa and Associates(1971), pp. 32-34. These authors examine GDP growth rates rather than total com­
modity output growth rates and use effective protection measures for a single year todeflate value added to constant world market prices rather than nominal protection
measures for a single year to deflate output; otherwise the calculations are quite similar.
23. See Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) for a discussion of the implications of measur­
ing growth rates at domestic or international prices. 
Chapter 11 
An @vv 
In the preceding chapters we have examined the history and the complex de­tails of foreign exchange and trade policy and have discussed quantitative
measures of the effects of these policies on efficiency and growth. In this
chapter we evaluate the influence of .uth Korea's economic growth on cm­ployment and income distribution. We also assess the main factors at workin the rapid growth of the South Korean economy since the early 1960s, par­ticularly the role of foreign exchange and trade policy, by drawing as much aspossible on our previous analysis. Then after summarizing the lessons of the 
two liberalization episodes, we shall caution against hasty generalizations
from the South Korean experience. 
EFFECTS OF GROWTH ON EMPLOYMENT 
The rapid growth of the Korean economy was documented in Chapter 2. Be­fore discussing the causes of this performance, however, it is appropriate to
analyze its effects on employment and income distribution. 
In fact, the rapid growth of the 1960s was accompanied by a steady de­
clitie in the rate of unemployment, particularly ia the nonfarm sector (Table11-1). In addition, the nonfarm proportion of the population was steadily
rising, exceeding 50 percent by 1970. At til, same time, farm population de­
clined not only relatively but also absolutely from a peak of 16.1 million 
in 1967 to a low of 14.4 million in 1970. 
Unemployment declined because job opportunities in the nonagricultural 
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TABLE 11-I
 
Fom aM Nohan. Populmal amd Uiemploymwea, 1957 to 1972
 
N'-nfarm Nonfarm 
Pop~ulation HouseholdFarm Nonfarm as Percent Unemploy- Unemploy-
Population Population of Total ment Rate ment Rate (millions) (millions) Population (percent) (percent)
 
1957 13.6 9.4 40.8 5.9 na 
1958 13.8 9.9 41.8 6.2 na1959 14.1 10.2 41.8 5.8 na 
1960 14.6 10.5 42.0 7.5 na
 
1961 14.5 11.4 43.9 7.9 na1962 15.1 11.5 43.3 8.3 na 
1963 15.3 12.0 44.1 8.2 16.4 
1964 15.6 12.4 44.5 7.7 14.4
1965 15.8 12.8 44.8 7.4 13.5 
1966 15.8 13.5 46.0 7.1 12.8 
1967 16.1 13.8 46.1 6.2 11.1 
1968 15.9 14.5 47.8 5.1 8.9 
1969 15.6 15.4 49.7 4.8 7.8
 
1970 14.4 17.1 54.3 
 4.5 7.4
1971 14.7 17.4 54.2 4.5 7.4
 
1972 14.7 18.0 55.1 4.5 7.5
 
NOTE: na-not available. Since the coverage and method of labor force survey
changed in 1963, the labor force statistics available for the period prior to 1963 were
consistent with those for the later period. All 
not 
data other than total population given in
this table for 1960-62 were therefore estimated by linking the old survey data with the 
new data (two different survey results were available for 1963).SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Econonic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, p.6; Economic Plan­
ning Board, Major Economic Indicators, July 1973, p.96; Economic Planning Board,
Korea Statistical Yearbook. various issues prior t,1964. 
sectors rapidly increased. Table 11-2 shows that the rate of growth of popula­
tion dropped steadily throughout the 1960s. From a high of 3.2 percent per
annum in 1961, it declined to 1.8 percent by 1970. The growth of the totallabor force, however, showed a fairly high rate of increase from 1960 to1972, although there were ups and downs reflecting moderate changes inparticipation rates. The farm labor force has declined since 1965, decreasing 
at a rate of 2.1 percent in 197 1. 
Job opportunities expanded rapidly, particularly in the manufacturing
sector, the leading sector of the economy (Table 11-3). At the same time,
growth in manufacturing stimulated rapid increases in output and employ­
ment in other nonagricultural sectors. 
TABLE 11-2 
Population and Labor Force Growth, 1960 to 1972 
GrowthGrowth Rate of Growth Growth GrowthRate Popu- Popu- Rate of Rate of Non-Total of Total Rate oflation lation Total Total Farm Farm farm Nonfa; .nPopu- Popu- 14 Years 14 Years Labor Labor Labor Labo. Labor Laborlation lation and Older and Older Force Force Force Force(millions) (percent) (millions) (percent) Force Force(millions) (percent) (millions) (percent) (millions) (percent)
1960 24.70 
- 14.16 
- 7.74 
- 4.93 
- 2.821961 25.50 ­3.2 14.50 2.4 7.94 2.6 4.85 -1.6 3.11 10.31962 26.23 2.9 14.85 2.4 8.15 2.7 5.06 4.4 3.101963 -0.326.99 2.9 15.09 1.6 8.34 2.3 5.09 0.6 3.251964 27.68 5.02.6 15.50 2.7 8.45 1.3 5.17 1.6 3.281965 28.33 2.4 15.94 2.8 0.9 8.86 4.9 5.23 1.2 3.631966 28.96 10.72.2 16.37 2.7 9.07 2.4 5.28 0.1 3.79 4.41967 29.54 2.0 16.76 2.4 9.30 2.5 5.20 -1.5 4.101968 30.17 2.1 17.17 8.22.5 9.65 3.8 5.26 1.2 4.391969 30.74 7.11.9 17.64 2.7 9.88 2.4 5.26 0.0 4.63 5.51970 31.30 1.8 18.25 3.5 10.20 3.2 5.20 -1.1 5.00 8.01971 31.85 1.8 18.98 4.0 10.54 3.3 5.09 
-2.1 5.45 9.01972 32.42 1.8 19.72 3.9 11.06 4.9 5.41 6.3 5.65 3.7 
SOURCE: Economic Planning Board. Annual Report on the Economically Active Population. 1972; Major Economic Indicators, July 1973,p. 96; and Korea StatisticalYearbook, various issues. 
TABLE 11-3
 
Employmut, Emuinlp amd Ouu Ia Nourk r Se. 1957 1972
 
Non-
Value agricl-
Monthly Employ-, Rate ofs Added in tural Rate of 
Earnings Seoul ment in Growth Manu- Growth Rate ofs Value Growth 
of Pro- Con- Rate of Manufac- of facturing of Growth Added of Non­
duction sumer Price Growth turing Employ- (billions Value Non- of Non- (billions agricul-
Workers Price Deflated of Price (thou- ment of won Added agricul- agricul- of won tural 
in Manu- Index Earnings Deflated sands in Manu- constant in tural tural constant Value 
facturing (1970 '1970 Earnings of facturing 1970 Manufac- Employ- Employ- 1970 Added (won) =100) prices) (percent) persons) (percent) prices) turing ment ment prices) (percent) 
1957 2,030 26.1 7,778 - 409 - 94.65 - 2,086 - 564.29 ­
1958 2,170 25.3 8,577 10.3 413 0.9 103.25 9.1 1,946 -6.7 589.03 4.4 
1959 2,350 26.4 6,902 3.8 456 10.5 112.78 9.2 1,938 -0.4 635.80 7.91960 2,330 28.6 8,147 8.5 438 -4.0 122.00 8.2 2,149 10.9 663.15 4.3 
!961 2,610 30.9 8,447 3.7 446 1.8 125.79 3. 1 2,547 18.5 662.28 -0.1
1962 2,780 32.9 8,450 0 511 14.5 142.34 13.2 2,580 1.3 728.81 10.1 
1963 3,180 39.7 8,010 -5.2 610 19.3 166.96 17.3 2,825 9.5 796.26 9.3 
1964 3,880 51.4 7,549 -5.8 637 4.4 177.86 6.5 2,974 5.3 827.40 3.9 
1965 4,600 58.4 7,877 4:3 772 21.2 213.35 20.0 3,396 14.2 927.05 12.0 
1966 5,420 65.4 8,287 5.2 833 7.9 249.87 17.1 3,547 4.5 1,051.27 13.4 
1967 6,640 72.5 9,159 10.5 1,021 22.6 306.77 22.8 3,906 10.1 1,218.23 15.9 
1968 8,400 80.6 10,422 13.8 1,170 14.6 389.67 27.0 4,354 11.5 1,437.04 18.0
1969 11,270 88.7 12,706 21.9 1,232 5.3 473.03 21.4 4,589 5.4 1,669.01 16.11970 14,561 100.0 14,561 14.6 1,284 4.2 560.01 18.4 4,829 5.2 1,864.67 11.7 
1971 17,349 112.3 15,449 6.1 1,336 4.1 659.21 17.7 5,190 7.5 2,078.36 11.5 
1972 20,104 125.6 16,006 3.6 1,445 8.2 762.79 15.7 5,213 0.4 2,262.70 8.9 
SouRcE: Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues: Economic Planning Board, KoreaStatisticalYearbook, various iue. 
a. Since the coverage and method of labor force survey changed in 1963, the labor force statistics available for the period prior to 1963 
were not consistent with those for the later period. All data other than total population given in this table for 1960-62 were therefore 
estimated by linking the old survey data with the new data (two different survey results were available for 1963). 
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Growth in employment opportunities in manufacturing was rapid mainlybecause of large increases in investment and output which created a demand 
for workers. The growth in output was achieved through labor-intensive meth­
ods. In many other countries rapid growth in manufacturing output is accom­
panied by a rapid increase in labor productivity because of a trend toward 
more capital-intensive methods. In Korea, by contrast, manufacturing em­
ployment grew very rapidly between 1957 and 1967, at 9.6 percent per an­
num, while labor productivity lagged behind at an annual rate of increase of
about 2.6 percent. From 1967 to 1972, however, productivity increased much 
more, at an average of 11.9 percent per annum. These changes were a function
of variations in the growth in real wages. In 1959, real monthly cainings of
manufacturing workers reached a peak of 8,902 won in terms of 1970 prices(Table 11-3). By 1964 real monthly earnings had declined to 7,549 wonbut they began to rise again in 1965. After surpassing the 1959 level in 1967,
they registered spectacular growth until 1970. This increase continued, though
at a somewhat slower rate, until 1972. By 1971, the 1964 level of earnings
had doubled. The rapid growth in real wages since 1967 was the result of in­
creasing tightness in the labor market and shortages of skilled labor. In con­
trast to the earlier period 1957 to 1967, it was correlated with much more
rapid increases in labor productivity and slower growth in employment. Be­
tween 1967 and 1972, the growth rate of employment dropped to 7.2 percent 
a year.
Even though manufacturing employment grew less rapidly after 1967, the 
rate of growth from 1957 to 1972 averaged 8.8 percent per annum. Mean­
while, total nonagricultural employment increased by 6.3 percent per annum. 
One reason for this good performance was the government's willingness to
allow wage rates to be set by competitive forces. Labor was not thoroughly
unionized nor did the govrnment press for minimum wages. Nonagricultural 
wages more accurately reflected the opportunity cost of labor in the tradi­
tional agricultural sector than they do in the typical less developed country
where government policies combined with union pressures keep wages in the
modern sector artificially high. Furthermore, by permitting the South Korean 
price structure to remain largely consistent with world prices, the government
provided incentives to concentrate production in labor-intensive exports andhome goods and to import capital-intensive goods rather than to substitute 
for imports. Labor absorption was rapid, at least until the very late 1960s
when labor shortages began to appear and wages started to rise very rapidly. 
GROWTH AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
Though it is difficult to determine the effect of South Korea's rapid growth onincome distribution, bits and pieces of evidence suggest that the distribution 
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hb 
 been quite even. In fact surveys reveal that among Korean households 
expenditure on Con-umption tends to be more nearly equal than it is else­
where in the world and that from 1964 to 1970 this distribution seemed toimprove.5 
Farm incomes are a notable case in point, thanks to a land reform that 
was begun under the U.S. military occupation and completed by the Korean 
government in 1949. The net result seems to be a remarkably even division
of land and income. Nor is there much disparity between farm and nonfarm 
income as the following table shows:2 
Avergc
Average Monthly Wage 
Monthly for 
Wage for Manufacturing 
Farm Produ,:tion 
Workers Workers 
(won) (won) 
1961 1,978 2,610 
1964 3,657 3,880 
1968 7,383 8,400 
1971 13,432 17,349 
Though manufacturing wages have generally been higher than farm wages,
the cost of living is probably lower in the country where farm workers often 
till their own vegetable gardens. Of course most farm work is seasonal, but 
ev 
'i so Korea appears to be free of the large differences between rural and 
urban income typical of other less developed countries. 
This impression is reinforced by data on average farm household income.: ,
Farm income and manufacturing wages can be compared as follows:4 
Annual 
Average Total Farm Houehold Manufacturing
Farm Household Income per Wage Income 
Income (won) Worker (won) (won) 
1964 125,692 56,618 46,560 
1968 178,959 87,297 100,800 
1971 356,382 179,990 208,128 
Total farm income, including income in kind, far exceeds annual wage income 
of production workers in manufacturing, but farm income per worker was 
somewhat greater than nonfarm income per worker in 1964, a good agricul­
tural year. In 1968 and 1971 farm income per worker was probably a bit less 
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than the average manufacturing wage. Even if these calculations are only
very rough, they lead to the same conclusion that rural-urban income dispari­
ties are small. 
Wages in nonagricultural sectors have tended to follow manufacturing 
wages. Market forces set the rates and because there are no great imperfec­
tions in the market disparities between sectors do not arise. In Korea where 
vast pools of the unemployed and the underemployed are unknown, the work­
ing class, both urban and rurdl, which forms the great bulk of the population,
lives on an income that is .iearly uniform. If data on income distribution were 
available they would probably show that ever the conspicuous wealth of a few 
entrepreneurs in Seoul is not enough to reverse the apparent pattern. 
FACTORS PROMOTING RAPID GROWTH 
The South Korean economy has not suffered from any constant deficiency in
effective demand. Except for 1958-61 and 1964 when effective demand was
restrained by either deflationary monetary and fiscal policy or by political
turmoil, investment demand since the Korean War has tended to be excessive
relative to the supply of savings, and inflation has been acute. The rate of re­
turn on investment has tended to be high as may be inferred from the large
demand for loanable funds that persisted despite very high interest rates after1965. Borrowing at these high rates increased continually throughout most of
the period from 1963 to 1971 and finder's fees for loans were common. Al­
though many bank loans were subsidized in one way or another and the aver­
age interest paid on them was probably only about two-thirds the official rate,
marginal borrowers had to pay the high rates which indicates that the rate of 
return ont marginal investments was at least as great. This inference is cor­
roborated by direct measurements. For example. Gilbert Brown has estimated
from national accounts data that the average rate of return 
on new investment 
was 20 to 30 percent. He also cites direct estimates based on data from elevenfirms that in late 1965 the average rate of return was about 28 percent.,
The South Korean economy has exhibited the characteristics that theory
would predict for an underdeveloped country where labor is abundant and
capital scarce-a high rate of return on capital, vigorous investment demand,
and meager investable resources. The main constraints on growth are savings
and foreign exchange. The factors that foster rapid growth are those that sus­
tain and complement heavy investment demand, those that increase the requi­
site supply of savings, those that earn the foreign exchange needed when the 
level of effective demand is high, and, finally, those that foster efficient resource
allocation, evidenced by a very low incremental capital-output ratio. The com­bination of these four factors produces a result that tends to be self-sustaining; 
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for rapid growth stimulates demand in nearly all netors of the economy. Asinvestment proves ever more profitable, an accelerator effect comes into play.Growth generates still more growth and in the consequent enthusiasm, pre­dictable setbacks turn out to be temporary as entrepreneurs become convinced
that the reumption of growth is inevitable. 
In addition to these factors, which in varying decs influence the growthof most developing countries, there are some that are peculiar to Korea.Though they have not yet been analyzed in any detail, they ought to be men­tioned for they contributed to a favorable environment for investors andhelped sustain brisk investment demand. For example, the work force inKorea is highly educated by the standards of most less developed countries.In 1970 the adult literacy rate was 88 percent,6 and the proportion of primaiy­
school-age children attending primary school was 97 percent.TA highly edu­
cated work force, it might be argued, was more easily trained and was a factorin the high levels of efficiency and productivity achieved. 
South Korea also has an abundant supply of entrepreneurial and mana­gerial expertise. Although very few Koreans became managers under theJapanese colonial regime, it did not take them long to develop a managerial
class after the liberation. A large proportion of them immigrated from NorthKorea, but many of the most successful entrepreneurs are of southern origin.No significant number of managers and entrepreneurs are foreign. Foreign di­
rect investment has been exceedingly small, only about 7.4 percent of total
-reign investments and loans between 1959 and 1971.8 
Another advantage favoring Korea's economic development was the poli­tical stability that prevailed during the period of most rapid growth. ParkChung Hee has made economic development the symbol of his government'slegitimacy.' His efforts have been aided by Korea's cultural homogeneity. Dis­putes over language and among ethnic groups have not beep important in 
South Korean politics.
South Korean development has also benefited from the weakness of thelabor movement which so far has produced few powerful, organizcd unions.In the Korean system of industrial organization, which in many ways is simi­lar to the Japanese, employees tend to remain with one firm for life, loyal totheir paternalistic employers. Because the labor force is docile and unaccus­tomed to collective bargaining, upward piessure on wages is negligible except
when manpower is scarce. Stabl. real wage rates helped to keep profits high
and to stimulate investment demand. 
Finally, ties with Japan encouraged growth. Although their colonial re­gine was cxtremely unpopular, the Japanese did manage to build a strongindustrial base in Korea before the war. Much of it was destroyed during the 
war, and the subsequent departure of Japanese managers was temporarily
crippling. Nevertheless, the Japanese had shown that industrialization was 
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possible in Korea and they had provided an example for the Koreans to imi­
tate. Imitation seemed all the more sensible since the Japanese, who had an 
economy of their own to rebuild, appeared to know how tie job should be 
done. Accordingly, the Koreans adopted the technology, the approach to labor 
relations, the expansionary psychology, and many of the government policiesthat had worked so well for the fapanese. As a result, the emphasis on export
promotion, the system of trade and foreign exchange controls, and the close 
cooperation between the public and private sectors that are reputed to be
characteristic of Japan alone are typical of South Korea as well. 
Investment demand, however voracious, cannot by itself sustain economic 
development. It must be matched by a rate of savings that is high enough tofinance the investments desired. Ample foreign exchange is also important,
for shortages can restrict realized investint by curtailing the supply of im­
ported raw materials and capital goods. And if inefficiencies in productk ,n go uncorrected, an economy can suffer from progressive debility. Havi.,ig
analyzed these issues in the preceding chapters, we shall now present our 
conclusions. 
SUPPLY OF SAVINGS 
The supply of savings, both domestic and foreign, was abundant during the 
1960s but not large enough to satisfy total investment demand because of aninflationary gap that has persisted throughout most of the period since 1963. 
Foreign Savings. 
We noted in Chapter 7 that foreign savings have remained about 10 per­
cent of GNP since 1960 (Table 7-4), while over the years their nature has 
changed. In the post-Korean War period, most foreign savings took the form
of foreign aid gants from the United Nations and from U.S. bilateral assis­
tance programs. In the early 1960s, foreign aid loans began to replace grants
and then, from 1966 onwards, commercial loans from a variety of countries 
became the dominant source. 
In Chapter 7, we estimated that foreign savings might have been respon­
sible for about 4 percent of total growth, assuming the average capital-output
ratio between 1960 and 1970 was about 2.5. That is, what appeared to be 
an annual growth rate of 10 percent might have been closer to 6 percent with­
out the contribution of foreign savings. By the early 1970s, foreign savings had 
declined in importance for two reasons. Domestic savings were becomhig more plentiful and because the capital-output ratio has tended to increase, growth 
per dollar of imported capital had apparently deteriorated. 
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Large importation of foreign capital led to heavy debt service by 1970Sinm 1971 the burden has become less onerous. 
Foreign cosmerc1ii borrowing probably was exceisive in the late 1960s,A divergence between social opportunity costs and the private costs of for.Sip capital made foreign borrowing more attractive than it should have been.The government originally encouraged all forms of foreign borrowing, buthad to discourage short-term transactions after 1970 under an IMF standby 
agreement.
There is little evidence that reliance on foreign aid was inordinate. Be­
cause aid receipts were usually grants, especially in the early 1960s, they
cost Korea little while yielding high rates of return. it is true that many of
the grants may have discouraged domestic savings, but at the time, SouthKorea was desperately poor and needed the additional resources both for 
consumption and investment. 
tcPrivit SavgsL 
Although foreign capitzl sparked the growth of the South Korean ccon­
omy, domcstic savings eventually sustained it. In 1960 domestic savings
financed only about 20 percent of total gross investment. By 1972 this pro­portion had risen to about 75 percent (see Table 7-4).
Business savings (in constant 1970 prices) grew rather slowly after theKorean War, but since 1957, they increased quite rapidly, at an average rate
of 11.8 percent per year between 1957 and 1972 (Table 11-4). As we
showed in Chapter 8, business savings are moderately responsive to interest 
rates. The elasticity of business savings is 0.34 although the interest rate is
still statistically a significant determinant of business savings (see equation(8-15) in Chapter 8), A more significant factor in business savings, however,
is nonagricultural value added. As value added and profits increase, business
savings tend to increase (there are no reliable profit data; nonagricultural
value added might serve as a proxy). The elasticity of business savings with 
respect to nonagricultural value added was 0.67 between 1960 and 1970.As Table 11-4 shows, household savings have been very erratic, being
very sensitive to both the rate of inflation and the interest rate on time de­
posits (see equation (8-14) in Chapter 8). Household savings were sub­
stantial while prices were rtable during the late 1950s and even greater in
the latter '60s after the interest rate reform of September 1965 had raised
the rates. During periods of low interest rates and high inflation, ikz the
early 1960s, household savings were very low and at times quite negative.
At 1.82, household savings were much more elastic than business sav­ings from 1955 to 1970 and they were also quite elastic with respect to the 
rate of inflation. 
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TABLE 11-4
 
Isms. Osui 5mhp, IUJ w 1972 
(billios of won, constant 1970 pices) 
G)vcrnment Busineu Houshold 
Year Savings Savings Savings Total 
1953 19.47 39.30 -15.09 43.61 
1954 4.67 44.13 36.93 15.73 
1955 10.65 4032 30.40 81.37 
1956 52.47 40.56 8.77 101.80 
1957 41.95 45.38 12.05 99.38 
1958 39.43 52.58 22.42 114.43 
1959 36.08 62.06 21.16 119.30 
1960 54.63 59.91 0.55 I 15.09 
1961 66.33 68.69 5.1X 140.21) 
1962 67.03 88.29 0.59 155.91 
1963 66.41 96.77 -17.50 145.68 
1964 71.50 96.07 -18.02 149.55 
1965 94.38 119.24 72.62 236.24 
1966 103.48 128.57 80.65 312.70 
1967 128.33 145.39 83.37 357.59 
1968 174.90 161.81 86.24 422.95 
1969 183.98 174.89 115.34 474.21 
1970 206.43 182.85 92.67 481.95 
1971 190.45 191.82 49.36 431.63 
1972 132.69 241.24 99.73 473.66 
NOTE: The estim;ates of savings include savings from transfers from 
abroad. Household savings include errors and omissions and exclude 
grain inventory changes. 
Sountc.: Table 8 -I IA. 
Govemmeid Savkngs. 
Government savings and business savings have been about equally impor­
tant in total savings since the Korean War (Table 11-4). Between 1953 and 
1970, government savings grew quite rapidly, at an average annual rate of 
15.7 percent. The growth was most substantial, however, after the 1964 tax 
reforms. From 1964 to 1970 government savings increased at a rate of 20.6 
percent per annum. 
Government savings multiplied both because of rapid growth in tax 
revenues and because of a slow rate of iacrease in current expenditures. Tax 
revenues rose sharply during the Korean War recovery, from about 5 percent 
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of GNP in 1953 to more than 10 percent in 1959. By 1964, however, they
had declined to 7.3 percent. After the 1964 tax reorms, revenues reached a 
peak of more than 16 percent of GNP in 1971 before declining slightly in 
1972.1' In addition, government monopolies contributed rapidly growing
net surpluses which constituted almost I I percent of central government 
revenues in 1972.1 
Government current expenditures grew less rapidly than total govern­
ment revenues from 1962 to 1970, when current expenditures declined from 
78 percent of current revenues to about 62 percent. Between 197G . 1972, 
current expendiltires rose more rapidly than revenues. Much of the govern­
ment nonrecurrent expenditures went to directly productive assets. Between 
1963 and 1971, about 14 percent of total government loans and investments 
went into mining and manufacturing, 39 percent into electricity, transport,
and communications, and 25 percent into agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.' ' 
The remainder was invested in housing, education, and other services. Some 
government savings were channeled to the private sector through government­
financed loan funds of development banking institutions such as the Korean 
Development Bank and the Medium Industry Bank. In 1963, government
funds accounted for more than onc-half of all outstanding loans of the bank­
ing sector. After the interest rate reform of 1965, the commercial banks greatly
expanded their loan portfolios, but even in 1970, government funds accounted 
for more than one-quarter of total outstanding loans by banking institutions.13 
In 1972, about one-sixth of total government savings was allocated to capital 
transfers of this type. II 
SUPPLY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
One of the most striking features of the South Korean economy has been the 
rapid growth of foreign exchange earnings. Foreign exchange receipts on cur­
rent account grew at an average annual rate of 26.2 perccnt between 1963 and 
1972 (Table 11-5). 
Invhl Earnh 
In the early 1960s, a high proportion of total foreign exchange receipts 
were invisibles and derived directly from the presence of a large contingent of 
UN (mostly U.S.) foro.s stationed in South Korea. Sales of local currency to 
UN forces, military procurement, and provision of electricity, transport, water,
and other public utilities to UN installations accounted for almost one-half of, 
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TABLE 1I-5
 
FmIP EXIAMWe Receips "sCWme Ae i, 19611 1972
 
(millions of dollars) 
Foreign Exchange Receipts Receipts front UN ,Forces 
Mer- Other and from U.S. Procurement 
chandise Current Won Pro-
Year Total Exports Receipts Total Sa es curement Utilities 
1961 166.2 42.6 123.6 79.7 35.7 38.4 5.6 
1962 179.0 56.7 122.3 86.1 47.2 34.1 4.8 
1963 . 177.2 85.2 91.8 58.3 30.5 22.1 5.7 
1964 212.2 115.1 97.1 63.7 26.4 33.2 4.1 
1965 298.0 172.2 125.8 74.0 34.1 35.7 4.2 
1966 486.8 248.4 238.4 100.9 30.4 65.5 5.0 
1967 695.4 320.2 375.2 147.1 35.3 106.7 5.1 
1968 889.4 464.9 424.5 177.6 49.3 122.3 6.0 
1969 1,102.0 604.9 497.1 207.0 43.1 155.7 8.2 
1970 1,306.7 816.0 490.7 190.8 52.3 131.4 7.1 
1971 1,523.4 1,036.8 486.6 173.5 61.3 106.0 6.2 
1972 2,159.2 1,580.0 579.2 192.8 97.6 90.6 4.6 
SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, p. 216; 1970, p. 282; 
Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1972, p. 406. 
a. These figures understate total receipts because they only include transactions con­
ducted through banking channels. For example, in 1971 export receipts totaled $1.132 
million according to customs clearance.. 
and total inv~sibles about three-quarters of, all foreign exchange earnings in 
1961. Receipts from UN forces and other invisibles were relatively tagnant 
between 1961 and 1965, however, so that by 1965 they accounted for about 
one-third of total earnings. The escalation of the U.S., effort in Viet Nam 
after 1965 brought more troops to South Korea and an increase in military 
procurement, both for troops in South Korea and for those in Viet Nam. 
South Korean goods were exported to Viet Nam under military procurement 
contracts beginning in 1967 and a number of Korean construction firms be­
came involved in military projects in South Viet Nam. Receipts from UN 
forces increased rapidly between 1965 and 1969, but other foreign exchange 
receipts grew even more quickly. After 1969, receipts from UN forces de­
clined, and by 1971, only 36 percent of invisible earnings and 11 percent of 
total foreign exchange receipts could be attributed to U.S. military procure­
ment and other earnings generated by the presence of UN forces in South 
Korea. 
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The major reason for the very rapid growth in foreign exchange earnings 
was the growth of exports. As we indicated in Chapter 6 exports in the 1950s 
were negligible and followed an erratic pattern, ranging from a high of $40 
million in 1953 to a low of $17 million in 1958 (Table 6-1). After 1958 ex­
ports began a pattern of uninterrupted growth, exceeding the 1953 level by 
1961. From 1962 until 1973, the growth rate of exports averaged 44.8 per­
cent per annum every year and reached a high of 98 percent in 1973. Exports 
increased from less than one-third of total current foreign exchange receipts, 
about one-eighth of the total value of imports in 1962, to three-quarters or 
all current foreign exchange receipts and almost 65 percent of the value of 
imports in 1972. 
In Chapter 6, we noted that exports of South Korea are relatively import 
intensive so that the net foreign exchange earnings are substantially less than 
the gross earnings. Even if a correction is made for this fact, the ratio of ex­
ports to GNP and the rate of growth of exports are exceptionally high by 
international standards. 
The reasons for the rapid growth of exports are somewhat elusive. Ac­
tually exports grew rapidly from a very low level in 1958. But prior to 1964, 
our cconometrie analysis in Chapter 6 indicated that neither exchange rates 
nor export subsidies could explain the growth -of exports. In 1964, the ex­
change rate was unified and the sensitivity of exports to exchange rates and 
subsidies increased markedly. The estimated elasticity of exports with respect 
to the purchasing-power-parity official exchange rate was 6.16 and the esti­
mated elasticity with respect to subsidies is 4.69. These very high elasticities, 
iiowever, are suspect because of the limited time period and the few degrees 
of freedom. Nevertheless, recent experience confirms the impression that 
Korean exports are highly sensitive to the exchange rate (the latest year for 
which data were used in the econometric work reported in chapters 6 and 8 
was 1970). The purchasing-power-parity exchange rate adjusted for realign­
ments in Japanese and European currency revaluations against the dollar, 
increased about 10 percent in 1972 and another 10 percent in 1973 (Table 
5-7). This was the result of a float of the won in the first half of 1972, the 
dollar devaluation in early 1972 and 1973, and the float of other currencies 
against the dollar. Exports increased 52 percent in 1972 and 98 percent in 
1973. 
The increased sensitivity of exports to exchange rates and subsidies may 
be due to the unification of exchange rates and the relative stability of the 
purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rate from 1964 to 1970. The 
elimination of multiple rates removes the uncertainties and administrative costs 
to the private entrepreneur in dealing with an unstable, multiple rate system. 
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The rapid growth of South Korea's exports cannot be explained simplyin terms of those incentives subject to quantitative measurement. Other very
important factors, perhaps even more important, are the government's atti­
tudes and methods of operating. For example, government officials use moral 
and political suasion to urge private entrepreneurs to meet export targets.
Firms who are successful in promoting exports receive favorable treatmentby tax officials, an important incentive in a country where effective tax rates 
are set more by administrative procedures than by law. Entrepreneurs who 
are successful exporters are publicly acclaimed and feted by the President 
and other high officials. 
With an atmosphere in which businessmen awe certain that government
will reward efforts to export, it is relatively easy to take the substantial risks 
of expanding production and capacity markets.for export A businessman 
cannot only expect tangible rewards for export performance, but knows thatif he runs into financial difficulties, the government will provide some form of 
special treatment to help him out of his troubles. 
Earnings on Capital Account. 
The other major sources of foreign exchange were on capital account. 
Official grant aid plus net capital inflows were many times greater than 
export earnings for some time after the Korean War. Capital imports reached $373 million or almost twenty times the level of exports in 1957 (Table 11-6).By 1964, export earnings exceeded capital account earnings for the first time
since the Korean War. The growth of foreign borrowing in the latter 1960s,
however, exceeded the growth of exports so that until 1969, capital imports
exceeded export earnings. In 1970, restrictions on capital imports again re­
duced them below the level of exports. By 1972, exports were three times as 
large as capital imports. 
DEMAND FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
Gold and foreign exchange holdings of South Korea have been relatively ample
compared with total imports. In 1960 they were more than 50 percent of the
total import bill. Despite the rapid growth of the economy from 1963 to 1972,
end-of-the-year foreign exchange reserves were never less than one-quarter
of the annual import bill ant were as high as 37 percent of imports in 1964,
the year of the exchange iate reforms (Table 11 -6).
During the same period, substantial liberalization of the import regime
took place. The average tariff level declined and quantitative restrictions were 
much less important than before 1963. The demand for imports was held in 
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TABLE 11-6 
CA9IWAeeu.d Tvumdlm adn Feip Eaebin HuIkg% 
1"3ft 1972 
Ratio of Gold fnd Foreign 
Net Loan Net Net CapitalImports Exchange Holdingsb 
Year 
Official Capital 
Grant Aid Inflows, 
(S million) (S million) 
Capital 
Imports 
($million) 
to Mer-
chandise 
Exports ($million) 
Percent 
of 
Imports 
1953 193 112 305 7.62 109 -
1954 139 28 167 6.96 108 -
1955 
1956 
1957 
240 
298 
355 
-.3 
14 
18 
237 
312 
373 
13.17 
12.48 
19.58 
96 
99 
116 
29 
26 
30 
1958 
1959 
319 
229 
-7 
-17 
312 
212 
18.35 
10.60 
146 
147 
42 
54 
1960 256 -1 255 7.28 157 51 
1961 207 19 226 5.51 207 73 
1962 200 -16 184 3.35 169 43 
1963 208 -104 204 2.34 131 26 
1964 141 -26 115 .97, 136 37 
1965 135 9 134 .­7 146 35 
1966 
1967 
122 
135 
218 
299 
340 
334 
1.36 
1.00 
245 
356 
36 
39 
1968 121 422 543 1.10 391 30 
1969 104 631 735 1.12 553 34 
1970 85 582 667 .76 610 34 
1971 64 662 726 .64 568 27 
1972 51 530 581 .35 740 33 
SouRcE: Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 222-223 and 
various issues prior to 1973. 
a.Loan capital, both private and government, short term and long term, net of 
amortization payments. 
b. Includes reserve position in IMF and special drawing rights. 
check, mainly by exchange rate policy. The large devaluation of 1964 raised 
the effective exchange rate on imports from 207.39 won to the dollar on a 
purchasing-power-parity basis in 1963 to 283.79 won to the dollar in 1965 
(Table 11-7). From 1965 to 1970, although the average effective rate de­
clined, it remained higher than at any time during the earlier period 1955 to 
1963--except for 1961 when there was a sharp devaluation. 
Imports into South Korea are very sensitive to exchange rate changes. 
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TABLE 1I-7
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Boll, mad Groolh of Impart, 1"S b 1970 
Purchasing­
Power-Parity 
Official Tariffs and Effective Growth 
Exchange Tariff Exchange Rate kate of 
Ratea Equivalents, on Imports' Imports Imports 
Year (won/dollar) (won/dollar) (won/dollar) (S million) (percent) 
1955 99.71 11.67 111.38 327 ­
1956 132.10 10.43 142.53 380 16.2 
1957 118.12 12.74 130.86 390 2.6 
1958 121.80 28.42 150.22 344 -11.8 
1959 I19.73 65.84 185.57 273 -20.6
 
1960 135.37 64.86 200.23 305 11.7 
1961 244.79 34.42 279.21 283 -7.2 
1962 226.57 28.39 254.96 390 37.8 
1963 189.32 18.07 207.39 497 27.4 
1964 232.22 23.35 255.57 365 -26.6 
1965 265.40 28.39 283.79 420 15.1 
1966 256.34 23.40 279.74 680 61.9 
1967 243. 12 23.48 266.60 909 33.7 
1968 233.30 22.62 255.92 1,322 45.4 
1969 234.53 20.60 255.13 1,650 24.8 
1970 240.21 20.29 260.50 1,804 9.3 
SouRcE: Tables 8-10C and 8- 11 B. 
a. The first three columns are won/dollar rates dcflated by a purchasing-power-parity 
index, and represent averages over the year. The third column is the sum of the first two 
columns. 
This is vividly illustrated by even a cursory look at the data in Table 11-7. 
In 1958 and 1959, imports dropped sharply, cvcn though GNP grew at 5.5 
and 4.4 percent in those years. In 1958, there was no devaluation of the offi­
cial exchange rate, but a foreign exchange tax was instituted and a price
stabilization program implemented, both of which raised the effective exchange 
rate on imports (on a purchasing-power-parity basis) about 15 percent. The 
imposition of the foreign exchange tax was equivalent to a dcvaluation for 
imports. Imports fell by 12 percent in 1958. Part of the reduction in imports 
was due to a fall in grain imports as domestic grain production increased 
sharply, but imports of consumer goods fell by 25 percent and imports of 
capital and intermediate goods were also reduced. In 1959, foreign exchange 
236 AN OVERVIEW 
tax receipts quadrupled and the effective exchange rate was increased by
another 23 percent. Imports fell by 21 percent. Although Fain imports con­tinued to fall, consumption goods imports fell by almost 50 percent and inter­
aaediate goods by almost 10 pereent."5
In January and February of 1961 a large devaluation reduced the value
of the won from 65 to 130 won to the dollar. Grain imports increased by 50percent, but imports of consumer and intermediate goods imports were sharply
reduced. The net result was a 7 percent decline in total imports even though
GNP grew 4.2 percent.
In 1964, there was a very sharp reduction in imports of 27 percent. The
official exchange rate was devalued almost 50 percent. The growth of GNP 
was 8.3 percent, but there were very substantial reductions in nearly all cate­gories of imports, including a 50 percent decrease in consumer goods imports.The evidence of the sensitivity of imports to exchange rates iscorrobo­
rated by the regression analysis described in Chapter 8. The regressions whichdealt with imports of consumption goods, capital goods, and intermediate goods, were stable regardless of the time period used. Linear regressions pro­
vided very good fits. The elasticities of imports with respect to the official 
exchange rate (ORD) and the level of tariffs and tariff equivalents on imports(SUBM) are shown in Table 11-8. 
Consumption goods are by far the most elastic with respect to changes
in exchange rates and tariffs. Imports of capital and inter;nediate goods arcgenerally less than unit elastic with respect to the exchange rate, but imports
of intermediate goods are fairly sensitive to changes in tariff rates. Since the 
supply of imports to Korea is probably close to infinitely elastic, it can be
assumed that exchange rate changes have a powerful effect in reducing the 
dollar value of imports. 
In the late 1960s, the demand for foreign exrhange was augmented bythe need to service foreign debt. Beginning in 1970 attempts were made to
restrict the import of foreign capital. By 1971, debt service payments reached$326.6 million on debt of maturity greater than one year. But debt service payments were still only a small fraction of the total use of foreign exchange
before 1971. 
South Korea succeeded in restraining the demand for foreign exchangeduring the period of rapid growth from 1963 to 1972. A less developed econ­
omy, growing at more than 10 percent per annum, can be expected to run
short of foreign exchange because of the rising demands for imports. Although
imports rose rapidly through much of this period, import growth would havebeen much greater had it not been for frequent devaluations and maintenance
of the purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rate for imports at a con­
stant level. Furthermore, the stable exchange rate helped stimulate export
receipts, which were used to finance an increasingly large share of the total 
import bill. 
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TABLE 1I-8 
Elaimdky of Imped, Varim,. Puim 
Commercial 
Import 
Variables 
Policy 
Variable , (dependent (explanatory Time Period 
variable) variable) 1955-59 1960-64 1965-70 1955-70 
Imports of Effective ex- -2.09 -5.48 -1.43 -2.11 
consumption 
goods (MC) 
change rate 
on imports 
(ORD &SUBl) 
Imports of Official ex- -0.86 -0.99 -0.21 -0.36 
capihl change rate 
goods (MK) (ORD) 
/O'ffcial -0.57 -0.80 -0.33 -0.47 
Imports ofinemedisof exchangeate "(ORD) 
goods (MI) )Tariffs and 
tariff equiv­
-0.97 -1.36 -0.57 -0.79 
\alents (SUBM) 
NoTE: Elasticities based on regression equations (8-24), (8-25), and (8-26) in Chapter 8,and computed at the means of the variables. 
a.In constant 1965 prices. 
b. Purchasing-power-parity basis. 
Although South Korean economic policies favored high effective ex­
change rates, especially for exports, these policies caused some loss in govern­
ment revenues and savings. As our analysis in Chapter 9 indicated, less sub­
sidization of exports and higher taxes on imports could have generated some­
what more growth. Nevertheless, the Korean performance was unusually good
compared with the records of other less developed countries. 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
There is no conclusive way tr determine whether the Korean economy has 
operated efficiently. Because the various empirical methods used in the litera­
ture all have their faults, caution is necessary in discussing measures of effi­
ciency. It is clear, however, that in Korea inefficiency has not been sufficient to 
stifle very rapid growth over the decade beginning in 1963. Furthermore, most 
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of the conventional measures analyzed in Chapter 10 suggest a low level of 
inefficiency. 
Prior to the 1964 exchange rate unification and liberalizing reforms, the 
system of exchange rates and trade policy probably did foster inefficiency.
Quantitative restrictions were very important and the exchange rates were 
various and widely divergent.
Since 1964, however, the government has followed different policies. Al­
though liberalizing trends have waxed and waned, the fluctuations have been 
minor, never approaching the chaos of the late 1950s. 
In Chapter 10, we analyzed the restrictiveness of the trade policy and 
exchange rate regime in 1968. We saw that in Korea the average level of 
nominal protection is low. For manufacturing, the level of nominal protec­
tion estimated from information on comparative international and domestic 
prices was about 10.7 percent in 1968 and is probably much lower today be­
cause average tariff r:,els have steadily declined. Quantitative restrictions are 
not an important cause of large differences between international and domestic 
prices. The 77 commodity groups receiving significant protection throughquantitative restrictions in 1968 accounted for only II percent of total domes­
tic sales. 
Unlike many other countries, Korea does not maintain large differences 
in nominal protection between industry and agriculture. Average nominal 
protection was !6.6 percent for agriculture and 10.7 percent for manufac­
turing. General variability of protection among sectors is quite low. When the 
Korean economy is measured in constant international prices rather than 
constant domestic prices, the total and scctoral rate%of growth do not differ 
significantly. Emphasis on export promotion has led to rapid growth in the 
most labor-intensive sectors. 
The observations made in Chapter 10 suggest an efficient pattern of 
growth. Such inefficiencies that do arise stem from the protection of agricul­
ture and import-competing manufactures. The effective subsidy in 1968 to 
agriculture was 21.3 percent (Corden definition) and to manufacturing -4.7 
percent. Effective protection is also much higher for import-competing indus­
tries than for export industries and for domestic sales than for export sales in 
industries that sell in both export and domestic markets. 
Policies that affect the incentive to import foreign capital can influence 
efficiency just as much as policies that affect exports and import substitutes. 
In Korea, the incentive to import short-term foreign capital during the 1960s 
was excessive. Domestic inflation, high real and nominal domestic interest 
rates, and a failure to devalue smoothly and adequately all contributed to an 
exaggerated demand for foreign loan capital.
Policies governing credit, interest rates, pricing, the subsidization and 
management of government enterprises, and taxation also bear on efficiency.16 
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Only partial ulowMce was made for thee policies in our estimates of effc 
tive subsidy. It is clear, however, when they are taken into account, that bod 
the total and the variability of effective subsidies increase. 
ROLE OF THE LIBERALIZATION EPISODES 
The major liberalization efforts in Korea took place in 1964 and 1965. Earlien 
attempts in 1961 and 1962 that had failed of full implementation prompted 
a return to the multiple exchange rate system in 1963. 
There is no dear correlation between the liberalization of 1964-65 and
the start of rapid growth. In fact, mining and manufacturing output, which 
had grown 14.1 percent in 1962 (constant 1970 prices), a-d 15.7 percent in
1963, registered a gain of only 6.9 percent in the first year of liberalization. 
Only a poor harvest made 1962 a bad year and only an excellent harvest 
made 1964 a good one (Table 2-4). The satisfactory performance of 1962
and 1963 was largely the result of expansionary fiscal policies whereas indus­
trial performance suffered in 1964, despite liberalization, because fiscal and 
monetary stabilization were rigidly enforced. 
Nor was the devaluation of 1964 associated with a sudden upsurge of 
exports. Having touched bottom in 1958, exports grew without interruption
from 1959 on. 
The main argument in defense of liberalization is that it laid the basisfor a decade of sustained growth, whereas fiscal and monetary policies were
responsible for brief deviations from a propensity for substantial real growth.
It might also be argued that liberalization itself was less important as a direct 
influence on the economy than it was as the harbinger of 'a new approach to 
exchange rates and trade policy that favored rapid growth.
Since liberalization, the effective exchange rates on exports and importshave remained high (somewhat higher for exports than for imports--see Table 
5-10) while foreign exchange has never become a severe constraint on growth.
The devaluation of 1964 was followcd by many others over the next eight or
nine years, both floating devaluations and discontinuous changes in the value 
of the won. Exchange rates had great effect on export perfi..rnance, particu­larly after the reforms of 1964, and as Chapter 6 demonstrates, the growth of 
exports has been the dominant factor in the growth of the economy as a whole. 
We conclude, therefore, that the unification of the exchange rates and the
stability of the effective exchange rate were powerful stimuli to subsequent 
growth. 
By contrast, the interest rate reform of September 1965 was probably of 
more intrinsic importance in its effect on the rate of growth. Tin interest rate
reform greatly encouraged household savings which having been negative in 
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1964 became about one-quarter of total domestic savinlp in 1969. Business
savinp, which had been neary stagnant from 1962 to 1964, more thandoubled between 1964 and 1970. Even more important than this boost for
savings was the effect of the interest rate reform on incentives to hold assets 
in different forms. Commercial bank time deposits became the more favored 
way to hold savinp; the increase in commercial bank deposits far exceededthe increase in total savings.'? Most loanable funds were controlled by the
commercial banks. Though some of their lending was done at subsidized 
interest rates, thus encouraging inefficient use of resources, the commercialbanks could lend in much greater volume than the unorganized money markets
and operate with much lower overhead. The cost to large borrowers was al!;o
much lower if they borrowed from the commercial banks instead of from a 
myriad of small operators in the unorganized money market. 
The reforms of August 1972 took a different tack. After 1965, no serious
effort had been made to reduce the rate of inflation. Rather, high nominalinterest rates and frequent devaluations were supposed to compensate for rapidinflation. With the reforms of 1972, low nominal interest rates, stability of the
exchange rate, and less rapid price inflation were to be the basic elements ofpolicy. According to McKinnon (1973), there arc important flaws in this newpolicy. A major factor in increasing the money supply in Korea is the discount
of export bills at very low rates of discount and low rates of interest on thebills themselves to exporters. The low rate of interest on the bills increases
exporters' demand for this form of credit and the even lower discount rate 
encourages commercial banks to discount the bills at the Bank of Korea, thusincreasing commercial bank reserves. In fact, in the first six months of 1973,
the discount of export bills exceeded the increase in commercial bank reserves,the other sources of reserve creation having undergone a net decline. Because
of the discount of export bills, which has become the main source of reserve
creation, the Bank of Korea has lost effective control of the money supply.Under such conditions, it is unlikely that inflation can be held within reason­
able bounds. Added to the inflationary difficulties is the rapid increase inprices of petroleum products and grains, both of which Korea imports in large
amounts. The success of the new policies in the long run, however, will depend 
on finding ways to bring the money supply back under control. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Korean experience over the decade since 1963, remarkable as it seems tohave been, does not necessarily provide a model for other less developed
countries. There have been a number of special factors operating which are 
not likely to be replicated in other countries. It was the confluence of those 
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factors, no one of them separately, that led to successful growth. First, abun­dant foreign assistance, particularly during reconstruction after the Korean 
War, helped build the infrastructural base for subsequent growth, although theperiods of high levels of foreign aid are not coterminous with the periods of 
most rapid growth. Only a few other countries, having special relationships
with the United States because of U.S. foreign policy objectives, received as 
much per capita foreign aid. 
Second, Korea was able to maintain high and growing levels of govern­
ment savings. Rates of taxation and public enterprise profits rose sharply whilethe growth of current expenditures remained moderate. Probably such a per­formance is only possible in countries where political leaders are powerful and 
secure. In many less developed countries political power is fragmented, thepolitical process is highly competitive, and ethnic and regional differences are 
acute. Policy-makers in such circumstances arc unlikely to be able to control 
revenues and expenditures to the necessary degree. To maintain themselves 
in power, they must use government expenditures as a means of gaining the 
support of particular interest groups. Public enterprises are rarely profitable
because staffing them becomes a form of dispensing political patronage and top management posts are filled according to political criteria. Costs are high
and productivity low. Prices tend to be kept unrealistically low for fear ofinjuring powerful interest groups by allowing prices to rise. Higher rates oftaxation yield returns only if they are accompanied by greater expenditures
contrived for the benefit of particular interest gr'oups.
Third, frequent devaluations, either of the discontinuous type or of thegliding peg variety, arc seldom feasible where resistance is intense. Discon­tinuous devaluations typically raise prices sharply for many imported goods,particularly for nonluxuries which had not been subject to stringent import
contrr ". Consumer groups and industrial end-users who would suffer in con­
sequence may resist efforts to devalue. Even gliding devaluations, which raiseprices of imported goods more gradually, are not always popular. When theAllende regime came to power in Chile, it abolished the gliding exchange rate
and fixed the foreign-exchange value of the domestic curccy, partly because
the gliding peg was politically unpopular. Even Korea abandoned the glidingpeg in 1972 because considerab!e resistance to devi.uations had gathered 
among a wide variety of industrialists. Many Korean firms had accumulatedlarge foreign debts and were financially precarious. Continuous t:,valuationsincreased the amount of their Jollar-spcified liabilities in terms of won. Otherfirms producing mainly for the domestic market saw the costs of importedinputs rising and joined the resistance. Exporters, always favored by subsidies 
of various sorts as well as by frequent devaluations, have not organized an
effective counterforce, possibly because they feel they can always count on
enough subsidization to make up for losses caused by a failure to devalue. 
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Fourth, government policies toward labor in Korea prevented real wages
from rising except in response to labor shotages in the late 1960s. This af­
fected growth in two ways. Profit rates and returns to capital were high. stimu­
lating high levels of investment. Wage disparities did not arise among sectors;
labor was efficiently allocated among sectors; and there were no large and 
growing pools of wasted labor in the form of unemployed workers. On the 
contrary, unemployment rates declined throughout much of the 1960s. 
The lack of pressure from organized labor in South Korea ispartly his­
torical accident. During industrialization under the Japanese, labor organiza­
tions were suppressed and suppression has continued to the present day. In 
many other less developed countries, organized labor ispowerful and political 
regimes are dependent on it for support. The demands of labor cannot be 
ignored in such circumstances and it would be foolish of the government to 
insist that wages be set by market forces. 
Fifth. South Korea underwent a thoroughgoing land reform first under 
the U.S. military government and later under an indigenous Korean govern­
ment. Japanese landowners were expropriated and the subsequent redistribu­
tion of land was evenhanded. This meant that no large numbers of landless 
laborers streamed ipto the cities in response to slight differences in urban and 
rural wage rates. No doubt workers migrated from country to city, but they
did not overburden the system, since there were more jobs available in the 
cities than there were migrants to fill them, as the decline in urban unemploy­
ment rates reveals. The even distribution of land also meant that the organiza­
tion of agricultural production could easily be made labor intensive. The 
result was an efficient usc. of resources where land and capital were scz rce and 
labor superabundant. 
A land reform like South Korea's is not easily duplicated in other coun­
tries. Large landholdings, which were in the hands of one group of foreigners,
the Japanese, were expropriated initially by another group of foreigners, the 
Americans. But when an indigenous government attempts to expropriate land 
from major landholders who are politically powetful, the reforms are not 
likely to be so sweeping. 
Sixth, Korean culture places a very high value on education. Since parents 
ar willing to spend large amounts of their own funds for the education of 
their children, they support a vigorous system of high-quality private schools 
throughout the country. Thus, even though public expenditures on education 
in Korea are low by international standards, South Korea's literacy rate is one 
of the highest in the world. Korea also has a very high proportion Of secondary
school and university graduates. Because this large investment in human capi­
tal did not require a commensurate public expenditure, more public resources 
could he channeled instead into economic overheads and directly productive 
investments. 
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These special factors am lacking in many less developed countries and the
combination of any number of them is rare imleed. Taiwan is the only lessdeveloped society where strong similarities to Korea are found. 
These special factors, however, are not sufficient in themselves to cxplaindie success of the South Korean economy. Economic policies made an im­portant contribution: tax and government expenditure reforms, the interest
rate reforms, the exchange rate reforms, and the general emphasis on exportpromotion and reliance on international prices were some of the most critical.There is some evidence that export promotion was a bit overdone-greater
reliance on tariffs particularly as a source of revenue may have generated
slightly more growth-but the bias toward exports was far preferable to a
strong bias in favor of import substitution. The export bias allowed ellicientindustries to establish themselves without being limited in size UP)ihe domestic
market. The export bias led to an increasingly open economy and generated agrowing share of the foreign exchange that lessened the economy's dependence
on foreign capital imports. The subsidization of exports led to some inefficient 
resource allocation but did not result in the saine distortion of incentives whichis often the result of import substitution. Quotas imports or prohibitiveon 
tariffs can distort the structure of product prices much 
more than the instru­
ments typically used to promote exports. Exports arc subsidized by tax exemp­tions and rebates, subsidization of credit, and subsidization of inputs. Theeffect of these instruments on costs and prices is limited. For example, incometax exemptions can be applied only if a firm is profitable and only to the
extent that profits are made. Subsidized electricity and transportation ratestypically affect only a small proportion of costs. In theory a direct export
subsidy could be made to have as large a distorting effect as any tariff orimport quota. In fact, direct subsidies have rarely been used. There has alwaysbeen a reluctance to use direct subsidies, partly because they must be appropri­
ated as a specific government expenditure ,ind the effect on the budget is obvi­
ous and direct. A tax exemption, however, does not appear directly in thebudget either as an expenditure or as negative revenue. An import 'luota has 
no obvious impact on the government budget. An import tariff except whenprohibitive makes a positive contribution to revenue. 
Unfortunate:y, South Korea's economic gains have been accompanied by
a great deal of political repression. Labor unions have been very much dis­
couraged, and there exist many cases of employer abuse of unskilled workers,
reminiscent of nineteenth century sweitshops in Western nations. The SouthKorean experience does illustrate, however, the effectiveness of price-ori­
ented economic policies in initiating and sustaining rapid economic growth.The poor performance in the area of human rights and in the labor policy istempered by a favorable performance in terms of income distribution and theexistence of many benevolently paternalistic employers. The relevance of the 
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Korean experience to other less developed economies, however, isquestionable 
at best because it was probably the combination of political, historical, and 
cultural circumstance found only in South Korea that made these policies 
succeed. In other circumstances they might not work. 
NOTES 
I. See Chenery. Duloy, and Jolly (1973), Chapter 2. 
2. Economic Planning Board, Major Economic Indicators, May 1972, pp. 18-89. 
Farm wages are reported in terms of a drily wage rate. To get monthly earnings, the 
daily wage rate was multiplied by 23. 
3. Bank of Korea, Economic tatiscs Yearbook, various issues. 
4. Average total farm household income is from Ministry of Agriculture and For­
estry, Report on the Results ol Farm Economy Survey and Production Cost Survey of 
Agricultural Products (1972). Average total farm household income is divided by 2.22 
workers per household in 196,4 2.05 workers per household in 1968, and 1.98 workers 
in 1971. These figures were estimated from the farm labor force estimates in Table 11-2 
and the total number of farm households in Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Year­
book. 1973. p. 104. Manufacturing wages are from p. 254 of the same publication. 
S. Brown (1973), p.205. 
6. Literacy rate for population aged 13 and over from Economic Planning Board, 
"Briefing Materials to the President," June II, 1973. 
7. Ministry of Education, Statistical Yearbook of Education, 1970, pp. 138-139. 
1. Major Economic Indicators, 1961-1971, Seoul. Economic Planning Board. May 
1972, p. I1. 
9. See Cole and Lyman (1971). 
10. Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbock, 1973, pp. 258-259 and 288-289. 
II. Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 290-291. 
12. Economic Planning Board, Major Economic Indicators, 1961-1971, p .33. 
13. Ibid., p. 35. 
14. Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics Yearbook. 1973, pp. 283-289. 
15. For data on grain imports and the breakdown of imports into consumption 
goods, capital goods, and intermediate goods, see Table 8-10C and definitions and sources 
in Table t-8. 
16. See Brown (1973) for an analysis of the efficiency aspects of a number of these 
policies. 
17. Commercial bank deposits increased from 28 billion won in 1964 to 636 bil­
lion won in 1971; time and savings deposits increased from 9 to 467 billion won over the 
same period. See Major Economic Indicators, 1961-1971, p. 35. 
Appendix A 
Delineatio of Phases 
DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS USED IN THE PROJECT 
Exchaqe Rates. 
I. Nominal exchange rate: The official parity for a transaction. For
countries maintaining a single exchange rate registered with the International 
Monetary Fund, the nominal exchangc rate is the registered rate.' 
2. Effective exchange rate (EER): The number of units of local cur­
rency actually paid or received for a one-dollar international transaction. Sur­
charges, tariffs, the implicit interest foregone on guarantee deposits, and any
other charges against purchases of goods and services abroad are included, as 
are rebates, the value of import replenishment rights, and other incentives to 
earn foreign exchange for sales of goods and services abroad. 
3. Price-level-deflated (PLD) nominal exchange rates: The nominal ex­
change rate deflated in relation to some base period by the price level index 
of the country. 
4. Price-level-deflated EER (PLD-EER): The EER deflated by the 
price level index of the country.
5. Purchasing-power-parity adjusted exchange rates: The relevant (nom­inal or effective) exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the foreign price
level to the domestic price level.2 
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I. Gross devaluation: The change in the parity registered with the IMF (or, synonymously inmost cases, de jure devaluation).
2. Net devaluation: The weighted average of changes in EERs by
classes of transactions (or, synonymously in most cases, de facto devalua­
tion).
3. Real gross devaluation: The gross devaluation adjusted for the in­
crease in the domestic price level over the relevant period.
4. Real net devaluation: The net devaluation similarly adjusted. 
Preis Coueq. 
I. Explicit tarifl: The amount of tariff charged against the import of a good as a percentage of the import price (in local currency at the nominal 
exchange rate) of the good.3 
2. Implicit tariff (or, synonymously, tariff equivalent): The ratio of the 
domestic price (net of normal distribution costs) minus the c.i.f. import price
to the c.i.f. import price in local currency.'
3. I'remiumn: The windfall profit accruing to the recipient of an importlicense per dollar of imports. It is the difference between the domestic selling
price (net of normal distribution costs) and the landed cost of the item (in­
cluding tariffs and other charges). The premium is thus the difference between 
the implicit and the explicit tariff (including other charges) multiplied by the 
nominal exchange rate.:' 
4. Nominal tarifl: The tariff--either explicit or implicit as specified­
on a commodity.
5. Effective tarill: The explicit or implicit tariff on value added as dis­tinct from the nominal tariff on a commodity. This concept is also expressed
as the effective rate of protection (ERP) or as the effective protective rate (EPR).
6. Domestic resources costs (DRC): The value of domestic resources (evaluated at "shadow" or opportunity cost prices) employed in !arning or
saving a dollar of foreign exchange (in the value-added sense) when produc­
ing domestic goods. 
DELINEATION OF PHASES INUSED TRACING THE 
EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES 
To achieve comparability of analysis among different countries, each author
of a country study was asked to identify the chronol'gical development of his 
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country's payments regime through the following phase. There was no pre­sumption that a country would necessarily pass through all the phases in
chronological sequence.
Phase 1: During this period, quantitative restrictions on internationaltransactions are imposed and then intensified. They generally arr initiated inresponse to an unsustainable payments deficit and then, for a period, are in­tensified. During the period when reliance upon quantitative restrictions as ameans of controlling the balance of payments is increasing, the country is saidto be in Phase 1. 
Phase I1: During this phase, quantitative restrictions arc still intense, butvarious price measures are taken to offset sonic of the undesired results of thesystem. Heightened tariffs, surcharges on imports, rebates for exports, specialtourist exchange rates, and other price interventions arc used in this phase.However, primary reliance continues to be placed on quantitative restrictions.Phase III: This phase is characterized by an attempt to systematize thechanges which take place during Phase If. It generally starts with a formalexchange-rate change and may be accompanied by removal of some of thesurcharges, etc., imposed during Phase 11and by reduced reliance upon quan­titative restrictions. Phase Ill may be little more than a tidying-up operation(in which case the likelihood is that the country will re-enter Phase II), or itmay signal the beginning of withdrawal from reliance upon quantitative re­
strictions. 
Phase IIV: If the changes in Phase Ill result in adjustments within thecountry, so that liberalization can continue, the country is said to enter PhaseIV. The necessary adjustments generally include increased foreign-exchangeearnings and gradual relaxation of quantitative restrictions. The latter relaxa­tion may take the form of changes in the nature of quantitative restrictionsor of increased foreign-exchange allocations, and thus reduced premiums, un­der the same administrative system.
Phase V: This is a period during which an exchange regime is fully lib­eralized. There is full convertibility on current account, and quantitative re­strictions are 
not employed as a means of regulating the cx ante balance of 
payments. 
NOTES 
I. In this volume the term official exchange rate is used more frequently thannominal exchange rate.
2. The terms used in this volume have more frequently been the purchasing.power.parity efective exchange rate and the official 'xchange rate on a purchasing-powerparity 
batrh. 
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3. In this volwe Ow tem legal arif rather than explicittari has been used. 
4. Nonlu tedf raterather than implicit tarifl rate is used in this volume. 
S. See he Iwo pre~ding footnotes referring to the terms explicit tarifi and implicitforiff, 
Adelman, Irma, ed. Practical Approaches it) Development Phnning: Korea's 
Second Five-Year Plan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. 
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Balassa, Bela, and Schydlowsky, D. -Effective Tarilfs, )omestic Cost of For­
cign Exchjge, and the Equilibrium lExchange Rate." Journal of 1uliti
cal Economy 7 (1968): 348-360. 
Balassa, Bela, ct al. Deveiopimnent Strategies in Seni-Industrialized Countries. 
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